From: jan.glauber@caviumnetworks.com (Jan Glauber)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: arm64: W+X mapping check failures
Date: Wed, 25 Apr 2018 15:37:04 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180425133704.GA6474@hc> (raw)
Hi all,
enabling CONFIG_DEBUG_WX we see insecure mappings reported across various kernel
versions and machines. I've not yet seen this with upstream but that doesn't
mean much as the issue is a race and I cannot trigger it reliably.
The reported W+X mappings are gone after the boot is finished. The addresses
all belong to .init.* sections of the first loaded kernel modules.
Example log (I changed the warnings as I found the backtrace quite useless):
[ 39.157884] Freeing unused kernel memory: 5248K
[ 39.167997] note_prot_wx: Found insecure W+X mapping at start: ffff000000ab9000 addr: ffff000000abd000 pages: 4
[ 39.178246] note_prot_wx: Found insecure W+X mapping at start: ffff000000ac3000 addr: ffff000000ac5000 pages: 2
[ 39.188495] note_prot_wx: Found insecure W+X mapping at start: ffff000000acd000 addr: ffff000000ad0000 pages: 3
[ 39.198745] note_prot_wx: Found insecure W+X mapping at start: ffff000000af9000 addr: ffff000000afc000 pages: 3
[ 39.212981] Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, 12 W+X pages found, 0 non-UXN pages found
I think this is a race between module loading and the ptdump_check_wx().
The RCU'd do_free_init() can be delayed _after_ ptdump_check_wx() for a coming module.
I tried using stop_machine() around the memory check similar to arm but that does not
solve the race. It is not a critical issue as the .init sections are freed afterwards
anyway but still the warning is a bit misleading.
Any thoughts?
--Jan
next reply other threads:[~2018-04-25 13:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-04-25 13:37 Jan Glauber [this message]
2018-04-25 13:55 ` arm64: W+X mapping check failures Jeffrey Hugo
2018-04-25 14:50 ` Jan Glauber
2018-04-25 15:18 ` Jeffrey Hugo
2018-04-25 13:57 ` Mark Rutland
2018-04-25 14:47 ` Jan Glauber
2018-04-26 11:00 ` James Morse
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