* [PATCH] serial: atmel: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability reported by smatch
@ 2023-08-22 11:13 Hari Prasath Gujulan Elango
2023-08-22 11:30 ` Greg KH
0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Hari Prasath Gujulan Elango @ 2023-08-22 11:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: richard.genoud, gregkh, jirislaby, nicolas.ferre,
alexandre.belloni, claudiu.beznea
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-serial, linux-arm-kernel,
Hari Prasath Gujulan Elango
smatch reports the below spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
drivers/tty/serial/atmel_serial.c:2675 atmel_console_setup() warn: potential spectre issue 'atmel_ports' [r] (local cap)
Fix the same by using the array_index_nospec() to mitigate this
potential vulnerability especially because the console index is
controlled by user-space.
Signed-off-by: Hari Prasath Gujulan Elango <Hari.PrasathGE@microchip.com>
---
drivers/tty/serial/atmel_serial.c | 15 +++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/atmel_serial.c b/drivers/tty/serial/atmel_serial.c
index 3467a875641a..25f004dd9efd 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/serial/atmel_serial.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/serial/atmel_serial.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
#include <linux/suspend.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/io.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include <asm/div64.h>
#include <asm/ioctls.h>
@@ -2662,13 +2663,23 @@ static void __init atmel_console_get_options(struct uart_port *port, int *baud,
static int __init atmel_console_setup(struct console *co, char *options)
{
- struct uart_port *port = &atmel_ports[co->index].uart;
- struct atmel_uart_port *atmel_port = to_atmel_uart_port(port);
+ struct uart_port *port;
+ struct atmel_uart_port *atmel_port;
int baud = 115200;
int bits = 8;
int parity = 'n';
int flow = 'n';
+ if (unlikely(co->index < 0 || co->index >= ATMEL_MAX_UART))
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ co->index = array_index_nospec(co->index, ATMEL_MAX_UART);
+ port = &atmel_ports[co->index].uart;
+ if (!port)
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ atmel_port = to_atmel_uart_port(port);
+
if (port->membase == NULL) {
/* Port not initialized yet - delay setup */
return -ENODEV;
--
2.34.1
_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] serial: atmel: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability reported by smatch
2023-08-22 11:13 [PATCH] serial: atmel: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability reported by smatch Hari Prasath Gujulan Elango
@ 2023-08-22 11:30 ` Greg KH
0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Greg KH @ 2023-08-22 11:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Hari Prasath Gujulan Elango
Cc: alexandre.belloni, richard.genoud, linux-kernel, linux-serial,
claudiu.beznea, jirislaby, linux-arm-kernel
On Tue, Aug 22, 2023 at 04:43:21PM +0530, Hari Prasath Gujulan Elango wrote:
> smatch reports the below spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
>
> drivers/tty/serial/atmel_serial.c:2675 atmel_console_setup() warn: potential spectre issue 'atmel_ports' [r] (local cap)
>
> Fix the same by using the array_index_nospec() to mitigate this
> potential vulnerability especially because the console index is
> controlled by user-space.
>
> Signed-off-by: Hari Prasath Gujulan Elango <Hari.PrasathGE@microchip.com>
> ---
> drivers/tty/serial/atmel_serial.c | 15 +++++++++++++--
> 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/atmel_serial.c b/drivers/tty/serial/atmel_serial.c
> index 3467a875641a..25f004dd9efd 100644
> --- a/drivers/tty/serial/atmel_serial.c
> +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/atmel_serial.c
> @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
> #include <linux/suspend.h>
> #include <linux/mm.h>
> #include <linux/io.h>
> +#include <linux/nospec.h>
>
> #include <asm/div64.h>
> #include <asm/ioctls.h>
> @@ -2662,13 +2663,23 @@ static void __init atmel_console_get_options(struct uart_port *port, int *baud,
>
> static int __init atmel_console_setup(struct console *co, char *options)
> {
> - struct uart_port *port = &atmel_ports[co->index].uart;
> - struct atmel_uart_port *atmel_port = to_atmel_uart_port(port);
> + struct uart_port *port;
> + struct atmel_uart_port *atmel_port;
> int baud = 115200;
> int bits = 8;
> int parity = 'n';
> int flow = 'n';
>
> + if (unlikely(co->index < 0 || co->index >= ATMEL_MAX_UART))
Only ever use likely/unlikely if you can measure the difference with and
without the marking. Otherwise do not use it as the compiler and cpu do
a better job than we do in figuring this out.
> + return -ENODEV;
> +
> + co->index = array_index_nospec(co->index, ATMEL_MAX_UART);
How exactl is index controlled by userspace such that a spectre gadget
can be used here? You have to be able to call this multiple times in a
row, unsuccessfully and successfully, how does that happen through the
console api?
thanks,
greg k-h
_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2023-08-22 11:31 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2023-08-22 11:13 [PATCH] serial: atmel: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability reported by smatch Hari Prasath Gujulan Elango
2023-08-22 11:30 ` Greg KH
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).