[RFC PATCH v3 0/3] arm64/kernel: get rid of GCC large model code

[RFC PATCH v3 0/3] arm64/kernel: get rid of GCC large model code

[Ard Biesheuvel]

Hi all,

I am resending this as an RFC, because I'd like to understand whether
anyone else shares my concern, or whether I am being overly paranoid.

v2 blurb:

GCC's large model uses literal pools to emit cross object symbol
references rather than movz/movk sequences, resulting in data items
mixed in the with executable code in modules' .text segments, reducing
cache utilization, but also potentially resulting in the creation of
code gadgets that are exploitable under speculative execution.

We are using GCC's large model for two separate reasons, both of which can
be worked around rather easily:
- KASLR uses it to move modules and the kernel very far apart, which is
  not really needed,
- the Cortex-A53 erratum code uses it to avoid ADRP instruction altogether,
  which can be replaced by selective patching of only the ADRP instructions
  that are affected by the erratum

Ard Biesheuvel (3):
  arm64/kernel: kaslr: reduce module randomization range to 4 GB
  arm64/kernel: don't ban ADRP to work around Cortex-A53 erratum #843419
  arm64/kernel: enable A53 erratum #8434319 handling at runtime

 arch/arm64/Kconfig                  | 18 ++---
 arch/arm64/Makefile                 |  5 --
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h    |  3 +-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/module.h     |  2 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c      | 26 +++++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/kaslr.c           | 20 +++--
 arch/arm64/kernel/module-plts.c     | 77 +++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/arm64/kernel/module.c          | 40 ++++++++--
 arch/arm64/kernel/reloc_test_core.c |  4 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/reloc_test_syms.S | 12 ++-
 include/linux/sizes.h               |  2 +
 11 files changed, 171 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)

-- 
2.11.0

[RFC PATCH v3 1/3] arm64/kernel: kaslr: reduce module randomization range to 4 GB

[Ard Biesheuvel]

We currently have to rely on the GCC large code model for KASLR for
two distinct but related reasons:
- if we enable full randomization, modules will be loaded very far away
  from the core kernel, where they are out of range for ADRP instructions,
- even without full randomization, the fact that the 128 MB module region
  is now no longer fully reserved for kernel modules means that there is
  a very low likelihood that the normal bottom-up allocation of other
  vmalloc regions may collide, and use up the range for other things.

Large model code is suboptimal, given that each symbol reference involves
a literal load that goes through the D-cache, reducing cache utilization.
But more importantly, literals are not instructions but part of .text
nonetheless, and hence mapped with executable permissions.

So let's get rid of our dependency on the large model for KASLR, by:
- reducing the full randomization range to 4 GB, thereby ensuring that
  ADRP references between modules and the kernel are always in range,
- reduce the spillover range to 4 GB as well, so that we fallback to a
  region that is still guaranteed to be in range
- move the randomization window of the core kernel to the middle of the
  VMALLOC space

Note that KASAN always uses the module region outside of the vmalloc space,
so keep the kernel close to that if KASAN is enabled.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
 arch/arm64/Kconfig         |  7 +++----
 arch/arm64/kernel/kaslr.c  | 20 ++++++++++++--------
 arch/arm64/kernel/module.c |  7 ++++---
 include/linux/sizes.h      |  2 ++
 4 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
index 7381eeb7ef8e..ae7d3d4c0bbe 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
@@ -1109,7 +1109,6 @@ config ARM64_MODULE_CMODEL_LARGE
 
 config ARM64_MODULE_PLTS
 	bool
-	select ARM64_MODULE_CMODEL_LARGE
 	select HAVE_MOD_ARCH_SPECIFIC
 
 config RELOCATABLE
@@ -1143,12 +1142,12 @@ config RANDOMIZE_BASE
 	  If unsure, say N.
 
 config RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL
-	bool "Randomize the module region independently from the core kernel"
+	bool "Randomize the module region over a 4 GB range"
 	depends on RANDOMIZE_BASE
 	default y
 	help
-	  Randomizes the location of the module region without considering the
-	  location of the core kernel. This way, it is impossible for modules
+	  Randomizes the location of the module region inside a 4 GB window
+	  covering the core kernel. This way, it is less likely for modules
 	  to leak information about the location of core kernel data structures
 	  but it does imply that function calls between modules and the core
 	  kernel will need to be resolved via veneers in the module PLT.
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/kaslr.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/kaslr.c
index 47080c49cc7e..17dbdb055314 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/kaslr.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/kaslr.c
@@ -117,13 +117,15 @@ u64 __init kaslr_early_init(u64 dt_phys)
 	/*
 	 * OK, so we are proceeding with KASLR enabled. Calculate a suitable
 	 * kernel image offset from the seed. Let's place the kernel in the
-	 * lower half of the VMALLOC area (VA_BITS - 2).
+	 * middle half of the VMALLOC area (VA_BITS - 2), and stay clear of
+	 * the lower and upper quarters to avoid colliding with other
+	 * allocations.
 	 * Even if we could randomize at page granularity for 16k and 64k pages,
 	 * let's always round to 2 MB so we don't interfere with the ability to
 	 * map using contiguous PTEs
 	 */
 	mask = ((1UL << (VA_BITS - 2)) - 1) & ~(SZ_2M - 1);
-	offset = seed & mask;
+	offset = BIT(VA_BITS - 3) + (seed & mask);
 
 	/* use the top 16 bits to randomize the linear region */
 	memstart_offset_seed = seed >> 48;
@@ -149,21 +151,23 @@ u64 __init kaslr_early_init(u64 dt_phys)
 		 * vmalloc region, since shadow memory is allocated for each
 		 * module at load time, whereas the vmalloc region is shadowed
 		 * by KASAN zero pages. So keep modules out of the vmalloc
-		 * region if KASAN is enabled.
+		 * region if KASAN is enabled, and put the kernel well within
+		 * 4 GB of the module region.
 		 */
-		return offset;
+		return offset % SZ_2G;
 
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL)) {
 		/*
-		 * Randomize the module region independently from the core
-		 * kernel. This prevents modules from leaking any information
+		 * Randomize the module region over a 4 GB window covering the
+		 * kernel. This reduces the risk of modules leaking information
 		 * about the address of the kernel itself, but results in
 		 * branches between modules and the core kernel that are
 		 * resolved via PLTs. (Branches between modules will be
 		 * resolved normally.)
 		 */
-		module_range = VMALLOC_END - VMALLOC_START - MODULES_VSIZE;
-		module_alloc_base = VMALLOC_START;
+		module_range = SZ_4G - (u64)(_end - _stext);
+		module_alloc_base = max((u64)_end + offset - SZ_4G,
+					(u64)MODULES_VADDR);
 	} else {
 		/*
 		 * Randomize the module region by setting module_alloc_base to
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/module.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/module.c
index f469e0435903..10c6ab9534e8 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/module.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/module.c
@@ -55,9 +55,10 @@ void *module_alloc(unsigned long size)
 		 * less likely that the module region gets exhausted, so we
 		 * can simply omit this fallback in that case.
 		 */
-		p = __vmalloc_node_range(size, MODULE_ALIGN, VMALLOC_START,
-				VMALLOC_END, GFP_KERNEL, PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC, 0,
-				NUMA_NO_NODE, __builtin_return_address(0));
+		p = __vmalloc_node_range(size, MODULE_ALIGN, module_alloc_base,
+				module_alloc_base + SZ_4G, GFP_KERNEL,
+				PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC, 0, NUMA_NO_NODE,
+				__builtin_return_address(0));
 
 	if (p && (kasan_module_alloc(p, size) < 0)) {
 		vfree(p);
diff --git a/include/linux/sizes.h b/include/linux/sizes.h
index ce3e8150c174..bc621db852d9 100644
--- a/include/linux/sizes.h
+++ b/include/linux/sizes.h
@@ -44,4 +44,6 @@
 #define SZ_1G				0x40000000
 #define SZ_2G				0x80000000
 
+#define SZ_4G				0x100000000ULL
+
 #endif /* __LINUX_SIZES_H__ */
-- 
2.11.0

[RFC PATCH v3 1/3] arm64/kernel: kaslr: reduce module randomization range to 4 GB

[Mark Rutland]

On Wed, Feb 14, 2018 at 11:36:43AM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> We currently have to rely on the GCC large code model for KASLR for
> two distinct but related reasons:
> - if we enable full randomization, modules will be loaded very far away
>   from the core kernel, where they are out of range for ADRP instructions,
> - even without full randomization, the fact that the 128 MB module region
>   is now no longer fully reserved for kernel modules means that there is
>   a very low likelihood that the normal bottom-up allocation of other
>   vmalloc regions may collide, and use up the range for other things.
> 
> Large model code is suboptimal, given that each symbol reference involves
> a literal load that goes through the D-cache, reducing cache utilization.
> But more importantly, literals are not instructions but part of .text
> nonetheless, and hence mapped with executable permissions.

I guess that means they pollute the I-caches, too?

How big a difference does this series make to .text size?

I don't really have a strong opinion here. IIRC the idea for randomizing
modules across the whole vmalloc space was to make it harder for module
bugs to leak "real" kernel addresses, but I don't know how much that's
likely to help in practice, and the performance / cache footprint wins
are enticing.

[...]

> @@ -149,21 +151,23 @@ u64 __init kaslr_early_init(u64 dt_phys)
>  		 * vmalloc region, since shadow memory is allocated for each
>  		 * module at load time, whereas the vmalloc region is shadowed
>  		 * by KASAN zero pages. So keep modules out of the vmalloc
> -		 * region if KASAN is enabled.
> +		 * region if KASAN is enabled, and put the kernel well within
> +		 * 4 GB of the module region.
>  		 */
> -		return offset;
> +		return offset % SZ_2G;

I wonder if we can do more here, taking the kernel size into account.

[...]

> diff --git a/include/linux/sizes.h b/include/linux/sizes.h
> index ce3e8150c174..bc621db852d9 100644
> --- a/include/linux/sizes.h
> +++ b/include/linux/sizes.h
> @@ -44,4 +44,6 @@
>  #define SZ_1G				0x40000000
>  #define SZ_2G				0x80000000
>  
> +#define SZ_4G				0x100000000ULL

Some asm includes <linux/sizes.h>, so it'd be nice for this to use
ULL().

Masahiro Yamada had patches moving that to <linux/const.h>.

Thanks,
Mark.

[RFC PATCH v3 1/3] arm64/kernel: kaslr: reduce module randomization range to 4 GB

[Ard Biesheuvel]

On 23 February 2018 at 17:00, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 14, 2018 at 11:36:43AM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>> We currently have to rely on the GCC large code model for KASLR for
>> two distinct but related reasons:
>> - if we enable full randomization, modules will be loaded very far away
>>   from the core kernel, where they are out of range for ADRP instructions,
>> - even without full randomization, the fact that the 128 MB module region
>>   is now no longer fully reserved for kernel modules means that there is
>>   a very low likelihood that the normal bottom-up allocation of other
>>   vmalloc regions may collide, and use up the range for other things.
>>
>> Large model code is suboptimal, given that each symbol reference involves
>> a literal load that goes through the D-cache, reducing cache utilization.
>> But more importantly, literals are not instructions but part of .text
>> nonetheless, and hence mapped with executable permissions.
>
> I guess that means they pollute the I-caches, too?
>

Yes.

> How big a difference does this series make to .text size?
>

I will add the numbers for a couple of sizable modules when I respin,
although i don't expect that aspect to be the most convincing.

> I don't really have a strong opinion here. IIRC the idea for randomizing
> modules across the whole vmalloc space was to make it harder for module
> bugs to leak "real" kernel addresses, but I don't know how much that's
> likely to help in practice, and the performance / cache footprint wins
> are enticing.
>

Yes. I think the important thing is that they are randomized
independently, and the additional entropy in the high order bits is
unlikely to make a huge difference imo.

When we added KASLR, the reason we enabled full module randomization
by default was to get coverage for the new PLT code, not because it is
deemed 'better' in some respect.

> [...]
>
>> @@ -149,21 +151,23 @@ u64 __init kaslr_early_init(u64 dt_phys)
>>                * vmalloc region, since shadow memory is allocated for each
>>                * module at load time, whereas the vmalloc region is shadowed
>>                * by KASAN zero pages. So keep modules out of the vmalloc
>> -              * region if KASAN is enabled.
>> +              * region if KASAN is enabled, and put the kernel well within
>> +              * 4 GB of the module region.
>>                */
>> -             return offset;
>> +             return offset % SZ_2G;
>
> I wonder if we can do more here, taking the kernel size into account.
>
> [...]
>

Not sure whether it matters tbh. To be honest, I think most KASAN
users turn KASLR off unless they are debugging some aspect of KASLR
itself (that's certainly how I use it)

>> diff --git a/include/linux/sizes.h b/include/linux/sizes.h
>> index ce3e8150c174..bc621db852d9 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/sizes.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/sizes.h
>> @@ -44,4 +44,6 @@
>>  #define SZ_1G                                0x40000000
>>  #define SZ_2G                                0x80000000
>>
>> +#define SZ_4G                                0x100000000ULL
>
> Some asm includes <linux/sizes.h>, so it'd be nice for this to use
> ULL().
>
> Masahiro Yamada had patches moving that to <linux/const.h>.
>

OK

[RFC PATCH v3 1/3] arm64/kernel: kaslr: reduce module randomization range to 4 GB

[Ard Biesheuvel]

On 23 February 2018 at 17:07, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote:
> On 23 February 2018 at 17:00, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> wrote:
>> On Wed, Feb 14, 2018 at 11:36:43AM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>>> We currently have to rely on the GCC large code model for KASLR for
>>> two distinct but related reasons:
>>> - if we enable full randomization, modules will be loaded very far away
>>>   from the core kernel, where they are out of range for ADRP instructions,
>>> - even without full randomization, the fact that the 128 MB module region
>>>   is now no longer fully reserved for kernel modules means that there is
>>>   a very low likelihood that the normal bottom-up allocation of other
>>>   vmalloc regions may collide, and use up the range for other things.
>>>
>>> Large model code is suboptimal, given that each symbol reference involves
>>> a literal load that goes through the D-cache, reducing cache utilization.
>>> But more importantly, literals are not instructions but part of .text
>>> nonetheless, and hence mapped with executable permissions.
>>
>> I guess that means they pollute the I-caches, too?
>>
>
> Yes.
>
>> How big a difference does this series make to .text size?
>>
>
> I will add the numbers for a couple of sizable modules when I respin,
> although i don't expect that aspect to be the most convincing.
>

For the record, this is what I get before and after for a widely used
fairly large module:

   text    data     bss     dec     hex filename
 317907    7004      16 324927   4f53f net/mac80211/mac80211.ko

   text    data     bss     dec     hex filename
 315603    7004      19 322626   4ec42 net/mac80211/mac80211.ko

This is large model vs small model with the stack protector in strong mode.

So while the size does decrease slightly, I think the reduced cache
footprint is a more important metric here, and I am not sure how to
measure that.

>> I don't really have a strong opinion here. IIRC the idea for randomizing
>> modules across the whole vmalloc space was to make it harder for module
>> bugs to leak "real" kernel addresses, but I don't know how much that's
>> likely to help in practice, and the performance / cache footprint wins
>> are enticing.
>>
>
> Yes. I think the important thing is that they are randomized
> independently, and the additional entropy in the high order bits is
> unlikely to make a huge difference imo.
>
> When we added KASLR, the reason we enabled full module randomization
> by default was to get coverage for the new PLT code, not because it is
> deemed 'better' in some respect.
>
>> [...]
>>
>>> @@ -149,21 +151,23 @@ u64 __init kaslr_early_init(u64 dt_phys)
>>>                * vmalloc region, since shadow memory is allocated for each
>>>                * module at load time, whereas the vmalloc region is shadowed
>>>                * by KASAN zero pages. So keep modules out of the vmalloc
>>> -              * region if KASAN is enabled.
>>> +              * region if KASAN is enabled, and put the kernel well within
>>> +              * 4 GB of the module region.
>>>                */
>>> -             return offset;
>>> +             return offset % SZ_2G;
>>
>> I wonder if we can do more here, taking the kernel size into account.
>>
>> [...]
>>
>
> Not sure whether it matters tbh. To be honest, I think most KASAN
> users turn KASLR off unless they are debugging some aspect of KASLR
> itself (that's certainly how I use it)
>
>>> diff --git a/include/linux/sizes.h b/include/linux/sizes.h
>>> index ce3e8150c174..bc621db852d9 100644
>>> --- a/include/linux/sizes.h
>>> +++ b/include/linux/sizes.h
>>> @@ -44,4 +44,6 @@
>>>  #define SZ_1G                                0x40000000
>>>  #define SZ_2G                                0x80000000
>>>
>>> +#define SZ_4G                                0x100000000ULL
>>
>> Some asm includes <linux/sizes.h>, so it'd be nice for this to use
>> ULL().
>>
>> Masahiro Yamada had patches moving that to <linux/const.h>.
>>
>
> OK

[RFC PATCH v3 2/3] arm64/kernel: don't ban ADRP to work around Cortex-A53 erratum #843419

[Ard Biesheuvel]

Working around Cortex-A53 erratum #843419 involves special handling of
ADRP instructions that end up in the last two instruction slots of a
4k page, or whose output register gets overwritten without having been
read. (Note that the latter instruction sequence is never emitted by
a properly functioning compiler)

Normally, this gets taken care of by the linker, which can spot such
sequences at final link time, and insert a veneer if the ADRP ends up
at a vulnerable offset. However, linux kernel modules are partially
linked ELF objects, and so there is no 'final link time' other than the
runtime loading of the module, at which time all the static relocations
are resolved.

For this reason, we have implemented the #843419 workaround for modules
by avoiding ADRP instructions altogether, by using the large C model,
and by passing -mpc-relative-literal-loads to recent versions of GCC
that may emit adrp/ldr pairs to perform literal loads. However, this
workaround forces us to keep literal data mixed with the instructions
in the executable .text segment, and literal data may inadvertently
turn into an exploitable speculative gadget depending on the relative
offsets of arbitrary symbols.

So let's reimplement this workaround in a way that allows us to switch
back to the small C model, and to drop the -mpc-relative-literal-loads
GCC switch, by patching affected ADRP instructions at runtime:
- ADRP instructions that do not appear at 4k relative offset 0xff8 or
  0xffc are ignored
- ADRP instructions that are within 1 MB of their target symbol are
  converted into ADR instructions
- remaining ADRP instructions are redirected via a veneer that performs
  the load using an unaffected movn/movk sequence.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
 arch/arm64/Kconfig                  | 11 ++-
 arch/arm64/Makefile                 |  5 --
 arch/arm64/include/asm/module.h     |  2 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/module-plts.c     | 76 +++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/arm64/kernel/module.c          | 32 ++++++++-
 arch/arm64/kernel/reloc_test_core.c |  4 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/reloc_test_syms.S | 12 +++-
 7 files changed, 120 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
index ae7d3d4c0bbe..1b11285cba36 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
@@ -455,12 +455,12 @@ config ARM64_ERRATUM_845719
 config ARM64_ERRATUM_843419
 	bool "Cortex-A53: 843419: A load or store might access an incorrect address"
 	default y
-	select ARM64_MODULE_CMODEL_LARGE if MODULES
+	select ARM64_MODULE_PLTS if MODULES
 	help
 	  This option links the kernel with '--fix-cortex-a53-843419' and
-	  builds modules using the large memory model in order to avoid the use
-	  of the ADRP instruction, which can cause a subsequent memory access
-	  to use an incorrect address on Cortex-A53 parts up to r0p4.
+	  enables PLT support to replace certain ADRP instructions, which can
+	  cause subsequent memory accesses to use an incorrect address on
+	  Cortex-A53 parts up to r0p4.
 
 	  If unsure, say Y.
 
@@ -1104,9 +1104,6 @@ config ARM64_SVE
 
 	  To enable use of this extension on CPUs that implement it, say Y.
 
-config ARM64_MODULE_CMODEL_LARGE
-	bool
-
 config ARM64_MODULE_PLTS
 	bool
 	select HAVE_MOD_ARCH_SPECIFIC
diff --git a/arch/arm64/Makefile b/arch/arm64/Makefile
index b481b4a7c011..811ad08c531d 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm64/Makefile
@@ -51,7 +51,6 @@ endif
 
 KBUILD_CFLAGS	+= -mgeneral-regs-only $(lseinstr) $(brokengasinst)
 KBUILD_CFLAGS	+= -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables
-KBUILD_CFLAGS	+= $(call cc-option, -mpc-relative-literal-loads)
 KBUILD_AFLAGS	+= $(lseinstr) $(brokengasinst)
 
 KBUILD_CFLAGS	+= $(call cc-option,-mabi=lp64)
@@ -77,10 +76,6 @@ endif
 
 CHECKFLAGS	+= -D__aarch64__ -m64
 
-ifeq ($(CONFIG_ARM64_MODULE_CMODEL_LARGE), y)
-KBUILD_CFLAGS_MODULE	+= -mcmodel=large
-endif
-
 ifeq ($(CONFIG_ARM64_MODULE_PLTS),y)
 KBUILD_LDFLAGS_MODULE	+= -T $(srctree)/arch/arm64/kernel/module.lds
 endif
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/module.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/module.h
index 4f766178fa6f..b6dbbe3123a9 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/module.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/module.h
@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ struct mod_arch_specific {
 u64 module_emit_plt_entry(struct module *mod, void *loc, const Elf64_Rela *rela,
 			  Elf64_Sym *sym);
 
+u64 module_emit_adrp_veneer(struct module *mod, void *loc, u64 val);
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE
 extern u64 module_alloc_base;
 #else
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/module-plts.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/module-plts.c
index ea640f92fe5a..93b808056cb4 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/module-plts.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/module-plts.c
@@ -41,6 +41,46 @@ u64 module_emit_plt_entry(struct module *mod, void *loc, const Elf64_Rela *rela,
 	return (u64)&plt[i];
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_843419
+u64 module_emit_adrp_veneer(struct module *mod, void *loc, u64 val)
+{
+	struct mod_plt_sec *pltsec = !in_init(mod, loc) ? &mod->arch.core :
+							  &mod->arch.init;
+	struct plt_entry *plt = (struct plt_entry *)pltsec->plt->sh_addr;
+	int i = pltsec->plt_num_entries++;
+	u32 mov0, mov1, mov2, br;
+	int rd;
+
+	BUG_ON(pltsec->plt_num_entries > pltsec->plt_max_entries);
+
+	/* get the destination register of the ADRP instruction */
+	rd = aarch64_insn_decode_register(AARCH64_INSN_REGTYPE_RD,
+					  le32_to_cpup((__le32 *)loc));
+
+	/* generate the veneer instructions */
+	mov0 = aarch64_insn_gen_movewide(rd, (u16)~val, 0,
+					 AARCH64_INSN_VARIANT_64BIT,
+					 AARCH64_INSN_MOVEWIDE_INVERSE);
+	mov1 = aarch64_insn_gen_movewide(rd, (u16)(val >> 16), 16,
+					 AARCH64_INSN_VARIANT_64BIT,
+					 AARCH64_INSN_MOVEWIDE_KEEP);
+	mov2 = aarch64_insn_gen_movewide(rd, (u16)(val >> 32), 32,
+					 AARCH64_INSN_VARIANT_64BIT,
+					 AARCH64_INSN_MOVEWIDE_KEEP);
+	br = aarch64_insn_gen_branch_imm((u64)&plt[i].br, (u64)loc + 4,
+					 AARCH64_INSN_BRANCH_NOLINK);
+
+	plt[i] = (struct plt_entry){
+			cpu_to_le32(mov0),
+			cpu_to_le32(mov1),
+			cpu_to_le32(mov2),
+			cpu_to_le32(br)
+		};
+
+	return (u64)&plt[i];
+}
+#endif
+
 #define cmp_3way(a,b)	((a) < (b) ? -1 : (a) > (b))
 
 static int cmp_rela(const void *a, const void *b)
@@ -68,16 +108,21 @@ static bool duplicate_rel(const Elf64_Rela *rela, int num)
 }
 
 static unsigned int count_plts(Elf64_Sym *syms, Elf64_Rela *rela, int num,
-			       Elf64_Word dstidx)
+			       Elf64_Word dstidx, Elf_Shdr *dstsec)
 {
 	unsigned int ret = 0;
 	Elf64_Sym *s;
 	int i;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+		u64 min_align;
+
 		switch (ELF64_R_TYPE(rela[i].r_info)) {
 		case R_AARCH64_JUMP26:
 		case R_AARCH64_CALL26:
+			if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE))
+				break;
+
 			/*
 			 * We only have to consider branch targets that resolve
 			 * to symbols that are defined in a different section.
@@ -109,6 +154,31 @@ static unsigned int count_plts(Elf64_Sym *syms, Elf64_Rela *rela, int num,
 			if (rela[i].r_addend != 0 || !duplicate_rel(rela, i))
 				ret++;
 			break;
+		case R_AARCH64_ADR_PREL_PG_HI21_NC:
+		case R_AARCH64_ADR_PREL_PG_HI21:
+			if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_843419))
+				break;
+
+			/*
+			 * Determine the minimal safe alignment for this ADRP
+			 * instruction: the section alignment at which it is
+			 * guaranteed not to appear at a vulnerable offset.
+			 */
+			min_align = 2 << ffz(rela[i].r_offset | 0x7);
+
+			/*
+			 * Allocate veneer space for each ADRP that may appear
+			 *@a vulnerable offset nonetheless. At relocation
+			 * time, some of these will remain unused since some
+			 * ADRP instructions can be patched to ADR instructions
+			 * instead.
+			 */
+			if (min_align > SZ_4K)
+				ret++;
+			else
+				dstsec->sh_addralign = max(dstsec->sh_addralign,
+							   min_align);
+			break;
 		}
 	}
 	return ret;
@@ -166,10 +236,10 @@ int module_frob_arch_sections(Elf_Ehdr *ehdr, Elf_Shdr *sechdrs,
 
 		if (strncmp(secstrings + dstsec->sh_name, ".init", 5) != 0)
 			core_plts += count_plts(syms, rels, numrels,
-						sechdrs[i].sh_info);
+						sechdrs[i].sh_info, dstsec);
 		else
 			init_plts += count_plts(syms, rels, numrels,
-						sechdrs[i].sh_info);
+						sechdrs[i].sh_info, dstsec);
 	}
 
 	mod->arch.core.plt->sh_type = SHT_NOBITS;
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/module.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/module.c
index 10c6ab9534e8..d1bbdffd1e6c 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/module.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/module.c
@@ -198,6 +198,32 @@ static int reloc_insn_imm(enum aarch64_reloc_op op, __le32 *place, u64 val,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static bool reloc_adrp_erratum_843419(struct module *mod, __le32 *place,
+				      u64 val)
+{
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_843419))
+		return false;
+
+	/* only ADRP instructions at the end of a 4k page are affected */
+	if (((u64)place & 0xfff) < 0xff8)
+		return false;
+
+	/* patch ADRP to ADR if it is in range */
+	if (!reloc_insn_imm(RELOC_OP_PREL, place, val & ~0xfff, 0, 21,
+			    AARCH64_INSN_IMM_ADR)) {
+		((u8 *)place)[3] &= 0x7f; /* clear opcode bit 31 */
+	} else {
+		u32 insn;
+
+		/* out of range for ADR -> emit a veneer */
+		val = module_emit_adrp_veneer(mod, place, val & ~0xfff);
+		insn = aarch64_insn_gen_branch_imm((u64)place, val,
+						   AARCH64_INSN_BRANCH_NOLINK);
+		*place = cpu_to_le32(insn);
+	}
+	return true;
+}
+
 int apply_relocate_add(Elf64_Shdr *sechdrs,
 		       const char *strtab,
 		       unsigned int symindex,
@@ -337,14 +363,16 @@ int apply_relocate_add(Elf64_Shdr *sechdrs,
 			ovf = reloc_insn_imm(RELOC_OP_PREL, loc, val, 0, 21,
 					     AARCH64_INSN_IMM_ADR);
 			break;
-#ifndef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_843419
 		case R_AARCH64_ADR_PREL_PG_HI21_NC:
 			overflow_check = false;
 		case R_AARCH64_ADR_PREL_PG_HI21:
+			ovf = 0;
+			if (reloc_adrp_erratum_843419(me, loc, val))
+				break;
+
 			ovf = reloc_insn_imm(RELOC_OP_PAGE, loc, val, 12, 21,
 					     AARCH64_INSN_IMM_ADR);
 			break;
-#endif
 		case R_AARCH64_ADD_ABS_LO12_NC:
 		case R_AARCH64_LDST8_ABS_LO12_NC:
 			overflow_check = false;
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/reloc_test_core.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/reloc_test_core.c
index c124752a8bd3..a70489c584c7 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/reloc_test_core.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/reloc_test_core.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ asmlinkage u64 absolute_data16(void);
 asmlinkage u64 signed_movw(void);
 asmlinkage u64 unsigned_movw(void);
 asmlinkage u64 relative_adrp(void);
+asmlinkage u64 relative_adrp_far(void);
 asmlinkage u64 relative_adr(void);
 asmlinkage u64 relative_data64(void);
 asmlinkage u64 relative_data32(void);
@@ -43,9 +44,8 @@ static struct {
 	{ "R_AARCH64_ABS16",		absolute_data16, UL(SYM16_ABS_VAL) },
 	{ "R_AARCH64_MOVW_SABS_Gn",	signed_movw, UL(SYM64_ABS_VAL) },
 	{ "R_AARCH64_MOVW_UABS_Gn",	unsigned_movw, UL(SYM64_ABS_VAL) },
-#ifndef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_843419
 	{ "R_AARCH64_ADR_PREL_PG_HI21",	relative_adrp, (u64)&sym64_rel },
-#endif
+	{ "R_AARCH64_ADR_PREL_PG_HI21",	relative_adrp_far, (u64)&printk },
 	{ "R_AARCH64_ADR_PREL_LO21",	relative_adr, (u64)&sym64_rel },
 	{ "R_AARCH64_PREL64",		relative_data64, (u64)&sym64_rel },
 	{ "R_AARCH64_PREL32",		relative_data32, (u64)&sym64_rel },
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/reloc_test_syms.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/reloc_test_syms.S
index e1edcefeb02d..f333b4b7880d 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/reloc_test_syms.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/reloc_test_syms.S
@@ -43,15 +43,21 @@ ENTRY(unsigned_movw)
 	ret
 ENDPROC(unsigned_movw)
 
-#ifndef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_843419
-
+	.align	12
+	.space	0xff8
 ENTRY(relative_adrp)
 	adrp	x0, sym64_rel
 	add	x0, x0, #:lo12:sym64_rel
 	ret
 ENDPROC(relative_adrp)
 
-#endif
+	.align	12
+	.space	0xffc
+ENTRY(relative_adrp_far)
+	adrp	x0, printk
+	add	x0, x0, #:lo12:printk
+	ret
+ENDPROC(relative_adrp_far)
 
 ENTRY(relative_adr)
 	adr	x0, sym64_rel
-- 
2.11.0

[RFC PATCH v3 2/3] arm64/kernel: don't ban ADRP to work around Cortex-A53 erratum #843419

[Mark Rutland]

On Wed, Feb 14, 2018 at 11:36:44AM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> +static bool reloc_adrp_erratum_843419(struct module *mod, __le32 *place,
> +				      u64 val)
> +{
> +	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_843419))
> +		return false;
> +
> +	/* only ADRP instructions at the end of a 4k page are affected */
> +	if (((u64)place & 0xfff) < 0xff8)
> +		return false;
> +
> +	/* patch ADRP to ADR if it is in range */
> +	if (!reloc_insn_imm(RELOC_OP_PREL, place, val & ~0xfff, 0, 21,
> +			    AARCH64_INSN_IMM_ADR)) {
> +		((u8 *)place)[3] &= 0x7f; /* clear opcode bit 31 */

That's a bit hideous, and broken for BE, I think.

Can we not construct the equivalent ADR using the usual insn code, and
insert it?

Thanks,
Mark.

[RFC PATCH v3 2/3] arm64/kernel: don't ban ADRP to work around Cortex-A53 erratum #843419

[Ard Biesheuvel]

On 23 February 2018 at 17:15, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 14, 2018 at 11:36:44AM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>> +static bool reloc_adrp_erratum_843419(struct module *mod, __le32 *place,
>> +                                   u64 val)
>> +{
>> +     if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_843419))
>> +             return false;
>> +
>> +     /* only ADRP instructions at the end of a 4k page are affected */
>> +     if (((u64)place & 0xfff) < 0xff8)
>> +             return false;
>> +
>> +     /* patch ADRP to ADR if it is in range */
>> +     if (!reloc_insn_imm(RELOC_OP_PREL, place, val & ~0xfff, 0, 21,
>> +                         AARCH64_INSN_IMM_ADR)) {
>> +             ((u8 *)place)[3] &= 0x7f; /* clear opcode bit 31 */
>
> That's a bit hideous, and broken for BE, I think.
>

Instructions are always LE

> Can we not construct the equivalent ADR using the usual insn code, and
> insert it?
>

Sure.

[RFC PATCH v3 2/3] arm64/kernel: don't ban ADRP to work around Cortex-A53 erratum #843419

[Mark Rutland]

On Fri, Feb 23, 2018 at 05:17:31PM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On 23 February 2018 at 17:15, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> wrote:
> > On Wed, Feb 14, 2018 at 11:36:44AM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> >> +static bool reloc_adrp_erratum_843419(struct module *mod, __le32 *place,
> >> +                                   u64 val)
> >> +{
> >> +     if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_843419))
> >> +             return false;
> >> +
> >> +     /* only ADRP instructions at the end of a 4k page are affected */
> >> +     if (((u64)place & 0xfff) < 0xff8)
> >> +             return false;
> >> +
> >> +     /* patch ADRP to ADR if it is in range */
> >> +     if (!reloc_insn_imm(RELOC_OP_PREL, place, val & ~0xfff, 0, 21,
> >> +                         AARCH64_INSN_IMM_ADR)) {
> >> +             ((u8 *)place)[3] &= 0x7f; /* clear opcode bit 31 */
> >
> > That's a bit hideous, and broken for BE, I think.
> 
> Instructions are always LE

Ugh; I forgot that single didn't have endianness. :(

> > Can we not construct the equivalent ADR using the usual insn code, and
> > insert it?
> 
> Sure.

Cheers!

Mark.

[RFC PATCH v3 2/3] arm64/kernel: don't ban ADRP to work around Cortex-A53 erratum #843419

[Ard Biesheuvel]

On 23 February 2018 at 17:25, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> wrote:
> On Fri, Feb 23, 2018 at 05:17:31PM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>> On 23 February 2018 at 17:15, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> wrote:
>> > On Wed, Feb 14, 2018 at 11:36:44AM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>> >> +static bool reloc_adrp_erratum_843419(struct module *mod, __le32 *place,
>> >> +                                   u64 val)
>> >> +{
>> >> +     if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_843419))
>> >> +             return false;
>> >> +
>> >> +     /* only ADRP instructions at the end of a 4k page are affected */
>> >> +     if (((u64)place & 0xfff) < 0xff8)
>> >> +             return false;
>> >> +
>> >> +     /* patch ADRP to ADR if it is in range */
>> >> +     if (!reloc_insn_imm(RELOC_OP_PREL, place, val & ~0xfff, 0, 21,
>> >> +                         AARCH64_INSN_IMM_ADR)) {
>> >> +             ((u8 *)place)[3] &= 0x7f; /* clear opcode bit 31 */
>> >
>> > That's a bit hideous, and broken for BE, I think.
>>
>> Instructions are always LE
>
> Ugh; I forgot that single didn't have endianness. :(
>
>> > Can we not construct the equivalent ADR using the usual insn code, and
>> > insert it?
>>
>> Sure.
>
> Cheers!
>

Umm, it appears we don't have any code to emit ADR or ADRP
instructions, and I am reluctant to add a bunch of routines that are
only ever used to flick a single opcode bit.

[RFC PATCH v3 2/3] arm64/kernel: don't ban ADRP to work around Cortex-A53 erratum #843419

[Mark Rutland]

On Sat, Feb 24, 2018 at 05:54:01PM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On 23 February 2018 at 17:25, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> wrote:
> > On Fri, Feb 23, 2018 at 05:17:31PM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> >> On 23 February 2018 at 17:15, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> wrote:
> >> > On Wed, Feb 14, 2018 at 11:36:44AM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:

> >> >> +     /* patch ADRP to ADR if it is in range */
> >> >> +     if (!reloc_insn_imm(RELOC_OP_PREL, place, val & ~0xfff, 0, 21,
> >> >> +                         AARCH64_INSN_IMM_ADR)) {
> >> >> +             ((u8 *)place)[3] &= 0x7f; /* clear opcode bit 31 */

> >> > Can we not construct the equivalent ADR using the usual insn code, and
> >> > insert it?
> >>
> >> Sure.
> >
> > Cheers!
> 
> Umm, it appears we don't have any code to emit ADR or ADRP
> instructions, and I am reluctant to add a bunch of routines that are
> only ever used to flick a single opcode bit.

Fair enough.

Mark.

[RFC PATCH v3 2/3] arm64/kernel: don't ban ADRP to work around Cortex-A53 erratum #843419

[Will Deacon]

On Wed, Feb 14, 2018 at 11:36:44AM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> Working around Cortex-A53 erratum #843419 involves special handling of
> ADRP instructions that end up in the last two instruction slots of a
> 4k page, or whose output register gets overwritten without having been
> read. (Note that the latter instruction sequence is never emitted by
> a properly functioning compiler)

Does the workaround currently implemented in the linker also make this
same assumption? If not, I'm a little wary that we're making an assumption
about compiler behaviour with no way to detect whether its been violated or
not.

> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/module-plts.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/module-plts.c
> index ea640f92fe5a..93b808056cb4 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/module-plts.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/module-plts.c
> @@ -41,6 +41,46 @@ u64 module_emit_plt_entry(struct module *mod, void *loc, const Elf64_Rela *rela,
>  	return (u64)&plt[i];
>  }
>  
> +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_843419
> +u64 module_emit_adrp_veneer(struct module *mod, void *loc, u64 val)
> +{
> +	struct mod_plt_sec *pltsec = !in_init(mod, loc) ? &mod->arch.core :
> +							  &mod->arch.init;
> +	struct plt_entry *plt = (struct plt_entry *)pltsec->plt->sh_addr;
> +	int i = pltsec->plt_num_entries++;
> +	u32 mov0, mov1, mov2, br;
> +	int rd;
> +
> +	BUG_ON(pltsec->plt_num_entries > pltsec->plt_max_entries);

I'd prefer just to fail loading the module, but I see we already have
a BUG_ON for the existing PLT code. Oh well.

> +
> +	/* get the destination register of the ADRP instruction */
> +	rd = aarch64_insn_decode_register(AARCH64_INSN_REGTYPE_RD,
> +					  le32_to_cpup((__le32 *)loc));
> +
> +	/* generate the veneer instructions */
> +	mov0 = aarch64_insn_gen_movewide(rd, (u16)~val, 0,
> +					 AARCH64_INSN_VARIANT_64BIT,
> +					 AARCH64_INSN_MOVEWIDE_INVERSE);
> +	mov1 = aarch64_insn_gen_movewide(rd, (u16)(val >> 16), 16,
> +					 AARCH64_INSN_VARIANT_64BIT,
> +					 AARCH64_INSN_MOVEWIDE_KEEP);
> +	mov2 = aarch64_insn_gen_movewide(rd, (u16)(val >> 32), 32,
> +					 AARCH64_INSN_VARIANT_64BIT,
> +					 AARCH64_INSN_MOVEWIDE_KEEP);
> +	br = aarch64_insn_gen_branch_imm((u64)&plt[i].br, (u64)loc + 4,
> +					 AARCH64_INSN_BRANCH_NOLINK);
> +
> +	plt[i] = (struct plt_entry){
> +			cpu_to_le32(mov0),
> +			cpu_to_le32(mov1),
> +			cpu_to_le32(mov2),
> +			cpu_to_le32(br)
> +		};
> +
> +	return (u64)&plt[i];
> +}
> +#endif
> +
>  #define cmp_3way(a,b)	((a) < (b) ? -1 : (a) > (b))
>  
>  static int cmp_rela(const void *a, const void *b)
> @@ -68,16 +108,21 @@ static bool duplicate_rel(const Elf64_Rela *rela, int num)
>  }
>  
>  static unsigned int count_plts(Elf64_Sym *syms, Elf64_Rela *rela, int num,
> -			       Elf64_Word dstidx)
> +			       Elf64_Word dstidx, Elf_Shdr *dstsec)
>  {
>  	unsigned int ret = 0;
>  	Elf64_Sym *s;
>  	int i;
>  
>  	for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
> +		u64 min_align;
> +
>  		switch (ELF64_R_TYPE(rela[i].r_info)) {
>  		case R_AARCH64_JUMP26:
>  		case R_AARCH64_CALL26:
> +			if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE))
> +				break;
> +
>  			/*
>  			 * We only have to consider branch targets that resolve
>  			 * to symbols that are defined in a different section.
> @@ -109,6 +154,31 @@ static unsigned int count_plts(Elf64_Sym *syms, Elf64_Rela *rela, int num,
>  			if (rela[i].r_addend != 0 || !duplicate_rel(rela, i))
>  				ret++;
>  			break;
> +		case R_AARCH64_ADR_PREL_PG_HI21_NC:
> +		case R_AARCH64_ADR_PREL_PG_HI21:
> +			if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_843419))
> +				break;
> +
> +			/*
> +			 * Determine the minimal safe alignment for this ADRP
> +			 * instruction: the section alignment at which it is
> +			 * guaranteed not to appear at a vulnerable offset.
> +			 */
> +			min_align = 2 << ffz(rela[i].r_offset | 0x7);

I'm struggling to decipher this, can you give me a hint please? Why 0x7? Is
the "2" because of the two vulnerable offsets?

Will

[RFC PATCH v3 2/3] arm64/kernel: don't ban ADRP to work around Cortex-A53 erratum #843419

[Ard Biesheuvel]

On 5 March 2018 at 17:18, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 14, 2018 at 11:36:44AM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>> Working around Cortex-A53 erratum #843419 involves special handling of
>> ADRP instructions that end up in the last two instruction slots of a
>> 4k page, or whose output register gets overwritten without having been
>> read. (Note that the latter instruction sequence is never emitted by
>> a properly functioning compiler)
>
> Does the workaround currently implemented in the linker also make this
> same assumption? If not, I'm a little wary that we're making an assumption
> about compiler behaviour with no way to detect whether its been violated or
> not.
>

I can check, but I don't see how a compiler would ever choose 'adrp'
when it emits what amounts to a nop instruction.

>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/module-plts.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/module-plts.c
>> index ea640f92fe5a..93b808056cb4 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/module-plts.c
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/module-plts.c
>> @@ -41,6 +41,46 @@ u64 module_emit_plt_entry(struct module *mod, void *loc, const Elf64_Rela *rela,
>>       return (u64)&plt[i];
>>  }
>>
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_843419
>> +u64 module_emit_adrp_veneer(struct module *mod, void *loc, u64 val)
>> +{
>> +     struct mod_plt_sec *pltsec = !in_init(mod, loc) ? &mod->arch.core :
>> +                                                       &mod->arch.init;
>> +     struct plt_entry *plt = (struct plt_entry *)pltsec->plt->sh_addr;
>> +     int i = pltsec->plt_num_entries++;
>> +     u32 mov0, mov1, mov2, br;
>> +     int rd;
>> +
>> +     BUG_ON(pltsec->plt_num_entries > pltsec->plt_max_entries);
>
> I'd prefer just to fail loading the module, but I see we already have
> a BUG_ON for the existing PLT code. Oh well.
>

I can fix that in a followup patch

>> +
>> +     /* get the destination register of the ADRP instruction */
>> +     rd = aarch64_insn_decode_register(AARCH64_INSN_REGTYPE_RD,
>> +                                       le32_to_cpup((__le32 *)loc));
>> +
>> +     /* generate the veneer instructions */
>> +     mov0 = aarch64_insn_gen_movewide(rd, (u16)~val, 0,
>> +                                      AARCH64_INSN_VARIANT_64BIT,
>> +                                      AARCH64_INSN_MOVEWIDE_INVERSE);
>> +     mov1 = aarch64_insn_gen_movewide(rd, (u16)(val >> 16), 16,
>> +                                      AARCH64_INSN_VARIANT_64BIT,
>> +                                      AARCH64_INSN_MOVEWIDE_KEEP);
>> +     mov2 = aarch64_insn_gen_movewide(rd, (u16)(val >> 32), 32,
>> +                                      AARCH64_INSN_VARIANT_64BIT,
>> +                                      AARCH64_INSN_MOVEWIDE_KEEP);
>> +     br = aarch64_insn_gen_branch_imm((u64)&plt[i].br, (u64)loc + 4,
>> +                                      AARCH64_INSN_BRANCH_NOLINK);
>> +
>> +     plt[i] = (struct plt_entry){
>> +                     cpu_to_le32(mov0),
>> +                     cpu_to_le32(mov1),
>> +                     cpu_to_le32(mov2),
>> +                     cpu_to_le32(br)
>> +             };
>> +
>> +     return (u64)&plt[i];
>> +}
>> +#endif
>> +
>>  #define cmp_3way(a,b)        ((a) < (b) ? -1 : (a) > (b))
>>
>>  static int cmp_rela(const void *a, const void *b)
>> @@ -68,16 +108,21 @@ static bool duplicate_rel(const Elf64_Rela *rela, int num)
>>  }
>>
>>  static unsigned int count_plts(Elf64_Sym *syms, Elf64_Rela *rela, int num,
>> -                            Elf64_Word dstidx)
>> +                            Elf64_Word dstidx, Elf_Shdr *dstsec)
>>  {
>>       unsigned int ret = 0;
>>       Elf64_Sym *s;
>>       int i;
>>
>>       for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
>> +             u64 min_align;
>> +
>>               switch (ELF64_R_TYPE(rela[i].r_info)) {
>>               case R_AARCH64_JUMP26:
>>               case R_AARCH64_CALL26:
>> +                     if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE))
>> +                             break;
>> +
>>                       /*
>>                        * We only have to consider branch targets that resolve
>>                        * to symbols that are defined in a different section.
>> @@ -109,6 +154,31 @@ static unsigned int count_plts(Elf64_Sym *syms, Elf64_Rela *rela, int num,
>>                       if (rela[i].r_addend != 0 || !duplicate_rel(rela, i))
>>                               ret++;
>>                       break;
>> +             case R_AARCH64_ADR_PREL_PG_HI21_NC:
>> +             case R_AARCH64_ADR_PREL_PG_HI21:
>> +                     if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_843419))
>> +                             break;
>> +
>> +                     /*
>> +                      * Determine the minimal safe alignment for this ADRP
>> +                      * instruction: the section alignment at which it is
>> +                      * guaranteed not to appear at a vulnerable offset.
>> +                      */
>> +                     min_align = 2 << ffz(rela[i].r_offset | 0x7);
>
> I'm struggling to decipher this, can you give me a hint please? Why 0x7? Is
> the "2" because of the two vulnerable offsets?
>

What it basically does is preserve 0 bits in the address of the instruction.

Given that ADRP instructions at addresses ending in fff8 or fffc may
be vulnerable, if any of the bits [11:3] are zero, we can increase the
alignment of this section to ensure it remains zero, guaranteeing that
the resulting address won't end in fff8 or fffc

Bits 0 .. 2 don't count, hence the 0x7. If bit 3 is zero, we can align
to '1 << (3 + 1)' == '2 << 3', and bit 3 will remain zero.

[RFC PATCH v3 2/3] arm64/kernel: don't ban ADRP to work around Cortex-A53 erratum #843419

[Will Deacon]

On Mon, Mar 05, 2018 at 05:26:35PM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On 5 March 2018 at 17:18, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> wrote:
> > On Wed, Feb 14, 2018 at 11:36:44AM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> >> Working around Cortex-A53 erratum #843419 involves special handling of
> >> ADRP instructions that end up in the last two instruction slots of a
> >> 4k page, or whose output register gets overwritten without having been
> >> read. (Note that the latter instruction sequence is never emitted by
> >> a properly functioning compiler)
> >
> > Does the workaround currently implemented in the linker also make this
> > same assumption? If not, I'm a little wary that we're making an assumption
> > about compiler behaviour with no way to detect whether its been violated or
> > not.
> >
> 
> I can check, but I don't see how a compiler would ever choose 'adrp'
> when it emits what amounts to a nop instruction.

Agreed, but it wouldn't be the first time we've seen compilers do weird
things.

> >> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/module-plts.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/module-plts.c
> >> index ea640f92fe5a..93b808056cb4 100644
> >> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/module-plts.c
> >> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/module-plts.c
> >> @@ -41,6 +41,46 @@ u64 module_emit_plt_entry(struct module *mod, void *loc, const Elf64_Rela *rela,
> >>       return (u64)&plt[i];
> >>  }
> >>
> >> +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_843419
> >> +u64 module_emit_adrp_veneer(struct module *mod, void *loc, u64 val)
> >> +{
> >> +     struct mod_plt_sec *pltsec = !in_init(mod, loc) ? &mod->arch.core :
> >> +                                                       &mod->arch.init;
> >> +     struct plt_entry *plt = (struct plt_entry *)pltsec->plt->sh_addr;
> >> +     int i = pltsec->plt_num_entries++;
> >> +     u32 mov0, mov1, mov2, br;
> >> +     int rd;
> >> +
> >> +     BUG_ON(pltsec->plt_num_entries > pltsec->plt_max_entries);
> >
> > I'd prefer just to fail loading the module, but I see we already have
> > a BUG_ON for the existing PLT code. Oh well.
> >
> 
> I can fix that in a followup patch

Thanks.

> >> +
> >> +     /* get the destination register of the ADRP instruction */
> >> +     rd = aarch64_insn_decode_register(AARCH64_INSN_REGTYPE_RD,
> >> +                                       le32_to_cpup((__le32 *)loc));
> >> +
> >> +     /* generate the veneer instructions */
> >> +     mov0 = aarch64_insn_gen_movewide(rd, (u16)~val, 0,
> >> +                                      AARCH64_INSN_VARIANT_64BIT,
> >> +                                      AARCH64_INSN_MOVEWIDE_INVERSE);
> >> +     mov1 = aarch64_insn_gen_movewide(rd, (u16)(val >> 16), 16,
> >> +                                      AARCH64_INSN_VARIANT_64BIT,
> >> +                                      AARCH64_INSN_MOVEWIDE_KEEP);
> >> +     mov2 = aarch64_insn_gen_movewide(rd, (u16)(val >> 32), 32,
> >> +                                      AARCH64_INSN_VARIANT_64BIT,
> >> +                                      AARCH64_INSN_MOVEWIDE_KEEP);
> >> +     br = aarch64_insn_gen_branch_imm((u64)&plt[i].br, (u64)loc + 4,
> >> +                                      AARCH64_INSN_BRANCH_NOLINK);
> >> +
> >> +     plt[i] = (struct plt_entry){
> >> +                     cpu_to_le32(mov0),
> >> +                     cpu_to_le32(mov1),
> >> +                     cpu_to_le32(mov2),
> >> +                     cpu_to_le32(br)
> >> +             };
> >> +
> >> +     return (u64)&plt[i];
> >> +}
> >> +#endif
> >> +
> >>  #define cmp_3way(a,b)        ((a) < (b) ? -1 : (a) > (b))
> >>
> >>  static int cmp_rela(const void *a, const void *b)
> >> @@ -68,16 +108,21 @@ static bool duplicate_rel(const Elf64_Rela *rela, int num)
> >>  }
> >>
> >>  static unsigned int count_plts(Elf64_Sym *syms, Elf64_Rela *rela, int num,
> >> -                            Elf64_Word dstidx)
> >> +                            Elf64_Word dstidx, Elf_Shdr *dstsec)
> >>  {
> >>       unsigned int ret = 0;
> >>       Elf64_Sym *s;
> >>       int i;
> >>
> >>       for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
> >> +             u64 min_align;
> >> +
> >>               switch (ELF64_R_TYPE(rela[i].r_info)) {
> >>               case R_AARCH64_JUMP26:
> >>               case R_AARCH64_CALL26:
> >> +                     if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE))
> >> +                             break;
> >> +
> >>                       /*
> >>                        * We only have to consider branch targets that resolve
> >>                        * to symbols that are defined in a different section.
> >> @@ -109,6 +154,31 @@ static unsigned int count_plts(Elf64_Sym *syms, Elf64_Rela *rela, int num,
> >>                       if (rela[i].r_addend != 0 || !duplicate_rel(rela, i))
> >>                               ret++;
> >>                       break;
> >> +             case R_AARCH64_ADR_PREL_PG_HI21_NC:
> >> +             case R_AARCH64_ADR_PREL_PG_HI21:
> >> +                     if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_843419))
> >> +                             break;
> >> +
> >> +                     /*
> >> +                      * Determine the minimal safe alignment for this ADRP
> >> +                      * instruction: the section alignment at which it is
> >> +                      * guaranteed not to appear at a vulnerable offset.
> >> +                      */
> >> +                     min_align = 2 << ffz(rela[i].r_offset | 0x7);
> >
> > I'm struggling to decipher this, can you give me a hint please? Why 0x7? Is
> > the "2" because of the two vulnerable offsets?
> >
> 
> What it basically does is preserve 0 bits in the address of the instruction.
> 
> Given that ADRP instructions at addresses ending in fff8 or fffc may
> be vulnerable, if any of the bits [11:3] are zero, we can increase the
> alignment of this section to ensure it remains zero, guaranteeing that
> the resulting address won't end in fff8 or fffc
> 
> Bits 0 .. 2 don't count, hence the 0x7. If bit 3 is zero, we can align
> to '1 << (3 + 1)' == '2 << 3', and bit 3 will remain zero.

Please put this in a comment ;)

Will

[RFC PATCH v3 2/3] arm64/kernel: don't ban ADRP to work around Cortex-A53 erratum #843419

[Ard Biesheuvel]

On 5 March 2018 at 17:34, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 05, 2018 at 05:26:35PM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>> On 5 March 2018 at 17:18, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> wrote:
>> > On Wed, Feb 14, 2018 at 11:36:44AM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>> >> Working around Cortex-A53 erratum #843419 involves special handling of
>> >> ADRP instructions that end up in the last two instruction slots of a
>> >> 4k page, or whose output register gets overwritten without having been
>> >> read. (Note that the latter instruction sequence is never emitted by
>> >> a properly functioning compiler)
>> >
>> > Does the workaround currently implemented in the linker also make this
>> > same assumption? If not, I'm a little wary that we're making an assumption
>> > about compiler behaviour with no way to detect whether its been violated or
>> > not.
>> >
>>
>> I can check, but I don't see how a compiler would ever choose 'adrp'
>> when it emits what amounts to a nop instruction.
>
> Agreed, but it wouldn't be the first time we've seen compilers do weird
> things.
>

I just checked ld.bfd: it only checks for sequence 1, which is the one
that affects ADRP instructions at offsets 0xfff8/0xfffc modulo 4 KB.
It actually checks more elaborately whether the sequence is in fact
vulnerable rather than assuming any ADRP instruction at such an offset
may be vulnerable, but in my testing of the current patches, I only
get a handful of them anyway of which the majority are resolved by
patching ADRP->ADR.

Sequence 2 is described as follows in the docs:

"""
Sequence 2:
1) An ADRP instruction, which writes to a register Rn.
2) Another instruction which writes to Rn.
o This cannot be a branch or an ADRP.
o This cannot read Rn.
3)
4)
Another instruction.
o This cannot be a branch.
o This cannot write Rn.
o This may optionally read Rn.
A load or store instruction from the "Load/store register (unsigned
immediate)" encoding class, using Rn as the
base address register.
"""

and ld.bfd does not check for it at all.



>> >> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/module-plts.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/module-plts.c
>> >> index ea640f92fe5a..93b808056cb4 100644
>> >> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/module-plts.c
>> >> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/module-plts.c
>> >> @@ -41,6 +41,46 @@ u64 module_emit_plt_entry(struct module *mod, void *loc, const Elf64_Rela *rela,
>> >>       return (u64)&plt[i];
>> >>  }
>> >>
>> >> +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_843419
>> >> +u64 module_emit_adrp_veneer(struct module *mod, void *loc, u64 val)
>> >> +{
>> >> +     struct mod_plt_sec *pltsec = !in_init(mod, loc) ? &mod->arch.core :
>> >> +                                                       &mod->arch.init;
>> >> +     struct plt_entry *plt = (struct plt_entry *)pltsec->plt->sh_addr;
>> >> +     int i = pltsec->plt_num_entries++;
>> >> +     u32 mov0, mov1, mov2, br;
>> >> +     int rd;
>> >> +
>> >> +     BUG_ON(pltsec->plt_num_entries > pltsec->plt_max_entries);
>> >
>> > I'd prefer just to fail loading the module, but I see we already have
>> > a BUG_ON for the existing PLT code. Oh well.
>> >
>>
>> I can fix that in a followup patch
>
> Thanks.
>
>> >> +
>> >> +     /* get the destination register of the ADRP instruction */
>> >> +     rd = aarch64_insn_decode_register(AARCH64_INSN_REGTYPE_RD,
>> >> +                                       le32_to_cpup((__le32 *)loc));
>> >> +
>> >> +     /* generate the veneer instructions */
>> >> +     mov0 = aarch64_insn_gen_movewide(rd, (u16)~val, 0,
>> >> +                                      AARCH64_INSN_VARIANT_64BIT,
>> >> +                                      AARCH64_INSN_MOVEWIDE_INVERSE);
>> >> +     mov1 = aarch64_insn_gen_movewide(rd, (u16)(val >> 16), 16,
>> >> +                                      AARCH64_INSN_VARIANT_64BIT,
>> >> +                                      AARCH64_INSN_MOVEWIDE_KEEP);
>> >> +     mov2 = aarch64_insn_gen_movewide(rd, (u16)(val >> 32), 32,
>> >> +                                      AARCH64_INSN_VARIANT_64BIT,
>> >> +                                      AARCH64_INSN_MOVEWIDE_KEEP);
>> >> +     br = aarch64_insn_gen_branch_imm((u64)&plt[i].br, (u64)loc + 4,
>> >> +                                      AARCH64_INSN_BRANCH_NOLINK);
>> >> +
>> >> +     plt[i] = (struct plt_entry){
>> >> +                     cpu_to_le32(mov0),
>> >> +                     cpu_to_le32(mov1),
>> >> +                     cpu_to_le32(mov2),
>> >> +                     cpu_to_le32(br)
>> >> +             };
>> >> +
>> >> +     return (u64)&plt[i];
>> >> +}
>> >> +#endif
>> >> +
>> >>  #define cmp_3way(a,b)        ((a) < (b) ? -1 : (a) > (b))
>> >>
>> >>  static int cmp_rela(const void *a, const void *b)
>> >> @@ -68,16 +108,21 @@ static bool duplicate_rel(const Elf64_Rela *rela, int num)
>> >>  }
>> >>
>> >>  static unsigned int count_plts(Elf64_Sym *syms, Elf64_Rela *rela, int num,
>> >> -                            Elf64_Word dstidx)
>> >> +                            Elf64_Word dstidx, Elf_Shdr *dstsec)
>> >>  {
>> >>       unsigned int ret = 0;
>> >>       Elf64_Sym *s;
>> >>       int i;
>> >>
>> >>       for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
>> >> +             u64 min_align;
>> >> +
>> >>               switch (ELF64_R_TYPE(rela[i].r_info)) {
>> >>               case R_AARCH64_JUMP26:
>> >>               case R_AARCH64_CALL26:
>> >> +                     if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE))
>> >> +                             break;
>> >> +
>> >>                       /*
>> >>                        * We only have to consider branch targets that resolve
>> >>                        * to symbols that are defined in a different section.
>> >> @@ -109,6 +154,31 @@ static unsigned int count_plts(Elf64_Sym *syms, Elf64_Rela *rela, int num,
>> >>                       if (rela[i].r_addend != 0 || !duplicate_rel(rela, i))
>> >>                               ret++;
>> >>                       break;
>> >> +             case R_AARCH64_ADR_PREL_PG_HI21_NC:
>> >> +             case R_AARCH64_ADR_PREL_PG_HI21:
>> >> +                     if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_843419))
>> >> +                             break;
>> >> +
>> >> +                     /*
>> >> +                      * Determine the minimal safe alignment for this ADRP
>> >> +                      * instruction: the section alignment at which it is
>> >> +                      * guaranteed not to appear at a vulnerable offset.
>> >> +                      */
>> >> +                     min_align = 2 << ffz(rela[i].r_offset | 0x7);
>> >
>> > I'm struggling to decipher this, can you give me a hint please? Why 0x7? Is
>> > the "2" because of the two vulnerable offsets?
>> >
>>
>> What it basically does is preserve 0 bits in the address of the instruction.
>>
>> Given that ADRP instructions at addresses ending in fff8 or fffc may
>> be vulnerable, if any of the bits [11:3] are zero, we can increase the
>> alignment of this section to ensure it remains zero, guaranteeing that
>> the resulting address won't end in fff8 or fffc
>>
>> Bits 0 .. 2 don't count, hence the 0x7. If bit 3 is zero, we can align
>> to '1 << (3 + 1)' == '2 << 3', and bit 3 will remain zero.
>
> Please put this in a comment ;)
>

OK

[RFC PATCH v3 2/3] arm64/kernel: don't ban ADRP to work around Cortex-A53 erratum #843419

[Will Deacon]

On Mon, Mar 05, 2018 at 05:41:17PM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On 5 March 2018 at 17:34, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> wrote:
> > On Mon, Mar 05, 2018 at 05:26:35PM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> >> On 5 March 2018 at 17:18, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> wrote:
> >> > On Wed, Feb 14, 2018 at 11:36:44AM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> >> >> Working around Cortex-A53 erratum #843419 involves special handling of
> >> >> ADRP instructions that end up in the last two instruction slots of a
> >> >> 4k page, or whose output register gets overwritten without having been
> >> >> read. (Note that the latter instruction sequence is never emitted by
> >> >> a properly functioning compiler)
> >> >
> >> > Does the workaround currently implemented in the linker also make this
> >> > same assumption? If not, I'm a little wary that we're making an assumption
> >> > about compiler behaviour with no way to detect whether its been violated or
> >> > not.
> >> >
> >>
> >> I can check, but I don't see how a compiler would ever choose 'adrp'
> >> when it emits what amounts to a nop instruction.
> >
> > Agreed, but it wouldn't be the first time we've seen compilers do weird
> > things.
> >
> 
> I just checked ld.bfd: it only checks for sequence 1, which is the one
> that affects ADRP instructions at offsets 0xfff8/0xfffc modulo 4 KB.
> It actually checks more elaborately whether the sequence is in fact
> vulnerable rather than assuming any ADRP instruction at such an offset
> may be vulnerable, but in my testing of the current patches, I only
> get a handful of them anyway of which the majority are resolved by
> patching ADRP->ADR.
> 
> Sequence 2 is described as follows in the docs:
> 
> """
> Sequence 2:
> 1) An ADRP instruction, which writes to a register Rn.
> 2) Another instruction which writes to Rn.
> o This cannot be a branch or an ADRP.
> o This cannot read Rn.
> 3)
> 4)
> Another instruction.
> o This cannot be a branch.
> o This cannot write Rn.
> o This may optionally read Rn.
> A load or store instruction from the "Load/store register (unsigned
> immediate)" encoding class, using Rn as the
> base address register.
> """
> 
> and ld.bfd does not check for it at all.

In which case, the code you're proposing for modules is just as good as
what we're doing for the kernel text itself. Might be worth mentioning that
somewhere, but I think it's fine.

Thanks for looking,

Will

[RFC PATCH v3 3/3] arm64/kernel: enable A53 erratum #8434319 handling at runtime

[Ard Biesheuvel]

Omit patching of ADRP instruction at module load time if the current
CPUs are not susceptible to the erratum.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
Open question: how should we handle big.LITTLE configurations where affected
Cortex-A53s may appear late.

 arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h |  3 ++-
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c   | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/module-plts.c  |  3 ++-
 arch/arm64/kernel/module.c       |  3 ++-
 4 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h
index bb263820de13..39134c46bb13 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h
@@ -45,7 +45,8 @@
 #define ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR		24
 #define ARM64_HARDEN_BP_POST_GUEST_EXIT		25
 #define ARM64_HAS_RAS_EXTN			26
+#define ARM64_WORKAROUND_843419			27
 
-#define ARM64_NCAPS				27
+#define ARM64_NCAPS				28
 
 #endif /* __ASM_CPUCAPS_H */
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
index 07823595b7f0..c065d5649b1b 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
@@ -228,6 +228,23 @@ static int qcom_enable_link_stack_sanitization(void *data)
 }
 #endif	/* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */
 
+static bool __maybe_unused
+needs_erratum_843419_workaround(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
+				int scope)
+{
+	u32 cpuid = read_cpuid_id();
+
+	WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible());
+
+	if ((cpuid & MIDR_CPU_MODEL_MASK) != MIDR_CORTEX_A53)
+		return false;
+	else if ((cpuid & (MIDR_REVISION_MASK | MIDR_VARIANT_MASK)) == 0x4)
+		/* erratum was fixed in some versions of r0p4 */
+		return !(read_cpuid(REVIDR_EL1) & BIT(8));
+	else
+		return true;
+}
+
 #define MIDR_RANGE(model, min, max) \
 	.def_scope = SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU, \
 	.matches = is_affected_midr_range, \
@@ -283,6 +300,15 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = {
 			   MIDR_CPU_VAR_REV(1, 2)),
 	},
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_843419
+	{
+	/* Cortex-A53 r0p[01234] */
+		.desc = "ARM erratum 843419",
+		.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_843419,
+		.def_scope = SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU,
+		.matches = needs_erratum_843419_workaround,
+	},
+#endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_845719
 	{
 	/* Cortex-A53 r0p[01234] */
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/module-plts.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/module-plts.c
index 93b808056cb4..0a208a49eb70 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/module-plts.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/module-plts.c
@@ -156,7 +156,8 @@ static unsigned int count_plts(Elf64_Sym *syms, Elf64_Rela *rela, int num,
 			break;
 		case R_AARCH64_ADR_PREL_PG_HI21_NC:
 		case R_AARCH64_ADR_PREL_PG_HI21:
-			if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_843419))
+			if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_843419) ||
+			    !cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_WORKAROUND_843419))
 				break;
 
 			/*
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/module.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/module.c
index d1bbdffd1e6c..5a05f84d575e 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/module.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/module.c
@@ -201,7 +201,8 @@ static int reloc_insn_imm(enum aarch64_reloc_op op, __le32 *place, u64 val,
 static bool reloc_adrp_erratum_843419(struct module *mod, __le32 *place,
 				      u64 val)
 {
-	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_843419))
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_843419) ||
+	    !cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_WORKAROUND_843419))
 		return false;
 
 	/* only ADRP instructions at the end of a 4k page are affected */
-- 
2.11.0

[RFC PATCH v3 3/3] arm64/kernel: enable A53 erratum #8434319 handling at runtime

[Mark Rutland]

On Wed, Feb 14, 2018 at 11:36:45AM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> Omit patching of ADRP instruction at module load time if the current
> CPUs are not susceptible to the erratum.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
> ---
> Open question: how should we handle big.LITTLE configurations where affected
> Cortex-A53s may appear late.

I think verify_local_cpu_errata_workarounds() will handle that for us,
aborting the late onlining of a CPU with an erratum a boot CPU didn't
have.

[...]

> +static bool __maybe_unused
> +needs_erratum_843419_workaround(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
> +				int scope)
> +{
> +	u32 cpuid = read_cpuid_id();
> +
> +	WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible());
> +
> +	if ((cpuid & MIDR_CPU_MODEL_MASK) != MIDR_CORTEX_A53)
> +		return false;
> +	else if ((cpuid & (MIDR_REVISION_MASK | MIDR_VARIANT_MASK)) == 0x4)
> +		/* erratum was fixed in some versions of r0p4 */
> +		return !(read_cpuid(REVIDR_EL1) & BIT(8));
> +	else
> +		return true;
> +}

This would be easier to read as:

	if ((cpuid & MIDR_CPU_MODEL_MASK) != MIDR_CORTEX_A53)
		return false;

	/* erratum was fixed in some versions of r0p4 */
	if ((cpuid & (MIDR_REVISION_MASK | MIDR_VARIANT_MASK)) == 0x4)
		return !(read_cpuid(REVIDR_EL1) & BIT(8));
	
	return true;

Thanks,
Mark.

[RFC PATCH v3 3/3] arm64/kernel: enable A53 erratum #8434319 handling at runtime

[Will Deacon]

On Wed, Feb 14, 2018 at 11:36:45AM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> Omit patching of ADRP instruction at module load time if the current
> CPUs are not susceptible to the erratum.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
> ---
> Open question: how should we handle big.LITTLE configurations where affected
> Cortex-A53s may appear late.

We should fail to bring them online. I think the infrastructure already
exists for this and we used it for other errata already.

> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h
> index bb263820de13..39134c46bb13 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h
> @@ -45,7 +45,8 @@
>  #define ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR		24
>  #define ARM64_HARDEN_BP_POST_GUEST_EXIT		25
>  #define ARM64_HAS_RAS_EXTN			26
> +#define ARM64_WORKAROUND_843419			27
>  
> -#define ARM64_NCAPS				27
> +#define ARM64_NCAPS				28
>  
>  #endif /* __ASM_CPUCAPS_H */
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
> index 07823595b7f0..c065d5649b1b 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
> @@ -228,6 +228,23 @@ static int qcom_enable_link_stack_sanitization(void *data)
>  }
>  #endif	/* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */
>  
> +static bool __maybe_unused
> +needs_erratum_843419_workaround(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
> +				int scope)
> +{
> +	u32 cpuid = read_cpuid_id();
> +
> +	WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible());
> +
> +	if ((cpuid & MIDR_CPU_MODEL_MASK) != MIDR_CORTEX_A53)
> +		return false;
> +	else if ((cpuid & (MIDR_REVISION_MASK | MIDR_VARIANT_MASK)) == 0x4)
> +		/* erratum was fixed in some versions of r0p4 */
> +		return !(read_cpuid(REVIDR_EL1) & BIT(8));

The rXpY information is in the MIDR, so this is checking for something else
afaict.

Will

[RFC PATCH v3 3/3] arm64/kernel: enable A53 erratum #8434319 handling at runtime

[Ard Biesheuvel]

On 5 March 2018 at 17:22, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 14, 2018 at 11:36:45AM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>> Omit patching of ADRP instruction at module load time if the current
>> CPUs are not susceptible to the erratum.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
>> ---
>> Open question: how should we handle big.LITTLE configurations where affected
>> Cortex-A53s may appear late.
>
> We should fail to bring them online. I think the infrastructure already
> exists for this and we used it for other errata already.
>

I think that is what it does currently. The question is whether that
should be considered a regression or not.

>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h
>> index bb263820de13..39134c46bb13 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h
>> @@ -45,7 +45,8 @@
>>  #define ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR                24
>>  #define ARM64_HARDEN_BP_POST_GUEST_EXIT              25
>>  #define ARM64_HAS_RAS_EXTN                   26
>> +#define ARM64_WORKAROUND_843419                      27
>>
>> -#define ARM64_NCAPS                          27
>> +#define ARM64_NCAPS                          28
>>
>>  #endif /* __ASM_CPUCAPS_H */
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
>> index 07823595b7f0..c065d5649b1b 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
>> @@ -228,6 +228,23 @@ static int qcom_enable_link_stack_sanitization(void *data)
>>  }
>>  #endif       /* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */
>>
>> +static bool __maybe_unused
>> +needs_erratum_843419_workaround(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
>> +                             int scope)
>> +{
>> +     u32 cpuid = read_cpuid_id();
>> +
>> +     WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible());
>> +
>> +     if ((cpuid & MIDR_CPU_MODEL_MASK) != MIDR_CORTEX_A53)
>> +             return false;
>> +     else if ((cpuid & (MIDR_REVISION_MASK | MIDR_VARIANT_MASK)) == 0x4)
>> +             /* erratum was fixed in some versions of r0p4 */
>> +             return !(read_cpuid(REVIDR_EL1) & BIT(8));
>
> The rXpY information is in the MIDR, so this is checking for something else
> afaict.
>

No, it checks the REVIDR of r0p4 parts, of which bit 8 tells us if
this specific erratum has been fixed.

[RFC PATCH v3 3/3] arm64/kernel: enable A53 erratum #8434319 handling at runtime

[Will Deacon]

On Mon, Mar 05, 2018 at 05:29:26PM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On 5 March 2018 at 17:22, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> wrote:
> > On Wed, Feb 14, 2018 at 11:36:45AM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> >> Omit patching of ADRP instruction at module load time if the current
> >> CPUs are not susceptible to the erratum.
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
> >> ---
> >> Open question: how should we handle big.LITTLE configurations where affected
> >> Cortex-A53s may appear late.
> >
> > We should fail to bring them online. I think the infrastructure already
> > exists for this and we used it for other errata already.
> >
> 
> I think that is what it does currently. The question is whether that
> should be considered a regression or not.

This can only happen with maxcpus=, right? I wouldn't be too worried about
it in that case.

> 
> >> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h
> >> index bb263820de13..39134c46bb13 100644
> >> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h
> >> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h
> >> @@ -45,7 +45,8 @@
> >>  #define ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR                24
> >>  #define ARM64_HARDEN_BP_POST_GUEST_EXIT              25
> >>  #define ARM64_HAS_RAS_EXTN                   26
> >> +#define ARM64_WORKAROUND_843419                      27
> >>
> >> -#define ARM64_NCAPS                          27
> >> +#define ARM64_NCAPS                          28
> >>
> >>  #endif /* __ASM_CPUCAPS_H */
> >> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
> >> index 07823595b7f0..c065d5649b1b 100644
> >> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
> >> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
> >> @@ -228,6 +228,23 @@ static int qcom_enable_link_stack_sanitization(void *data)
> >>  }
> >>  #endif       /* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */
> >>
> >> +static bool __maybe_unused
> >> +needs_erratum_843419_workaround(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
> >> +                             int scope)
> >> +{
> >> +     u32 cpuid = read_cpuid_id();
> >> +
> >> +     WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible());
> >> +
> >> +     if ((cpuid & MIDR_CPU_MODEL_MASK) != MIDR_CORTEX_A53)
> >> +             return false;
> >> +     else if ((cpuid & (MIDR_REVISION_MASK | MIDR_VARIANT_MASK)) == 0x4)
> >> +             /* erratum was fixed in some versions of r0p4 */
> >> +             return !(read_cpuid(REVIDR_EL1) & BIT(8));
> >
> > The rXpY information is in the MIDR, so this is checking for something else
> > afaict.
> >
> 
> No, it checks the REVIDR of r0p4 parts, of which bit 8 tells us if
> this specific erratum has been fixed.

/me checks errata notice.

Ok, fair enough! Given that it looks like this mechanism is used for other
errata too, it would make sense to support it in the arm64_cpu_capabilities
structure alongside the midr stuff.

Will

[RFC PATCH v3 3/3] arm64/kernel: enable A53 erratum #8434319 handling at runtime

[Ard Biesheuvel]

On 5 March 2018 at 17:40, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 05, 2018 at 05:29:26PM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>> On 5 March 2018 at 17:22, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> wrote:
>> > On Wed, Feb 14, 2018 at 11:36:45AM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>> >> Omit patching of ADRP instruction at module load time if the current
>> >> CPUs are not susceptible to the erratum.
>> >>
>> >> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
>> >> ---
>> >> Open question: how should we handle big.LITTLE configurations where affected
>> >> Cortex-A53s may appear late.
>> >
>> > We should fail to bring them online. I think the infrastructure already
>> > exists for this and we used it for other errata already.
>> >
>>
>> I think that is what it does currently. The question is whether that
>> should be considered a regression or not.
>
> This can only happen with maxcpus=, right? I wouldn't be too worried about
> it in that case.
>
>>
>> >> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h
>> >> index bb263820de13..39134c46bb13 100644
>> >> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h
>> >> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h
>> >> @@ -45,7 +45,8 @@
>> >>  #define ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR                24
>> >>  #define ARM64_HARDEN_BP_POST_GUEST_EXIT              25
>> >>  #define ARM64_HAS_RAS_EXTN                   26
>> >> +#define ARM64_WORKAROUND_843419                      27
>> >>
>> >> -#define ARM64_NCAPS                          27
>> >> +#define ARM64_NCAPS                          28
>> >>
>> >>  #endif /* __ASM_CPUCAPS_H */
>> >> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
>> >> index 07823595b7f0..c065d5649b1b 100644
>> >> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
>> >> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
>> >> @@ -228,6 +228,23 @@ static int qcom_enable_link_stack_sanitization(void *data)
>> >>  }
>> >>  #endif       /* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */
>> >>
>> >> +static bool __maybe_unused
>> >> +needs_erratum_843419_workaround(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
>> >> +                             int scope)
>> >> +{
>> >> +     u32 cpuid = read_cpuid_id();
>> >> +
>> >> +     WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible());
>> >> +
>> >> +     if ((cpuid & MIDR_CPU_MODEL_MASK) != MIDR_CORTEX_A53)
>> >> +             return false;
>> >> +     else if ((cpuid & (MIDR_REVISION_MASK | MIDR_VARIANT_MASK)) == 0x4)
>> >> +             /* erratum was fixed in some versions of r0p4 */
>> >> +             return !(read_cpuid(REVIDR_EL1) & BIT(8));
>> >
>> > The rXpY information is in the MIDR, so this is checking for something else
>> > afaict.
>> >
>>
>> No, it checks the REVIDR of r0p4 parts, of which bit 8 tells us if
>> this specific erratum has been fixed.
>
> /me checks errata notice.
>
> Ok, fair enough! Given that it looks like this mechanism is used for other
> errata too, it would make sense to support it in the arm64_cpu_capabilities
> structure alongside the midr stuff.
>

Are you saying I should abstract REVIDR access for this series? I
don't mind, but in that case, could you be a bit clearer about what
you would like to see?

[RFC PATCH v3 3/3] arm64/kernel: enable A53 erratum #8434319 handling at runtime

[Will Deacon]

On Mon, Mar 05, 2018 at 06:01:30PM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On 5 March 2018 at 17:40, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> wrote:
> > On Mon, Mar 05, 2018 at 05:29:26PM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> >> On 5 March 2018 at 17:22, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> wrote:
> >> > On Wed, Feb 14, 2018 at 11:36:45AM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> >> >> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
> >> >> index 07823595b7f0..c065d5649b1b 100644
> >> >> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
> >> >> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
> >> >> @@ -228,6 +228,23 @@ static int qcom_enable_link_stack_sanitization(void *data)
> >> >>  }
> >> >>  #endif       /* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */
> >> >>
> >> >> +static bool __maybe_unused
> >> >> +needs_erratum_843419_workaround(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
> >> >> +                             int scope)
> >> >> +{
> >> >> +     u32 cpuid = read_cpuid_id();
> >> >> +
> >> >> +     WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible());
> >> >> +
> >> >> +     if ((cpuid & MIDR_CPU_MODEL_MASK) != MIDR_CORTEX_A53)
> >> >> +             return false;
> >> >> +     else if ((cpuid & (MIDR_REVISION_MASK | MIDR_VARIANT_MASK)) == 0x4)
> >> >> +             /* erratum was fixed in some versions of r0p4 */
> >> >> +             return !(read_cpuid(REVIDR_EL1) & BIT(8));
> >> >
> >> > The rXpY information is in the MIDR, so this is checking for something else
> >> > afaict.
> >> >
> >>
> >> No, it checks the REVIDR of r0p4 parts, of which bit 8 tells us if
> >> this specific erratum has been fixed.
> >
> > /me checks errata notice.
> >
> > Ok, fair enough! Given that it looks like this mechanism is used for other
> > errata too, it would make sense to support it in the arm64_cpu_capabilities
> > structure alongside the midr stuff.
> >
> 
> Are you saying I should abstract REVIDR access for this series? I
> don't mind, but in that case, could you be a bit clearer about what
> you would like to see?

Sorry, yes. I was thinking about having a revidr mask/value pair field in
the arm64_cpu_capabilities structure which, if set to a non-zero value by
the errata entry, is then used as a secondary check if the MIDR match
indicates that the CPU is affected by the erratum. A quick look at some of
our errata notices suggests that this can then be used for some other Cortex
cores as well.

Feel free to do it as a follow-up patch if it's easier.

Will

[RFC PATCH v3 0/3] arm64/kernel: get rid of GCC large model code

[Will Deacon]

On Wed, Feb 14, 2018 at 11:36:42AM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> I am resending this as an RFC, because I'd like to understand whether
> anyone else shares my concern, or whether I am being overly paranoid.
> 
> v2 blurb:
> 
> GCC's large model uses literal pools to emit cross object symbol
> references rather than movz/movk sequences, resulting in data items
> mixed in the with executable code in modules' .text segments, reducing
> cache utilization, but also potentially resulting in the creation of
> code gadgets that are exploitable under speculative execution.
> 
> We are using GCC's large model for two separate reasons, both of which can
> be worked around rather easily:
> - KASLR uses it to move modules and the kernel very far apart, which is
>   not really needed,
> - the Cortex-A53 erratum code uses it to avoid ADRP instruction altogether,
>   which can be replaced by selective patching of only the ADRP instructions
>   that are affected by the erratum

I think this is a sensible thing to do, cheers.

Will