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From: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
To: elver@google.com, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	 Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>,
	Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>,
	 Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>,
	llvm@lists.linux.dev,  Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	 linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,  kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH 3/3] arm64, compiler-context-analysis: Permit alias analysis through __READ_ONCE() with CONFIG_LTO=y
Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2026 01:25:12 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260126002936.2676435-4-elver@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260126002936.2676435-1-elver@google.com>

When enabling Clang's Context Analysis (aka. Thread Safety Analysis) on
kernel/futex/core.o (see Peter's changes at [1]), in arm64 LTO builds we
could see:

| kernel/futex/core.c:982:1: warning: spinlock 'atomic ? __u.__val : q->lock_ptr' is still held at the end of function [-Wthread-safety-analysis]
|      982 | }
|          | ^
|    kernel/futex/core.c:976:2: note: spinlock acquired here
|      976 |         spin_lock(lock_ptr);
|          |         ^
| kernel/futex/core.c:982:1: warning: expecting spinlock 'q->lock_ptr' to be held at the end of function [-Wthread-safety-analysis]
|      982 | }
|          | ^
|    kernel/futex/core.c:966:6: note: spinlock acquired here
|      966 | void futex_q_lockptr_lock(struct futex_q *q)
|          |      ^
|    2 warnings generated.

Where we have:

	extern void futex_q_lockptr_lock(struct futex_q *q) __acquires(q->lock_ptr);
	..
	void futex_q_lockptr_lock(struct futex_q *q)
	{
		spinlock_t *lock_ptr;

		/*
		 * See futex_unqueue() why lock_ptr can change.
		 */
		guard(rcu)();
	retry:
>>		lock_ptr = READ_ONCE(q->lock_ptr);
		spin_lock(lock_ptr);
	...
	}

The READ_ONCE() above is expanded to arm64's LTO __READ_ONCE(). Here,
Clang Thread Safety Analysis's alias analysis resolves 'lock_ptr' to
'atomic ? __u.__val : q->lock_ptr', and considers this the identity of
the context lock given it can't see through the inline assembly;
however, we simply want 'q->lock_ptr' as the canonical context lock.
While for code generation the compiler simplified to __u.__val for
pointers (8 byte case -> atomic), TSA's analysis (a) happens much
earlier on the AST, and (b) would be the wrong deduction.

Now that we've gotten rid of the 'atomic' ternary comparison, we can
return '__u.__val' through a pointer that we initialize with '&x', but
then change with a pointer-to-pointer. When READ_ONCE()'ing a context
lock pointer, TSA's alias analysis does not invalidate the initial alias
when updated through the pointer-to-pointer, and we make it effectively
"see through" the __READ_ONCE().

Code generation is unchanged.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260121110704.221498346@infradead.org [1]
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202601221040.TeM0ihff-lkp@intel.com/
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/rwonce.h | 6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/rwonce.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/rwonce.h
index 9963948f4b44..85b1dd7b0274 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/rwonce.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/rwonce.h
@@ -31,8 +31,10 @@
  */
 #define __READ_ONCE(x)							\
 ({									\
-	typeof(&(x)) __x = &(x);					\
+	auto __x = &(x);						\
+	auto __ret = (TYPEOF_UNQUAL(*__x) *)__x, *__retp = &__ret;	\
 	union { TYPEOF_UNQUAL(*__x) __val; char __c[1]; } __u;		\
+	*__retp = &__u.__val;						\
 	switch (sizeof(x)) {						\
 	case 1:								\
 		asm volatile(__LOAD_RCPC(b, %w0, %1)			\
@@ -57,7 +59,7 @@
 	default:							\
 		__u.__val = *(volatile typeof(*__x) *)__x;		\
 	}								\
-	__u.__val;							\
+	*__ret;								\
 })
 
 #endif	/* !BUILD_VDSO */
-- 
2.52.0.457.g6b5491de43-goog



      parent reply	other threads:[~2026-01-26  0:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-01-26  0:25 [PATCH 0/3] arm64: Fixes for __READ_ONCE() with CONFIG_LTO=y Marco Elver
2026-01-26  0:25 ` [PATCH 1/3] arm64: Fix non-atomic " Marco Elver
2026-01-26  0:25 ` [PATCH 2/3] arm64: Optimize " Marco Elver
2026-01-26  7:56   ` Arnd Bergmann
2026-01-26 19:54     ` Marco Elver
2026-01-26 22:24       ` Arnd Bergmann
2026-01-27 12:01         ` Marco Elver
2026-01-27 14:30           ` David Laight
2026-01-27 15:04             ` Marco Elver
2026-01-27 18:54               ` David Laight
2026-01-26 22:55       ` David Laight
2026-01-26 11:16   ` David Laight
2026-01-26 23:15     ` Marco Elver
2026-01-27 10:13       ` David Laight
2026-01-26  0:25 ` Marco Elver [this message]

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