From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2B503C433EF for ; Tue, 26 Oct 2021 13:13:09 +0000 (UTC) Received: from bombadil.infradead.org (bombadil.infradead.org [198.137.202.133]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E4CDD60E08 for ; Tue, 26 Oct 2021 13:13:08 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.4.1 mail.kernel.org E4CDD60E08 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=arm.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=lists.infradead.org DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=lists.infradead.org; s=bombadil.20210309; h=Sender: Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-Type:List-Subscribe:List-Help:List-Post: List-Archive:List-Unsubscribe:List-Id:In-Reply-To:MIME-Version:References: Message-ID:Subject:Cc:To:From:Date:Reply-To:Content-ID:Content-Description: Resent-Date:Resent-From:Resent-Sender:Resent-To:Resent-Cc:Resent-Message-ID: List-Owner; bh=BS39ZQpjsMlQS9y7t7LevNFrwKkz4ThN0KnSavOf31c=; b=FMSRaZ02BqdRPr ulKbkuA89+OM2BqfNM+idGNnd1nYSkdnPJH+SjotSifsjYZd+Z1uma65yS8s6mN6DLRJrQRc8c2zM w7rDtZEtdl9mB79u+AkRKRlCxX+xdDFuCfjul7kAyhcXsCME8/v8xyZTg1XgdG+oAteA4mx2Aw5A5 hBDuV8io+cMQfS+CSc3Rix1CGHpOnSGis0c+9gFKRidLIPpprnx4G31xM0J6Oe1zUkLXcj3rTY2DF A8cqt9n+wFSzKKhEYB0i+ArUXJJULP107AC4GtBhKj8uUQUpCt5w+1ghyNxLtdsvoKH5A2R4y6+wS 0/Aw15EH/x7QxgFLBkoQ==; Received: from localhost ([::1] helo=bombadil.infradead.org) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.94.2 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1mfMEp-001qFq-Mj; Tue, 26 Oct 2021 13:11:35 +0000 Received: from foss.arm.com ([217.140.110.172]) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.94.2 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1mfMEk-001qEt-2z for linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org; Tue, 26 Oct 2021 13:11:33 +0000 Received: from usa-sjc-imap-foss1.foss.arm.com (unknown [10.121.207.14]) by usa-sjc-mx-foss1.foss.arm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 069B5D6E; Tue, 26 Oct 2021 06:11:25 -0700 (PDT) Received: from C02TD0UTHF1T.local (unknown [10.57.74.144]) by usa-sjc-imap-foss1.foss.arm.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 461353F73D; Tue, 26 Oct 2021 06:11:22 -0700 (PDT) Date: Tue, 26 Oct 2021 14:11:19 +0100 From: Mark Rutland To: Rob Herring Cc: Will Deacon , Peter Zijlstra , Vince Weaver , honnappa.nagarahalli@arm.com, Zachary.Leaf@arm.com, Catalin Marinas , Ingo Molnar , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , Alexander Shishkin , Jiri Olsa , Namhyung Kim , Thomas Gleixner , Borislav Petkov , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 4/5] arm64: perf: Enable PMU counter userspace access for perf event Message-ID: <20211026131119.GD34073@C02TD0UTHF1T.local> References: <20211019231907.1009567-1-robh@kernel.org> <20211019231907.1009567-5-robh@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20211019231907.1009567-5-robh@kernel.org> X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20211026_061130_251849_8AFE25FD X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 58.53 ) X-BeenThere: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.34 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org On Tue, Oct 19, 2021 at 06:19:06PM -0500, Rob Herring wrote: > Arm PMUs can support direct userspace access of counters which allows for > low overhead (i.e. no syscall) self-monitoring of tasks. The same feature > exists on x86 called 'rdpmc'. Unlike x86, userspace access will only be > enabled for thread bound events. This could be extended if needed, but > simplifies the implementation and reduces the chances for any > information leaks (which the x86 implementation suffers from). > > PMU EL0 access will be enabled when an event with userspace access is > part of the thread's context. This includes when the event is not > scheduled on the PMU. There's some additional overhead clearing > dirty counters when access is enabled in order to prevent leaking > disabled counter data from other tasks. > > Unlike x86, enabling of userspace access must be requested with a new > attr bit: config1:1. If the user requests userspace access with 64-bit > counters, then the event open will fail if the h/w doesn't support > 64-bit counters. Chaining is not supported with userspace access. The > modes for config1 are as follows: > > config1 = 0 : user access disabled and always 32-bit > config1 = 1 : user access disabled and always 64-bit (using chaining if needed) > config1 = 2 : user access enabled and always 32-bit > config1 = 3 : user access enabled and always 64-bit > > Based on work by Raphael Gault , but has been > completely re-written. > > Cc: Will Deacon > Cc: Mark Rutland > Cc: Peter Zijlstra > Cc: Ingo Molnar > Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo > Cc: Alexander Shishkin > Cc: Jiri Olsa > Cc: Namhyung Kim > Cc: Catalin Marinas > Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org > Cc: linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org > Signed-off-by: Rob Herring > --- > v11: > - Add and use armv8pmu_event_has_user_read() helper > - s/armv8pmu_access_event_idx/armv8pmu_user_event_idx/ > - Return error for user access when not a task bound event or no > 64-bit counters when requested. > - Move custom sysctl handler function from prior patch to here > > v10: > - Don't control enabling user access based on mmap(). Changing the > event_(un)mapped to run on the event's cpu doesn't work for x86. > Triggering on mmap() doesn't limit access in any way and complicates > the implementation. > - Drop dirty counter tracking and just clear all unused counters. > - Make the sysctl immediately disable access via IPI. > - Merge armv8pmu_event_is_chained() and armv8pmu_event_can_chain() > > v9: > - Enabling/disabling of user access is now controlled in .start() and > mmap hooks which are now called on CPUs that the event is on. > Depends on rework of perf core and x86 RDPMC code posted here: > https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210728230230.1911468-1-robh@kernel.org/ > > v8: > - Rework user access tracking and enabling to be done on task > context changes using sched_task() hook. This avoids the need for any > IPIs, mm_switch hooks or undef instr handler. > - Only support user access when explicitly requested on open and > only for a thread bound events. This avoids some of the information > leaks x86 has and simplifies the implementation. > > v7: > - Clear disabled counters when user access is enabled for a task to > avoid leaking other tasks counter data. > - Rework context switch handling utilizing sched_task callback > - Add armv8pmu_event_can_chain() helper > - Rework config1 flags handling structure > - Use ARMV8_IDX_CYCLE_COUNTER_USER define for remapped user cycle > counter index > > v6: > - Add new attr.config1 rdpmc bit for userspace to hint it wants > userspace access when also requesting 64-bit counters. > > v5: > - Only set cap_user_rdpmc if event is on current cpu > - Limit enabling/disabling access to CPUs associated with the PMU > (supported_cpus) and with the mm_struct matching current->active_mm. > > v2: > - Move mapped/unmapped into arm64 code. Fixes arm32. > - Rebase on cap_user_time_short changes > > Changes from Raphael's v4: > - Drop homogeneous check > - Disable access for chained counters > - Set pmc_width in user page > --- > arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c | 117 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- > 1 file changed, 110 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c > index 6ae20c4217af..c11f08e4eeb6 100644 > --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c > +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c > @@ -285,6 +285,7 @@ static const struct attribute_group armv8_pmuv3_events_attr_group = { > > PMU_FORMAT_ATTR(event, "config:0-15"); > PMU_FORMAT_ATTR(long, "config1:0"); > +PMU_FORMAT_ATTR(rdpmc, "config1:1"); > > static int sysctl_perf_user_access __read_mostly; > > @@ -293,9 +294,15 @@ static inline bool armv8pmu_event_is_64bit(struct perf_event *event) > return event->attr.config1 & 0x1; > } > > +static inline bool armv8pmu_event_want_user_access(struct perf_event *event) > +{ > + return event->attr.config1 & 0x2; > +} > + > static struct attribute *armv8_pmuv3_format_attrs[] = { > &format_attr_event.attr, > &format_attr_long.attr, > + &format_attr_rdpmc.attr, > NULL, > }; > > @@ -364,7 +371,7 @@ static const struct attribute_group armv8_pmuv3_caps_attr_group = { > */ > #define ARMV8_IDX_CYCLE_COUNTER 0 > #define ARMV8_IDX_COUNTER0 1 > - > +#define ARMV8_IDX_CYCLE_COUNTER_USER 32 > > /* > * We unconditionally enable ARMv8.5-PMU long event counter support > @@ -376,18 +383,22 @@ static bool armv8pmu_has_long_event(struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu) > return (cpu_pmu->pmuver >= ID_AA64DFR0_PMUVER_8_5); > } > > +static inline bool armv8pmu_event_has_user_read(struct perf_event *event) > +{ > + return event->hw.flags & PERF_EVENT_FLAG_USER_READ_CNT; > +} > + > /* > * We must chain two programmable counters for 64 bit events, > * except when we have allocated the 64bit cycle counter (for CPU > - * cycles event). This must be called only when the event has > - * a counter allocated. > + * cycles event) or when user space counter access is enabled. > */ > static inline bool armv8pmu_event_is_chained(struct perf_event *event) > { > int idx = event->hw.idx; > struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu = to_arm_pmu(event->pmu); > > - return !WARN_ON(idx < 0) && > + return !armv8pmu_event_has_user_read(event) && > armv8pmu_event_is_64bit(event) && > !armv8pmu_has_long_event(cpu_pmu) && > (idx != ARMV8_IDX_CYCLE_COUNTER); > @@ -720,6 +731,27 @@ static inline u32 armv8pmu_getreset_flags(void) > return value; > } > > +static void armv8pmu_disable_user_access(void) > +{ > + write_sysreg(0, pmuserenr_el0); > +} > + > +static void armv8pmu_enable_user_access(struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu) > +{ > + int i; > + struct pmu_hw_events *cpuc = this_cpu_ptr(cpu_pmu->hw_events); > + > + /* Clear any unused counters to avoid leaking their contents */ > + for_each_clear_bit(i, cpuc->used_mask, cpu_pmu->num_events) { > + if (i == ARMV8_IDX_CYCLE_COUNTER) > + write_sysreg(0, pmccntr_el0); > + else > + armv8pmu_write_evcntr(i, 0); > + } > + > + write_sysreg(ARMV8_PMU_USERENR_ER | ARMV8_PMU_USERENR_CR, pmuserenr_el0); > +} > + > static void armv8pmu_enable_event(struct perf_event *event) > { > /* > @@ -763,6 +795,14 @@ static void armv8pmu_disable_event(struct perf_event *event) > > static void armv8pmu_start(struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu) > { > + struct perf_event_context *task_ctx = > + this_cpu_ptr(cpu_pmu->pmu.pmu_cpu_context)->task_ctx; > + > + if (sysctl_perf_user_access && task_ctx && task_ctx->nr_user) > + armv8pmu_enable_user_access(cpu_pmu); > + else > + armv8pmu_disable_user_access(); > + > /* Enable all counters */ > armv8pmu_pmcr_write(armv8pmu_pmcr_read() | ARMV8_PMU_PMCR_E); > } > @@ -880,13 +920,16 @@ static int armv8pmu_get_event_idx(struct pmu_hw_events *cpuc, > if (evtype == ARMV8_PMUV3_PERFCTR_CPU_CYCLES) { > if (!test_and_set_bit(ARMV8_IDX_CYCLE_COUNTER, cpuc->used_mask)) > return ARMV8_IDX_CYCLE_COUNTER; > + else if (armv8pmu_event_is_64bit(event) && > + armv8pmu_event_want_user_access(event) && > + !armv8pmu_has_long_event(cpu_pmu)) > + return -EAGAIN; > } > > /* > * Otherwise use events counters > */ > - if (armv8pmu_event_is_64bit(event) && > - !armv8pmu_has_long_event(cpu_pmu)) > + if (armv8pmu_event_is_chained(event)) > return armv8pmu_get_chain_idx(cpuc, cpu_pmu); > else > return armv8pmu_get_single_idx(cpuc, cpu_pmu); > @@ -902,6 +945,22 @@ static void armv8pmu_clear_event_idx(struct pmu_hw_events *cpuc, > clear_bit(idx - 1, cpuc->used_mask); > } > > +static int armv8pmu_user_event_idx(struct perf_event *event) > +{ > + if (!sysctl_perf_user_access || !armv8pmu_event_has_user_read(event)) > + return 0; > + > + /* > + * We remap the cycle counter index to 32 to > + * match the offset applied to the rest of > + * the counter indices. > + */ > + if (event->hw.idx == ARMV8_IDX_CYCLE_COUNTER) > + return ARMV8_IDX_CYCLE_COUNTER_USER; > + > + return event->hw.idx; > +} > + > /* > * Add an event filter to a given event. > */ > @@ -998,6 +1057,24 @@ static int __armv8_pmuv3_map_event(struct perf_event *event, > if (armv8pmu_event_is_64bit(event)) > event->hw.flags |= ARMPMU_EVT_64BIT; > > + /* > + * User events must be allocated into a single counter, and so > + * must not be chained. > + * > + * Most 64-bit events require long counter support, but 64-bit > + * CPU_CYCLES events can be placed into the dedicated cycle > + * counter when this is free. > + */ > + if (armv8pmu_event_want_user_access(event)) { > + if ((armv8pmu_event_is_64bit(event) && > + (hw_event_id != ARMV8_PMUV3_PERFCTR_CPU_CYCLES) && > + !armv8pmu_has_long_event(armpmu)) || > + !(event->attach_state & PERF_ATTACH_TASK)) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + event->hw.flags |= PERF_EVENT_FLAG_USER_READ_CNT; > + } Minor nit, but this'd be slightly more legibile as two conditions, and thinking aboutthis some more, we should probably use -EOPNOTSUPP for the unsupported counter size case, since that can vary by platform (and aligns with what we do for mode exclusion). So with this changed to: if (armv8pmu_event_want_user_access(event)) { if (!(event->attach_state & PERF_ATTACH_TASK)) return -EINVAL; if (armv8pmu_event_is_64bit(event) && (hw_event_id != ARMV8_PMUV3_PERFCTR_CPU_CYCLES) && !armv8pmu_has_long_event(armpmu)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; event->hw.flags |= PERF_EVENT_FLAG_USER_READ_CNT; } Other than that (and modulo the PMSELR_EL0 issue noted in reply to the cover letter), this looks good to me. Thanks, Mark. > + > /* Only expose micro/arch events supported by this PMU */ > if ((hw_event_id > 0) && (hw_event_id < ARMV8_PMUV3_MAX_COMMON_EVENTS) > && test_bit(hw_event_id, armpmu->pmceid_bitmap)) { > @@ -1106,13 +1183,29 @@ static int armv8pmu_probe_pmu(struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu) > return probe.present ? 0 : -ENODEV; > } > > +static void armv8pmu_disable_user_access_ipi(void *unused) > +{ > + armv8pmu_disable_user_access(); > +} > + > +int armv8pmu_proc_user_access_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, > + void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) > +{ > + int ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); > + if (ret || !write || sysctl_perf_user_access) > + return ret; > + > + on_each_cpu(armv8pmu_disable_user_access_ipi, NULL, 1); > + return 0; > +} > + > static struct ctl_table armv8_pmu_sysctl_table[] = { > { > .procname = "perf_user_access", > .data = &sysctl_perf_user_access, > .maxlen = sizeof(unsigned int), > .mode = 0644, > - .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, > + .proc_handler = armv8pmu_proc_user_access_handler, > .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO, > .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE, > }, > @@ -1142,6 +1235,8 @@ static int armv8_pmu_init(struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu, char *name, > cpu_pmu->set_event_filter = armv8pmu_set_event_filter; > cpu_pmu->filter_match = armv8pmu_filter_match; > > + cpu_pmu->pmu.event_idx = armv8pmu_user_event_idx; > + > cpu_pmu->name = name; > cpu_pmu->map_event = map_event; > cpu_pmu->attr_groups[ARMPMU_ATTR_GROUP_EVENTS] = events ? > @@ -1318,6 +1413,14 @@ void arch_perf_update_userpage(struct perf_event *event, > userpg->cap_user_time = 0; > userpg->cap_user_time_zero = 0; > userpg->cap_user_time_short = 0; > + userpg->cap_user_rdpmc = armv8pmu_event_has_user_read(event); > + > + if (userpg->cap_user_rdpmc) { > + if (event->hw.flags & ARMPMU_EVT_64BIT) > + userpg->pmc_width = 64; > + else > + userpg->pmc_width = 32; > + } > > do { > rd = sched_clock_read_begin(&seq); > -- > 2.32.0 > _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel