From: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
To: linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org, mhiramat@kernel.org,
oleg@redhat.com, peterz@infradead.org, mingo@redhat.com,
acme@kernel.org, namhyung@kernel.org, mark.rutland@arm.com,
alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com, jolsa@kernel.org,
irogers@google.com, adrian.hunter@intel.com,
kan.liang@linux.intel.com, thiago.bauermann@linaro.org,
broonie@kernel.org, yury.khrustalev@arm.com,
kristina.martsenko@arm.com, liaochang1@huawei.com,
catalin.marinas@arm.com, will@kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
Subject: [PATCH v6 4/7] arm64: probes: Add GCS support to bl/blr/ret
Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2025 16:34:49 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250818213452.50439-5-jeremy.linton@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250818213452.50439-1-jeremy.linton@arm.com>
The arm64 probe simulation doesn't currently have logic in place
to deal with GCS and this results in core dumps if probes are inserted
at control flow locations. Fix-up bl, blr and ret to manipulate the
shadow stack as needed.
While we manipulate and validate the shadow stack correctly, the
hardware provides additional security by only allowing GCS operations
against pages which are marked to support GCS. For writing there is
gcssttr() which enforces this, but there isn't an equivalent for
reading. This means that uprobe users should be aware that probing on
control flow instructions which require reading the shadow stack (ex:
ret) offers lower security guarantees than what is achieved without
the uprobe active.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
---
arch/arm64/kernel/probes/simulate-insn.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/simulate-insn.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/simulate-insn.c
index 09a0b36122d0..97ed4db75417 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/simulate-insn.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/simulate-insn.c
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
#include <asm/traps.h>
#include "simulate-insn.h"
+#include "asm/gcs.h"
#define bbl_displacement(insn) \
sign_extend32(((insn) & 0x3ffffff) << 2, 27)
@@ -49,6 +50,21 @@ static inline u32 get_w_reg(struct pt_regs *regs, int reg)
return lower_32_bits(pt_regs_read_reg(regs, reg));
}
+static inline int update_lr(struct pt_regs *regs, long addr)
+{
+ int err = 0;
+
+ if (user_mode(regs) && task_gcs_el0_enabled(current)) {
+ push_user_gcs(addr, &err);
+ if (err) {
+ force_sig(SIGSEGV);
+ return err;
+ }
+ }
+ procedure_link_pointer_set(regs, addr);
+ return err;
+}
+
static bool __kprobes check_cbz(u32 opcode, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
int xn = opcode & 0x1f;
@@ -107,9 +123,9 @@ simulate_b_bl(u32 opcode, long addr, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
int disp = bbl_displacement(opcode);
- /* Link register is x30 */
if (opcode & (1 << 31))
- set_x_reg(regs, 30, addr + 4);
+ if (update_lr(regs, addr + 4))
+ return;
instruction_pointer_set(regs, addr + disp);
}
@@ -129,21 +145,31 @@ void __kprobes
simulate_br_blr(u32 opcode, long addr, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
int xn = (opcode >> 5) & 0x1f;
+ int b_target = get_x_reg(regs, xn);
- /* update pc first in case we're doing a "blr lr" */
- instruction_pointer_set(regs, get_x_reg(regs, xn));
-
- /* Link register is x30 */
if (((opcode >> 21) & 0x3) == 1)
- set_x_reg(regs, 30, addr + 4);
+ if (update_lr(regs, addr + 4))
+ return;
+
+ instruction_pointer_set(regs, b_target);
}
void __kprobes
simulate_ret(u32 opcode, long addr, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
+ u64 ret_addr;
+ int err = 0;
int xn = (opcode >> 5) & 0x1f;
-
- instruction_pointer_set(regs, get_x_reg(regs, xn));
+ unsigned long r_target = get_x_reg(regs, xn);
+
+ if (user_mode(regs) && task_gcs_el0_enabled(current)) {
+ ret_addr = pop_user_gcs(&err);
+ if (err || ret_addr != r_target) {
+ force_sig(SIGSEGV);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ instruction_pointer_set(regs, r_target);
}
void __kprobes
--
2.50.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-08-18 22:52 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-08-18 21:34 [PATCH v6 0/7] arm64: Enable UPROBES with GCS Jeremy Linton
2025-08-18 21:34 ` [PATCH v6 1/7] arm64: probes: Break ret out from bl/blr Jeremy Linton
2025-08-18 21:34 ` [PATCH v6 2/7] arm64: uaccess: Move existing GCS accessors definitions to gcs.h Jeremy Linton
2025-08-20 15:25 ` Mark Brown
2025-08-18 21:34 ` [PATCH v6 3/7] arm64: uaccess: Add additional userspace GCS accessors Jeremy Linton
2025-08-20 17:24 ` Mark Brown
2025-08-18 21:34 ` Jeremy Linton [this message]
2025-08-18 21:34 ` [PATCH v6 5/7] arm64: uprobes: Add GCS support to uretprobes Jeremy Linton
2025-08-18 21:34 ` [PATCH v6 6/7] arm64: Kconfig: Remove GCS restrictions on UPROBES Jeremy Linton
2025-08-18 21:34 ` [PATCH v6 7/7] uprobes: uprobe_warn should use passed task Jeremy Linton
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