From: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
To: Yang Shi <yang@os.amperecomputing.com>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>,
nicolinc@nvidia.com, james.morse@arm.com, robin.murphy@arm.com,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, iommu@lists.linux.dev,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [v3 PATCH] iommu/arm-smmu-v3: Fix L1 stream table index calculation for 32-bit sid size
Date: Tue, 8 Oct 2024 18:41:20 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20241008174119.GA11091@willie-the-truck> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <b5725875-d04c-42e3-bcbe-e119019de7e1@os.amperecomputing.com>
On Tue, Oct 08, 2024 at 10:04:50AM -0700, Yang Shi wrote:
> On 10/8/24 8:15 AM, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
> > On Tue, Oct 08, 2024 at 02:34:58PM +0100, Will Deacon wrote:
> >
> > > This all looks a bit messy to me. The architecture guarantees that
> > > 2-level stream tables are supported once we hit 7-bit SIDs and, although
> > > the driver relaxes this to > 8-bit SIDs, we'll never run into overflow
> > > problems in the linear table code above.
> > My original point was about the confidential compute position (sigh)
> > that the untrusted hypverisor should not corrupt the driver.
> >
> > So your statement is architecturally true, but we never check that
> > IDR0_ST_LVL_2LVL is set if IDR1_SIDSIZE > 2**7, and so we can get into
> > this situation where the hypervisor could trigger some kind of bad
> > behavior.
>
> Jason's concern seems valid to me IMHO. But if the simpler version is
> preferred, I'd suggest add some comments at least or the check suggested by
> Jason to make the architecture guarantee more clear. Just in case someone
> else won't repeat what we had done just because they see "1ULL" in 2lvl code
> but not in linear code.
In principle, I'm not opposed to hardening the driver against malicious
virtual hardware, but I don't think we need to add comments everywhere
where we're relying on architectural behaviour. The hardening should
also be done separately from fixing a bug affecting users with real
hardware.
Will
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-10-08 17:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-10-04 18:04 [v3 PATCH] iommu/arm-smmu-v3: Fix L1 stream table index calculation for 32-bit sid size Yang Shi
2024-10-04 21:14 ` Daniel Mentz
2024-10-04 21:47 ` Yang Shi
2024-10-05 1:03 ` Daniel Mentz
2024-10-05 1:53 ` Yang Shi
2024-10-07 16:36 ` Daniel Mentz
2024-10-07 17:49 ` Yang Shi
2024-10-07 17:50 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2024-10-07 18:43 ` Yang Shi
2024-10-08 13:34 ` Will Deacon
2024-10-08 15:15 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2024-10-08 17:04 ` Yang Shi
2024-10-08 17:41 ` Will Deacon [this message]
2024-10-08 17:42 ` Will Deacon
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