From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk (Alan Cox) Date: Thu, 7 Dec 2017 14:26:57 +0000 Subject: [RFC v3 PATCH 0/2] Introduce Security Version to EFI Stub In-Reply-To: <20171205100148.5757-1-glin@suse.com> References: <20171205100148.5757-1-glin@suse.com> Message-ID: <20171207142657.52e1363a@alans-desktop> To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org List-Id: linux-arm-kernel.lists.infradead.org On Tue, 5 Dec 2017 18:01:46 +0800 Gary Lin wrote: > The series of patches introduce Security Version to EFI stub. > > Security Version is a monotonically increasing number and designed to > prevent the user from loading an insecure kernel accidentally. The > bootloader maintains a list of security versions corresponding to > different distributions. After fixing a critical vulnerability, the > distribution kernel maintainer bumps the "version", and the bootloader > updates the list automatically. This seems a mindbogglingly complicated way to implement something you could do with a trivial script in the package that updates the list of iffy kernels and when generating the new grub.conf puts them in a menu of 'old insecure' kernels. Why do you even need this in the EFI stub ? What happens if you want to invalidate an old kernel but not push a new one ? Today if you've got a package that maintains the list of 'iffy' kernels you can push a tiny package, under your scheme you've got to push new kernels which is an un-necessary and high risk OS change. It just feels like an attempt to solve the problem in completely the wrong place. Alan