From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: mark.rutland@arm.com (Mark Rutland) Date: Tue, 14 Feb 2017 17:54:05 +0000 Subject: [PATCH v2 4/5] arm64: mmu: map .text as read-only from the outset In-Reply-To: <42A48E4E-EF3C-4F28-A660-AFEBB238B698@linaro.org> References: <1486844586-26135-1-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> <1486844586-26135-5-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> <20170214155704.GE23718@leverpostej> <651D9CBB-3E64-41CE-BF85-D2FF0CB927B7@linaro.org> <20170214174029.GJ23718@leverpostej> <42A48E4E-EF3C-4F28-A660-AFEBB238B698@linaro.org> Message-ID: <20170214175405.GL23718@leverpostej> To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org List-Id: linux-arm-kernel.lists.infradead.org On Tue, Feb 14, 2017 at 05:49:19PM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: > > > On 14 Feb 2017, at 17:40, Mark Rutland wrote: > > > >> On Tue, Feb 14, 2017 at 04:15:11PM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: > >> Having trivial 'off' switches for security features makes me feel > >> uneasy (although this is orthogonal to this patch) > > > > From my PoV, external debuggers are the sole reason to allow rodata=off > > for arm64, and we already allow rodata=off. > > > > > > Indeed. If that is how it works currently, we shouldn't interfere with > it. If we ever get anywhere with the lockdown patches, we should > blacklist this parameter (or rather, not whitelist it, since > blacklisting kernel params to enforce security is infeasible imo) Agreed on all counts! Mark.