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From: alex.shi@linaro.org (Alex Shi)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH 05/39] arm64: Make USER_DS an inclusive limit
Date: Fri,  9 Mar 2018 17:06:48 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180309090722.26279-6-alex.shi@linaro.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180309090722.26279-1-alex.shi@linaro.org>

From: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>

Commit 51369e398d0d upstream.

Currently, USER_DS represents an exclusive limit while KERNEL_DS is
inclusive. In order to do some clever trickery for speculation-safe
masking, we need them both to behave equivalently - there aren't enough
bits to make KERNEL_DS exclusive, so we have precisely one option. This
also happens to correct a longstanding false negative for a range
ending on the very top byte of kernel memory.

Mark Rutland points out that we've actually got the semantics of
addresses vs. segments muddled up in most of the places we need to
amend, so shuffle the {USER,KERNEL}_DS definitions around such that we
can correct those properly instead of just pasting "-1"s everywhere.

Signed-off-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Shi <alex.shi@linaro.org>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h |  3 ++
 arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h   | 45 +++++++++++++++++-------------
 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S          |  2 +-
 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h
index 12d5b2b97f04..c49597ae529d 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@
 
 #define TASK_SIZE_64		(UL(1) << VA_BITS)
 
+#define KERNEL_DS	UL(-1)
+#define USER_DS		(TASK_SIZE_64 - 1)
+
 #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
 
 /*
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 829fa6d3e561..c625cc5531fc 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -56,10 +56,7 @@ struct exception_table_entry
 
 extern int fixup_exception(struct pt_regs *regs);
 
-#define KERNEL_DS	(-1UL)
 #define get_ds()	(KERNEL_DS)
-
-#define USER_DS		TASK_SIZE_64
 #define get_fs()	(current_thread_info()->addr_limit)
 
 static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs)
@@ -87,22 +84,32 @@ static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs)
  * Returns 1 if the range is valid, 0 otherwise.
  *
  * This is equivalent to the following test:
- * (u65)addr + (u65)size <= current->addr_limit
- *
- * This needs 65-bit arithmetic.
+ * (u65)addr + (u65)size <= (u65)current->addr_limit + 1
  */
-#define __range_ok(addr, size)						\
-({									\
-	unsigned long __addr = (unsigned long __force)(addr);		\
-	unsigned long flag, roksum;					\
-	__chk_user_ptr(addr);						\
-	asm("adds %1, %1, %3; ccmp %1, %4, #2, cc; cset %0, ls"		\
-		: "=&r" (flag), "=&r" (roksum)				\
-		: "1" (__addr), "Ir" (size),				\
-		  "r" (current_thread_info()->addr_limit)		\
-		: "cc");						\
-	flag;								\
-})
+static inline unsigned long __range_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
+{
+	unsigned long limit = current_thread_info()->addr_limit;
+
+	__chk_user_ptr(addr);
+	asm volatile(
+	// A + B <= C + 1 for all A,B,C, in four easy steps:
+	// 1: X = A + B; X' = X % 2^64
+	"	adds	%0, %0, %2\n"
+	// 2: Set C = 0 if X > 2^64, to guarantee X' > C in step 4
+	"	csel	%1, xzr, %1, hi\n"
+	// 3: Set X' = ~0 if X >= 2^64. For X == 2^64, this decrements X'
+	//    to compensate for the carry flag being set in step 4. For
+	//    X > 2^64, X' merely has to remain nonzero, which it does.
+	"	csinv	%0, %0, xzr, cc\n"
+	// 4: For X < 2^64, this gives us X' - C - 1 <= 0, where the -1
+	//    comes from the carry in being clear. Otherwise, we are
+	//    testing X' - C == 0, subject to the previous adjustments.
+	"	sbcs	xzr, %0, %1\n"
+	"	cset	%0, ls\n"
+	: "+r" (addr), "+r" (limit) : "Ir" (size) : "cc");
+
+	return addr;
+}
 
 /*
  * When dealing with data aborts, watchpoints, or instruction traps we may end
@@ -111,7 +118,7 @@ static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs)
  */
 #define untagged_addr(addr)		sign_extend64(addr, 55)
 
-#define access_ok(type, addr, size)	__range_ok(addr, size)
+#define access_ok(type, addr, size)	__range_ok((unsigned long)(addr), size)
 #define user_addr_max			get_fs
 
 /*
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
index fbb4fdd370b9..274898465a3f 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@
 	/* Save the task's original addr_limit and set USER_DS (TASK_SIZE_64) */
 	ldr	x20, [tsk, #TI_ADDR_LIMIT]
 	str	x20, [sp, #S_ORIG_ADDR_LIMIT]
-	mov	x20, #TASK_SIZE_64
+	mov	x20, #USER_DS
 	str	x20, [tsk, #TI_ADDR_LIMIT]
 	.endif /* \el == 0 */
 	mrs	x22, elr_el1
-- 
2.16.2.440.gc6284da

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-03-09  9:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-03-09  9:06 spectre backport for LTS 4.4 review Alex Shi
2018-03-09  9:06 ` [PATCH 01/39] mm: Introduce lm_alias Alex Shi
2018-03-09  9:06 ` [PATCH 02/39] arm64: barrier: Add CSDB macros to control data-value prediction Alex Shi
2018-03-09  9:06 ` [PATCH 03/39] arm64: Implement array_index_mask_nospec() Alex Shi
2018-03-09  9:06 ` [PATCH 04/39] arm64: move TASK_* definitions to <asm/processor.h> Alex Shi
2018-03-09  9:06 ` Alex Shi [this message]
2018-03-09  9:06 ` [PATCH 06/39] arm64: entry: Ensure branch through syscall table is bounded under speculation Alex Shi
2018-03-09  9:06 ` [PATCH 07/39] arm64: Use pointer masking to limit uaccess speculation Alex Shi
2018-03-09  9:06 ` [PATCH 08/39] arm64: uaccess: Prevent speculative use of the current addr_limit Alex Shi
2018-03-09  9:06 ` [PATCH 09/39] arm64: uaccess: Don't bother eliding access_ok checks in __{get, put}_user Alex Shi
2018-03-09  9:06 ` [PATCH 10/39] arm64: futex: Mask __user pointers prior to dereference Alex Shi
2018-03-09  9:06 ` [PATCH 11/39] drivers/firmware: Expose psci_get_version through psci_ops structure Alex Shi
2018-03-09  9:06 ` [PATCH 12/39] arm64: Move post_ttbr_update_workaround to C code Alex Shi
2018-03-09  9:06 ` [PATCH 13/39] arm64: Add skeleton to harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks Alex Shi
2018-03-09  9:06 ` [PATCH 14/39] arm64: Move BP hardening to check_and_switch_context Alex Shi
2018-03-09  9:06 ` [PATCH 15/39] arm64: KVM: Use per-CPU vector when BP hardening is enabled Alex Shi
2018-03-09  9:06 ` [PATCH 16/39] arm64: entry: Apply BP hardening for high-priority synchronous exceptions Alex Shi
2018-03-09  9:07 ` [PATCH 17/39] arm64: entry: Apply BP hardening for suspicious interrupts from EL0 Alex Shi
2018-03-09  9:07 ` [PATCH 18/39] arm64: cpu_errata: Allow an erratum to be match for all revisions of a core Alex Shi
2018-03-09  9:07 ` [PATCH 19/39] arm64: prefetch: add alternative pattern for CPUs without a prefetcher Alex Shi
2018-03-09  9:07 ` [PATCH 20/39] arm64: cputype: Add missing MIDR values for Cortex-A72 and Cortex-A75 Alex Shi
2018-03-09  9:07 ` [PATCH 21/39] arm64: Implement branch predictor hardening for affected Cortex-A CPUs Alex Shi
2018-03-09  9:07 ` [PATCH 22/39] arm64: KVM: Increment PC after handling an SMC trap Alex Shi
2018-03-09  9:07 ` [PATCH 23/39] arm/arm64: KVM: Consolidate the PSCI include files Alex Shi
2018-03-09  9:07 ` [PATCH 24/39] arm/arm64: KVM: Add PSCI_VERSION helper Alex Shi
2018-03-09  9:07 ` [PATCH 25/39] arm/arm64: KVM: Add smccc accessors to PSCI code Alex Shi
2018-03-09  9:07 ` [PATCH 26/39] arm/arm64: KVM: Implement PSCI 1.0 support Alex Shi
2018-03-09  9:07 ` [PATCH 27/39] ARM: 8478/2: arm/arm64: add arm-smccc Alex Shi
2018-03-09  9:07 ` [PATCH 28/39] ARM: 8479/2: add implementation for arm-smccc Alex Shi
2018-03-09  9:07 ` [PATCH 29/39] ARM: 8480/2: arm64: " Alex Shi
2018-03-09  9:07 ` [PATCH 30/39] ARM: 8481/2: drivers: psci: replace psci firmware calls Alex Shi
2018-03-09  9:07 ` [PATCH 31/39] arm/arm64: KVM: Advertise SMCCC v1.1 Alex Shi
2018-03-09  9:07 ` [PATCH 32/39] arm/arm64: KVM: Turn kvm_psci_version into a static inline Alex Shi
2018-03-09  9:07 ` [PATCH 33/39] arm64: KVM: Report SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 BP hardening support Alex Shi
2018-03-09  9:07 ` [PATCH 34/39] arm64: KVM: Add SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 fast handling Alex Shi
2018-03-09  9:07 ` [PATCH 35/39] firmware/psci: Expose PSCI conduit Alex Shi
2018-03-09  9:07 ` [PATCH 36/39] firmware/psci: Expose SMCCC version through psci_ops Alex Shi
2018-03-09  9:07 ` [PATCH 37/39] arm/arm64: smccc: Make function identifiers an unsigned quantity Alex Shi
2018-03-09  9:07 ` [PATCH 38/39] arm/arm64: smccc: Implement SMCCC v1.1 inline primitive Alex Shi
2018-03-09  9:07 ` [PATCH 39/39] arm64: Add ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 BP hardening support Alex Shi

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