[PATCH 6.12 0/8] KVM: arm64: Backport of SVE fixes to v6.12

[PATCH 6.12 0/8] KVM: arm64: Backport of SVE fixes to v6.12

[Mark Brown]

This series backports some recent fixes for SVE/KVM interactions from
Mark Rutland to v6.12.

Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
---
Fuad Tabba (1):
      KVM: arm64: Calculate cptr_el2 traps on activating traps

Mark Rutland (7):
      KVM: arm64: Unconditionally save+flush host FPSIMD/SVE/SME state
      KVM: arm64: Remove host FPSIMD saving for non-protected KVM
      KVM: arm64: Remove VHE host restore of CPACR_EL1.ZEN
      KVM: arm64: Remove VHE host restore of CPACR_EL1.SMEN
      KVM: arm64: Refactor exit handlers
      KVM: arm64: Mark some header functions as inline
      KVM: arm64: Eagerly switch ZCR_EL{1,2}

 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h       |  25 ++----
 arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c              |  25 ------
 arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c                    |   9 ---
 arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c                 | 100 ++----------------------
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S              |   5 ++
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h | 133 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c      |  15 ++--
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c          |  29 -------
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c        | 134 ++++++++++++++++++--------------
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c         |  21 ++---
 10 files changed, 204 insertions(+), 292 deletions(-)
---
base-commit: e9cc806c0152fa9993f817cebf42989a3e2530bb
change-id: 20250227-stable-sve-6-12-777778ad28fb

Best regards,
-- 
Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>

[PATCH 6.12 1/8] KVM: arm64: Calculate cptr_el2 traps on activating traps

[Mark Brown]

From: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>

[ Upstream commit 2fd5b4b0e7b440602455b79977bfa64dea101e6c ]

Similar to VHE, calculate the value of cptr_el2 from scratch on
activate traps. This removes the need to store cptr_el2 in every
vcpu structure. Moreover, some traps, such as whether the guest
owns the fp registers, need to be set on every vcpu run.

Reported-by: James Clark <james.clark@linaro.org>
Fixes: 5294afdbf45a ("KVM: arm64: Exclude FP ownership from kvm_vcpu_arch")
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241216105057.579031-13-tabba@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h |  1 -
 arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c              |  1 -
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c    | 29 ----------------------
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c  | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
 4 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 1bf70fa1045dcd6704bdcd233767cdb7522b316f..d148cf578cb84e7dec4d1add2afa60a3c7a1e041 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -697,7 +697,6 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_arch {
 	u64 hcr_el2;
 	u64 hcrx_el2;
 	u64 mdcr_el2;
-	u64 cptr_el2;
 
 	/* Exception Information */
 	struct kvm_vcpu_fault_info fault;
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
index 3cf65daa75a51f71fa7168016f8c3d81dc326cca..e6f0443210a8b7a65f616b25b2e6f74a05683ed6 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
@@ -1577,7 +1577,6 @@ static int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_vcpu_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	}
 
 	vcpu_reset_hcr(vcpu);
-	vcpu->arch.cptr_el2 = kvm_get_reset_cptr_el2(vcpu);
 
 	/*
 	 * Handle the "start in power-off" case.
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c
index 077d4098548d2c87abdd3931285d87798d63adb3..7c464340bcd078df58b74164707f263a6bdb0272 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c
@@ -28,8 +28,6 @@ static void pvm_init_traps_aa64pfr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	const u64 feature_ids = pvm_read_id_reg(vcpu, SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1);
 	u64 hcr_set = HCR_RW;
 	u64 hcr_clear = 0;
-	u64 cptr_set = 0;
-	u64 cptr_clear = 0;
 
 	/* Protected KVM does not support AArch32 guests. */
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(FIELD_GET(ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR0_EL1_EL0),
@@ -59,21 +57,10 @@ static void pvm_init_traps_aa64pfr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	/* Trap AMU */
 	if (!FIELD_GET(ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR0_EL1_AMU), feature_ids)) {
 		hcr_clear |= HCR_AMVOFFEN;
-		cptr_set |= CPTR_EL2_TAM;
-	}
-
-	/* Trap SVE */
-	if (!FIELD_GET(ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR0_EL1_SVE), feature_ids)) {
-		if (has_hvhe())
-			cptr_clear |= CPACR_ELx_ZEN;
-		else
-			cptr_set |= CPTR_EL2_TZ;
 	}
 
 	vcpu->arch.hcr_el2 |= hcr_set;
 	vcpu->arch.hcr_el2 &= ~hcr_clear;
-	vcpu->arch.cptr_el2 |= cptr_set;
-	vcpu->arch.cptr_el2 &= ~cptr_clear;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -103,7 +90,6 @@ static void pvm_init_traps_aa64dfr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	const u64 feature_ids = pvm_read_id_reg(vcpu, SYS_ID_AA64DFR0_EL1);
 	u64 mdcr_set = 0;
 	u64 mdcr_clear = 0;
-	u64 cptr_set = 0;
 
 	/* Trap/constrain PMU */
 	if (!FIELD_GET(ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64DFR0_EL1_PMUVer), feature_ids)) {
@@ -130,21 +116,12 @@ static void pvm_init_traps_aa64dfr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	if (!FIELD_GET(ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64DFR0_EL1_TraceFilt), feature_ids))
 		mdcr_set |= MDCR_EL2_TTRF;
 
-	/* Trap Trace */
-	if (!FIELD_GET(ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64DFR0_EL1_TraceVer), feature_ids)) {
-		if (has_hvhe())
-			cptr_set |= CPACR_EL1_TTA;
-		else
-			cptr_set |= CPTR_EL2_TTA;
-	}
-
 	/* Trap External Trace */
 	if (!FIELD_GET(ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64DFR0_EL1_ExtTrcBuff), feature_ids))
 		mdcr_clear |= MDCR_EL2_E2TB_MASK << MDCR_EL2_E2TB_SHIFT;
 
 	vcpu->arch.mdcr_el2 |= mdcr_set;
 	vcpu->arch.mdcr_el2 &= ~mdcr_clear;
-	vcpu->arch.cptr_el2 |= cptr_set;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -195,10 +172,6 @@ static void pvm_init_trap_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	/* Clear res0 and set res1 bits to trap potential new features. */
 	vcpu->arch.hcr_el2 &= ~(HCR_RES0);
 	vcpu->arch.mdcr_el2 &= ~(MDCR_EL2_RES0);
-	if (!has_hvhe()) {
-		vcpu->arch.cptr_el2 |= CPTR_NVHE_EL2_RES1;
-		vcpu->arch.cptr_el2 &= ~(CPTR_NVHE_EL2_RES0);
-	}
 }
 
 /*
@@ -579,8 +552,6 @@ int __pkvm_init_vcpu(pkvm_handle_t handle, struct kvm_vcpu *host_vcpu,
 		return ret;
 	}
 
-	hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.cptr_el2 = kvm_get_reset_cptr_el2(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu);
-
 	return 0;
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c
index cc69106734ca732ba9276ac1eaf84be3e7381648..81d933a71310fd1132b2450cd08108e071a2cf78 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c
@@ -36,33 +36,46 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, kvm_hyp_vector);
 
 extern void kvm_nvhe_prepare_backtrace(unsigned long fp, unsigned long pc);
 
-static void __activate_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+static void __activate_cptr_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
-	u64 val;
+	u64 val = CPTR_EL2_TAM;	/* Same bit irrespective of E2H */
 
-	___activate_traps(vcpu, vcpu->arch.hcr_el2);
-	__activate_traps_common(vcpu);
+	if (has_hvhe()) {
+		val |= CPACR_ELx_TTA;
 
-	val = vcpu->arch.cptr_el2;
-	val |= CPTR_EL2_TAM;	/* Same bit irrespective of E2H */
-	val |= has_hvhe() ? CPACR_EL1_TTA : CPTR_EL2_TTA;
-	if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_SME)) {
-		if (has_hvhe())
-			val &= ~CPACR_ELx_SMEN;
-		else
-			val |= CPTR_EL2_TSM;
-	}
+		if (guest_owns_fp_regs()) {
+			val |= CPACR_ELx_FPEN;
+			if (vcpu_has_sve(vcpu))
+				val |= CPACR_ELx_ZEN;
+		}
+	} else {
+		val |= CPTR_EL2_TTA | CPTR_NVHE_EL2_RES1;
 
-	if (!guest_owns_fp_regs()) {
-		if (has_hvhe())
-			val &= ~(CPACR_ELx_FPEN | CPACR_ELx_ZEN);
-		else
-			val |= CPTR_EL2_TFP | CPTR_EL2_TZ;
+		/*
+		 * Always trap SME since it's not supported in KVM.
+		 * TSM is RES1 if SME isn't implemented.
+		 */
+		val |= CPTR_EL2_TSM;
 
-		__activate_traps_fpsimd32(vcpu);
+		if (!vcpu_has_sve(vcpu) || !guest_owns_fp_regs())
+			val |= CPTR_EL2_TZ;
+
+		if (!guest_owns_fp_regs())
+			val |= CPTR_EL2_TFP;
 	}
 
+	if (!guest_owns_fp_regs())
+		__activate_traps_fpsimd32(vcpu);
+
 	kvm_write_cptr_el2(val);
+}
+
+static void __activate_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	___activate_traps(vcpu, vcpu->arch.hcr_el2);
+	__activate_traps_common(vcpu);
+	__activate_cptr_traps(vcpu);
+
 	write_sysreg(__this_cpu_read(kvm_hyp_vector), vbar_el2);
 
 	if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_AT)) {

-- 
2.39.5

[PATCH 6.12 2/8] KVM: arm64: Unconditionally save+flush host FPSIMD/SVE/SME state

[Mark Brown]

From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>

[ Upstream commit fbc7e61195e23f744814e78524b73b59faa54ab4 ]

There are several problems with the way hyp code lazily saves the host's
FPSIMD/SVE state, including:

* Host SVE being discarded unexpectedly due to inconsistent
  configuration of TIF_SVE and CPACR_ELx.ZEN. This has been seen to
  result in QEMU crashes where SVE is used by memmove(), as reported by
  Eric Auger:

  https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-68997

* Host SVE state is discarded *after* modification by ptrace, which was an
  unintentional ptrace ABI change introduced with lazy discarding of SVE state.

* The host FPMR value can be discarded when running a non-protected VM,
  where FPMR support is not exposed to a VM, and that VM uses
  FPSIMD/SVE. In these cases the hyp code does not save the host's FPMR
  before unbinding the host's FPSIMD/SVE/SME state, leaving a stale
  value in memory.

Avoid these by eagerly saving and "flushing" the host's FPSIMD/SVE/SME
state when loading a vCPU such that KVM does not need to save any of the
host's FPSIMD/SVE/SME state. For clarity, fpsimd_kvm_prepare() is
removed and the necessary call to fpsimd_save_and_flush_cpu_state() is
placed in kvm_arch_vcpu_load_fp(). As 'fpsimd_state' and 'fpmr_ptr'
should not be used, they are set to NULL; all uses of these will be
removed in subsequent patches.

Historical problems go back at least as far as v5.17, e.g. erroneous
assumptions about TIF_SVE being clear in commit:

  8383741ab2e773a9 ("KVM: arm64: Get rid of host SVE tracking/saving")

... and so this eager save+flush probably needs to be backported to ALL
stable trees.

Fixes: 93ae6b01bafee8fa ("KVM: arm64: Discard any SVE state when entering KVM guests")
Fixes: 8c845e2731041f0f ("arm64/sve: Leave SVE enabled on syscall if we don't context switch")
Fixes: ef3be86021c3bdf3 ("KVM: arm64: Add save/restore support for FPMR")
Reported-by: Eric Auger <eauger@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Wilco Dijkstra <wilco.dijkstra@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Eric Auger <eric.auger@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Cc: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250210195226.1215254-2-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
[ Mark: Handle vcpu/host flag conflict ]
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
---
 arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c | 25 -------------------------
 arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c    | 35 ++++++++++-------------------------
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c
index 6d21971ae5594f32947480cfa168db400a69a283..f38d22dac140f1b2a8de3f2f2ba1e5da22d2d1c8 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c
@@ -1694,31 +1694,6 @@ void fpsimd_signal_preserve_current_state(void)
 		sve_to_fpsimd(current);
 }
 
-/*
- * Called by KVM when entering the guest.
- */
-void fpsimd_kvm_prepare(void)
-{
-	if (!system_supports_sve())
-		return;
-
-	/*
-	 * KVM does not save host SVE state since we can only enter
-	 * the guest from a syscall so the ABI means that only the
-	 * non-saved SVE state needs to be saved.  If we have left
-	 * SVE enabled for performance reasons then update the task
-	 * state to be FPSIMD only.
-	 */
-	get_cpu_fpsimd_context();
-
-	if (test_and_clear_thread_flag(TIF_SVE)) {
-		sve_to_fpsimd(current);
-		current->thread.fp_type = FP_STATE_FPSIMD;
-	}
-
-	put_cpu_fpsimd_context();
-}
-
 /*
  * Associate current's FPSIMD context with this cpu
  * The caller must have ownership of the cpu FPSIMD context before calling
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c
index ea5484ce1f3ba3121b6938bda15f7a8057d49051..efb54ed60fe1d1d8a904b10a4a4bd3c820d9dac5 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c
@@ -54,16 +54,18 @@ void kvm_arch_vcpu_load_fp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	if (!system_supports_fpsimd())
 		return;
 
-	fpsimd_kvm_prepare();
-
 	/*
-	 * We will check TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE just before entering the
-	 * guest in kvm_arch_vcpu_ctxflush_fp() and override this to
-	 * FP_STATE_FREE if the flag set.
+	 * Ensure that any host FPSIMD/SVE/SME state is saved and unbound such
+	 * that the host kernel is responsible for restoring this state upon
+	 * return to userspace, and the hyp code doesn't need to save anything.
+	 *
+	 * When the host may use SME, fpsimd_save_and_flush_cpu_state() ensures
+	 * that PSTATE.{SM,ZA} == {0,0}.
 	 */
-	*host_data_ptr(fp_owner) = FP_STATE_HOST_OWNED;
-	*host_data_ptr(fpsimd_state) = kern_hyp_va(&current->thread.uw.fpsimd_state);
-	*host_data_ptr(fpmr_ptr) = kern_hyp_va(&current->thread.uw.fpmr);
+	fpsimd_save_and_flush_cpu_state();
+	*host_data_ptr(fp_owner) = FP_STATE_FREE;
+	*host_data_ptr(fpsimd_state) = NULL;
+	*host_data_ptr(fpmr_ptr) = NULL;
 
 	vcpu_clear_flag(vcpu, HOST_SVE_ENABLED);
 	if (read_sysreg(cpacr_el1) & CPACR_EL1_ZEN_EL0EN)
@@ -73,23 +75,6 @@ void kvm_arch_vcpu_load_fp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		vcpu_clear_flag(vcpu, HOST_SME_ENABLED);
 		if (read_sysreg(cpacr_el1) & CPACR_EL1_SMEN_EL0EN)
 			vcpu_set_flag(vcpu, HOST_SME_ENABLED);
-
-		/*
-		 * If PSTATE.SM is enabled then save any pending FP
-		 * state and disable PSTATE.SM. If we leave PSTATE.SM
-		 * enabled and the guest does not enable SME via
-		 * CPACR_EL1.SMEN then operations that should be valid
-		 * may generate SME traps from EL1 to EL1 which we
-		 * can't intercept and which would confuse the guest.
-		 *
-		 * Do the same for PSTATE.ZA in the case where there
-		 * is state in the registers which has not already
-		 * been saved, this is very unlikely to happen.
-		 */
-		if (read_sysreg_s(SYS_SVCR) & (SVCR_SM_MASK | SVCR_ZA_MASK)) {
-			*host_data_ptr(fp_owner) = FP_STATE_FREE;
-			fpsimd_save_and_flush_cpu_state();
-		}
 	}
 
 	/*

-- 
2.39.5

[PATCH 6.12 3/8] KVM: arm64: Remove host FPSIMD saving for non-protected KVM

[Mark Brown]

From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>

Now that the host eagerly saves its own FPSIMD/SVE/SME state,
non-protected KVM never needs to save the host FPSIMD/SVE/SME state,
and the code to do this is never used. Protected KVM still needs to
save/restore the host FPSIMD/SVE state to avoid leaking guest state to
the host (and to avoid revealing to the host whether the guest used
FPSIMD/SVE/SME), and that code needs to be retained.

Remove the unused code and data structures.

To avoid the need for a stub copy of kvm_hyp_save_fpsimd_host() in the
VHE hyp code, the nVHE/hVHE version is moved into the shared switch
header, where it is only invoked when KVM is in protected mode.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250210195226.1215254-3-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h       | 20 +++++---------------
 arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c                    |  8 --------
 arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c                 |  2 --
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c      |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c        | 28 ----------------------------
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c         |  8 --------
 7 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 64 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index d148cf578cb84e7dec4d1add2afa60a3c7a1e041..d8802490b25cba65369f03d94627a2624f14b072 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -602,23 +602,13 @@ struct kvm_host_data {
 	struct kvm_cpu_context host_ctxt;
 
 	/*
-	 * All pointers in this union are hyp VA.
+	 * Hyp VA.
 	 * sve_state is only used in pKVM and if system_supports_sve().
 	 */
-	union {
-		struct user_fpsimd_state *fpsimd_state;
-		struct cpu_sve_state *sve_state;
-	};
-
-	union {
-		/* HYP VA pointer to the host storage for FPMR */
-		u64	*fpmr_ptr;
-		/*
-		 * Used by pKVM only, as it needs to provide storage
-		 * for the host
-		 */
-		u64	fpmr;
-	};
+	struct cpu_sve_state *sve_state;
+
+	/* Used by pKVM only. */
+	u64	fpmr;
 
 	/* Ownership of the FP regs */
 	enum {
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
index e6f0443210a8b7a65f616b25b2e6f74a05683ed6..634d3f62481827a3bf3aba6bf78cafed71b5bd32 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
@@ -2476,14 +2476,6 @@ static void finalize_init_hyp_mode(void)
 			per_cpu_ptr_nvhe_sym(kvm_host_data, cpu)->sve_state =
 				kern_hyp_va(sve_state);
 		}
-	} else {
-		for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
-			struct user_fpsimd_state *fpsimd_state;
-
-			fpsimd_state = &per_cpu_ptr_nvhe_sym(kvm_host_data, cpu)->host_ctxt.fp_regs;
-			per_cpu_ptr_nvhe_sym(kvm_host_data, cpu)->fpsimd_state =
-				kern_hyp_va(fpsimd_state);
-		}
 	}
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c
index efb54ed60fe1d1d8a904b10a4a4bd3c820d9dac5..2ee6bde85235581d6bc9cba7e578c55875b5d5a1 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c
@@ -64,8 +64,6 @@ void kvm_arch_vcpu_load_fp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	 */
 	fpsimd_save_and_flush_cpu_state();
 	*host_data_ptr(fp_owner) = FP_STATE_FREE;
-	*host_data_ptr(fpsimd_state) = NULL;
-	*host_data_ptr(fpmr_ptr) = NULL;
 
 	vcpu_clear_flag(vcpu, HOST_SVE_ENABLED);
 	if (read_sysreg(cpacr_el1) & CPACR_EL1_ZEN_EL0EN)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h
index 5310fe1da6165bcdedfb5ce61bce353e4c9dd58b..a7f6a653f33718d1a25e232608e63ea287f2a672 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h
@@ -344,7 +344,28 @@ static inline void __hyp_sve_save_host(void)
 			 true);
 }
 
-static void kvm_hyp_save_fpsimd_host(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+static void kvm_hyp_save_fpsimd_host(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Non-protected kvm relies on the host restoring its sve state.
+	 * Protected kvm restores the host's sve state as not to reveal that
+	 * fpsimd was used by a guest nor leak upper sve bits.
+	 */
+	if (system_supports_sve()) {
+		__hyp_sve_save_host();
+
+		/* Re-enable SVE traps if not supported for the guest vcpu. */
+		if (!vcpu_has_sve(vcpu))
+			cpacr_clear_set(CPACR_ELx_ZEN, 0);
+
+	} else {
+		__fpsimd_save_state(host_data_ptr(host_ctxt.fp_regs));
+	}
+
+	if (kvm_has_fpmr(kern_hyp_va(vcpu->kvm)))
+		*host_data_ptr(fpmr) = read_sysreg_s(SYS_FPMR);
+}
+
 
 /*
  * We trap the first access to the FP/SIMD to save the host context and
@@ -394,7 +415,7 @@ static bool kvm_hyp_handle_fpsimd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
 	isb();
 
 	/* Write out the host state if it's in the registers */
-	if (host_owns_fp_regs())
+	if (is_protected_kvm_enabled() && host_owns_fp_regs())
 		kvm_hyp_save_fpsimd_host(vcpu);
 
 	/* Restore the guest state */
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c
index fefc89209f9e41c95478f6770881eb314a38b4c2..4e757a77322c9efc59cdff501745f7c80d452358 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ static void fpsimd_sve_sync(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	if (system_supports_sve())
 		__hyp_sve_restore_host();
 	else
-		__fpsimd_restore_state(*host_data_ptr(fpsimd_state));
+		__fpsimd_restore_state(host_data_ptr(host_ctxt.fp_regs));
 
 	if (has_fpmr)
 		write_sysreg_s(*host_data_ptr(fpmr), SYS_FPMR);
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c
index 81d933a71310fd1132b2450cd08108e071a2cf78..3ce16f90fe6af7be21bc7b84a9d8b3905b8b08a7 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c
@@ -193,34 +193,6 @@ static bool kvm_handle_pvm_sys64(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
 		kvm_handle_pvm_sysreg(vcpu, exit_code));
 }
 
-static void kvm_hyp_save_fpsimd_host(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
-	/*
-	 * Non-protected kvm relies on the host restoring its sve state.
-	 * Protected kvm restores the host's sve state as not to reveal that
-	 * fpsimd was used by a guest nor leak upper sve bits.
-	 */
-	if (unlikely(is_protected_kvm_enabled() && system_supports_sve())) {
-		__hyp_sve_save_host();
-
-		/* Re-enable SVE traps if not supported for the guest vcpu. */
-		if (!vcpu_has_sve(vcpu))
-			cpacr_clear_set(CPACR_ELx_ZEN, 0);
-
-	} else {
-		__fpsimd_save_state(*host_data_ptr(fpsimd_state));
-	}
-
-	if (kvm_has_fpmr(kern_hyp_va(vcpu->kvm))) {
-		u64 val = read_sysreg_s(SYS_FPMR);
-
-		if (unlikely(is_protected_kvm_enabled()))
-			*host_data_ptr(fpmr) = val;
-		else
-			**host_data_ptr(fpmr_ptr) = val;
-	}
-}
-
 static const exit_handler_fn hyp_exit_handlers[] = {
 	[0 ... ESR_ELx_EC_MAX]		= NULL,
 	[ESR_ELx_EC_CP15_32]		= kvm_hyp_handle_cp15_32,
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c
index 80581b1c399595fd64d0ccada498edac322480a6..e7ca0424107adec2371ae4553ebab9857c60b6d9 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c
@@ -309,14 +309,6 @@ static bool kvm_hyp_handle_eret(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
 	return true;
 }
 
-static void kvm_hyp_save_fpsimd_host(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
-	__fpsimd_save_state(*host_data_ptr(fpsimd_state));
-
-	if (kvm_has_fpmr(vcpu->kvm))
-		**host_data_ptr(fpmr_ptr) = read_sysreg_s(SYS_FPMR);
-}
-
 static bool kvm_hyp_handle_tlbi_el2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
 {
 	int ret = -EINVAL;

-- 
2.39.5

[PATCH 6.12 4/8] KVM: arm64: Remove VHE host restore of CPACR_EL1.ZEN

[Mark Brown]

From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>

[ Upstream commit 459f059be702056d91537b99a129994aa6ccdd35 ]

When KVM is in VHE mode, the host kernel tries to save and restore the
configuration of CPACR_EL1.ZEN (i.e. CPTR_EL2.ZEN when HCR_EL2.E2H=1)
across kvm_arch_vcpu_load_fp() and kvm_arch_vcpu_put_fp(), since the
configuration may be clobbered by hyp when running a vCPU. This logic is
currently redundant.

The VHE hyp code unconditionally configures CPTR_EL2.ZEN to 0b01 when
returning to the host, permitting host kernel usage of SVE.

Now that the host eagerly saves and unbinds its own FPSIMD/SVE/SME
state, there's no need to save/restore the state of the EL0 SVE trap.
The kernel can safely save/restore state without trapping, as described
above, and will restore userspace state (including trap controls) before
returning to userspace.

Remove the redundant logic.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250210195226.1215254-4-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
[Rework for refactoring of where the flags are stored -- broonie]
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h |  2 --
 arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c           | 16 ----------------
 2 files changed, 18 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index d8802490b25cba65369f03d94627a2624f14b072..1a126fa657fcde3433f37f3aaf464a5b6a5f095d 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -891,8 +891,6 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_arch {
 /* Save TRBE context if active  */
 #define DEBUG_STATE_SAVE_TRBE	__vcpu_single_flag(iflags, BIT(6))
 
-/* SVE enabled for host EL0 */
-#define HOST_SVE_ENABLED	__vcpu_single_flag(sflags, BIT(0))
 /* SME enabled for EL0 */
 #define HOST_SME_ENABLED	__vcpu_single_flag(sflags, BIT(1))
 /* Physical CPU not in supported_cpus */
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c
index 2ee6bde85235581d6bc9cba7e578c55875b5d5a1..4127abfd319c2c683d2281efa52a6abe5fac67ee 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c
@@ -65,10 +65,6 @@ void kvm_arch_vcpu_load_fp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	fpsimd_save_and_flush_cpu_state();
 	*host_data_ptr(fp_owner) = FP_STATE_FREE;
 
-	vcpu_clear_flag(vcpu, HOST_SVE_ENABLED);
-	if (read_sysreg(cpacr_el1) & CPACR_EL1_ZEN_EL0EN)
-		vcpu_set_flag(vcpu, HOST_SVE_ENABLED);
-
 	if (system_supports_sme()) {
 		vcpu_clear_flag(vcpu, HOST_SME_ENABLED);
 		if (read_sysreg(cpacr_el1) & CPACR_EL1_SMEN_EL0EN)
@@ -202,18 +198,6 @@ void kvm_arch_vcpu_put_fp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		 * when needed.
 		 */
 		fpsimd_save_and_flush_cpu_state();
-	} else if (has_vhe() && system_supports_sve()) {
-		/*
-		 * The FPSIMD/SVE state in the CPU has not been touched, and we
-		 * have SVE (and VHE): CPACR_EL1 (alias CPTR_EL2) has been
-		 * reset by kvm_reset_cptr_el2() in the Hyp code, disabling SVE
-		 * for EL0.  To avoid spurious traps, restore the trap state
-		 * seen by kvm_arch_vcpu_load_fp():
-		 */
-		if (vcpu_get_flag(vcpu, HOST_SVE_ENABLED))
-			sysreg_clear_set(CPACR_EL1, 0, CPACR_EL1_ZEN_EL0EN);
-		else
-			sysreg_clear_set(CPACR_EL1, CPACR_EL1_ZEN_EL0EN, 0);
 	}
 
 	local_irq_restore(flags);

-- 
2.39.5

[PATCH 6.12 5/8] KVM: arm64: Remove VHE host restore of CPACR_EL1.SMEN

[Mark Brown]

From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>

[ Upstream commit 407a99c4654e8ea65393f412c421a55cac539f5b ]

When KVM is in VHE mode, the host kernel tries to save and restore the
configuration of CPACR_EL1.SMEN (i.e. CPTR_EL2.SMEN when HCR_EL2.E2H=1)
across kvm_arch_vcpu_load_fp() and kvm_arch_vcpu_put_fp(), since the
configuration may be clobbered by hyp when running a vCPU. This logic
has historically been broken, and is currently redundant.

This logic was originally introduced in commit:

  861262ab86270206 ("KVM: arm64: Handle SME host state when running guests")

At the time, the VHE hyp code would reset CPTR_EL2.SMEN to 0b00 when
returning to the host, trapping host access to SME state. Unfortunately,
this was unsafe as the host could take a softirq before calling
kvm_arch_vcpu_put_fp(), and if a softirq handler were to use kernel mode
NEON the resulting attempt to save the live FPSIMD/SVE/SME state would
result in a fatal trap.

That issue was limited to VHE mode. For nVHE/hVHE modes, KVM always
saved/restored the host kernel's CPACR_EL1 value, and configured
CPTR_EL2.TSM to 0b0, ensuring that host usage of SME would not be
trapped.

The issue above was incidentally fixed by commit:

  375110ab51dec5dc ("KVM: arm64: Fix resetting SME trap values on reset for (h)VHE")

That commit changed the VHE hyp code to configure CPTR_EL2.SMEN to 0b01
when returning to the host, permitting host kernel usage of SME,
avoiding the issue described above. At the time, this was not identified
as a fix for commit 861262ab86270206.

Now that the host eagerly saves and unbinds its own FPSIMD/SVE/SME
state, there's no need to save/restore the state of the EL0 SME trap.
The kernel can safely save/restore state without trapping, as described
above, and will restore userspace state (including trap controls) before
returning to userspace.

Remove the redundant logic.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250210195226.1215254-5-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
[Update for rework of flags storage -- broonie]
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h |  2 --
 arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c           | 21 ---------------------
 2 files changed, 23 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 1a126fa657fcde3433f37f3aaf464a5b6a5f095d..122a1e12582c0584bce86c5416ef7d150f90fe95 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -891,8 +891,6 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_arch {
 /* Save TRBE context if active  */
 #define DEBUG_STATE_SAVE_TRBE	__vcpu_single_flag(iflags, BIT(6))
 
-/* SME enabled for EL0 */
-#define HOST_SME_ENABLED	__vcpu_single_flag(sflags, BIT(1))
 /* Physical CPU not in supported_cpus */
 #define ON_UNSUPPORTED_CPU	__vcpu_single_flag(sflags, BIT(2))
 /* WFIT instruction trapped */
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c
index 4127abfd319c2c683d2281efa52a6abe5fac67ee..f64724197958e0d8a4ec17deb1f9826ce3625eb7 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c
@@ -65,12 +65,6 @@ void kvm_arch_vcpu_load_fp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	fpsimd_save_and_flush_cpu_state();
 	*host_data_ptr(fp_owner) = FP_STATE_FREE;
 
-	if (system_supports_sme()) {
-		vcpu_clear_flag(vcpu, HOST_SME_ENABLED);
-		if (read_sysreg(cpacr_el1) & CPACR_EL1_SMEN_EL0EN)
-			vcpu_set_flag(vcpu, HOST_SME_ENABLED);
-	}
-
 	/*
 	 * If normal guests gain SME support, maintain this behavior for pKVM
 	 * guests, which don't support SME.
@@ -141,21 +135,6 @@ void kvm_arch_vcpu_put_fp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 	local_irq_save(flags);
 
-	/*
-	 * If we have VHE then the Hyp code will reset CPACR_EL1 to
-	 * the default value and we need to reenable SME.
-	 */
-	if (has_vhe() && system_supports_sme()) {
-		/* Also restore EL0 state seen on entry */
-		if (vcpu_get_flag(vcpu, HOST_SME_ENABLED))
-			sysreg_clear_set(CPACR_EL1, 0, CPACR_ELx_SMEN);
-		else
-			sysreg_clear_set(CPACR_EL1,
-					 CPACR_EL1_SMEN_EL0EN,
-					 CPACR_EL1_SMEN_EL1EN);
-		isb();
-	}
-
 	if (guest_owns_fp_regs()) {
 		if (vcpu_has_sve(vcpu)) {
 			u64 zcr = read_sysreg_el1(SYS_ZCR);

-- 
2.39.5

[PATCH 6.12 6/8] KVM: arm64: Refactor exit handlers

[Mark Brown]

From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>

[ Upstream commit 9b66195063c5a145843547b1d692bd189be85287 ]

The hyp exit handling logic is largely shared between VHE and nVHE/hVHE,
with common logic in arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h. The code
in the header depends on function definitions provided by
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c and arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c
when they include the header.

This is an unusual header dependency, and prevents the use of
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h in other files as this would
result in compiler warnings regarding missing definitions, e.g.

| In file included from arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c:8:
| ./arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h:733:31: warning: 'kvm_get_exit_handler_array' used but never defined
|   733 | static const exit_handler_fn *kvm_get_exit_handler_array(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
|       |                               ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
| ./arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h:735:13: warning: 'early_exit_filter' used but never defined
|   735 | static void early_exit_filter(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code);
|       |             ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Refactor the logic such that the header doesn't depend on anything from
the C files. There should be no functional change as a result of this
patch.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250210195226.1215254-7-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
---
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h | 30 ++++++------------------------
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c        | 28 ++++++++++++++++------------
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c         |  9 ++++-----
 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h
index a7f6a653f33718d1a25e232608e63ea287f2a672..e14aba19847f2c66c202a869b5173f25a9a7f66e 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h
@@ -635,23 +635,16 @@ static bool kvm_hyp_handle_dabt_low(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
 
 typedef bool (*exit_handler_fn)(struct kvm_vcpu *, u64 *);
 
-static const exit_handler_fn *kvm_get_exit_handler_array(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
-
-static void early_exit_filter(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code);
-
 /*
  * Allow the hypervisor to handle the exit with an exit handler if it has one.
  *
  * Returns true if the hypervisor handled the exit, and control should go back
  * to the guest, or false if it hasn't.
  */
-static inline bool kvm_hyp_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
+static inline bool kvm_hyp_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code,
+				       const exit_handler_fn *handlers)
 {
-	const exit_handler_fn *handlers = kvm_get_exit_handler_array(vcpu);
-	exit_handler_fn fn;
-
-	fn = handlers[kvm_vcpu_trap_get_class(vcpu)];
-
+	exit_handler_fn fn = handlers[kvm_vcpu_trap_get_class(vcpu)];
 	if (fn)
 		return fn(vcpu, exit_code);
 
@@ -681,20 +674,9 @@ static inline void synchronize_vcpu_pstate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code
  * the guest, false when we should restore the host state and return to the
  * main run loop.
  */
-static inline bool fixup_guest_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
+static inline bool __fixup_guest_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code,
+				      const exit_handler_fn *handlers)
 {
-	/*
-	 * Save PSTATE early so that we can evaluate the vcpu mode
-	 * early on.
-	 */
-	synchronize_vcpu_pstate(vcpu, exit_code);
-
-	/*
-	 * Check whether we want to repaint the state one way or
-	 * another.
-	 */
-	early_exit_filter(vcpu, exit_code);
-
 	if (ARM_EXCEPTION_CODE(*exit_code) != ARM_EXCEPTION_IRQ)
 		vcpu->arch.fault.esr_el2 = read_sysreg_el2(SYS_ESR);
 
@@ -724,7 +706,7 @@ static inline bool fixup_guest_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
 		goto exit;
 
 	/* Check if there's an exit handler and allow it to handle the exit. */
-	if (kvm_hyp_handle_exit(vcpu, exit_code))
+	if (kvm_hyp_handle_exit(vcpu, exit_code, handlers))
 		goto guest;
 exit:
 	/* Return to the host kernel and handle the exit */
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c
index 3ce16f90fe6af7be21bc7b84a9d8b3905b8b08a7..ee74006c47bc44ca1d9bdf1ce7d4d8a41cf8e494 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c
@@ -224,19 +224,21 @@ static const exit_handler_fn *kvm_get_exit_handler_array(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	return hyp_exit_handlers;
 }
 
-/*
- * Some guests (e.g., protected VMs) are not be allowed to run in AArch32.
- * The ARMv8 architecture does not give the hypervisor a mechanism to prevent a
- * guest from dropping to AArch32 EL0 if implemented by the CPU. If the
- * hypervisor spots a guest in such a state ensure it is handled, and don't
- * trust the host to spot or fix it.  The check below is based on the one in
- * kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run().
- *
- * Returns false if the guest ran in AArch32 when it shouldn't have, and
- * thus should exit to the host, or true if a the guest run loop can continue.
- */
-static void early_exit_filter(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
+static inline bool fixup_guest_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
 {
+	const exit_handler_fn *handlers = kvm_get_exit_handler_array(vcpu);
+
+	synchronize_vcpu_pstate(vcpu, exit_code);
+
+	/*
+	 * Some guests (e.g., protected VMs) are not be allowed to run in
+	 * AArch32.  The ARMv8 architecture does not give the hypervisor a
+	 * mechanism to prevent a guest from dropping to AArch32 EL0 if
+	 * implemented by the CPU. If the hypervisor spots a guest in such a
+	 * state ensure it is handled, and don't trust the host to spot or fix
+	 * it.  The check below is based on the one in
+	 * kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run().
+	 */
 	if (unlikely(vcpu_is_protected(vcpu) && vcpu_mode_is_32bit(vcpu))) {
 		/*
 		 * As we have caught the guest red-handed, decide that it isn't
@@ -249,6 +251,8 @@ static void early_exit_filter(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
 		*exit_code &= BIT(ARM_EXIT_WITH_SERROR_BIT);
 		*exit_code |= ARM_EXCEPTION_IL;
 	}
+
+	return __fixup_guest_exit(vcpu, exit_code, handlers);
 }
 
 /* Switch to the guest for legacy non-VHE systems */
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c
index e7ca0424107adec2371ae4553ebab9857c60b6d9..46c1f5caf007331cdbbc806a184e9b4721042fc0 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c
@@ -423,13 +423,10 @@ static const exit_handler_fn hyp_exit_handlers[] = {
 	[ESR_ELx_EC_MOPS]		= kvm_hyp_handle_mops,
 };
 
-static const exit_handler_fn *kvm_get_exit_handler_array(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+static inline bool fixup_guest_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
 {
-	return hyp_exit_handlers;
-}
+	synchronize_vcpu_pstate(vcpu, exit_code);
 
-static void early_exit_filter(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
-{
 	/*
 	 * If we were in HYP context on entry, adjust the PSTATE view
 	 * so that the usual helpers work correctly.
@@ -449,6 +446,8 @@ static void early_exit_filter(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
 		*vcpu_cpsr(vcpu) &= ~(PSR_MODE_MASK | PSR_MODE32_BIT);
 		*vcpu_cpsr(vcpu) |= mode;
 	}
+
+	return __fixup_guest_exit(vcpu, exit_code, hyp_exit_handlers);
 }
 
 /* Switch to the guest for VHE systems running in EL2 */

-- 
2.39.5

[PATCH 6.12 7/8] KVM: arm64: Mark some header functions as inline

[Mark Brown]

From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>

[ Upstream commit f9dd00de1e53a47763dfad601635d18542c3836d ]

The shared hyp switch header has a number of static functions which
might not be used by all files that include the header, and when unused
they will provoke compiler warnings, e.g.

| In file included from arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c:8:
| ./arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h:703:13: warning: 'kvm_hyp_handle_dabt_low' defined but not used [-Wunused-function]
|   703 | static bool kvm_hyp_handle_dabt_low(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
|       |             ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
| ./arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h:682:13: warning: 'kvm_hyp_handle_cp15_32' defined but not used [-Wunused-function]
|   682 | static bool kvm_hyp_handle_cp15_32(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
|       |             ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
| ./arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h:662:13: warning: 'kvm_hyp_handle_sysreg' defined but not used [-Wunused-function]
|   662 | static bool kvm_hyp_handle_sysreg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
|       |             ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
| ./arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h:458:13: warning: 'kvm_hyp_handle_fpsimd' defined but not used [-Wunused-function]
|   458 | static bool kvm_hyp_handle_fpsimd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
|       |             ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
| ./arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h:329:13: warning: 'kvm_hyp_handle_mops' defined but not used [-Wunused-function]
|   329 | static bool kvm_hyp_handle_mops(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
|       |             ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Mark these functions as 'inline' to suppress this warning. This
shouldn't result in any functional change.

At the same time, avoid the use of __alias() in the header and alias
kvm_hyp_handle_iabt_low() and kvm_hyp_handle_watchpt_low() to
kvm_hyp_handle_memory_fault() using CPP, matching the style in the rest
of the kernel. For consistency, kvm_hyp_handle_memory_fault() is also
marked as 'inline'.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250210195226.1215254-8-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
---
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h | 19 +++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h
index e14aba19847f2c66c202a869b5173f25a9a7f66e..c1ab31429a0e5fab97cd06c3b7b6e378170bd99d 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h
@@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ static inline bool __populate_fault_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	return __get_fault_info(vcpu->arch.fault.esr_el2, &vcpu->arch.fault);
 }
 
-static bool kvm_hyp_handle_mops(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
+static inline bool kvm_hyp_handle_mops(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
 {
 	*vcpu_pc(vcpu) = read_sysreg_el2(SYS_ELR);
 	arm64_mops_reset_regs(vcpu_gp_regs(vcpu), vcpu->arch.fault.esr_el2);
@@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ static void kvm_hyp_save_fpsimd_host(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
  * If FP/SIMD is not implemented, handle the trap and inject an undefined
  * instruction exception to the guest. Similarly for trapped SVE accesses.
  */
-static bool kvm_hyp_handle_fpsimd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
+static inline bool kvm_hyp_handle_fpsimd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
 {
 	bool sve_guest;
 	u8 esr_ec;
@@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ static bool handle_ampere1_tcr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	return true;
 }
 
-static bool kvm_hyp_handle_sysreg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
+static inline bool kvm_hyp_handle_sysreg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
 {
 	if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_TX2_219_TVM) &&
 	    handle_tx2_tvm(vcpu))
@@ -584,7 +584,7 @@ static bool kvm_hyp_handle_sysreg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
 	return false;
 }
 
-static bool kvm_hyp_handle_cp15_32(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
+static inline bool kvm_hyp_handle_cp15_32(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
 {
 	if (static_branch_unlikely(&vgic_v3_cpuif_trap) &&
 	    __vgic_v3_perform_cpuif_access(vcpu) == 1)
@@ -593,19 +593,18 @@ static bool kvm_hyp_handle_cp15_32(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
 	return false;
 }
 
-static bool kvm_hyp_handle_memory_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
+static inline bool kvm_hyp_handle_memory_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					       u64 *exit_code)
 {
 	if (!__populate_fault_info(vcpu))
 		return true;
 
 	return false;
 }
-static bool kvm_hyp_handle_iabt_low(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
-	__alias(kvm_hyp_handle_memory_fault);
-static bool kvm_hyp_handle_watchpt_low(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
-	__alias(kvm_hyp_handle_memory_fault);
+#define kvm_hyp_handle_iabt_low		kvm_hyp_handle_memory_fault
+#define kvm_hyp_handle_watchpt_low	kvm_hyp_handle_memory_fault
 
-static bool kvm_hyp_handle_dabt_low(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
+static inline bool kvm_hyp_handle_dabt_low(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
 {
 	if (kvm_hyp_handle_memory_fault(vcpu, exit_code))
 		return true;

-- 
2.39.5

[PATCH 6.12 8/8] KVM: arm64: Eagerly switch ZCR_EL{1,2}

[Mark Brown]

From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>

[ Upstream commit 59419f10045bc955d2229819c7cf7a8b0b9c5b59 ]

In non-protected KVM modes, while the guest FPSIMD/SVE/SME state is live on the
CPU, the host's active SVE VL may differ from the guest's maximum SVE VL:

* For VHE hosts, when a VM uses NV, ZCR_EL2 contains a value constrained
  by the guest hypervisor, which may be less than or equal to that
  guest's maximum VL.

  Note: in this case the value of ZCR_EL1 is immaterial due to E2H.

* For nVHE/hVHE hosts, ZCR_EL1 contains a value written by the guest,
  which may be less than or greater than the guest's maximum VL.

  Note: in this case hyp code traps host SVE usage and lazily restores
  ZCR_EL2 to the host's maximum VL, which may be greater than the
  guest's maximum VL.

This can be the case between exiting a guest and kvm_arch_vcpu_put_fp().
If a softirq is taken during this period and the softirq handler tries
to use kernel-mode NEON, then the kernel will fail to save the guest's
FPSIMD/SVE state, and will pend a SIGKILL for the current thread.

This happens because kvm_arch_vcpu_ctxsync_fp() binds the guest's live
FPSIMD/SVE state with the guest's maximum SVE VL, and
fpsimd_save_user_state() verifies that the live SVE VL is as expected
before attempting to save the register state:

| if (WARN_ON(sve_get_vl() != vl)) {
|         force_signal_inject(SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, 0, 0);
|         return;
| }

Fix this and make this a bit easier to reason about by always eagerly
switching ZCR_EL{1,2} at hyp during guest<->host transitions. With this
happening, there's no need to trap host SVE usage, and the nVHE/nVHE
__deactivate_cptr_traps() logic can be simplified to enable host access
to all present FPSIMD/SVE/SME features.

In protected nVHE/hVHE modes, the host's state is always saved/restored
by hyp, and the guest's state is saved prior to exit to the host, so
from the host's PoV the guest never has live FPSIMD/SVE/SME state, and
the host's ZCR_EL1 is never clobbered by hyp.

Fixes: 8c8010d69c132273 ("KVM: arm64: Save/restore SVE state for nVHE")
Fixes: 2e3cf82063a00ea0 ("KVM: arm64: nv: Ensure correct VL is loaded before saving SVE state")
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250210195226.1215254-9-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
---
 arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c                 | 30 -----------------
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S              |  5 +++
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c      | 13 ++++----
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c        | 33 +++++++++++++++---
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c         |  4 +++
 6 files changed, 103 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c
index f64724197958e0d8a4ec17deb1f9826ce3625eb7..3cbb999419af7bb31ce9cec2baafcad00491610a 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c
@@ -136,36 +136,6 @@ void kvm_arch_vcpu_put_fp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	local_irq_save(flags);
 
 	if (guest_owns_fp_regs()) {
-		if (vcpu_has_sve(vcpu)) {
-			u64 zcr = read_sysreg_el1(SYS_ZCR);
-
-			/*
-			 * If the vCPU is in the hyp context then ZCR_EL1 is
-			 * loaded with its vEL2 counterpart.
-			 */
-			__vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, vcpu_sve_zcr_elx(vcpu)) = zcr;
-
-			/*
-			 * Restore the VL that was saved when bound to the CPU,
-			 * which is the maximum VL for the guest. Because the
-			 * layout of the data when saving the sve state depends
-			 * on the VL, we need to use a consistent (i.e., the
-			 * maximum) VL.
-			 * Note that this means that at guest exit ZCR_EL1 is
-			 * not necessarily the same as on guest entry.
-			 *
-			 * ZCR_EL2 holds the guest hypervisor's VL when running
-			 * a nested guest, which could be smaller than the
-			 * max for the vCPU. Similar to above, we first need to
-			 * switch to a VL consistent with the layout of the
-			 * vCPU's SVE state. KVM support for NV implies VHE, so
-			 * using the ZCR_EL1 alias is safe.
-			 */
-			if (!has_vhe() || (vcpu_has_nv(vcpu) && !is_hyp_ctxt(vcpu)))
-				sve_cond_update_zcr_vq(vcpu_sve_max_vq(vcpu) - 1,
-						       SYS_ZCR_EL1);
-		}
-
 		/*
 		 * Flush (save and invalidate) the fpsimd/sve state so that if
 		 * the host tries to use fpsimd/sve, it's not using stale data
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S
index 4433a234aa9ba242f43b943d22011b5ddacd8af7..9f4e8d68ab505cf4a7aa8673643d9b47ca1bc7cb 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S
@@ -44,6 +44,11 @@ alternative_if ARM64_HAS_RAS_EXTN
 alternative_else_nop_endif
 	mrs	x1, isr_el1
 	cbz	x1,  1f
+
+	// Ensure that __guest_enter() always provides a context
+	// synchronization event so that callers don't need ISBs for anything
+	// that would usually be synchonized by the ERET.
+	isb
 	mov	x0, #ARM_EXCEPTION_IRQ
 	ret
 
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h
index c1ab31429a0e5fab97cd06c3b7b6e378170bd99d..cc9cb63959463a7ddb35d868b17e485b1223d507 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h
@@ -344,6 +344,65 @@ static inline void __hyp_sve_save_host(void)
 			 true);
 }
 
+static inline void fpsimd_lazy_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	u64 zcr_el1, zcr_el2;
+
+	if (!guest_owns_fp_regs())
+		return;
+
+	if (vcpu_has_sve(vcpu)) {
+		/* A guest hypervisor may restrict the effective max VL. */
+		if (vcpu_has_nv(vcpu) && !is_hyp_ctxt(vcpu))
+			zcr_el2 = __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, ZCR_EL2);
+		else
+			zcr_el2 = vcpu_sve_max_vq(vcpu) - 1;
+
+		write_sysreg_el2(zcr_el2, SYS_ZCR);
+
+		zcr_el1 = __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, vcpu_sve_zcr_elx(vcpu));
+		write_sysreg_el1(zcr_el1, SYS_ZCR);
+	}
+}
+
+static inline void fpsimd_lazy_switch_to_host(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	u64 zcr_el1, zcr_el2;
+
+	if (!guest_owns_fp_regs())
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * When the guest owns the FP regs, we know that guest+hyp traps for
+	 * any FPSIMD/SVE/SME features exposed to the guest have been disabled
+	 * by either fpsimd_lazy_switch_to_guest() or kvm_hyp_handle_fpsimd()
+	 * prior to __guest_entry(). As __guest_entry() guarantees a context
+	 * synchronization event, we don't need an ISB here to avoid taking
+	 * traps for anything that was exposed to the guest.
+	 */
+	if (vcpu_has_sve(vcpu)) {
+		zcr_el1 = read_sysreg_el1(SYS_ZCR);
+		__vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, vcpu_sve_zcr_elx(vcpu)) = zcr_el1;
+
+		/*
+		 * The guest's state is always saved using the guest's max VL.
+		 * Ensure that the host has the guest's max VL active such that
+		 * the host can save the guest's state lazily, but don't
+		 * artificially restrict the host to the guest's max VL.
+		 */
+		if (has_vhe()) {
+			zcr_el2 = vcpu_sve_max_vq(vcpu) - 1;
+			write_sysreg_el2(zcr_el2, SYS_ZCR);
+		} else {
+			zcr_el2 = sve_vq_from_vl(kvm_host_sve_max_vl) - 1;
+			write_sysreg_el2(zcr_el2, SYS_ZCR);
+
+			zcr_el1 = vcpu_sve_max_vq(vcpu) - 1;
+			write_sysreg_el1(zcr_el1, SYS_ZCR);
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 static void kvm_hyp_save_fpsimd_host(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	/*
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c
index 4e757a77322c9efc59cdff501745f7c80d452358..1c8e2ad32e8c396fc4b11d5fec2e86728f2829d9 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
  */
 
 #include <hyp/adjust_pc.h>
+#include <hyp/switch.h>
 
 #include <asm/pgtable-types.h>
 #include <asm/kvm_asm.h>
@@ -176,8 +177,12 @@ static void handle___kvm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt)
 		sync_hyp_vcpu(hyp_vcpu);
 		pkvm_put_hyp_vcpu(hyp_vcpu);
 	} else {
+		struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = kern_hyp_va(host_vcpu);
+
 		/* The host is fully trusted, run its vCPU directly. */
-		ret = __kvm_vcpu_run(host_vcpu);
+		fpsimd_lazy_switch_to_guest(vcpu);
+		ret = __kvm_vcpu_run(vcpu);
+		fpsimd_lazy_switch_to_host(vcpu);
 	}
 
 out:
@@ -486,12 +491,6 @@ void handle_trap(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt)
 	case ESR_ELx_EC_SMC64:
 		handle_host_smc(host_ctxt);
 		break;
-	case ESR_ELx_EC_SVE:
-		cpacr_clear_set(0, CPACR_ELx_ZEN);
-		isb();
-		sve_cond_update_zcr_vq(sve_vq_from_vl(kvm_host_sve_max_vl) - 1,
-				       SYS_ZCR_EL2);
-		break;
 	case ESR_ELx_EC_IABT_LOW:
 	case ESR_ELx_EC_DABT_LOW:
 		handle_host_mem_abort(host_ctxt);
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c
index ee74006c47bc44ca1d9bdf1ce7d4d8a41cf8e494..a1245fa838319544f3770a05a58eeed5233f0324 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c
@@ -40,6 +40,9 @@ static void __activate_cptr_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	u64 val = CPTR_EL2_TAM;	/* Same bit irrespective of E2H */
 
+	if (!guest_owns_fp_regs())
+		__activate_traps_fpsimd32(vcpu);
+
 	if (has_hvhe()) {
 		val |= CPACR_ELx_TTA;
 
@@ -48,6 +51,8 @@ static void __activate_cptr_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 			if (vcpu_has_sve(vcpu))
 				val |= CPACR_ELx_ZEN;
 		}
+
+		write_sysreg(val, cpacr_el1);
 	} else {
 		val |= CPTR_EL2_TTA | CPTR_NVHE_EL2_RES1;
 
@@ -62,12 +67,32 @@ static void __activate_cptr_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 		if (!guest_owns_fp_regs())
 			val |= CPTR_EL2_TFP;
+
+		write_sysreg(val, cptr_el2);
 	}
+}
 
-	if (!guest_owns_fp_regs())
-		__activate_traps_fpsimd32(vcpu);
+static void __deactivate_cptr_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (has_hvhe()) {
+		u64 val = CPACR_ELx_FPEN;
+
+		if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_SVE))
+			val |= CPACR_ELx_ZEN;
+		if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_SME))
+			val |= CPACR_ELx_SMEN;
+
+		write_sysreg(val, cpacr_el1);
+	} else {
+		u64 val = CPTR_NVHE_EL2_RES1;
+
+		if (!cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_SVE))
+			val |= CPTR_EL2_TZ;
+		if (!cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_SME))
+			val |= CPTR_EL2_TSM;
 
-	kvm_write_cptr_el2(val);
+		write_sysreg(val, cptr_el2);
+	}
 }
 
 static void __activate_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
@@ -120,7 +145,7 @@ static void __deactivate_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 	write_sysreg(this_cpu_ptr(&kvm_init_params)->hcr_el2, hcr_el2);
 
-	kvm_reset_cptr_el2(vcpu);
+	__deactivate_cptr_traps(vcpu);
 	write_sysreg(__kvm_hyp_host_vector, vbar_el2);
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c
index 46c1f5caf007331cdbbc806a184e9b4721042fc0..496abfd3646b9858e95e06a79edec11eee3a5893 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c
@@ -462,6 +462,8 @@ static int __kvm_vcpu_run_vhe(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 	sysreg_save_host_state_vhe(host_ctxt);
 
+	fpsimd_lazy_switch_to_guest(vcpu);
+
 	/*
 	 * Note that ARM erratum 1165522 requires us to configure both stage 1
 	 * and stage 2 translation for the guest context before we clear
@@ -486,6 +488,8 @@ static int __kvm_vcpu_run_vhe(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 	__deactivate_traps(vcpu);
 
+	fpsimd_lazy_switch_to_host(vcpu);
+
 	sysreg_restore_host_state_vhe(host_ctxt);
 
 	if (guest_owns_fp_regs())

-- 
2.39.5

Re: [PATCH 6.12 3/8] KVM: arm64: Remove host FPSIMD saving for non-protected KVM

[Greg KH]

On Fri, Mar 14, 2025 at 12:35:15AM +0000, Mark Brown wrote:
> From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
> 
> Now that the host eagerly saves its own FPSIMD/SVE/SME state,
> non-protected KVM never needs to save the host FPSIMD/SVE/SME state,
> and the code to do this is never used. Protected KVM still needs to
> save/restore the host FPSIMD/SVE state to avoid leaking guest state to
> the host (and to avoid revealing to the host whether the guest used
> FPSIMD/SVE/SME), and that code needs to be retained.
> 
> Remove the unused code and data structures.
> 
> To avoid the need for a stub copy of kvm_hyp_save_fpsimd_host() in the
> VHE hyp code, the nVHE/hVHE version is moved into the shared switch
> header, where it is only invoked when KVM is in protected mode.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
> Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
> Tested-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
> Cc: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
> Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
> Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
> Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250210195226.1215254-3-mark.rutland@arm.com
> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
> ---

What is the upstream git id for this on?

thanks,

greg k-h

Re: [PATCH 6.12 3/8] KVM: arm64: Remove host FPSIMD saving for non-protected KVM

[Catalin Marinas]

On Fri, Mar 14, 2025 at 06:32:45AM +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 14, 2025 at 12:35:15AM +0000, Mark Brown wrote:
> > From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
> > 
> > Now that the host eagerly saves its own FPSIMD/SVE/SME state,
> > non-protected KVM never needs to save the host FPSIMD/SVE/SME state,
> > and the code to do this is never used. Protected KVM still needs to
> > save/restore the host FPSIMD/SVE state to avoid leaking guest state to
> > the host (and to avoid revealing to the host whether the guest used
> > FPSIMD/SVE/SME), and that code needs to be retained.
> > 
> > Remove the unused code and data structures.
> > 
> > To avoid the need for a stub copy of kvm_hyp_save_fpsimd_host() in the
> > VHE hyp code, the nVHE/hVHE version is moved into the shared switch
> > header, where it is only invoked when KVM is in protected mode.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
> > Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
> > Tested-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
> > Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
> > Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
> > Cc: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
> > Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
> > Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
> > Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
> > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250210195226.1215254-3-mark.rutland@arm.com
> > Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
> > Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
> > ---
> 
> What is the upstream git id for this on?

It seems to be 8eca7f6d5100 ("KVM: arm64: Remove host FPSIMD saving for
non-protected KVM").

-- 
Catalin

Re: [PATCH 6.12 3/8] KVM: arm64: Remove host FPSIMD saving for non-protected KVM

[Mark Brown]

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 292 bytes --]

On Fri, Mar 14, 2025 at 02:40:13PM +0000, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 14, 2025 at 06:32:45AM +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:

> > What is the upstream git id for this on?

> It seems to be 8eca7f6d5100 ("KVM: arm64: Remove host FPSIMD saving for
> non-protected KVM").

Yes, sorry.

[-- Attachment #2: signature.asc --]
[-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 488 bytes --]

Re: [PATCH 6.12 8/8] KVM: arm64: Eagerly switch ZCR_EL{1,2}

[Gavin Shan]

Hi Mark,

On 3/14/25 10:35 AM, Mark Brown wrote:
> From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
> 
> [ Upstream commit 59419f10045bc955d2229819c7cf7a8b0b9c5b59 ]
> 
> In non-protected KVM modes, while the guest FPSIMD/SVE/SME state is live on the
> CPU, the host's active SVE VL may differ from the guest's maximum SVE VL:
> 
> * For VHE hosts, when a VM uses NV, ZCR_EL2 contains a value constrained
>    by the guest hypervisor, which may be less than or equal to that
>    guest's maximum VL.
> 
>    Note: in this case the value of ZCR_EL1 is immaterial due to E2H.
> 
> * For nVHE/hVHE hosts, ZCR_EL1 contains a value written by the guest,
>    which may be less than or greater than the guest's maximum VL.
> 
>    Note: in this case hyp code traps host SVE usage and lazily restores
>    ZCR_EL2 to the host's maximum VL, which may be greater than the
>    guest's maximum VL.
> 
> This can be the case between exiting a guest and kvm_arch_vcpu_put_fp().
> If a softirq is taken during this period and the softirq handler tries
> to use kernel-mode NEON, then the kernel will fail to save the guest's
> FPSIMD/SVE state, and will pend a SIGKILL for the current thread.
> 
> This happens because kvm_arch_vcpu_ctxsync_fp() binds the guest's live
> FPSIMD/SVE state with the guest's maximum SVE VL, and
> fpsimd_save_user_state() verifies that the live SVE VL is as expected
> before attempting to save the register state:
> 
> | if (WARN_ON(sve_get_vl() != vl)) {
> |         force_signal_inject(SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, 0, 0);
> |         return;
> | }
> 
> Fix this and make this a bit easier to reason about by always eagerly
> switching ZCR_EL{1,2} at hyp during guest<->host transitions. With this
> happening, there's no need to trap host SVE usage, and the nVHE/nVHE
> __deactivate_cptr_traps() logic can be simplified to enable host access
> to all present FPSIMD/SVE/SME features.
> 
> In protected nVHE/hVHE modes, the host's state is always saved/restored
> by hyp, and the guest's state is saved prior to exit to the host, so
> from the host's PoV the guest never has live FPSIMD/SVE/SME state, and
> the host's ZCR_EL1 is never clobbered by hyp.
> 
> Fixes: 8c8010d69c132273 ("KVM: arm64: Save/restore SVE state for nVHE")
> Fixes: 2e3cf82063a00ea0 ("KVM: arm64: nv: Ensure correct VL is loaded before saving SVE state")
> Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
> Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
> Tested-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
> Cc: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
> Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
> Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
> Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250210195226.1215254-9-mark.rutland@arm.com
> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
> ---
>   arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c                 | 30 -----------------
>   arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S              |  5 +++
>   arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>   arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c      | 13 ++++----
>   arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c        | 33 +++++++++++++++---
>   arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c         |  4 +++
>   6 files changed, 103 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
> 

[...]

> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c
> index 4e757a77322c9efc59cdff501745f7c80d452358..1c8e2ad32e8c396fc4b11d5fec2e86728f2829d9 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c
> @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
>    */
>   
>   #include <hyp/adjust_pc.h>
> +#include <hyp/switch.h>
>   
>   #include <asm/pgtable-types.h>
>   #include <asm/kvm_asm.h>
> @@ -176,8 +177,12 @@ static void handle___kvm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt)
>   		sync_hyp_vcpu(hyp_vcpu);
>   		pkvm_put_hyp_vcpu(hyp_vcpu);
>   	} else {
> +		struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = kern_hyp_va(host_vcpu);
> +
>   		/* The host is fully trusted, run its vCPU directly. */
> -		ret = __kvm_vcpu_run(host_vcpu);
> +		fpsimd_lazy_switch_to_guest(vcpu);
> +		ret = __kvm_vcpu_run(vcpu);
> +		fpsimd_lazy_switch_to_host(vcpu);
>   	}
>   

@host_vcpu should have been hypervisor's linear mapping address in v6.12. It looks
incorrect to assume it's a kernel's linear mapping address and convert it (@host_vcpu)
to the hypervisor's linear address agin, if I don't miss anything.

https://web.git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/tree/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c?h=linux-6.12.y

Thanks,
Gavin

>   out:
> @@ -486,12 +491,6 @@ void handle_trap(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt)
>   	case ESR_ELx_EC_SMC64:
>   		handle_host_smc(host_ctxt);
>   		break;
> -	case ESR_ELx_EC_SVE:
> -		cpacr_clear_set(0, CPACR_ELx_ZEN);
> -		isb();
> -		sve_cond_update_zcr_vq(sve_vq_from_vl(kvm_host_sve_max_vl) - 1,
> -				       SYS_ZCR_EL2);
> -		break;
>   	case ESR_ELx_EC_IABT_LOW:
>   	case ESR_ELx_EC_DABT_LOW:
>   		handle_host_mem_abort(host_ctxt);
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c
> index ee74006c47bc44ca1d9bdf1ce7d4d8a41cf8e494..a1245fa838319544f3770a05a58eeed5233f0324 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c
> @@ -40,6 +40,9 @@ static void __activate_cptr_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>   {
>   	u64 val = CPTR_EL2_TAM;	/* Same bit irrespective of E2H */
>   
> +	if (!guest_owns_fp_regs())
> +		__activate_traps_fpsimd32(vcpu);
> +
>   	if (has_hvhe()) {
>   		val |= CPACR_ELx_TTA;
>   
> @@ -48,6 +51,8 @@ static void __activate_cptr_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>   			if (vcpu_has_sve(vcpu))
>   				val |= CPACR_ELx_ZEN;
>   		}
> +
> +		write_sysreg(val, cpacr_el1);
>   	} else {
>   		val |= CPTR_EL2_TTA | CPTR_NVHE_EL2_RES1;
>   
> @@ -62,12 +67,32 @@ static void __activate_cptr_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>   
>   		if (!guest_owns_fp_regs())
>   			val |= CPTR_EL2_TFP;
> +
> +		write_sysreg(val, cptr_el2);
>   	}
> +}
>   
> -	if (!guest_owns_fp_regs())
> -		__activate_traps_fpsimd32(vcpu);
> +static void __deactivate_cptr_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +{
> +	if (has_hvhe()) {
> +		u64 val = CPACR_ELx_FPEN;
> +
> +		if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_SVE))
> +			val |= CPACR_ELx_ZEN;
> +		if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_SME))
> +			val |= CPACR_ELx_SMEN;
> +
> +		write_sysreg(val, cpacr_el1);
> +	} else {
> +		u64 val = CPTR_NVHE_EL2_RES1;
> +
> +		if (!cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_SVE))
> +			val |= CPTR_EL2_TZ;
> +		if (!cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_SME))
> +			val |= CPTR_EL2_TSM;
>   
> -	kvm_write_cptr_el2(val);
> +		write_sysreg(val, cptr_el2);
> +	}
>   }
>   
>   static void __activate_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> @@ -120,7 +145,7 @@ static void __deactivate_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>   
>   	write_sysreg(this_cpu_ptr(&kvm_init_params)->hcr_el2, hcr_el2);
>   
> -	kvm_reset_cptr_el2(vcpu);
> +	__deactivate_cptr_traps(vcpu);
>   	write_sysreg(__kvm_hyp_host_vector, vbar_el2);
>   }
>   
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c
> index 46c1f5caf007331cdbbc806a184e9b4721042fc0..496abfd3646b9858e95e06a79edec11eee3a5893 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c
> @@ -462,6 +462,8 @@ static int __kvm_vcpu_run_vhe(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>   
>   	sysreg_save_host_state_vhe(host_ctxt);
>   
> +	fpsimd_lazy_switch_to_guest(vcpu);
> +
>   	/*
>   	 * Note that ARM erratum 1165522 requires us to configure both stage 1
>   	 * and stage 2 translation for the guest context before we clear
> @@ -486,6 +488,8 @@ static int __kvm_vcpu_run_vhe(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>   
>   	__deactivate_traps(vcpu);
>   
> +	fpsimd_lazy_switch_to_host(vcpu);
> +
>   	sysreg_restore_host_state_vhe(host_ctxt);
>   
>   	if (guest_owns_fp_regs())
> 

Re: [PATCH 6.12 8/8] KVM: arm64: Eagerly switch ZCR_EL{1,2}

[Marc Zyngier]

On Wed, 19 Mar 2025 00:26:14 +0000,
Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com> wrote:
> 
> Hi Mark,
> 
> On 3/14/25 10:35 AM, Mark Brown wrote:
> > From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
> > 
> > [ Upstream commit 59419f10045bc955d2229819c7cf7a8b0b9c5b59 ]
> > 
> > In non-protected KVM modes, while the guest FPSIMD/SVE/SME state is live on the
> > CPU, the host's active SVE VL may differ from the guest's maximum SVE VL:
> > 
> > * For VHE hosts, when a VM uses NV, ZCR_EL2 contains a value constrained
> >    by the guest hypervisor, which may be less than or equal to that
> >    guest's maximum VL.
> > 
> >    Note: in this case the value of ZCR_EL1 is immaterial due to E2H.
> > 
> > * For nVHE/hVHE hosts, ZCR_EL1 contains a value written by the guest,
> >    which may be less than or greater than the guest's maximum VL.
> > 
> >    Note: in this case hyp code traps host SVE usage and lazily restores
> >    ZCR_EL2 to the host's maximum VL, which may be greater than the
> >    guest's maximum VL.
> > 
> > This can be the case between exiting a guest and kvm_arch_vcpu_put_fp().
> > If a softirq is taken during this period and the softirq handler tries
> > to use kernel-mode NEON, then the kernel will fail to save the guest's
> > FPSIMD/SVE state, and will pend a SIGKILL for the current thread.
> > 
> > This happens because kvm_arch_vcpu_ctxsync_fp() binds the guest's live
> > FPSIMD/SVE state with the guest's maximum SVE VL, and
> > fpsimd_save_user_state() verifies that the live SVE VL is as expected
> > before attempting to save the register state:
> > 
> > | if (WARN_ON(sve_get_vl() != vl)) {
> > |         force_signal_inject(SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, 0, 0);
> > |         return;
> > | }
> > 
> > Fix this and make this a bit easier to reason about by always eagerly
> > switching ZCR_EL{1,2} at hyp during guest<->host transitions. With this
> > happening, there's no need to trap host SVE usage, and the nVHE/nVHE
> > __deactivate_cptr_traps() logic can be simplified to enable host access
> > to all present FPSIMD/SVE/SME features.
> > 
> > In protected nVHE/hVHE modes, the host's state is always saved/restored
> > by hyp, and the guest's state is saved prior to exit to the host, so
> > from the host's PoV the guest never has live FPSIMD/SVE/SME state, and
> > the host's ZCR_EL1 is never clobbered by hyp.
> > 
> > Fixes: 8c8010d69c132273 ("KVM: arm64: Save/restore SVE state for nVHE")
> > Fixes: 2e3cf82063a00ea0 ("KVM: arm64: nv: Ensure correct VL is loaded before saving SVE state")
> > Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
> > Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
> > Tested-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
> > Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
> > Cc: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
> > Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
> > Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
> > Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
> > Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
> > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250210195226.1215254-9-mark.rutland@arm.com
> > Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
> > Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
> > ---
> >   arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c                 | 30 -----------------
> >   arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S              |  5 +++
> >   arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >   arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c      | 13 ++++----
> >   arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c        | 33 +++++++++++++++---
> >   arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c         |  4 +++
> >   6 files changed, 103 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
> > 
> 
> [...]
> 
> > diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c
> > index 4e757a77322c9efc59cdff501745f7c80d452358..1c8e2ad32e8c396fc4b11d5fec2e86728f2829d9 100644
> > --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c
> > +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c
> > @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
> >    */
> >     #include <hyp/adjust_pc.h>
> > +#include <hyp/switch.h>
> >     #include <asm/pgtable-types.h>
> >   #include <asm/kvm_asm.h>
> > @@ -176,8 +177,12 @@ static void handle___kvm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt)
> >   		sync_hyp_vcpu(hyp_vcpu);
> >   		pkvm_put_hyp_vcpu(hyp_vcpu);
> >   	} else {
> > +		struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = kern_hyp_va(host_vcpu);
> > +
> >   		/* The host is fully trusted, run its vCPU directly. */
> > -		ret = __kvm_vcpu_run(host_vcpu);
> > +		fpsimd_lazy_switch_to_guest(vcpu);
> > +		ret = __kvm_vcpu_run(vcpu);
> > +		fpsimd_lazy_switch_to_host(vcpu);
> >   	}
> >   
> 
> @host_vcpu should have been hypervisor's linear mapping address in v6.12. It looks
> incorrect to assume it's a kernel's linear mapping address and convert it (@host_vcpu)
> to the hypervisor's linear address agin, if I don't miss anything.

host_vcpu is passed as a parameter to the hypercall, and is definitely
a kernel address.

However, at this stage, we have *already* converted it to a HYP VA:

https://web.git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/tree/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c?h=linux-6.12.y#n147

The result is that this change is turning a perfectly valid HYP VA
into... something. Odds are that the masking/patching will not mess up
the address, but this is completely buggy anyway. In general,
kern_hyp_va() is not an idempotent operation.

Thanks for noticing that something was wrong.

Broonie, can you please look into this?

Greg, it may be more prudent to unstage this series from 6.12-stable
until we know for sure this is the only problem.

	M.

-- 
Without deviation from the norm, progress is not possible.

Re: [PATCH 6.12 8/8] KVM: arm64: Eagerly switch ZCR_EL{1,2}

[Mark Rutland]

On Wed, Mar 19, 2025 at 09:15:54AM +0000, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> On Wed, 19 Mar 2025 00:26:14 +0000,
> Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com> wrote:
> > On 3/14/25 10:35 AM, Mark Brown wrote:

> > > diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c
> > > index 4e757a77322c9efc59cdff501745f7c80d452358..1c8e2ad32e8c396fc4b11d5fec2e86728f2829d9 100644
> > > --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c
> > > +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c
> > > @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
> > >    */
> > >     #include <hyp/adjust_pc.h>
> > > +#include <hyp/switch.h>
> > >     #include <asm/pgtable-types.h>
> > >   #include <asm/kvm_asm.h>
> > > @@ -176,8 +177,12 @@ static void handle___kvm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt)
> > >   		sync_hyp_vcpu(hyp_vcpu);
> > >   		pkvm_put_hyp_vcpu(hyp_vcpu);
> > >   	} else {
> > > +		struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = kern_hyp_va(host_vcpu);
> > > +
> > >   		/* The host is fully trusted, run its vCPU directly. */
> > > -		ret = __kvm_vcpu_run(host_vcpu);
> > > +		fpsimd_lazy_switch_to_guest(vcpu);
> > > +		ret = __kvm_vcpu_run(vcpu);
> > > +		fpsimd_lazy_switch_to_host(vcpu);
> > >   	}
> > >   
> > 
> > @host_vcpu should have been hypervisor's linear mapping address in v6.12. It looks
> > incorrect to assume it's a kernel's linear mapping address and convert it (@host_vcpu)
> > to the hypervisor's linear address agin, if I don't miss anything.
> 
> host_vcpu is passed as a parameter to the hypercall, and is definitely
> a kernel address.
> 
> However, at this stage, we have *already* converted it to a HYP VA:
> 
> https://web.git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/tree/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c?h=linux-6.12.y#n147

That's also the case in v6.13; the earlier conversion was removed in
v6.14-rc1 in commit:

  f7d03fcbf1f48206 ("KVM: arm64: Introduce __pkvm_vcpu_{load,put}()")

... where the code in the 'else' block changed from:

|	ret = __kvm_vcpu_run(host_vcpu);

... to:

	ret = __kvm_vcpu_run(kern_hyp_va(host_vcpu));
|

In the upstream version of this patch, the code here changed from

|	/* The host is fully trusted, run its vCPU directly. */
|	ret = __kvm_vcpu_run(kern_hyp_va(host_vcpu));

... to:

|	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = kern_hyp_va(host_vcpu);
|
|	/* The host is fully trusted, run its vCPU directly. */
|	fpsimd_lazy_switch_to_guest(vcpu);
|	ret = __kvm_vcpu_run(vcpu);
|	fpsimd_lazy_switch_to_host(vcpu);

> The result is that this change is turning a perfectly valid HYP VA
> into... something. Odds are that the masking/patching will not mess up
> the address, but this is completely buggy anyway. In general,
> kern_hyp_va() is not an idempotent operation.

IIUC today it *happens* to be idempotent, but as you say that is not
guaranteed to remain the case, and this is definitely a logical bug.

> Thanks for noticing that something was wrong.
> 
> Broonie, can you please look into this?
> 
> Greg, it may be more prudent to unstage this series from 6.12-stable
> until we know for sure this is the only problem.

As above, likewise with the v6.13 version.

I'll go reply there linking to this thread.

Mark.

Re: [PATCH 6.12 8/8] KVM: arm64: Eagerly switch ZCR_EL{1,2}

[Mark Brown]

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 820 bytes --]

On Wed, Mar 19, 2025 at 10:20:11AM +0000, Mark Rutland wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 19, 2025 at 09:15:54AM +0000, Marc Zyngier wrote:

> > The result is that this change is turning a perfectly valid HYP VA
> > into... something. Odds are that the masking/patching will not mess up
> > the address, but this is completely buggy anyway. In general,
> > kern_hyp_va() is not an idempotent operation.

> IIUC today it *happens* to be idempotent, but as you say that is not
> guaranteed to remain the case, and this is definitely a logical bug.

I think so, yes.  I suspect the idempotency confused me.

> > Greg, it may be more prudent to unstage this series from 6.12-stable
> > until we know for sure this is the only problem.

> As above, likewise with the v6.13 version.

Yes, please unstage these.  I'll send out new versions.

[-- Attachment #2: signature.asc --]
[-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 488 bytes --]

Re: [PATCH 6.12 8/8] KVM: arm64: Eagerly switch ZCR_EL{1,2}

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

On Wed, Mar 19, 2025 at 01:02:30PM +0000, Mark Brown wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 19, 2025 at 10:20:11AM +0000, Mark Rutland wrote:
> > On Wed, Mar 19, 2025 at 09:15:54AM +0000, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> 
> > > The result is that this change is turning a perfectly valid HYP VA
> > > into... something. Odds are that the masking/patching will not mess up
> > > the address, but this is completely buggy anyway. In general,
> > > kern_hyp_va() is not an idempotent operation.
> 
> > IIUC today it *happens* to be idempotent, but as you say that is not
> > guaranteed to remain the case, and this is definitely a logical bug.
> 
> I think so, yes.  I suspect the idempotency confused me.
> 
> > > Greg, it may be more prudent to unstage this series from 6.12-stable
> > > until we know for sure this is the only problem.
> 
> > As above, likewise with the v6.13 version.
> 
> Yes, please unstage these.  I'll send out new versions.

All now dropped from both queues, thanks.

greg k-h