From: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
To: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Cc: kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
maz@kernel.org, oliver.upton@linux.dev, mark.rutland@arm.com,
joey.gouly@arm.com, suzuki.poulose@arm.com, yuzenghui@huawei.com,
catalin.marinas@arm.com, broonie@kernel.org, qperret@google.com,
vdonnefort@google.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 3/3] KVM: arm64: Create each pKVM hyp vcpu after its corresponding host vcpu
Date: Tue, 18 Feb 2025 09:27:06 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250218092705.GA17030@willie-the-truck> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CA+EHjTzLW1HiiPr+=vStMYJcYEHUBFcEy_YMT3uJuLRA3zDzEw@mail.gmail.com>
On Mon, Feb 17, 2025 at 03:56:53PM +0000, Fuad Tabba wrote:
> On Mon, 17 Feb 2025 at 15:41, Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com> wrote:
> > On Mon, 17 Feb 2025 at 15:30, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Fri, Feb 14, 2025 at 03:02:58PM +0000, Fuad Tabba wrote:
> > > > Instead of creating and initializing _all_ hyp vcpus in pKVM when
> > > > the first host vcpu runs for the first time, initialize _each_
> > > > hyp vcpu in conjunction with its corresponding host vcpu.
> > > >
> > > > Some of the host vcpu state (e.g., system registers and traps
> > > > values) are not initialized until the first time the host vcpu is
> > > > run. Therefore, initializing a hyp vcpu before its corresponding
> > > > host vcpu has run for the first time might not view the complete
> > > > host state of these vcpus.
> > > >
> > > > Additionally, this behavior is inline with non-protected modes.
> > > >
> > > > Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
> > > > ---
> > > > arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 +
> > > > arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_pkvm.h | 1 +
> > > > arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 4 ++
> > > > arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/pkvm.h | 6 ---
> > > > arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c | 54 +++++++++++++++-----------
> > > > arch/arm64/kvm/pkvm.c | 28 ++++++-------
> > > > 6 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
> > >
> > > [...]
> > >
> > > > static int init_pkvm_hyp_vcpu(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu,
> > > > struct pkvm_hyp_vm *hyp_vm,
> > > > - struct kvm_vcpu *host_vcpu,
> > > > - unsigned int vcpu_idx)
> > > > + struct kvm_vcpu *host_vcpu)
> > > > {
> > > > int ret = 0;
> > > >
> > > > if (hyp_pin_shared_mem(host_vcpu, host_vcpu + 1))
> > > > return -EBUSY;
> > > >
> > > > - if (host_vcpu->vcpu_idx != vcpu_idx) {
> > > > - ret = -EINVAL;
> > > > - goto done;
> > > > - }
> > > > -
> > > > hyp_vcpu->host_vcpu = host_vcpu;
> > > >
> > > > hyp_vcpu->vcpu.kvm = &hyp_vm->kvm;
> > > > hyp_vcpu->vcpu.vcpu_id = READ_ONCE(host_vcpu->vcpu_id);
> > > > - hyp_vcpu->vcpu.vcpu_idx = vcpu_idx;
> > > > + hyp_vcpu->vcpu.vcpu_idx = READ_ONCE(host_vcpu->vcpu_idx);
> > > >
> > > > hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.hw_mmu = &hyp_vm->kvm.arch.mmu;
> > > > hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.cflags = READ_ONCE(host_vcpu->arch.cflags);
> > > > @@ -687,27 +689,28 @@ int __pkvm_init_vcpu(pkvm_handle_t handle, struct kvm_vcpu *host_vcpu,
> > > > goto unlock;
> > > > }
> > > >
> > > > - idx = hyp_vm->nr_vcpus;
> > > > + ret = init_pkvm_hyp_vcpu(hyp_vcpu, hyp_vm, host_vcpu);
> > > > + if (ret)
> > > > + goto unlock;
> > > > +
> > > > + idx = hyp_vcpu->vcpu.vcpu_idx;
> > > > if (idx >= hyp_vm->kvm.created_vcpus) {
> > > > ret = -EINVAL;
> > > > goto unlock;
> > > > }
> > > >
> > > > - ret = init_pkvm_hyp_vcpu(hyp_vcpu, hyp_vm, host_vcpu, idx);
> > > > - if (ret)
> > > > + if (hyp_vm->vcpus[idx]) {
> > > > + ret = -EINVAL;
> > > > goto unlock;
> > > > + }
> > >
> > > I'm not sure how much we care at EL2, but it looks like there's a
> > > potential spectre gadget here given that 'idx' is now untrusted.
> > > Perhaps chuck something like:
> > >
> > > idx = array_index_nospec(idx, hyp_vm->kvm.created_vcpus);
> > >
> > > before indexing into 'hyp_vm->vcpus[]'?
> >
> > I'll add that when I respin.
>
> pKVM is riddled with these kinds of accesses (e.g.,
> get_vm_by_handle(). It might be better if I address this in a separate
> series.
Yeah, makes sense to me. Like I said, I'm not entirely sure how much we
care about spectre at EL2, given that it's using a separate translation
regime, but having a series to fix up some of the potential issues might
provide a useful basis for discussion.
Will
prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-02-18 9:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-02-14 15:02 [PATCH v1 0/3] KVM: arm64: Fix initializing HCRX_EL2 and other traps in pKVM Fuad Tabba
2025-02-14 15:02 ` [PATCH v1 1/3] KVM: arm64: Initialize HCRX_EL2 " Fuad Tabba
2025-02-26 10:07 ` Oliver Upton
2025-02-26 10:45 ` Marc Zyngier
2025-02-26 12:44 ` Fuad Tabba
2025-02-26 15:28 ` Marc Zyngier
2025-02-26 18:53 ` Oliver Upton
2025-02-26 18:54 ` Fuad Tabba
2025-02-26 12:36 ` Fuad Tabba
2025-02-14 15:02 ` [PATCH v1 2/3] KVM: arm64: Factor out pkvm hyp vcpu creation to separate function Fuad Tabba
2025-02-14 15:02 ` [PATCH v1 3/3] KVM: arm64: Create each pKVM hyp vcpu after its corresponding host vcpu Fuad Tabba
2025-02-17 15:30 ` Will Deacon
2025-02-17 15:41 ` Fuad Tabba
2025-02-17 15:56 ` Fuad Tabba
2025-02-18 9:27 ` Will Deacon [this message]
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