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From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: Stefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@i2se.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Subject: [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 13/16] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre-v2
Date: Tue,  8 Oct 2019 17:39:27 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20191008153930.15386-14-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191008153930.15386-1-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>

From: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>

[ Upstream commit d2532e27b5638bb2e2dd52b80b7ea2ec65135377 ]

Track whether all the cores in the machine are vulnerable to Spectre-v2,
and whether all the vulnerable cores have been mitigated. We then expose
this information to userspace via sysfs.

Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@i2se.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
index 96b0319dd0d6..b29d0b3b18b2 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
@@ -480,6 +480,10 @@ has_cortex_a76_erratum_1463225(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
 	.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM,			\
 	CAP_MIDR_RANGE_LIST(midr_list)
 
+/* Track overall mitigation state. We are only mitigated if all cores are ok */
+static bool __hardenbp_enab = true;
+static bool __spectrev2_safe = true;
+
 /*
  * Generic helper for handling capabilties with multiple (match,enable) pairs
  * of call backs, sharing the same capability bit.
@@ -522,6 +526,10 @@ static const struct midr_range spectre_v2_safe_list[] = {
 	{ /* sentinel */ }
 };
 
+/*
+ * Track overall bp hardening for all heterogeneous cores in the machine.
+ * We are only considered "safe" if all booted cores are known safe.
+ */
 static bool __maybe_unused
 check_branch_predictor(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)
 {
@@ -543,6 +551,8 @@ check_branch_predictor(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)
 	if (!need_wa)
 		return false;
 
+	__spectrev2_safe = false;
+
 	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR)) {
 		pr_warn_once("spectrev2 mitigation disabled by kernel configuration\n");
 		__hardenbp_enab = false;
@@ -552,11 +562,14 @@ check_branch_predictor(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)
 	/* forced off */
 	if (__nospectre_v2) {
 		pr_info_once("spectrev2 mitigation disabled by command line option\n");
+		__hardenbp_enab = false;
 		return false;
 	}
 
-	if (need_wa < 0)
+	if (need_wa < 0) {
 		pr_warn_once("ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 missing from firmware\n");
+		__hardenbp_enab = false;
+	}
 
 	return (need_wa > 0);
 }
@@ -753,3 +766,15 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 {
 	return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
 }
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
+		char *buf)
+{
+	if (__spectrev2_safe)
+		return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+
+	if (__hardenbp_enab)
+		return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: Branch predictor hardening\n");
+
+	return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+}
-- 
2.20.1


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  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-10-08 15:43 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-10-08 15:39 [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 00/16] arm64 spec mitigation backports Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-08 15:39 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 01/16] arm64: cpufeature: Detect SSBS and advertise to userspace Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-08 15:39 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 02/16] arm64: ssbd: Add support for PSTATE.SSBS rather than trapping to EL3 Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-09  8:04   ` Patch "arm64: ssbd: Add support for PSTATE.SSBS rather than trapping to EL3" has been added to the 4.19-stable tree gregkh
2019-10-08 15:39 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 03/16] KVM: arm64: Set SCTLR_EL2.DSSBS if SSBD is forcefully disabled and !vhe Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-09  8:04   ` Patch "KVM: arm64: Set SCTLR_EL2.DSSBS if SSBD is forcefully disabled and !vhe" has been added to the 4.19-stable tree gregkh
2019-10-08 15:39 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 04/16] arm64: docs: Document SSBS HWCAP Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-09  8:04   ` Patch "arm64: docs: Document SSBS HWCAP" has been added to the 4.19-stable tree gregkh
2019-10-08 15:39 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 05/16] arm64: fix SSBS sanitization Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-09  8:04   ` Patch "arm64: fix SSBS sanitization" has been added to the 4.19-stable tree gregkh
2019-10-08 15:39 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 06/16] arm64: Add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre-v1 Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-09  8:04   ` Patch "arm64: Add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre-v1" has been added to the 4.19-stable tree gregkh
2019-10-08 15:39 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 07/16] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for meltdown Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-09  8:04   ` Patch "arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for meltdown" has been added to the 4.19-stable tree gregkh
2019-10-08 15:39 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 08/16] arm64: enable generic CPU vulnerabilites support Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-09  8:04   ` Patch "arm64: enable generic CPU vulnerabilites support" has been added to the 4.19-stable tree gregkh
2019-10-08 15:39 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 09/16] arm64: Always enable ssb vulnerability detection Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-09  8:04   ` Patch "arm64: Always enable ssb vulnerability detection" has been added to the 4.19-stable tree gregkh
2019-10-08 15:39 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 10/16] arm64: Provide a command line to disable spectre_v2 mitigation Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-09  8:04   ` Patch "arm64: Provide a command line to disable spectre_v2 mitigation" has been added to the 4.19-stable tree gregkh
2019-10-08 15:39 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 11/16] arm64: Advertise mitigation of Spectre-v2, or lack thereof Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-09  8:04   ` Patch "arm64: Advertise mitigation of Spectre-v2, or lack thereof" has been added to the 4.19-stable tree gregkh
2019-10-08 15:39 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 12/16] arm64: Always enable spectre-v2 vulnerability detection Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-09  8:04   ` Patch "arm64: Always enable spectre-v2 vulnerability detection" has been added to the 4.19-stable tree gregkh
2019-10-08 15:39 ` Ard Biesheuvel [this message]
2019-10-09  8:04   ` Patch "arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre-v2" " gregkh
2019-10-08 15:39 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 14/16] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for speculative store bypass Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-09  8:04   ` Patch "arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for speculative store bypass" has been added to the 4.19-stable tree gregkh
2019-10-08 15:39 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 15/16] arm64: ssbs: Don't treat CPUs with SSBS as unaffected by SSB Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-09  8:04   ` Patch "arm64: ssbs: Don't treat CPUs with SSBS as unaffected by SSB" has been added to the 4.19-stable tree gregkh
2019-10-08 15:39 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 16/16] arm64: Force SSBS on context switch Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-09  8:04   ` Patch "arm64: Force SSBS on context switch" has been added to the 4.19-stable tree gregkh
2019-10-09  8:04 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 00/16] arm64 spec mitigation backports Greg KH
2019-10-09  8:17   ` Ard Biesheuvel

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