From: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
To: kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: maz@kernel.org, will@kernel.org, qperret@google.com,
tabba@google.com, seanjc@google.com, alexandru.elisei@arm.com,
catalin.marinas@arm.com, philmd@linaro.org, james.morse@arm.com,
suzuki.poulose@arm.com, oliver.upton@linux.dev,
mark.rutland@arm.com, broonie@kernel.org, joey.gouly@arm.com,
rananta@google.com, yuzenghui@huawei.com
Subject: [PATCH v4 6/9] KVM: arm64: Eagerly restore host fpsimd/sve state in pKVM
Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2024 13:28:48 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240603122852.3923848-7-tabba@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240603122852.3923848-1-tabba@google.com>
When running in protected mode we don't want to leak protected
guest state to the host, including whether a guest has used
fpsimd/sve. Therefore, eagerly restore the host state on guest
exit when running in protected mode, which happens only if the
guest has used fpsimd/sve.
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
---
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h | 13 ++++-
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c | 67 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c | 2 +
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c | 16 +++++-
4 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h
index 9b904c858df0..0c4de44534b7 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h
@@ -321,6 +321,17 @@ static inline void __hyp_sve_restore_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
write_sysreg_el1(__vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, ZCR_EL1), SYS_ZCR);
}
+static inline void __hyp_sve_save_host(void)
+{
+ struct cpu_sve_state *sve_state = *host_data_ptr(sve_state);
+
+ sve_state->zcr_el1 = read_sysreg_el1(SYS_ZCR);
+ write_sysreg_s(ZCR_ELx_LEN_MASK, SYS_ZCR_EL2);
+ __sve_save_state(sve_state->sve_regs + sve_ffr_offset(kvm_host_sve_max_vl),
+ &sve_state->fpsr,
+ true);
+}
+
static void kvm_hyp_save_fpsimd_host(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
/*
@@ -355,7 +366,7 @@ static bool kvm_hyp_handle_fpsimd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
/* Valid trap. Switch the context: */
/* First disable enough traps to allow us to update the registers */
- if (sve_guest)
+ if (sve_guest || (is_protected_kvm_enabled() && system_supports_sve()))
cpacr_clear_set(0, CPACR_ELx_FPEN | CPACR_ELx_ZEN);
else
cpacr_clear_set(0, CPACR_ELx_FPEN);
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c
index f71394d0e32a..bd93b8a9e172 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c
@@ -23,20 +23,80 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct kvm_nvhe_init_params, kvm_init_params);
void __kvm_hyp_host_forward_smc(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt);
+static void __hyp_sve_save_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, ZCR_EL1) = read_sysreg_el1(SYS_ZCR);
+ /*
+ * On saving/restoring guest sve state, always use the maximum VL for
+ * the guest. The layout of the data when saving the sve state depends
+ * on the VL, so use a consistent (i.e., the maximum) guest VL.
+ */
+ sve_cond_update_zcr_vq(vcpu_sve_max_vq(vcpu) - 1, SYS_ZCR_EL2);
+ __sve_save_state(vcpu_sve_pffr(vcpu), &vcpu->arch.ctxt.fp_regs.fpsr, true);
+ write_sysreg_s(ZCR_ELx_LEN_MASK, SYS_ZCR_EL2);
+}
+
+static void __hyp_sve_restore_host(void)
+{
+ struct cpu_sve_state *sve_state = *host_data_ptr(sve_state);
+
+ /*
+ * On saving/restoring host sve state, always use the maximum VL for
+ * the host. The layout of the data when saving the sve state depends
+ * on the VL, so use a consistent (i.e., the maximum) host VL.
+ *
+ * Setting ZCR_EL2 to ZCR_ELx_LEN_MASK sets the effective length
+ * supported by the system (or limited at EL3).
+ */
+ write_sysreg_s(ZCR_ELx_LEN_MASK, SYS_ZCR_EL2);
+ __sve_restore_state(sve_state->sve_regs + sve_ffr_offset(kvm_host_sve_max_vl),
+ &sve_state->fpsr,
+ true);
+ write_sysreg_el1(sve_state->zcr_el1, SYS_ZCR);
+}
+
+static void fpsimd_sve_flush(void)
+{
+ *host_data_ptr(fp_owner) = FP_STATE_HOST_OWNED;
+}
+
+static void fpsimd_sve_sync(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (!guest_owns_fp_regs())
+ return;
+
+ cpacr_clear_set(0, CPACR_ELx_FPEN | CPACR_ELx_ZEN);
+ isb();
+
+ if (vcpu_has_sve(vcpu))
+ __hyp_sve_save_guest(vcpu);
+ else
+ __fpsimd_save_state(&vcpu->arch.ctxt.fp_regs);
+
+ if (system_supports_sve())
+ __hyp_sve_restore_host();
+ else
+ __fpsimd_restore_state(*host_data_ptr(fpsimd_state));
+
+ *host_data_ptr(fp_owner) = FP_STATE_HOST_OWNED;
+}
+
static void flush_hyp_vcpu(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu)
{
struct kvm_vcpu *host_vcpu = hyp_vcpu->host_vcpu;
+ fpsimd_sve_flush();
+
hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.ctxt = host_vcpu->arch.ctxt;
hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.sve_state = kern_hyp_va(host_vcpu->arch.sve_state);
- hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.sve_max_vl = host_vcpu->arch.sve_max_vl;
+ /* Limit guest vector length to the maximum supported by the host. */
+ hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.sve_max_vl = min(host_vcpu->arch.sve_max_vl, kvm_host_sve_max_vl);
hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.hw_mmu = host_vcpu->arch.hw_mmu;
hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.hcr_el2 = host_vcpu->arch.hcr_el2;
hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.mdcr_el2 = host_vcpu->arch.mdcr_el2;
- hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.cptr_el2 = host_vcpu->arch.cptr_el2;
hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.iflags = host_vcpu->arch.iflags;
@@ -54,10 +114,11 @@ static void sync_hyp_vcpu(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu)
struct vgic_v3_cpu_if *host_cpu_if = &host_vcpu->arch.vgic_cpu.vgic_v3;
unsigned int i;
+ fpsimd_sve_sync(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu);
+
host_vcpu->arch.ctxt = hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.ctxt;
host_vcpu->arch.hcr_el2 = hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.hcr_el2;
- host_vcpu->arch.cptr_el2 = hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.cptr_el2;
host_vcpu->arch.fault = hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.fault;
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c
index 25e9a94f6d76..feb27b4ce459 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c
@@ -588,6 +588,8 @@ int __pkvm_init_vcpu(pkvm_handle_t handle, struct kvm_vcpu *host_vcpu,
if (ret)
unmap_donated_memory(hyp_vcpu, sizeof(*hyp_vcpu));
+ hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.cptr_el2 = kvm_get_reset_cptr_el2(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu);
+
return ret;
}
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c
index 019f863922fa..bef74de7065b 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c
@@ -184,7 +184,21 @@ static bool kvm_handle_pvm_sys64(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
static void kvm_hyp_save_fpsimd_host(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
- __fpsimd_save_state(*host_data_ptr(fpsimd_state));
+ /*
+ * Non-protected kvm relies on the host restoring its sve state.
+ * Protected kvm restores the host's sve state as not to reveal that
+ * fpsimd was used by a guest nor leak upper sve bits.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(is_protected_kvm_enabled() && system_supports_sve())) {
+ __hyp_sve_save_host();
+
+ /* Re-enable SVE traps if not supported for the guest vcpu. */
+ if (!vcpu_has_sve(vcpu))
+ cpacr_clear_set(CPACR_ELx_ZEN, 0);
+
+ } else {
+ __fpsimd_save_state(*host_data_ptr(fpsimd_state));
+ }
}
static const exit_handler_fn hyp_exit_handlers[] = {
--
2.45.1.288.g0e0cd299f1-goog
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-06-03 12:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-06-03 12:28 [PATCH v4 0/9] KVM: arm64: Fix handling of host fpsimd/sve state in protected mode Fuad Tabba
2024-06-03 12:28 ` [PATCH v4 1/9] KVM: arm64: Reintroduce __sve_save_state Fuad Tabba
2024-06-03 13:55 ` Mark Brown
2024-06-03 14:11 ` Fuad Tabba
2024-06-03 14:16 ` Mark Brown
2024-06-03 12:28 ` [PATCH v4 2/9] KVM: arm64: Fix prototype for __sve_save_state/__sve_restore_state Fuad Tabba
2024-06-03 14:19 ` Mark Brown
2024-06-03 12:28 ` [PATCH v4 3/9] KVM: arm64: Abstract set/clear of CPTR_EL2 bits behind helper Fuad Tabba
2024-06-03 12:28 ` [PATCH v4 4/9] KVM: arm64: Specialize handling of host fpsimd state on trap Fuad Tabba
2024-06-03 12:28 ` [PATCH v4 5/9] KVM: arm64: Allocate memory mapped at hyp for host sve state in pKVM Fuad Tabba
2024-06-03 14:50 ` Mark Brown
2024-06-04 8:24 ` Fuad Tabba
2024-06-03 12:28 ` Fuad Tabba [this message]
2024-06-03 15:52 ` [PATCH v4 6/9] KVM: arm64: Eagerly restore host fpsimd/sve " Mark Brown
2024-06-04 12:03 ` Fuad Tabba
2024-06-04 13:13 ` Mark Brown
2024-06-04 13:52 ` Marc Zyngier
2024-06-04 14:07 ` Mark Brown
2024-06-03 12:28 ` [PATCH v4 7/9] KVM: arm64: Consolidate initializing the host data's fpsimd_state/sve " Fuad Tabba
2024-06-03 15:43 ` Mark Brown
2024-06-03 12:28 ` [PATCH v4 8/9] KVM: arm64: Refactor CPACR trap bit setting/clearing to use ELx format Fuad Tabba
2024-06-03 12:28 ` [PATCH v4 9/9] KVM: arm64: Ensure that SME controls are disabled in protected mode Fuad Tabba
2024-06-03 14:43 ` Mark Brown
2024-06-04 14:30 ` [PATCH v4 0/9] KVM: arm64: Fix handling of host fpsimd/sve state " Marc Zyngier
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