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* [PATCH stable 5.4] arm64: mm: account for hotplug memory when randomizing the linear region
@ 2025-01-09 16:54 Florian Fainelli
  2025-01-09 16:54 ` [PATCH] " Florian Fainelli
  2025-01-12 11:53 ` [PATCH stable 5.4] " Greg KH
  0 siblings, 2 replies; 29+ messages in thread
From: Florian Fainelli @ 2025-01-09 16:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: stable
  Cc: Ard Biesheuvel, Anshuman Khandual, Will Deacon, Steven Price,
	Robin Murphy, Catalin Marinas, Florian Fainelli, Baruch Siach,
	Petr Tesarik, Joey Gouly, Mike Rapoport (IBM), Baoquan He,
	Yang Shi, moderated list:ARM64 PORT (AARCH64 ARCHITECTURE),
	open list

From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>

commit 97d6786e0669daa5c2f2d07a057f574e849dfd3e upstream

As a hardening measure, we currently randomize the placement of
physical memory inside the linear region when KASLR is in effect.
Since the random offset at which to place the available physical
memory inside the linear region is chosen early at boot, it is
based on the memblock description of memory, which does not cover
hotplug memory. The consequence of this is that the randomization
offset may be chosen such that any hotplugged memory located above
memblock_end_of_DRAM() that appears later is pushed off the end of
the linear region, where it cannot be accessed.

So let's limit this randomization of the linear region to ensure
that this can no longer happen, by using the CPU's addressable PA
range instead. As it is guaranteed that no hotpluggable memory will
appear that falls outside of that range, we can safely put this PA
range sized window anywhere in the linear region.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Cc: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201014081857.3288-1-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli <florian.fainelli@broadcom.com>
---
 arch/arm64/mm/init.c | 13 ++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/init.c b/arch/arm64/mm/init.c
index cbcac03c0e0d..a6034645d6f7 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/init.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/init.c
@@ -392,15 +392,18 @@ void __init arm64_memblock_init(void)
 
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE)) {
 		extern u16 memstart_offset_seed;
-		u64 range = linear_region_size -
-			    (memblock_end_of_DRAM() - memblock_start_of_DRAM());
+		u64 mmfr0 = read_cpuid(ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1);
+		int parange = cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field(
+					mmfr0, ID_AA64MMFR0_PARANGE_SHIFT);
+		s64 range = linear_region_size -
+			    BIT(id_aa64mmfr0_parange_to_phys_shift(parange));
 
 		/*
 		 * If the size of the linear region exceeds, by a sufficient
-		 * margin, the size of the region that the available physical
-		 * memory spans, randomize the linear region as well.
+		 * margin, the size of the region that the physical memory can
+		 * span, randomize the linear region as well.
 		 */
-		if (memstart_offset_seed > 0 && range >= ARM64_MEMSTART_ALIGN) {
+		if (memstart_offset_seed > 0 && range >= (s64)ARM64_MEMSTART_ALIGN) {
 			range /= ARM64_MEMSTART_ALIGN;
 			memstart_addr -= ARM64_MEMSTART_ALIGN *
 					 ((range * memstart_offset_seed) >> 16);
-- 
2.43.0



^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 29+ messages in thread
* [PATCH] arm64: mm: account for hotplug memory when randomizing the linear region
@ 2020-10-14  8:18 Ard Biesheuvel
  2020-10-15 10:46 ` Will Deacon
                   ` (2 more replies)
  0 siblings, 3 replies; 29+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2020-10-14  8:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-arm-kernel
  Cc: Anshuman Khandual, Catalin Marinas, Robin Murphy, Steven Price,
	Will Deacon, Ard Biesheuvel

As a hardening measure, we currently randomize the placement of
physical memory inside the linear region when KASLR is in effect.
Since the random offset at which to place the available physical
memory inside the linear region is chosen early at boot, it is
based on the memblock description of memory, which does not cover
hotplug memory. The consequence of this is that the randomization
offset may be chosen such that any hotplugged memory located above
memblock_end_of_DRAM() that appears later is pushed off the end of
the linear region, where it cannot be accessed.

So let's limit this randomization of the linear region to ensure
that this can no longer happen, by using the CPU's addressable PA
range instead. As it is guaranteed that no hotpluggable memory will
appear that falls outside of that range, we can safely put this PA
range sized window anywhere in the linear region.

Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Cc: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
---
Related to discussion here:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/1600332402-30123-1-git-send-email-anshuman.khandual@arm.com/

 arch/arm64/mm/init.c | 11 +++++++----
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/init.c b/arch/arm64/mm/init.c
index 0b393c275be0..af1b4ed2daa8 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/init.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/init.c
@@ -350,13 +350,16 @@ void __init arm64_memblock_init(void)
 
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE)) {
 		extern u16 memstart_offset_seed;
-		u64 range = linear_region_size -
-			    (memblock_end_of_DRAM() - memblock_start_of_DRAM());
+		u64 mmfr0 = read_cpuid(ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1);
+		int parange = cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field(
+					mmfr0, ID_AA64MMFR0_PARANGE_SHIFT);
+		s64 range = linear_region_size -
+			    BIT(id_aa64mmfr0_parange_to_phys_shift(parange));
 
 		/*
 		 * If the size of the linear region exceeds, by a sufficient
-		 * margin, the size of the region that the available physical
-		 * memory spans, randomize the linear region as well.
+		 * margin, the size of the region that the physical memory can
+		 * span, randomize the linear region as well.
 		 */
 		if (memstart_offset_seed > 0 && range >= ARM64_MEMSTART_ALIGN) {
 			range /= ARM64_MEMSTART_ALIGN;
-- 
2.17.1

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^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 29+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2025-01-30 19:14 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 29+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2025-01-09 16:54 [PATCH stable 5.4] arm64: mm: account for hotplug memory when randomizing the linear region Florian Fainelli
2025-01-09 16:54 ` [PATCH] " Florian Fainelli
2025-01-09 17:01   ` Florian Fainelli
2025-01-12 11:54     ` Greg KH
2025-01-13 15:44       ` Florian Fainelli
2025-01-20 13:59         ` Greg KH
2025-01-20 16:33           ` Florian Fainelli
2025-01-29  9:17             ` Greg KH
2025-01-29 17:45               ` Florian Fainelli
2025-01-29 22:15                 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-01-29 23:31                   ` Florian Fainelli
2025-01-30 10:05                     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-01-30 19:12                       ` Florian Fainelli
2025-01-12 11:53 ` [PATCH stable 5.4] " Greg KH
2025-01-29 18:05   ` Florian Fainelli
2025-01-30  7:43     ` Greg KH
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2020-10-14  8:18 [PATCH] " Ard Biesheuvel
2020-10-15 10:46 ` Will Deacon
2020-10-16 10:26   ` Anshuman Khandual
2020-10-17 12:39 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2020-11-10 19:14 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-11  3:48   ` Anshuman Khandual
2020-11-11  9:11     ` David Hildenbrand
2020-11-12  9:25     ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-13  3:16       ` Anshuman Khandual
2020-11-13  6:14         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2020-11-13  7:02           ` Anshuman Khandual
2020-11-13  7:06             ` Ard Biesheuvel
2020-11-13  7:40               ` Anshuman Khandual

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