From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: mark.rutland@arm.com, catalin.marinas@arm.com,
robin.murphy@arm.com, james.morse@arm.com, will@kernel.org,
hch@lst.de
Subject: [PATCHv3 01/17] arm64: ensure ERET from kthread is illegal
Date: Mon, 26 Oct 2020 13:31:40 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201026133156.44186-2-mark.rutland@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201026133156.44186-1-mark.rutland@arm.com>
For consistency, all tasks have a pt_regs reserved at the highest
portion of their task stack. Among other things, this ensures that a
task's SP is always pointing within its stack rather than pointing
immediately past the end.
While it is never legitimate to ERET from a kthread, we take pains to
initialize pt_regs for kthreads as if this were legitimate. As this is
never legitimate, the effects of an erroneous return are rarely tested.
Let's simplify things by initializing a kthread's pt_regs such that an
ERET is caught as an illegal exception return, and removing the explicit
initialization of other exception context. Note that as
spectre_v4_enable_task_mitigation() only manipulates the PSTATE within
the unused regs this is safe to remove.
As user tasks will have their exception context initialized via
start_thread() or start_compat_thread(), this should only impact cases
where something has gone very wrong and we'd like that to be clearly
indicated.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
---
arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 17 ++++++++---------
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
index 4784011cecac9..855137daafbfb 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
@@ -422,16 +422,15 @@ int copy_thread(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long stack_start,
if (clone_flags & CLONE_SETTLS)
p->thread.uw.tp_value = tls;
} else {
+ /*
+ * A kthread has no context to ERET to, so ensure any buggy
+ * ERET is treated as an illegal exception return.
+ *
+ * When a user task is created from a kthread, childregs will
+ * be initialized by start_thread() or start_compat_thread().
+ */
memset(childregs, 0, sizeof(struct pt_regs));
- childregs->pstate = PSR_MODE_EL1h;
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_UAO) &&
- cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_UAO))
- childregs->pstate |= PSR_UAO_BIT;
-
- spectre_v4_enable_task_mitigation(p);
-
- if (system_uses_irq_prio_masking())
- childregs->pmr_save = GIC_PRIO_IRQON;
+ childregs->pstate = PSR_MODE_EL1h | PSR_IL_BIT;
p->thread.cpu_context.x19 = stack_start;
p->thread.cpu_context.x20 = stk_sz;
--
2.11.0
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-10-26 13:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-10-26 13:31 [PATCHv3 00/17] arm64: remove set_fs() and friends Mark Rutland
2020-10-26 13:31 ` Mark Rutland [this message]
2020-10-26 13:31 ` [PATCHv3 02/17] arm64: add C wrappers for SET_PSTATE_*() Mark Rutland
2020-10-26 13:31 ` [PATCHv3 03/17] arm64: head.S: rename el2_setup -> init_kernel_el Mark Rutland
2020-10-26 13:31 ` [PATCHv3 04/17] arm64: head.S: cleanup SCTLR_ELx initialization Mark Rutland
2020-10-26 13:31 ` [PATCHv3 05/17] arm64: head.S: always initialize PSTATE Mark Rutland
2020-10-26 13:31 ` [PATCHv3 06/17] arm64: sdei: move uaccess logic to arch/arm64/ Mark Rutland
2020-10-26 13:31 ` [PATCHv3 07/17] arm64: sdei: explicitly simulate PAN/UAO entry Mark Rutland
2020-10-26 13:31 ` [PATCHv3 08/17] arm64: uaccess: move uao_* alternatives to asm-uaccess.h Mark Rutland
2020-11-03 14:26 ` Will Deacon
2020-11-03 14:41 ` Mark Rutland
2020-10-26 13:31 ` [PATCHv3 09/17] arm64: uaccess: rename privileged uaccess routines Mark Rutland
2020-10-26 13:31 ` [PATCHv3 10/17] arm64: uaccess: simplify __copy_user_flushcache() Mark Rutland
2020-10-27 17:33 ` Robin Murphy
2020-11-02 10:14 ` Mark Rutland
2020-10-26 13:31 ` [PATCHv3 11/17] arm64: uaccess: refactor __{get,put}_user Mark Rutland
2020-10-27 18:03 ` Robin Murphy
2020-11-02 10:25 ` Mark Rutland
2020-10-26 13:31 ` [PATCHv3 12/17] arm64: uaccess: split user/kernel routines Mark Rutland
2020-11-02 10:48 ` Mark Rutland
2020-10-26 13:31 ` [PATCHv3 13/17] arm64: uaccess cleanup macro naming Mark Rutland
2020-10-27 18:45 ` Robin Murphy
2020-11-02 10:35 ` Mark Rutland
2020-10-26 13:31 ` [PATCHv3 14/17] arm64: uaccess: remove set_fs() Mark Rutland
2020-10-26 13:31 ` [PATCHv3 15/17] arm64: uaccess: remove addr_limit_user_check() Mark Rutland
2020-10-26 13:31 ` [PATCHv3 16/17] arm64: uaccess: remove redundant PAN toggling Mark Rutland
2020-10-26 13:31 ` [PATCHv3 17/17] arm64: uaccess: remove vestigal UAO support Mark Rutland
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