From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: will.deacon@arm.com (Will Deacon) Date: Wed, 22 Nov 2017 19:37:14 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 00/18] arm64: Unmap the kernel whilst running in userspace (KAISER) In-Reply-To: <20171122161913.GB12684@amd> References: <1510942921-12564-1-git-send-email-will.deacon@arm.com> <20171122161913.GB12684@amd> Message-ID: <20171122193713.GL22648@arm.com> To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org List-Id: linux-arm-kernel.lists.infradead.org On Wed, Nov 22, 2017 at 05:19:14PM +0100, Pavel Machek wrote: > > This patch series implements something along the lines of KAISER for arm64: > > > > https://gruss.cc/files/kaiser.pdf > > > > although I wrote this from scratch because the paper has some funny > > assumptions about how the architecture works. There is a patch series > > in review for x86, which follows a similar approach: > > > > http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<20171110193058.BECA7D88@viggo.jf.intel.com> > > > > and the topic was recently covered by LWN (currently subscriber-only): > > > > https://lwn.net/Articles/738975/ > > > > The basic idea is that transitions to and from userspace are proxied > > through a trampoline page which is mapped into a separate page table and > > can switch the full kernel mapping in and out on exception entry and > > exit respectively. This is a valuable defence against various KASLR and > > timing attacks, particularly as the trampoline page is at a fixed virtual > > address and therefore the kernel text can be randomized > > independently. > > If I'm willing to do timing attacks to defeat KASLR... what prevents > me from using CPU caches to do that? Is that a rhetorical question? If not, then I'm probably not the best person to answer it. All I'm doing here is protecting against a class of attacks on kaslr that make use of the TLB/page-table walker to determine where the kernel is mapped. > There was blackhat talk about exactly that IIRC... Got a link? I'd be interested to see how the idea works in case there's an orthogonal defence against it. Will