From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: alex.shi@linaro.org (Alex Shi) Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2018 17:06:51 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 08/39] arm64: uaccess: Prevent speculative use of the current addr_limit In-Reply-To: <20180309090722.26279-1-alex.shi@linaro.org> References: <20180309090722.26279-1-alex.shi@linaro.org> Message-ID: <20180309090722.26279-9-alex.shi@linaro.org> To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org List-Id: linux-arm-kernel.lists.infradead.org From: Will Deacon commit c2f0ad4fc089 upstream. A mispredicted conditional call to set_fs could result in the wrong addr_limit being forwarded under speculation to a subsequent access_ok check, potentially forming part of a spectre-v1 attack using uaccess routines. This patch prevents this forwarding from taking place, but putting heavy barriers in set_fs after writing the addr_limit. Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland Signed-off-by: Will Deacon Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas Signed-off-by: Alex Shi --- arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h index 75363d723262..fc11c50af558 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -62,6 +62,13 @@ extern int fixup_exception(struct pt_regs *regs); static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs) { current_thread_info()->addr_limit = fs; + + /* + * Prevent a mispredicted conditional call to set_fs from forwarding + * the wrong address limit to access_ok under speculation. + */ + dsb(nsh); + isb(); } #define segment_eq(a, b) ((a) == (b)) -- 2.16.2.440.gc6284da