From: lukas@wunner.de (Lukas Wunner)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH 5/8] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #5]
Date: Fri, 9 Dec 2016 01:35:27 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161209003527.GA9062@wunner.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <14655.1481218273@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
On Thu, Dec 08, 2016 at 05:31:13PM +0000, David Howells wrote:
> Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> wrote:
> > > +out_efi_err:
> > > + pr_efi_err(sys_table_arg, "Could not determine UEFI Secure Boot status.\n");
> > > + if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
> > > + return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
> > > + return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown;
> > > +}
> >
> > In the out_efi_err path, the if-statement needs to come before the
> > pr_efi_err() call. Otherwise it would be a change of behaviour for
> > ARM to what we have now.
>
> As I understand it, if the BIOS is an EFI BIOS, these variables must exist -
> in which case I would argue that the pr_efi_err-statement should be before
> the if-statement.
The existing efi_get_secureboot() in arm-stub.c returns 0 in the
EFI_NOT_FOUND case and the "Could not determine ..." error is only
printed if the return value is < 0. So you're introducing a change
of behaviour.
If you feel the change is justified, fine, I won't argue against it
since I don't have a dog in this fight.
But obviously it's something that a reader of your patch will trip over,
so@least explain it in the commit message. It would also be good to
explain why you're moving the pr_efi_err() calls in the first place.
ISTR it has to do with the different interpretation of an error,
what I wrote in my previous e-mail: x86 defaults to considering secureboot
disabled on error, ARM to enabled. I'm not even sure that's correct,
I'd have to go re-read the whole thread, which again shows that there's
too little documentation in the commit message.
Thanks,
Lukas
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-12-09 0:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-12-07 13:18 [PATCH 0/8] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel [ver #5] David Howells
2016-12-07 13:18 ` [PATCH 1/8] efi: use typed function pointers for runtime services table " David Howells
2016-12-07 13:18 ` [PATCH 2/8] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services " David Howells
2016-12-07 13:18 ` [PATCH 3/8] arm/efi: " David Howells
2016-12-07 13:18 ` [PATCH 4/8] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions " David Howells
2016-12-07 13:18 ` [PATCH 5/8] efi: Get the secure boot status " David Howells
2016-12-08 6:57 ` Lukas Wunner
2016-12-08 8:16 ` David Howells
2016-12-08 12:42 ` Lukas Wunner
2016-12-08 17:31 ` David Howells
2016-12-09 0:35 ` Lukas Wunner [this message]
2016-12-07 13:18 ` [PATCH 6/8] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode " David Howells
2016-12-07 13:18 ` [PATCH 7/8] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit " David Howells
2016-12-07 13:19 ` [PATCH 8/8] efi: Handle secure boot from UEFI-2.6 " David Howells
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