From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Kristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Ramana Radhakrishnan <ramana.radhakrishnan@arm.com>,
Amit Kachhap <Amit.Kachhap@arm.com>,
Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [RFC v2 4/7] arm64: enable ptrauth earlier
Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 20:11:57 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <201905292010.8C66149@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190529190332.29753-5-kristina.martsenko@arm.com>
On Wed, May 29, 2019 at 08:03:29PM +0100, Kristina Martsenko wrote:
> When the kernel is compiled with pointer auth instructions, the boot CPU
> needs to start using address auth very early, so change the cpucap to
> account for this.
>
> A function that enables pointer auth cannot return, so compile such
> functions without pointer auth (using a compiler function attribute).
> The __no_ptrauth macro will be defined to the required function
> attribute in a later patch.
>
> Do not use the cpu_enable callback, to avoid compiling the whole
> callchain down to cpu_enable without pointer auth.
>
> Note the change in behavior: if the boot CPU has address auth and a late
> CPU does not, then we offline the late CPU. Until now we would have just
> disabled address auth in this case.
>
> Leave generic authentication as a "system scope" cpucap for now, since
> initially the kernel will only use address authentication.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com>
This feels a little out of order to define the empty __no_ptrauth here.
The only better option I can think of is to split the compiler flag
patch in half to introduce the __no_ptrauth flag in full, on its own.
Either way:
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-Kees
> ---
>
> Changes since RFC v1:
> - Enable instructions for all 5 keys
> - Replaced __always_inline with __no_ptrauth as it turns out __always_inline
> is only a hint (and could therefore result in crashes)
> - Left the __no_ptrauth definition blank for now as it needs to be determined
> with more complex logic in a later patch
> - Updated the Kconfig symbol description
> - Minor cleanups
> - Updated the commit message
>
> arch/arm64/Kconfig | 4 ++++
> arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 9 +++++++++
> arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
> arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 13 +++----------
> arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c | 7 ++++++-
> 5 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
> index 7e34b9eba5de..f4c1e9b30129 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
> @@ -1304,6 +1304,10 @@ config ARM64_PTR_AUTH
> hardware it will not be advertised to userspace nor will it be
> enabled.
>
> + If the feature is present on the primary CPU but not a secondary CPU,
> + then the secondary CPU will be offlined. On such a system, this
> + option should not be selected.
> +
> endmenu
>
> config ARM64_SVE
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h
> index ad952f2e0a2b..e36a7948b763 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h
> @@ -299,6 +299,15 @@ extern struct arm64_ftr_reg arm64_ftr_reg_ctrel0;
> #define ARM64_CPUCAP_STRICT_BOOT_CPU_FEATURE \
> (ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_BOOT_CPU | ARM64_CPUCAP_PANIC_ON_CONFLICT)
>
> +/*
> + * CPU feature used early in the boot based on the boot CPU. It is safe for a
> + * late CPU to have this feature even though the boot CPU hasn't enabled it,
> + * although the feature will not be used by Linux in this case. If the boot CPU
> + * has enabled this feature already, then every late CPU must have it.
> + */
> +#define ARM64_CPUCAP_BOOT_CPU_FEATURE \
> + (ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_BOOT_CPU | ARM64_CPUCAP_PERMITTED_FOR_LATE_CPU)
> +
> struct arm64_cpu_capabilities {
> const char *desc;
> u16 capability;
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h
> index fc8dc70cc19f..a97b7dc10bdb 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h
> @@ -11,6 +11,13 @@
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH
> /*
> + * Compile the function without pointer authentication instructions. This
> + * allows pointer authentication to be enabled/disabled within the function
> + * (but leaves the function unprotected by pointer authentication).
> + */
> +#define __no_ptrauth
> +
> +/*
> * Each key is a 128-bit quantity which is split across a pair of 64-bit
> * registers (Lo and Hi).
> */
> @@ -50,6 +57,16 @@ do { \
> write_sysreg_s(__pki_v.hi, SYS_ ## k ## KEYHI_EL1); \
> } while (0)
>
> +static inline void __no_ptrauth ptrauth_cpu_enable(void)
> +{
> + if (!system_supports_address_auth())
> + return;
> +
> + sysreg_clear_set(sctlr_el1, 0, SCTLR_ELx_ENIA | SCTLR_ELx_ENIB |
> + SCTLR_ELx_ENDA | SCTLR_ELx_ENDB);
> + isb();
> +}
> +
> extern int ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long arg);
>
> /*
> @@ -68,6 +85,8 @@ static inline unsigned long ptrauth_strip_insn_pac(unsigned long ptr)
> ptrauth_keys_init(&(tsk)->thread.keys_user)
>
> #else /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */
> +#define __no_ptrauth
> +#define ptrauth_cpu_enable(tsk)
> #define ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys(tsk, arg) (-EINVAL)
> #define ptrauth_strip_insn_pac(lr) (lr)
> #define ptrauth_thread_init_user(tsk)
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
> index 8a595b4cb0aa..2cf042ebb237 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
> @@ -1200,12 +1200,6 @@ static void cpu_clear_disr(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
> #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_RAS_EXTN */
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH
> -static void cpu_enable_address_auth(struct arm64_cpu_capabilities const *cap)
> -{
> - sysreg_clear_set(sctlr_el1, 0, SCTLR_ELx_ENIA | SCTLR_ELx_ENIB |
> - SCTLR_ELx_ENDA | SCTLR_ELx_ENDB);
> -}
> -
> static bool has_address_auth(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
> int __unused)
> {
> @@ -1474,7 +1468,7 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = {
> {
> .desc = "Address authentication (architected algorithm)",
> .capability = ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_ARCH,
> - .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE,
> + .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_BOOT_CPU_FEATURE,
> .sys_reg = SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1,
> .sign = FTR_UNSIGNED,
> .field_pos = ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT,
> @@ -1484,7 +1478,7 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = {
> {
> .desc = "Address authentication (IMP DEF algorithm)",
> .capability = ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_IMP_DEF,
> - .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE,
> + .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_BOOT_CPU_FEATURE,
> .sys_reg = SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1,
> .sign = FTR_UNSIGNED,
> .field_pos = ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT,
> @@ -1493,9 +1487,8 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = {
> },
> {
> .capability = ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH,
> - .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE,
> + .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_BOOT_CPU_FEATURE,
> .matches = has_address_auth,
> - .cpu_enable = cpu_enable_address_auth,
> },
> {
> .desc = "Generic authentication (architected algorithm)",
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c
> index 824de7038967..eca6aa05ac66 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c
> @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@
> #include <asm/numa.h>
> #include <asm/pgtable.h>
> #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
> +#include <asm/pointer_auth.h>
> #include <asm/processor.h>
> #include <asm/smp_plat.h>
> #include <asm/sections.h>
> @@ -238,6 +239,8 @@ asmlinkage notrace void secondary_start_kernel(void)
> */
> check_local_cpu_capabilities();
>
> + ptrauth_cpu_enable();
> +
> if (cpu_ops[cpu]->cpu_postboot)
> cpu_ops[cpu]->cpu_postboot();
>
> @@ -432,7 +435,7 @@ void __init smp_cpus_done(unsigned int max_cpus)
> mark_linear_text_alias_ro();
> }
>
> -void __init smp_prepare_boot_cpu(void)
> +void __init __no_ptrauth smp_prepare_boot_cpu(void)
> {
> set_my_cpu_offset(per_cpu_offset(smp_processor_id()));
> /*
> @@ -452,6 +455,8 @@ void __init smp_prepare_boot_cpu(void)
> /* Conditionally switch to GIC PMR for interrupt masking */
> if (system_uses_irq_prio_masking())
> init_gic_priority_masking();
> +
> + ptrauth_cpu_enable();
> }
>
> static u64 __init of_get_cpu_mpidr(struct device_node *dn)
> --
> 2.11.0
>
--
Kees Cook
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-05-30 3:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 41+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-05-29 19:03 [RFC v2 0/7] arm64: return address signing Kristina Martsenko
2019-05-29 19:03 ` [RFC v2 1/7] arm64: cpufeature: add pointer auth meta-capabilities Kristina Martsenko
2019-05-30 1:58 ` Kees Cook
2019-05-30 10:50 ` Suzuki K Poulose
2019-06-13 16:13 ` Suzuki K Poulose
2019-05-29 19:03 ` [RFC v2 2/7] arm64: install user ptrauth keys at kernel exit time Kristina Martsenko
2019-05-30 2:04 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-06 16:26 ` Catalin Marinas
2019-05-29 19:03 ` [RFC v2 3/7] arm64: cpufeature: handle conflicts based on capability Kristina Martsenko
2019-05-30 2:49 ` Kees Cook
2019-05-30 14:16 ` Suzuki K Poulose
2019-05-31 14:00 ` Kristina Martsenko
2019-05-31 15:08 ` Suzuki K Poulose
2019-05-29 19:03 ` [RFC v2 4/7] arm64: enable ptrauth earlier Kristina Martsenko
2019-05-30 3:11 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2019-06-13 15:41 ` Suzuki K Poulose
2019-05-29 19:03 ` [RFC v2 5/7] arm64: initialize and switch ptrauth kernel keys Kristina Martsenko
2019-05-30 3:34 ` Kees Cook
2019-05-30 16:26 ` Kristina Martsenko
2019-06-04 10:03 ` Dave Martin
2019-06-06 16:44 ` Catalin Marinas
2019-06-12 16:21 ` Kristina Martsenko
2019-06-13 10:44 ` Catalin Marinas
2019-05-29 19:03 ` [RFC v2 6/7] arm64: unwind: strip PAC from kernel addresses Kristina Martsenko
2019-05-30 3:36 ` Kees Cook
2019-05-29 19:03 ` [RFC v2 7/7] arm64: compile the kernel with ptrauth return address signing Kristina Martsenko
2019-05-30 3:45 ` Kees Cook
2019-05-30 3:09 ` [RFC v2 0/7] arm64: " Kees Cook
2019-05-30 7:25 ` Will Deacon
2019-05-30 8:39 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-05-30 9:11 ` Ramana Radhakrishnan
2019-05-30 9:12 ` Ramana Radhakrishnan
2019-06-06 17:44 ` Kristina Martsenko
2019-06-08 4:09 ` Kees Cook
[not found] ` <DB7PR08MB3865C4AA36C9C465B2A687DABF180@DB7PR08MB3865.eurprd08.prod.outlook.com>
2019-05-30 15:57 ` Kees Cook
[not found] ` <DB7PR08MB3865A83066179CE419D171EDBF180@DB7PR08MB3865.eurprd08.prod.outlook.com>
2019-05-30 18:05 ` Kees Cook
2019-05-31 9:22 ` Will Deacon
2019-06-02 15:43 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-03 10:40 ` Will Deacon
2019-06-04 13:52 ` Luke Cheeseman
2019-06-06 17:43 ` Kristina Martsenko
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