From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: riel@redhat.com (riel at redhat.com) Date: Wed, 24 May 2017 11:57:48 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 2/5] fork, random: use get_random_canary to set tsk->stack_canary In-Reply-To: <20170524155751.424-1-riel@redhat.com> References: <20170524155751.424-1-riel@redhat.com> Message-ID: <20170524155751.424-3-riel@redhat.com> To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org List-Id: linux-arm-kernel.lists.infradead.org From: Rik van Riel Use the ascii-armor canary to prevent unterminated C string overflows from being able to successfully overwrite the canary, even if they somehow obtain the canary value. Inspired by execshield ascii-armor and Daniel Micay's linux-hardened tree. Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel --- kernel/fork.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index aa1076c5e4a9..b3591e9250a8 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -560,7 +560,7 @@ static struct task_struct *dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *orig, int node) set_task_stack_end_magic(tsk); #ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR - tsk->stack_canary = get_random_long(); + tsk->stack_canary = get_random_canary(); #endif /* -- 2.9.3