From: matt@codeblueprint.co.uk (Matt Fleming)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH 5/8] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #6]
Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2017 14:33:04 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170111143304.GA29649@codeblueprint.co.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <148120024570.5854.10638278395097394138.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
On Thu, 08 Dec, at 12:30:45PM, David Howells wrote:
> Get the firmware's secure-boot status in the kernel boot wrapper and stash
> it somewhere that the main kernel image can find.
>
> The efi_get_secureboot() function is extracted from the arm stub and (a)
> generalised so that it can be called from x86 and (b) made to use
> efi_call_runtime() so that it can be run in mixed-mode.
>
> Suggested-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> ---
>
> Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt | 2 +
> arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 2 +
> arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S | 1
> arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S | 1
> arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam_utils.h | 5 +-
> arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h | 3 +
> arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 1
> drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile | 2 -
> drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c | 63 +++--------------------------
> drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c | 63 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> include/linux/efi.h | 8 ++++
> 11 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 61 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
[...]
> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S
> index d85b9625e836..c635f7e32f5c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S
> @@ -61,6 +61,7 @@
>
> __HEAD
> ENTRY(startup_32)
> + movb $0, BP_secure_boot(%esi)
> #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_STUB
> jmp preferred_addr
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
> index beab8322f72a..ccd2c7461b7f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
> @@ -244,6 +244,7 @@ ENTRY(startup_64)
> * that maps our entire kernel(text+data+bss+brk), zero page
> * and command line.
> */
> + movb $0, BP_secure_boot(%rsi)
> #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_STUB
> /*
> * The entry point for the PE/COFF executable is efi_pe_entry, so
Is clearing ::secure_boot really necessary? Any code path that goes
via efi_main() will set it correctly and all other code paths should
get it cleared in sanitize_boot_params(), no?
> diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
> index c7904556d7a8..92e23f03045e 100644
> --- a/include/linux/efi.h
> +++ b/include/linux/efi.h
> @@ -1477,6 +1477,14 @@ efi_status_t efi_setup_gop(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,
> bool efi_runtime_disabled(void);
> extern void efi_call_virt_check_flags(unsigned long flags, const char *call);
>
> +enum efi_secureboot_mode {
> + efi_secureboot_mode_unset,
> + efi_secureboot_mode_unknown,
> + efi_secureboot_mode_disabled,
> + efi_secureboot_mode_enabled,
> +};
> +enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table);
> +
> /*
> * Arch code can implement the following three template macros, avoiding
> * reptition for the void/non-void return cases of {__,}efi_call_virt():
>
What's the distinction between the unset and unknown enums?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-01-11 14:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-12-08 12:30 [PATCH 0/8] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel [ver #6] David Howells
2016-12-08 12:30 ` [PATCH 1/8] efi: use typed function pointers for runtime services table " David Howells
2016-12-08 12:30 ` [PATCH 2/8] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services " David Howells
2016-12-08 12:30 ` [PATCH 3/8] arm/efi: " David Howells
2016-12-08 12:30 ` [PATCH 4/8] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions " David Howells
2016-12-08 12:30 ` [PATCH 5/8] efi: Get the secure boot status " David Howells
2017-01-11 14:33 ` Matt Fleming [this message]
2017-01-11 15:27 ` David Howells
2017-01-16 14:49 ` Matt Fleming
2017-01-16 15:39 ` David Howells
2017-01-23 21:26 ` Matt Fleming
2017-01-23 22:11 ` David Howells
2017-01-27 14:01 ` Matt Fleming
[not found] ` <25118.1485778229@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
2017-01-30 13:50 ` What should the default lockdown mode be if the bootloader sentinel triggers sanitization? Matt Fleming
2017-01-30 14:01 ` David Howells
2017-01-31 11:57 ` Matt Fleming
2017-01-31 14:02 ` [PATCH 5/8] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #6] David Howells
2017-01-23 10:52 ` David Howells
2016-12-08 12:30 ` [PATCH 6/8] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode " David Howells
2016-12-08 12:31 ` [PATCH 7/8] efi: Handle secure boot from UEFI-2.6 " David Howells
2016-12-08 12:31 ` [PATCH 8/8] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit " David Howells
2017-01-11 14:51 ` Matt Fleming
2017-01-11 15:29 ` David Howells
2017-01-16 13:40 ` Matt Fleming
2017-01-16 15:40 ` David Howells
2017-01-11 15:01 ` [PATCH 0/8] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel " Matt Fleming
2017-01-11 15:05 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-01-24 17:15 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-01-27 18:03 ` Ard Biesheuvel
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