From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
"Diogo N. Sampaio" <diogo.sampaio@arm.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Luke Cheeseman <luke.cheeseman@arm.com>,
Kristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com>,
Ramana Radhakrishnan <ramana.radhakrishnan@arm.com>,
Amit Kachhap <Amit.Kachhap@arm.com>,
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [RFC v2 0/7] arm64: return address signing
Date: Thu, 30 May 2019 08:25:07 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190530072507.GA9955@brain-police> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <201905292004.3809FBAA66@keescook>
On Wed, May 29, 2019 at 08:09:23PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Wed, May 29, 2019 at 08:03:25PM +0100, Kristina Martsenko wrote:
> > This series improves function return address protection for the arm64 kernel, by
> > compiling the kernel with ARMv8.3 Pointer Authentication instructions. This
> > should help protect the kernel against attacks using return-oriented
> > programming.
>
> Can you speak to whether this feature should be enalbed in addition to
> or instead of the standard stack canary option?
Hmm. That's a really interesting question. Given that PAC is optional in the
hardware and behaves as NOPs on older CPUs, I've have thought that we'd need
to continue enabling stack canaries regardless. However, that then raises
the obvious question as to whether we could patch out the canary code if we
detect PAC at runtime, which probably needs compiler help...
Then again, perhaps there's benefit in having both features enabled.
So I think I agree with your question :)
Will
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-05-30 7:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 41+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-05-29 19:03 [RFC v2 0/7] arm64: return address signing Kristina Martsenko
2019-05-29 19:03 ` [RFC v2 1/7] arm64: cpufeature: add pointer auth meta-capabilities Kristina Martsenko
2019-05-30 1:58 ` Kees Cook
2019-05-30 10:50 ` Suzuki K Poulose
2019-06-13 16:13 ` Suzuki K Poulose
2019-05-29 19:03 ` [RFC v2 2/7] arm64: install user ptrauth keys at kernel exit time Kristina Martsenko
2019-05-30 2:04 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-06 16:26 ` Catalin Marinas
2019-05-29 19:03 ` [RFC v2 3/7] arm64: cpufeature: handle conflicts based on capability Kristina Martsenko
2019-05-30 2:49 ` Kees Cook
2019-05-30 14:16 ` Suzuki K Poulose
2019-05-31 14:00 ` Kristina Martsenko
2019-05-31 15:08 ` Suzuki K Poulose
2019-05-29 19:03 ` [RFC v2 4/7] arm64: enable ptrauth earlier Kristina Martsenko
2019-05-30 3:11 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-13 15:41 ` Suzuki K Poulose
2019-05-29 19:03 ` [RFC v2 5/7] arm64: initialize and switch ptrauth kernel keys Kristina Martsenko
2019-05-30 3:34 ` Kees Cook
2019-05-30 16:26 ` Kristina Martsenko
2019-06-04 10:03 ` Dave Martin
2019-06-06 16:44 ` Catalin Marinas
2019-06-12 16:21 ` Kristina Martsenko
2019-06-13 10:44 ` Catalin Marinas
2019-05-29 19:03 ` [RFC v2 6/7] arm64: unwind: strip PAC from kernel addresses Kristina Martsenko
2019-05-30 3:36 ` Kees Cook
2019-05-29 19:03 ` [RFC v2 7/7] arm64: compile the kernel with ptrauth return address signing Kristina Martsenko
2019-05-30 3:45 ` Kees Cook
2019-05-30 3:09 ` [RFC v2 0/7] arm64: " Kees Cook
2019-05-30 7:25 ` Will Deacon [this message]
2019-05-30 8:39 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-05-30 9:11 ` Ramana Radhakrishnan
2019-05-30 9:12 ` Ramana Radhakrishnan
2019-06-06 17:44 ` Kristina Martsenko
2019-06-08 4:09 ` Kees Cook
[not found] ` <DB7PR08MB3865C4AA36C9C465B2A687DABF180@DB7PR08MB3865.eurprd08.prod.outlook.com>
2019-05-30 15:57 ` Kees Cook
[not found] ` <DB7PR08MB3865A83066179CE419D171EDBF180@DB7PR08MB3865.eurprd08.prod.outlook.com>
2019-05-30 18:05 ` Kees Cook
2019-05-31 9:22 ` Will Deacon
2019-06-02 15:43 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-03 10:40 ` Will Deacon
2019-06-04 13:52 ` Luke Cheeseman
2019-06-06 17:43 ` Kristina Martsenko
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