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From: mark.rutland@arm.com (Mark Rutland)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH v3 3/7] arm64: Introduce uaccess_{disable,enable} functionality based on TTBR0_EL1
Date: Wed, 14 Sep 2016 09:52:29 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160914085159.GA13121@leverpostej> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jJETdRtuonhtkSxMf+sgCdBj2t2_U8yW2cDwcoGY=qvJw@mail.gmail.com>

On Tue, Sep 13, 2016 at 01:45:21PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 13, 2016 at 10:46 AM, Catalin Marinas
> > +static inline bool system_uses_ttbr0_pan(void)
> > +{
> > +       return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN) &&
> > +               !cpus_have_cap(ARM64_HAS_PAN);
> > +}
> > +

[...]

> >  #define __uaccess_enable(alt)                                          \
> >  do {                                                                   \
> > -       asm(ALTERNATIVE("nop", SET_PSTATE_PAN(0), alt,                  \
> > -                       CONFIG_ARM64_PAN));                             \
> > +       if (system_uses_ttbr0_pan())                                    \
> > +               uaccess_ttbr0_enable();                                 \
> > +       else                                                            \
> > +               asm(ALTERNATIVE("nop", SET_PSTATE_PAN(0), alt,          \
> > +                               CONFIG_ARM64_PAN));                     \
> >  } while (0)
> 
> Does this mean that with CONFIG_ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN, even with ARMv8.1,
> a cpu capability bitmask check is done each time we go through
> __uaccess_{en,dis}able?

Catalin reworked cpus_have_cap() to use static keys [1], and that's
queued in the arm64 for-next/core branch [2].

So this should expand to a single branch or nop that we patch when we
detect the presence/absence of PAN. There should be no bitmap check.

Thanks,
Mark.

[1] http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/linux-arm-kernel/2016-September/454025.html
[2] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux.git/log/?h=for-next/core

  reply	other threads:[~2016-09-14  8:52 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-09-13 17:46 [PATCH v3 0/7] arm64: Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching Catalin Marinas
2016-09-13 17:46 ` [PATCH v3 1/7] arm64: Factor out PAN enabling/disabling into separate uaccess_* macros Catalin Marinas
2016-09-15 15:10   ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-13 17:46 ` [PATCH v3 2/7] arm64: Factor out TTBR0_EL1 post-update workaround into a specific asm macro Catalin Marinas
2016-09-15 15:19   ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-13 17:46 ` [PATCH v3 3/7] arm64: Introduce uaccess_{disable, enable} functionality based on TTBR0_EL1 Catalin Marinas
2016-09-13 20:45   ` [PATCH v3 3/7] arm64: Introduce uaccess_{disable,enable} " Kees Cook
2016-09-14  8:52     ` Mark Rutland [this message]
2016-09-14 16:27       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-09-13 17:46 ` [PATCH v3 4/7] arm64: Disable TTBR0_EL1 during normal kernel execution Catalin Marinas
2016-09-14 16:45   ` Will Deacon
2016-09-13 17:46 ` [PATCH v3 5/7] arm64: Handle faults caused by inadvertent user access with PAN enabled Catalin Marinas
2016-09-16 11:33   ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-16 15:55     ` Catalin Marinas
2016-09-13 17:46 ` [PATCH v3 6/7] arm64: xen: Enable user access before a privcmd hvc call Catalin Marinas
2016-09-13 17:46 ` [PATCH v3 7/7] arm64: Enable CONFIG_ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN Catalin Marinas
2016-09-14 10:13 ` [PATCH v3 0/7] arm64: Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching Ard Biesheuvel
2016-09-14 10:27   ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-14 10:30     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-09-14 10:36       ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-14 10:48         ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-14 20:54 ` [kernel-hardening] " David Brown
2016-09-15  9:52   ` Catalin Marinas
2016-09-15 16:20 ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-15 16:41   ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-29 22:44   ` [kernel-hardening] " Sami Tolvanen
2016-09-30 18:42     ` Kees Cook
2016-10-27 14:54       ` Catalin Marinas
2016-10-27 21:23         ` Kees Cook
2016-10-14 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-10-15 14:35   ` Catalin Marinas
2016-10-16  2:04     ` Kees Cook

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