From: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
To: kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>,
Zenghui Yu <yuzenghui@huawei.com>,
Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>,
Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>,
Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v3 18/24] KVM: arm64: Split S1 permission evaluation into direct and hierarchical parts
Date: Wed, 11 Sep 2024 14:51:45 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240911135151.401193-19-maz@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240911135151.401193-1-maz@kernel.org>
The AArch64.S1DirectBasePermissions() pseudocode deals with both
direct and hierarchical S1 permission evaluation. While this is
probably convenient in the pseudocode, we would like a bit more
flexibility to slot things like indirect permissions.
To that effect, split the two permission check parts out of
handle_at_slow() and into their own functions. The permissions
are passed around in a new s1_perms type that contains the
individual permissions across the flow.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
---
arch/arm64/kvm/at.c | 164 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
1 file changed, 99 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/at.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/at.c
index 73b2ee662f371..d6ee3a5c30bc2 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/at.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/at.c
@@ -47,6 +47,10 @@ struct s1_walk_result {
bool failed;
};
+struct s1_perms {
+ bool ur, uw, ux, pr, pw, px;
+};
+
static void fail_s1_walk(struct s1_walk_result *wr, u8 fst, bool ptw, bool s2)
{
wr->fst = fst;
@@ -764,111 +768,141 @@ static bool pan3_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum trans_regime regime)
return sctlr & SCTLR_EL1_EPAN;
}
-static u64 handle_at_slow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 op, u64 vaddr)
+static void compute_s1_direct_permissions(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ struct s1_walk_info *wi,
+ struct s1_walk_result *wr,
+ struct s1_perms *s1p)
{
- bool perm_fail, ur, uw, ux, pr, pw, px;
- struct s1_walk_result wr = {};
- struct s1_walk_info wi = {};
- int ret, idx;
-
- ret = setup_s1_walk(vcpu, op, &wi, &wr, vaddr);
- if (ret)
- goto compute_par;
-
- if (wr.level == S1_MMU_DISABLED)
- goto compute_par;
-
- idx = srcu_read_lock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu);
-
- ret = walk_s1(vcpu, &wi, &wr, vaddr);
-
- srcu_read_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu, idx);
-
- if (ret)
- goto compute_par;
-
- /* FIXME: revisit when adding indirect permission support */
- /* AArch64.S1DirectBasePermissions() */
- if (wi.regime != TR_EL2) {
- switch (FIELD_GET(PTE_USER | PTE_RDONLY, wr.desc)) {
+ /* Non-hierarchical part of AArch64.S1DirectBasePermissions() */
+ if (wi->regime != TR_EL2) {
+ switch (FIELD_GET(PTE_USER | PTE_RDONLY, wr->desc)) {
case 0b00:
- pr = pw = true;
- ur = uw = false;
+ s1p->pr = s1p->pw = true;
+ s1p->ur = s1p->uw = false;
break;
case 0b01:
- pr = pw = ur = uw = true;
+ s1p->pr = s1p->pw = s1p->ur = s1p->uw = true;
break;
case 0b10:
- pr = true;
- pw = ur = uw = false;
+ s1p->pr = true;
+ s1p->pw = s1p->ur = s1p->uw = false;
break;
case 0b11:
- pr = ur = true;
- pw = uw = false;
+ s1p->pr = s1p->ur = true;
+ s1p->pw = s1p->uw = false;
break;
}
- switch (wr.APTable) {
+ /* We don't use px for anything yet, but hey... */
+ s1p->px = !((wr->desc & PTE_PXN) || s1p->uw);
+ s1p->ux = !(wr->desc & PTE_UXN);
+ } else {
+ s1p->ur = s1p->uw = s1p->ux = false;
+
+ if (!(wr->desc & PTE_RDONLY)) {
+ s1p->pr = s1p->pw = true;
+ } else {
+ s1p->pr = true;
+ s1p->pw = false;
+ }
+
+ /* XN maps to UXN */
+ s1p->px = !(wr->desc & PTE_UXN);
+ }
+}
+
+static void compute_s1_hierarchical_permissions(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ struct s1_walk_info *wi,
+ struct s1_walk_result *wr,
+ struct s1_perms *s1p)
+{
+ /* Hierarchical part of AArch64.S1DirectBasePermissions() */
+ if (wi->regime != TR_EL2) {
+ switch (wr->APTable) {
case 0b00:
break;
case 0b01:
- ur = uw = false;
+ s1p->ur = s1p->uw = false;
break;
case 0b10:
- pw = uw = false;
+ s1p->pw = s1p->uw = false;
break;
case 0b11:
- pw = ur = uw = false;
+ s1p->pw = s1p->ur = s1p->uw = false;
break;
}
- /* We don't use px for anything yet, but hey... */
- px = !((wr.desc & PTE_PXN) || wr.PXNTable || uw);
- ux = !((wr.desc & PTE_UXN) || wr.UXNTable);
-
- if (op == OP_AT_S1E1RP || op == OP_AT_S1E1WP) {
- bool pan;
-
- pan = *vcpu_cpsr(vcpu) & PSR_PAN_BIT;
- pan &= ur || uw || (pan3_enabled(vcpu, wi.regime) && ux);
- pw &= !pan;
- pr &= !pan;
- }
+ s1p->px &= !wr->PXNTable;
+ s1p->ux &= !wr->UXNTable;
} else {
- ur = uw = ux = false;
+ if (wr->APTable & BIT(1))
+ s1p->pw = false;
- if (!(wr.desc & PTE_RDONLY)) {
- pr = pw = true;
- } else {
- pr = true;
- pw = false;
- }
+ /* XN maps to UXN */
+ s1p->px &= !wr->UXNTable;
+ }
+}
- if (wr.APTable & BIT(1))
- pw = false;
+static void compute_s1_permissions(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 op,
+ struct s1_walk_info *wi,
+ struct s1_walk_result *wr,
+ struct s1_perms *s1p)
+{
+ compute_s1_direct_permissions(vcpu, wi, wr, s1p);
+ compute_s1_hierarchical_permissions(vcpu, wi, wr, s1p);
- /* XN maps to UXN */
- px = !((wr.desc & PTE_UXN) || wr.UXNTable);
+ if (op == OP_AT_S1E1RP || op == OP_AT_S1E1WP) {
+ bool pan;
+
+ pan = *vcpu_cpsr(vcpu) & PSR_PAN_BIT;
+ pan &= s1p->ur || s1p->uw || (pan3_enabled(vcpu, wi->regime) && s1p->ux);
+ s1p->pw &= !pan;
+ s1p->pr &= !pan;
}
+}
+
+static u64 handle_at_slow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 op, u64 vaddr)
+{
+ struct s1_walk_result wr = {};
+ struct s1_walk_info wi = {};
+ struct s1_perms s1p = {};
+ bool perm_fail = false;
+ int ret, idx;
+
+ ret = setup_s1_walk(vcpu, op, &wi, &wr, vaddr);
+ if (ret)
+ goto compute_par;
+
+ if (wr.level == S1_MMU_DISABLED)
+ goto compute_par;
+
+ idx = srcu_read_lock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu);
+
+ ret = walk_s1(vcpu, &wi, &wr, vaddr);
+
+ srcu_read_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu, idx);
+
+ if (ret)
+ goto compute_par;
- perm_fail = false;
+ compute_s1_permissions(vcpu, op, &wi, &wr, &s1p);
switch (op) {
case OP_AT_S1E1RP:
case OP_AT_S1E1R:
case OP_AT_S1E2R:
- perm_fail = !pr;
+ perm_fail = !s1p.pr;
break;
case OP_AT_S1E1WP:
case OP_AT_S1E1W:
case OP_AT_S1E2W:
- perm_fail = !pw;
+ perm_fail = !s1p.pw;
break;
case OP_AT_S1E0R:
- perm_fail = !ur;
+ perm_fail = !s1p.ur;
break;
case OP_AT_S1E0W:
- perm_fail = !uw;
+ perm_fail = !s1p.uw;
break;
case OP_AT_S1E1A:
case OP_AT_S1E2A:
--
2.39.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-09-11 14:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-09-11 13:51 [PATCH v3 00/24] KVM: arm64: Add EL2 support to FEAT_S1PIE Marc Zyngier
2024-09-11 13:51 ` [PATCH v3 01/24] arm64: Drop SKL0/SKL1 from TCR2_EL2 Marc Zyngier
2024-09-12 10:22 ` Joey Gouly
2024-09-11 13:51 ` [PATCH v3 02/24] arm64: Remove VNCR definition for PIRE0_EL2 Marc Zyngier
2024-09-11 13:51 ` [PATCH v3 03/24] arm64: Add encoding " Marc Zyngier
2024-09-11 13:51 ` [PATCH v3 04/24] KVM: arm64: nv: Add missing EL2->EL1 mappings in get_el2_to_el1_mapping() Marc Zyngier
2024-09-11 13:51 ` [PATCH v3 05/24] KVM: arm64: nv: Handle CNTHCTL_EL2 specially Marc Zyngier
2024-09-11 13:51 ` [PATCH v3 06/24] KVM: arm64: nv: Save/Restore vEL2 sysregs Marc Zyngier
2024-09-11 13:51 ` [PATCH v3 07/24] KVM: arm64: Correctly access TCR2_EL1, PIR_EL1, PIRE0_EL1 with VHE Marc Zyngier
2024-09-11 13:51 ` [PATCH v3 08/24] KVM: arm64: Extend masking facility to arbitrary registers Marc Zyngier
2024-09-11 13:51 ` [PATCH v3 09/24] arm64: Define ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1.HAFDBS advertising FEAT_HAFT Marc Zyngier
2024-09-11 13:51 ` [PATCH v3 10/24] KVM: arm64: Add TCR2_EL2 to the sysreg arrays Marc Zyngier
2024-09-11 13:51 ` [PATCH v3 11/24] KVM: arm64: Sanitise TCR2_EL2 Marc Zyngier
2024-09-11 13:51 ` [PATCH v3 12/24] KVM: arm64: Add save/restore for TCR2_EL2 Marc Zyngier
2024-09-11 13:51 ` [PATCH v3 13/24] KVM: arm64: Add PIR{,E0}_EL2 to the sysreg arrays Marc Zyngier
2024-09-11 13:51 ` [PATCH v3 14/24] KVM: arm64: Add save/restore for PIR{,E0}_EL2 Marc Zyngier
2024-09-11 13:51 ` [PATCH v3 15/24] KVM: arm64: Handle PIR{,E0}_EL2 traps Marc Zyngier
2024-09-11 13:51 ` [PATCH v3 16/24] KVM: arm64: Sanitise ID_AA64MMFR3_EL1 Marc Zyngier
2024-09-11 13:51 ` [PATCH v3 17/24] KVM: arm64: Add AT fast-path support for S1PIE Marc Zyngier
2024-09-11 13:51 ` Marc Zyngier [this message]
2024-09-11 14:15 ` [PATCH v3 18/24] KVM: arm64: Split S1 permission evaluation into direct and hierarchical parts Joey Gouly
2024-09-11 15:38 ` Marc Zyngier
2024-09-11 15:51 ` Joey Gouly
2024-09-11 16:10 ` Marc Zyngier
2024-09-12 10:04 ` Joey Gouly
2024-09-11 13:51 ` [PATCH v3 19/24] KVM: arm64: Disable hierarchical permissions when S1PIE is enabled Marc Zyngier
2024-09-11 13:51 ` [PATCH v3 20/24] KVM: arm64: Implement AT S1PIE support Marc Zyngier
2024-09-11 13:51 ` [PATCH v3 21/24] KVM: arm64: Define helper for EL2 registers with custom visibility Marc Zyngier
2024-09-11 13:51 ` [PATCH v3 22/24] KVM: arm64: Hide TCR2_EL1 from userspace when disabled for guests Marc Zyngier
2024-09-11 13:51 ` [PATCH v3 23/24] KVM: arm64: Hide S1PIE registers " Marc Zyngier
2024-09-11 13:51 ` [PATCH v3 24/24] KVM: arm64: Rely on visibility to let PIR*_ELx/TCR2_ELx UNDEF Marc Zyngier
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