From: marc.zyngier@arm.com (Marc Zyngier)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 10/17] arm64: ssbd: Add prctl interface for per-thread mitigation
Date: Tue, 29 May 2018 13:11:14 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180529121121.24927-11-marc.zyngier@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180529121121.24927-1-marc.zyngier@arm.com>
If running on a system that performs dynamic SSBD mitigation, allow
userspace to request the mitigation for itself. This is implemented
as a prctl call, allowing the mitigation to be enabled or disabled at
will for this particular thread.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
---
arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile | 1 +
arch/arm64/kernel/ssbd.c | 107 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 108 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/ssbd.c
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile b/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile
index bf825f38d206..0025f8691046 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_ARM64_RELOC_TEST) += arm64-reloc-test.o
arm64-reloc-test-y := reloc_test_core.o reloc_test_syms.o
arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP) += crash_dump.o
arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_ARM_SDE_INTERFACE) += sdei.o
+arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD) += ssbd.o
obj-y += $(arm64-obj-y) vdso/ probes/
obj-m += $(arm64-obj-m)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/ssbd.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/ssbd.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..07b12c034ec2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/ssbd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 ARM Ltd, All Rights Reserved.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/thread_info.h>
+
+#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+
+/*
+ * prctl interface for SSBD
+ */
+static int ssbd_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
+{
+ int state = arm64_get_ssbd_state();
+
+ /* Unsupported */
+ if (state == ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Treat the unaffected/mitigated state separately */
+ if (state == ARM64_SSBD_MITIGATED) {
+ switch (ctrl) {
+ case PR_SPEC_ENABLE:
+ return -EPERM;
+ case PR_SPEC_DISABLE:
+ case PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE:
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Things are a bit backward here: the arm64 internal API
+ * *enables the mitigation* when the userspace API *disables
+ * speculation*. So much fun.
+ */
+ switch (ctrl) {
+ case PR_SPEC_ENABLE:
+ /* If speculation is force disabled, enable is not allowed */
+ if (state == ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE ||
+ task_spec_ssb_force_disable(task))
+ return -EPERM;
+ task_clear_spec_ssb_disable(task);
+ clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD);
+ break;
+ case PR_SPEC_DISABLE:
+ if (state == ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE)
+ return -EPERM;
+ task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task);
+ set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD);
+ break;
+ case PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE:
+ if (state == ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE)
+ return -EPERM;
+ task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task);
+ task_set_spec_ssb_force_disable(task);
+ set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD);
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -ERANGE;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which,
+ unsigned long ctrl)
+{
+ switch (which) {
+ case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
+ return ssbd_prctl_set(task, ctrl);
+ default:
+ return -ENODEV;
+ }
+}
+
+static int ssbd_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ switch (arm64_get_ssbd_state()) {
+ case ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE:
+ return PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
+ case ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL:
+ if (task_spec_ssb_force_disable(task))
+ return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE;
+ if (task_spec_ssb_disable(task))
+ return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
+ return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
+ case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE:
+ return PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
+ default:
+ return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED;
+ }
+}
+
+int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which)
+{
+ switch (which) {
+ case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
+ return ssbd_prctl_get(task);
+ default:
+ return -ENODEV;
+ }
+}
--
2.14.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-05-29 12:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-05-29 12:11 [PATCH v2 00/17] arm64 SSBD (aka Spectre-v4) mitigation Marc Zyngier
2018-05-29 12:11 ` [PATCH v2 01/17] arm/arm64: smccc: Add SMCCC-specific return codes Marc Zyngier
2018-05-29 12:11 ` [PATCH v2 02/17] arm64: Call ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 on transitions between EL0 and EL1 Marc Zyngier
2018-05-29 12:11 ` [PATCH v2 03/17] arm64: Add per-cpu infrastructure to call ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 Marc Zyngier
2018-05-29 12:11 ` [PATCH v2 04/17] arm64: Add ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 probing Marc Zyngier
2018-05-29 13:39 ` Suzuki K Poulose
2018-05-29 12:11 ` [PATCH v2 05/17] arm64: Add 'ssbd' command-line option Marc Zyngier
2018-06-09 12:53 ` Jon Masters
2018-06-09 13:19 ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-29 12:11 ` [PATCH v2 06/17] arm64: ssbd: Add global mitigation state accessor Marc Zyngier
2018-05-29 12:11 ` [PATCH v2 07/17] arm64: ssbd: Skip apply_ssbd if not using dynamic mitigation Marc Zyngier
2018-06-09 13:03 ` Jon Masters
2018-06-09 13:21 ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-29 12:11 ` [PATCH v2 08/17] arm64: ssbd: Restore mitigation status on CPU resume Marc Zyngier
2018-05-29 13:35 ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-29 12:11 ` [PATCH v2 09/17] arm64: ssbd: Introduce thread flag to control userspace mitigation Marc Zyngier
2018-05-29 12:11 ` Marc Zyngier [this message]
2018-05-29 12:11 ` [PATCH v2 11/17] arm64: KVM: Add HYP per-cpu accessors Marc Zyngier
2018-05-29 12:11 ` [PATCH v2 12/17] arm64: KVM: Add ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 support for guests Marc Zyngier
2018-06-09 13:09 ` Jon Masters
2018-06-09 13:21 ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-29 12:11 ` [PATCH v2 13/17] arm64: KVM: Handle guest's ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 requests Marc Zyngier
2018-05-29 12:11 ` [PATCH v2 14/17] arm64: KVM: Add ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 discovery through ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID Marc Zyngier
2018-05-29 12:11 ` [PATCH v2 15/17] arm64: Add test_and_clear_flag and set_flag atomic assembler primitives Marc Zyngier
2018-05-29 12:11 ` [PATCH v2 16/17] arm64: ssbd: Enable delayed setting of TIF_SSBD Marc Zyngier
2018-05-29 12:11 ` [PATCH v2 17/17] arm64: ssbd: Implement arch_seccomp_spec_mitigate Marc Zyngier
2018-05-30 15:58 ` [PATCH v2 00/17] arm64 SSBD (aka Spectre-v4) mitigation Will Deacon
2018-05-31 16:41 ` Catalin Marinas
2018-05-31 16:55 ` Marc Zyngier
2018-06-09 13:16 ` Jon Masters
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