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From: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
To: linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org, mhiramat@kernel.org,
	oleg@redhat.com, peterz@infradead.org, mingo@redhat.com,
	acme@kernel.org, namhyung@kernel.org, mark.rutland@arm.com,
	alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com, jolsa@kernel.org,
	irogers@google.com, adrian.hunter@intel.com,
	kan.liang@linux.intel.com, thiago.bauermann@linaro.org,
	broonie@kernel.org, yury.khrustalev@arm.com,
	kristina.martsenko@arm.com, liaochang1@huawei.com,
	catalin.marinas@arm.com, will@kernel.org,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
Subject: [PATCH v7 3/7] arm64: uaccess: Add additional userspace GCS accessors
Date: Sun, 24 Aug 2025 22:34:17 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250825033421.463669-4-jeremy.linton@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250825033421.463669-1-jeremy.linton@arm.com>

Uprobes need more advanced read, push, and pop userspace GCS
functionality. Implement those features using the existing gcsstr()
and copy_from_user().

Its important to note that GCS pages can be read by normal
instructions, but the hardware validates that pages used by GCS
specific operations, have a GCS privilege set. We aren't validating this
in load_user_gcs because it requires stabilizing the VMA over the read
which may fault.

Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/gcs.h | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 54 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/gcs.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/gcs.h
index 10c68d3e6e30..97801543380e 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/gcs.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/gcs.h
@@ -116,6 +116,47 @@ static inline void put_user_gcs(unsigned long val, unsigned long __user *addr,
 	uaccess_ttbr0_disable();
 }
 
+static inline void push_user_gcs(unsigned long val, int *err)
+{
+	u64 gcspr = read_sysreg_s(SYS_GCSPR_EL0);
+
+	gcspr -= sizeof(u64);
+	put_user_gcs(val, (unsigned long __user *)gcspr, err);
+	if (!*err)
+		write_sysreg_s(gcspr, SYS_GCSPR_EL0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Unlike put/push_user_gcs() above, get/pop_user_gsc() doesn't
+ * validate the GCS permission is set on the page being read.  This
+ * differs from how the hardware works when it consumes data stored at
+ * GCSPR. Callers should ensure this is acceptable.
+ */
+static inline u64 get_user_gcs(unsigned long __user *addr, int *err)
+{
+	unsigned long ret;
+	u64 load = 0;
+
+	/* Ensure previous GCS operation are visible before we read the page */
+	gcsb_dsync();
+	ret = copy_from_user(&load, addr, sizeof(load));
+	if (ret != 0)
+		*err = ret;
+	return load;
+}
+
+static inline u64 pop_user_gcs(int *err)
+{
+	u64 gcspr = read_sysreg_s(SYS_GCSPR_EL0);
+	u64 read_val;
+
+	read_val = get_user_gcs((unsigned long __user *)gcspr, err);
+	if (!*err)
+		write_sysreg_s(gcspr + sizeof(u64), SYS_GCSPR_EL0);
+
+	return read_val;
+}
+
 #else
 
 static inline bool task_gcs_el0_enabled(struct task_struct *task)
@@ -126,6 +167,10 @@ static inline bool task_gcs_el0_enabled(struct task_struct *task)
 static inline void gcs_set_el0_mode(struct task_struct *task) { }
 static inline void gcs_free(struct task_struct *task) { }
 static inline void gcs_preserve_current_state(void) { }
+static inline void put_user_gcs(unsigned long val, unsigned long __user *addr,
+				int *err) { }
+static inline void push_user_gcs(unsigned long val, int *err) { }
+
 static inline unsigned long gcs_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *tsk,
 						   const struct kernel_clone_args *args)
 {
@@ -136,6 +181,15 @@ static inline int gcs_check_locked(struct task_struct *task,
 {
 	return 0;
 }
+static inline u64 get_user_gcs(unsigned long __user *addr, int *err)
+{
+	*err = -EFAULT;
+	return 0;
+}
+static inline u64 pop_user_gcs(int *err)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
 
 #endif
 
-- 
2.50.1



  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-08-25  3:46 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-08-25  3:34 [PATCH v7 0/7] arm64: Enable UPROBES with GCS Jeremy Linton
2025-08-25  3:34 ` [PATCH v7 1/7] arm64: probes: Break ret out from bl/blr Jeremy Linton
2025-08-25  3:34 ` [PATCH v7 2/7] arm64: uaccess: Move existing GCS accessors definitions to gcs.h Jeremy Linton
2025-08-25  3:34 ` Jeremy Linton [this message]
2025-08-25  3:34 ` [PATCH v7 4/7] arm64: probes: Add GCS support to bl/blr/ret Jeremy Linton
2025-08-25  3:34 ` [PATCH v7 5/7] arm64: uprobes: Add GCS support to uretprobes Jeremy Linton
2025-08-25  3:34 ` [PATCH v7 6/7] arm64: Kconfig: Remove GCS restrictions on UPROBES Jeremy Linton
2025-08-25  3:34 ` [PATCH v7 7/7] uprobes: uprobe_warn should use passed task Jeremy Linton

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