From: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
To: kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>,
Zenghui Yu <yuzenghui@huawei.com>,
Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>,
Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>,
Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v3 20/24] KVM: arm64: Implement AT S1PIE support
Date: Wed, 11 Sep 2024 14:51:47 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240911135151.401193-21-maz@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240911135151.401193-1-maz@kernel.org>
It doesn't take much effort to imple,emt S1PIE support in AT.
This is only a matter of using the AArch64.S1IndirectBasePermissions()
encodings for the permission, ignoring GCS which has no impact on AT,
and enforce FEAT_PAN3 being enabled as this is a requirement of
FEAT_S1PIE.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
---
arch/arm64/kvm/at.c | 119 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 118 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/at.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/at.c
index 9a922054d76cf..8a5e1c4682619 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/at.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/at.c
@@ -779,6 +779,9 @@ static bool pan3_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum trans_regime regime)
if (!kvm_has_feat(vcpu->kvm, ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1, PAN, PAN3))
return false;
+ if (s1pie_enabled(vcpu, regime))
+ return true;
+
if (regime == TR_EL10)
sctlr = vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, SCTLR_EL1);
else
@@ -862,12 +865,126 @@ static void compute_s1_hierarchical_permissions(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
}
}
+#define pi_idx(v, r, i) ((__vcpu_sys_reg((v), (r)) >> ((i) * 4)) & 0xf)
+
+#define set_priv_perms(p, r, w, x) \
+ do { \
+ (p)->pr = (r); \
+ (p)->pw = (w); \
+ (p)->px = (x); \
+ } while (0)
+
+#define set_unpriv_perms(p, r, w, x) \
+ do { \
+ (p)->ur = (r); \
+ (p)->uw = (w); \
+ (p)->ux = (x); \
+ } while (0)
+
+/* Similar to AArch64.S1IndirectBasePermissions(), without GCS */
+#define set_perms(w, p, ip) \
+ do { \
+ switch ((ip)) { \
+ case 0b0000: \
+ set_ ## w ## _perms((p), false, false, false); \
+ break; \
+ case 0b0001: \
+ set_ ## w ## _perms((p), true , false, false); \
+ break; \
+ case 0b0010: \
+ set_ ## w ## _perms((p), false, false, true ); \
+ break; \
+ case 0b0011: \
+ set_ ## w ## _perms((p), true , false, true ); \
+ break; \
+ case 0b0100: \
+ set_ ## w ## _perms((p), false, false, false); \
+ break; \
+ case 0b0101: \
+ set_ ## w ## _perms((p), true , true , false); \
+ break; \
+ case 0b0110: \
+ set_ ## w ## _perms((p), true , true , true ); \
+ break; \
+ case 0b0111: \
+ set_ ## w ## _perms((p), true , true , true ); \
+ break; \
+ case 0b1000: \
+ set_ ## w ## _perms((p), true , false, false); \
+ break; \
+ case 0b1001: \
+ set_ ## w ## _perms((p), true , false, false); \
+ break; \
+ case 0b1010: \
+ set_ ## w ## _perms((p), true , false, true ); \
+ break; \
+ case 0b1011: \
+ set_ ## w ## _perms((p), false, false, false); \
+ break; \
+ case 0b1100: \
+ set_ ## w ## _perms((p), true , true , false); \
+ break; \
+ case 0b1101: \
+ set_ ## w ## _perms((p), false, false, false); \
+ break; \
+ case 0b1110: \
+ set_ ## w ## _perms((p), true , true , true ); \
+ break; \
+ case 0b1111: \
+ set_ ## w ## _perms((p), false, false, false); \
+ break; \
+ } \
+ } while (0)
+
+static void compute_s1_indirect_permissions(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ struct s1_walk_info *wi,
+ struct s1_walk_result *wr,
+ struct s1_perms *s1p)
+{
+ u8 up, pp, idx;
+
+ idx = (FIELD_GET(GENMASK(54, 53), wr->desc) << 2 |
+ FIELD_GET(BIT(51), wr->desc) << 1 |
+ FIELD_GET(BIT(6), wr->desc));
+
+ switch (wi->regime) {
+ case TR_EL10:
+ pp = pi_idx(vcpu, PIR_EL1, idx);
+ up = pi_idx(vcpu, PIRE0_EL1, idx);
+ break;
+ case TR_EL20:
+ pp = pi_idx(vcpu, PIR_EL2, idx);
+ up = pi_idx(vcpu, PIRE0_EL2, idx);
+ break;
+ case TR_EL2:
+ pp = pi_idx(vcpu, PIR_EL2, idx);
+ up = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ set_perms(priv, s1p, pp);
+
+ if (wi->regime != TR_EL2)
+ set_perms(unpriv, s1p, up);
+ else
+ set_unpriv_perms(s1p, false, false, false);
+
+ if (s1p->px && s1p->uw) {
+ set_priv_perms(s1p, false, false, false);
+ set_unpriv_perms(s1p, false, false, false);
+ }
+}
+
static void compute_s1_permissions(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 op,
struct s1_walk_info *wi,
struct s1_walk_result *wr,
struct s1_perms *s1p)
{
- compute_s1_direct_permissions(vcpu, wi, wr, s1p);
+ if (!s1pie_enabled(vcpu, wi->regime))
+ compute_s1_direct_permissions(vcpu, wi, wr, s1p);
+ else
+ compute_s1_indirect_permissions(vcpu, wi, wr, s1p);
+
compute_s1_hierarchical_permissions(vcpu, wi, wr, s1p);
if (op == OP_AT_S1E1RP || op == OP_AT_S1E1WP) {
--
2.39.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-09-11 14:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-09-11 13:51 [PATCH v3 00/24] KVM: arm64: Add EL2 support to FEAT_S1PIE Marc Zyngier
2024-09-11 13:51 ` [PATCH v3 01/24] arm64: Drop SKL0/SKL1 from TCR2_EL2 Marc Zyngier
2024-09-12 10:22 ` Joey Gouly
2024-09-11 13:51 ` [PATCH v3 02/24] arm64: Remove VNCR definition for PIRE0_EL2 Marc Zyngier
2024-09-11 13:51 ` [PATCH v3 03/24] arm64: Add encoding " Marc Zyngier
2024-09-11 13:51 ` [PATCH v3 04/24] KVM: arm64: nv: Add missing EL2->EL1 mappings in get_el2_to_el1_mapping() Marc Zyngier
2024-09-11 13:51 ` [PATCH v3 05/24] KVM: arm64: nv: Handle CNTHCTL_EL2 specially Marc Zyngier
2024-09-11 13:51 ` [PATCH v3 06/24] KVM: arm64: nv: Save/Restore vEL2 sysregs Marc Zyngier
2024-09-11 13:51 ` [PATCH v3 07/24] KVM: arm64: Correctly access TCR2_EL1, PIR_EL1, PIRE0_EL1 with VHE Marc Zyngier
2024-09-11 13:51 ` [PATCH v3 08/24] KVM: arm64: Extend masking facility to arbitrary registers Marc Zyngier
2024-09-11 13:51 ` [PATCH v3 09/24] arm64: Define ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1.HAFDBS advertising FEAT_HAFT Marc Zyngier
2024-09-11 13:51 ` [PATCH v3 10/24] KVM: arm64: Add TCR2_EL2 to the sysreg arrays Marc Zyngier
2024-09-11 13:51 ` [PATCH v3 11/24] KVM: arm64: Sanitise TCR2_EL2 Marc Zyngier
2024-09-11 13:51 ` [PATCH v3 12/24] KVM: arm64: Add save/restore for TCR2_EL2 Marc Zyngier
2024-09-11 13:51 ` [PATCH v3 13/24] KVM: arm64: Add PIR{,E0}_EL2 to the sysreg arrays Marc Zyngier
2024-09-11 13:51 ` [PATCH v3 14/24] KVM: arm64: Add save/restore for PIR{,E0}_EL2 Marc Zyngier
2024-09-11 13:51 ` [PATCH v3 15/24] KVM: arm64: Handle PIR{,E0}_EL2 traps Marc Zyngier
2024-09-11 13:51 ` [PATCH v3 16/24] KVM: arm64: Sanitise ID_AA64MMFR3_EL1 Marc Zyngier
2024-09-11 13:51 ` [PATCH v3 17/24] KVM: arm64: Add AT fast-path support for S1PIE Marc Zyngier
2024-09-11 13:51 ` [PATCH v3 18/24] KVM: arm64: Split S1 permission evaluation into direct and hierarchical parts Marc Zyngier
2024-09-11 14:15 ` Joey Gouly
2024-09-11 15:38 ` Marc Zyngier
2024-09-11 15:51 ` Joey Gouly
2024-09-11 16:10 ` Marc Zyngier
2024-09-12 10:04 ` Joey Gouly
2024-09-11 13:51 ` [PATCH v3 19/24] KVM: arm64: Disable hierarchical permissions when S1PIE is enabled Marc Zyngier
2024-09-11 13:51 ` Marc Zyngier [this message]
2024-09-11 13:51 ` [PATCH v3 21/24] KVM: arm64: Define helper for EL2 registers with custom visibility Marc Zyngier
2024-09-11 13:51 ` [PATCH v3 22/24] KVM: arm64: Hide TCR2_EL1 from userspace when disabled for guests Marc Zyngier
2024-09-11 13:51 ` [PATCH v3 23/24] KVM: arm64: Hide S1PIE registers " Marc Zyngier
2024-09-11 13:51 ` [PATCH v3 24/24] KVM: arm64: Rely on visibility to let PIR*_ELx/TCR2_ELx UNDEF Marc Zyngier
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