[bpf-next v7 0/5] emit ENDBR/BTI instructions for indirect jump targets

[bpf-next v7 0/5] emit ENDBR/BTI instructions for indirect jump targets

[Xu Kuohai]

On architectures with CFI protection enabled that require landing pad
instructions at indirect jump targets, such as x86 with CET/IBT eanbled
and arm64 with BTI enabled, kernel panics when an indirect jump lands on
a target witout landing pad. Therefore, the JIT must emit landing pad
instructions for indirect jump targets.

The verifier already recognizes which instructions are indirect jump
targets during the verification phase. So we can stores this information
in env->insn_aux_data and pass it to the JIT as new parameter, so the JIT
knows which instructions are indirect jump targets.

During JIT, constants blinding is performed. It rewrites the private copy
of instructions for the JITed program, but it does not adjust the global
env->insn_aux_data array. As a result, after constants blinding, the
instruction indexes used by JIT may no longer match the indexes in
env->insn_aux_data, so the JIT can not lookup env->insn_aux_data directly.

To avoid this mistach, and considering that all existing arch-specific JITs
already implement constants blinding with largely duplicated code, move
constants blinding from JIT to generic code, before copying instructions
for each subprog.

v7:
- Move constants blinding logic back to bpf/core.c
- Compute ip address before switch statement in x86 JIT
- Clear JIT state from error path on arm64 and loongarch 

v6: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260306102329.2056216-1-xukuohai@huaweicloud.com/
- Move constants blinding from JIT to verifier
- Move call to bpf_prog_select_runtime from bpf_prog_load to verifier

v5: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260302102726.1126019-1-xukuohai@huaweicloud.com/
- Switch to pass env to JIT directly to get rid of coping private insn_aux_data for
  each prog

v4: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260114093914.2403982-1-xukuohai@huaweicloud.com/
- Switch to the approach proposed by Eduard, using insn_aux_data to indentify indirect
  jump targets, and emit ENDBR on x86

v3: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20251227081033.240336-1-xukuohai@huaweicloud.com/
- Get rid of unnecessary enum definition (Yonghong Song, Anton Protopopov)

v2: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20251223085447.139301-1-xukuohai@huaweicloud.com/
- Exclude instruction arrays not used for indirect jumps (Anton Protopopov)

v1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20251127140318.3944249-1-xukuohai@huaweicloud.com/

Xu Kuohai (5):
  bpf: Move constants blinding from JIT to verifier
  bpf: Pass bpf_verifier_env to JIT
  bpf: Add helper to detect indirect jump targets
  bpf, x86: Emit ENDBR for indirect jump targets
  bpf, arm64: Emit BTI for indirect jump target

 arch/arc/net/bpf_jit_core.c      |  37 ++------
 arch/arm/net/bpf_jit_32.c        |  43 ++-------
 arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c    |  86 ++++++-----------
 arch/loongarch/net/bpf_jit.c     |  58 ++++--------
 arch/mips/net/bpf_jit_comp.c     |  22 +----
 arch/parisc/net/bpf_jit_core.c   |  40 ++------
 arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp.c  |  47 +++-------
 arch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_core.c    |  47 +++-------
 arch/s390/net/bpf_jit_comp.c     |  43 ++-------
 arch/sparc/net/bpf_jit_comp_64.c |  43 ++-------
 arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c      |  68 +++++---------
 arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c    |  35 +------
 include/linux/bpf.h              |   2 +
 include/linux/bpf_verifier.h     |   9 +-
 include/linux/filter.h           |  11 ++-
 kernel/bpf/core.c                | 152 +++++++++++--------------------
 kernel/bpf/syscall.c             |   4 -
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c            |  34 ++++---
 18 files changed, 228 insertions(+), 553 deletions(-)

-- 
2.47.3

[bpf-next v7 1/5] bpf: Move constants blinding from JIT to verifier

[Xu Kuohai]

From: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com>

During the JIT stage, constants blinding rewrites instructions but only
rewrites the private instruction copy of the JITed subprog, leaving the
global instructions and insn_aux_data unchanged. This causes a mismatch
between subprog instructions and the global state, making it difficult
to look up the global insn_aux_data in the JIT.

To avoid this mismatch, and given that all arch-specific JITs already
support constants blinding, move it to the generic verifier code, and
switch to rewrite the global env->insnsi with the global states
adjusted, as other rewrites in the verifier do.

This removes the constant blinding calls in each JIT, which are largely
duplicated code across architectures.

And the prog clone functions and insn_array adjustment for the JIT
constant blinding are no longer needed, remove them too.

Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com>
---
 arch/arc/net/bpf_jit_core.c      | 20 +------
 arch/arm/net/bpf_jit_32.c        | 41 +++----------
 arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c    | 71 +++++++----------------
 arch/loongarch/net/bpf_jit.c     | 56 +++++-------------
 arch/mips/net/bpf_jit_comp.c     | 20 +------
 arch/parisc/net/bpf_jit_core.c   | 38 +++---------
 arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp.c  | 45 ++++-----------
 arch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_core.c    | 45 ++++-----------
 arch/s390/net/bpf_jit_comp.c     | 41 +++----------
 arch/sparc/net/bpf_jit_comp_64.c | 41 +++----------
 arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c      | 40 ++-----------
 arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c    | 33 ++---------
 include/linux/filter.h           |  7 ++-
 kernel/bpf/core.c                | 99 +++++---------------------------
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c            | 19 +++---
 15 files changed, 123 insertions(+), 493 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arc/net/bpf_jit_core.c b/arch/arc/net/bpf_jit_core.c
index 1421eeced0f5..12facf5750da 100644
--- a/arch/arc/net/bpf_jit_core.c
+++ b/arch/arc/net/bpf_jit_core.c
@@ -79,7 +79,6 @@ struct arc_jit_data {
  * The JIT pertinent context that is used by different functions.
  *
  * prog:		The current eBPF program being handled.
- * orig_prog:		The original eBPF program before any possible change.
  * jit:			The JIT buffer and its length.
  * bpf_header:		The JITed program header. "jit.buf" points inside it.
  * emit:		If set, opcodes are written to memory; else, a dry-run.
@@ -94,12 +93,10 @@ struct arc_jit_data {
  * need_extra_pass:	A forecast if an "extra_pass" will occur.
  * is_extra_pass:	Indicates if the current pass is an extra pass.
  * user_bpf_prog:	True, if VM opcodes come from a real program.
- * blinded:		True if "constant blinding" step returned a new "prog".
  * success:		Indicates if the whole JIT went OK.
  */
 struct jit_context {
 	struct bpf_prog			*prog;
-	struct bpf_prog			*orig_prog;
 	struct jit_buffer		jit;
 	struct bpf_binary_header	*bpf_header;
 	bool				emit;
@@ -114,7 +111,6 @@ struct jit_context {
 	bool				need_extra_pass;
 	bool				is_extra_pass;
 	bool				user_bpf_prog;
-	bool				blinded;
 	bool				success;
 };
 
@@ -161,13 +157,7 @@ static int jit_ctx_init(struct jit_context *ctx, struct bpf_prog *prog)
 {
 	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
 
-	ctx->orig_prog = prog;
-
-	/* If constant blinding was requested but failed, scram. */
-	ctx->prog = bpf_jit_blind_constants(prog);
-	if (IS_ERR(ctx->prog))
-		return PTR_ERR(ctx->prog);
-	ctx->blinded = (ctx->prog != ctx->orig_prog);
+	ctx->prog = prog;
 
 	/* If the verifier doesn't zero-extend, then we have to do it. */
 	ctx->do_zext = !ctx->prog->aux->verifier_zext;
@@ -214,14 +204,6 @@ static inline void maybe_free(struct jit_context *ctx, void **mem)
  */
 static void jit_ctx_cleanup(struct jit_context *ctx)
 {
-	if (ctx->blinded) {
-		/* if all went well, release the orig_prog. */
-		if (ctx->success)
-			bpf_jit_prog_release_other(ctx->prog, ctx->orig_prog);
-		else
-			bpf_jit_prog_release_other(ctx->orig_prog, ctx->prog);
-	}
-
 	maybe_free(ctx, (void **)&ctx->bpf2insn);
 	maybe_free(ctx, (void **)&ctx->jit_data);
 
diff --git a/arch/arm/net/bpf_jit_32.c b/arch/arm/net/bpf_jit_32.c
index deeb8f292454..e6b1bb2de627 100644
--- a/arch/arm/net/bpf_jit_32.c
+++ b/arch/arm/net/bpf_jit_32.c
@@ -2144,9 +2144,7 @@ bool bpf_jit_needs_zext(void)
 
 struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 {
-	struct bpf_prog *tmp, *orig_prog = prog;
 	struct bpf_binary_header *header;
-	bool tmp_blinded = false;
 	struct jit_ctx ctx;
 	unsigned int tmp_idx;
 	unsigned int image_size;
@@ -2156,20 +2154,7 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 	 * the interpreter.
 	 */
 	if (!prog->jit_requested)
-		return orig_prog;
-
-	/* If constant blinding was enabled and we failed during blinding
-	 * then we must fall back to the interpreter. Otherwise, we save
-	 * the new JITed code.
-	 */
-	tmp = bpf_jit_blind_constants(prog);
-
-	if (IS_ERR(tmp))
-		return orig_prog;
-	if (tmp != prog) {
-		tmp_blinded = true;
-		prog = tmp;
-	}
+		return prog;
 
 	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
 	ctx.prog = prog;
@@ -2179,10 +2164,8 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 	 * we must fall back to the interpreter
 	 */
 	ctx.offsets = kcalloc(prog->len, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (ctx.offsets == NULL) {
-		prog = orig_prog;
-		goto out;
-	}
+	if (ctx.offsets == NULL)
+		return prog;
 
 	/* 1) fake pass to find in the length of the JITed code,
 	 * to compute ctx->offsets and other context variables
@@ -2194,10 +2177,8 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 	 * being successful in the second pass, so just fall back
 	 * to the interpreter.
 	 */
-	if (build_body(&ctx)) {
-		prog = orig_prog;
+	if (build_body(&ctx))
 		goto out_off;
-	}
 
 	tmp_idx = ctx.idx;
 	build_prologue(&ctx);
@@ -2213,10 +2194,8 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 	ctx.idx += ctx.imm_count;
 	if (ctx.imm_count) {
 		ctx.imms = kcalloc(ctx.imm_count, sizeof(u32), GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (ctx.imms == NULL) {
-			prog = orig_prog;
+		if (ctx.imms == NULL)
 			goto out_off;
-		}
 	}
 #else
 	/* there's nothing about the epilogue on ARMv7 */
@@ -2238,10 +2217,8 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 	/* Not able to allocate memory for the structure then
 	 * we must fall back to the interpretation
 	 */
-	if (header == NULL) {
-		prog = orig_prog;
+	if (header == NULL)
 		goto out_imms;
-	}
 
 	/* 2.) Actual pass to generate final JIT code */
 	ctx.target = (u32 *) image_ptr;
@@ -2278,16 +2255,12 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 #endif
 out_off:
 	kfree(ctx.offsets);
-out:
-	if (tmp_blinded)
-		bpf_jit_prog_release_other(prog, prog == orig_prog ?
-					   tmp : orig_prog);
+
 	return prog;
 
 out_free:
 	image_ptr = NULL;
 	bpf_jit_binary_free(header);
-	prog = orig_prog;
 	goto out_imms;
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
index adf84962d579..566809be4a02 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
@@ -2006,17 +2006,22 @@ struct arm64_jit_data {
 	struct jit_ctx ctx;
 };
 
+static void clear_jit_state(struct bpf_prog *prog)
+{
+	prog->bpf_func = NULL;
+	prog->jited = 0;
+	prog->jited_len = 0;
+}
+
 struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 {
 	int image_size, prog_size, extable_size, extable_align, extable_offset;
-	struct bpf_prog *tmp, *orig_prog = prog;
 	struct bpf_binary_header *header;
 	struct bpf_binary_header *ro_header = NULL;
 	struct arm64_jit_data *jit_data;
 	void __percpu *priv_stack_ptr = NULL;
 	bool was_classic = bpf_prog_was_classic(prog);
 	int priv_stack_alloc_sz;
-	bool tmp_blinded = false;
 	bool extra_pass = false;
 	struct jit_ctx ctx;
 	u8 *image_ptr;
@@ -2025,26 +2030,13 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 	int exentry_idx;
 
 	if (!prog->jit_requested)
-		return orig_prog;
-
-	tmp = bpf_jit_blind_constants(prog);
-	/* If blinding was requested and we failed during blinding,
-	 * we must fall back to the interpreter.
-	 */
-	if (IS_ERR(tmp))
-		return orig_prog;
-	if (tmp != prog) {
-		tmp_blinded = true;
-		prog = tmp;
-	}
+		return prog;
 
 	jit_data = prog->aux->jit_data;
 	if (!jit_data) {
 		jit_data = kzalloc_obj(*jit_data);
-		if (!jit_data) {
-			prog = orig_prog;
-			goto out;
-		}
+		if (!jit_data)
+			return prog;
 		prog->aux->jit_data = jit_data;
 	}
 	priv_stack_ptr = prog->aux->priv_stack_ptr;
@@ -2056,10 +2048,8 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 		priv_stack_alloc_sz = round_up(prog->aux->stack_depth, 16) +
 				      2 * PRIV_STACK_GUARD_SZ;
 		priv_stack_ptr = __alloc_percpu_gfp(priv_stack_alloc_sz, 16, GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (!priv_stack_ptr) {
-			prog = orig_prog;
+		if (!priv_stack_ptr)
 			goto out_priv_stack;
-		}
 
 		priv_stack_init_guard(priv_stack_ptr, priv_stack_alloc_sz);
 		prog->aux->priv_stack_ptr = priv_stack_ptr;
@@ -2079,10 +2069,8 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 	ctx.prog = prog;
 
 	ctx.offset = kvzalloc_objs(int, prog->len + 1);
-	if (ctx.offset == NULL) {
-		prog = orig_prog;
+	if (ctx.offset == NULL)
 		goto out_off;
-	}
 
 	ctx.user_vm_start = bpf_arena_get_user_vm_start(prog->aux->arena);
 	ctx.arena_vm_start = bpf_arena_get_kern_vm_start(prog->aux->arena);
@@ -2095,15 +2083,11 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 	 * BPF line info needs ctx->offset[i] to be the offset of
 	 * instruction[i] in jited image, so build prologue first.
 	 */
-	if (build_prologue(&ctx, was_classic)) {
-		prog = orig_prog;
+	if (build_prologue(&ctx, was_classic))
 		goto out_off;
-	}
 
-	if (build_body(&ctx, extra_pass)) {
-		prog = orig_prog;
+	if (build_body(&ctx, extra_pass))
 		goto out_off;
-	}
 
 	ctx.epilogue_offset = ctx.idx;
 	build_epilogue(&ctx, was_classic);
@@ -2121,10 +2105,8 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 	ro_header = bpf_jit_binary_pack_alloc(image_size, &ro_image_ptr,
 					      sizeof(u64), &header, &image_ptr,
 					      jit_fill_hole);
-	if (!ro_header) {
-		prog = orig_prog;
+	if (!ro_header)
 		goto out_off;
-	}
 
 	/* Pass 2: Determine jited position and result for each instruction */
 
@@ -2152,10 +2134,8 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 	/* Dont write body instructions to memory for now */
 	ctx.write = false;
 
-	if (build_body(&ctx, extra_pass)) {
-		prog = orig_prog;
+	if (build_body(&ctx, extra_pass))
 		goto out_free_hdr;
-	}
 
 	ctx.epilogue_offset = ctx.idx;
 	ctx.exentry_idx = exentry_idx;
@@ -2164,19 +2144,15 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 
 	/* Pass 3: Adjust jump offset and write final image */
 	if (build_body(&ctx, extra_pass) ||
-		WARN_ON_ONCE(ctx.idx != ctx.epilogue_offset)) {
-		prog = orig_prog;
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(ctx.idx != ctx.epilogue_offset))
 		goto out_free_hdr;
-	}
 
 	build_epilogue(&ctx, was_classic);
 	build_plt(&ctx);
 
 	/* Extra pass to validate JITed code. */
-	if (validate_ctx(&ctx)) {
-		prog = orig_prog;
+	if (validate_ctx(&ctx))
 		goto out_free_hdr;
-	}
 
 	/* update the real prog size */
 	prog_size = sizeof(u32) * ctx.idx;
@@ -2193,15 +2169,13 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 		if (extra_pass && ctx.idx > jit_data->ctx.idx) {
 			pr_err_once("multi-func JIT bug %d > %d\n",
 				    ctx.idx, jit_data->ctx.idx);
-			prog->bpf_func = NULL;
-			prog->jited = 0;
-			prog->jited_len = 0;
+			clear_jit_state(prog);
 			goto out_free_hdr;
 		}
 		if (WARN_ON(bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize(ro_header, header))) {
 			/* ro_header has been freed */
 			ro_header = NULL;
-			prog = orig_prog;
+			clear_jit_state(prog);
 			goto out_off;
 		}
 		/*
@@ -2245,10 +2219,7 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 		kfree(jit_data);
 		prog->aux->jit_data = NULL;
 	}
-out:
-	if (tmp_blinded)
-		bpf_jit_prog_release_other(prog, prog == orig_prog ?
-					   tmp : orig_prog);
+
 	return prog;
 
 out_free_hdr:
diff --git a/arch/loongarch/net/bpf_jit.c b/arch/loongarch/net/bpf_jit.c
index 3bd89f55960d..57dd24d53c77 100644
--- a/arch/loongarch/net/bpf_jit.c
+++ b/arch/loongarch/net/bpf_jit.c
@@ -1911,43 +1911,26 @@ int arch_bpf_trampoline_size(const struct btf_func_model *m, u32 flags,
 
 struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 {
-	bool tmp_blinded = false, extra_pass = false;
+	bool extra_pass = false;
 	u8 *image_ptr, *ro_image_ptr;
 	int image_size, prog_size, extable_size;
 	struct jit_ctx ctx;
 	struct jit_data *jit_data;
 	struct bpf_binary_header *header;
 	struct bpf_binary_header *ro_header;
-	struct bpf_prog *tmp, *orig_prog = prog;
 
 	/*
 	 * If BPF JIT was not enabled then we must fall back to
 	 * the interpreter.
 	 */
 	if (!prog->jit_requested)
-		return orig_prog;
-
-	tmp = bpf_jit_blind_constants(prog);
-	/*
-	 * If blinding was requested and we failed during blinding,
-	 * we must fall back to the interpreter. Otherwise, we save
-	 * the new JITed code.
-	 */
-	if (IS_ERR(tmp))
-		return orig_prog;
-
-	if (tmp != prog) {
-		tmp_blinded = true;
-		prog = tmp;
-	}
+		return prog;
 
 	jit_data = prog->aux->jit_data;
 	if (!jit_data) {
 		jit_data = kzalloc_obj(*jit_data);
-		if (!jit_data) {
-			prog = orig_prog;
-			goto out;
-		}
+		if (!jit_data)
+			return prog;
 		prog->aux->jit_data = jit_data;
 	}
 	if (jit_data->ctx.offset) {
@@ -1967,17 +1950,13 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 	ctx.user_vm_start = bpf_arena_get_user_vm_start(prog->aux->arena);
 
 	ctx.offset = kvcalloc(prog->len + 1, sizeof(u32), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (ctx.offset == NULL) {
-		prog = orig_prog;
+	if (ctx.offset == NULL)
 		goto out_offset;
-	}
 
 	/* 1. Initial fake pass to compute ctx->idx and set ctx->flags */
 	build_prologue(&ctx);
-	if (build_body(&ctx, extra_pass)) {
-		prog = orig_prog;
+	if (build_body(&ctx, extra_pass))
 		goto out_offset;
-	}
 	ctx.epilogue_offset = ctx.idx;
 	build_epilogue(&ctx);
 
@@ -1993,10 +1972,8 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 	/* Now we know the size of the structure to make */
 	ro_header = bpf_jit_binary_pack_alloc(image_size, &ro_image_ptr, sizeof(u32),
 					      &header, &image_ptr, jit_fill_hole);
-	if (!ro_header) {
-		prog = orig_prog;
+	if (!ro_header)
 		goto out_offset;
-	}
 
 	/* 2. Now, the actual pass to generate final JIT code */
 	/*
@@ -2016,17 +1993,13 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 	ctx.num_exentries = 0;
 
 	build_prologue(&ctx);
-	if (build_body(&ctx, extra_pass)) {
-		prog = orig_prog;
+	if (build_body(&ctx, extra_pass))
 		goto out_free;
-	}
 	build_epilogue(&ctx);
 
 	/* 3. Extra pass to validate JITed code */
-	if (validate_ctx(&ctx)) {
-		prog = orig_prog;
+	if (validate_ctx(&ctx))
 		goto out_free;
-	}
 
 	/* And we're done */
 	if (bpf_jit_enable > 1)
@@ -2041,7 +2014,6 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 		if (WARN_ON(bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize(ro_header, header))) {
 			/* ro_header has been freed */
 			ro_header = NULL;
-			prog = orig_prog;
 			goto out_free;
 		}
 		/*
@@ -2073,13 +2045,15 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 		prog->aux->jit_data = NULL;
 	}
 
-out:
-	if (tmp_blinded)
-		bpf_jit_prog_release_other(prog, prog == orig_prog ? tmp : orig_prog);
-
 	return prog;
 
 out_free:
+	if (prog->jited) {
+		prog->bpf_func = NULL;
+		prog->jited = 0;
+		prog->jited_len = 0;
+	}
+
 	if (header) {
 		bpf_arch_text_copy(&ro_header->size, &header->size, sizeof(header->size));
 		bpf_jit_binary_pack_free(ro_header, header);
diff --git a/arch/mips/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/mips/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
index e355dfca4400..d2b6c955f18e 100644
--- a/arch/mips/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
+++ b/arch/mips/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
@@ -911,10 +911,8 @@ bool bpf_jit_needs_zext(void)
 
 struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 {
-	struct bpf_prog *tmp, *orig_prog = prog;
 	struct bpf_binary_header *header = NULL;
 	struct jit_context ctx;
-	bool tmp_blinded = false;
 	unsigned int tmp_idx;
 	unsigned int image_size;
 	u8 *image_ptr;
@@ -925,19 +923,7 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 	 * the interpreter.
 	 */
 	if (!prog->jit_requested)
-		return orig_prog;
-	/*
-	 * If constant blinding was enabled and we failed during blinding
-	 * then we must fall back to the interpreter. Otherwise, we save
-	 * the new JITed code.
-	 */
-	tmp = bpf_jit_blind_constants(prog);
-	if (IS_ERR(tmp))
-		return orig_prog;
-	if (tmp != prog) {
-		tmp_blinded = true;
-		prog = tmp;
-	}
+		return prog;
 
 	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
 	ctx.program = prog;
@@ -1025,14 +1011,10 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 	prog->jited_len = image_size;
 
 out:
-	if (tmp_blinded)
-		bpf_jit_prog_release_other(prog, prog == orig_prog ?
-					   tmp : orig_prog);
 	kfree(ctx.descriptors);
 	return prog;
 
 out_err:
-	prog = orig_prog;
 	if (header)
 		bpf_jit_binary_free(header);
 	goto out;
diff --git a/arch/parisc/net/bpf_jit_core.c b/arch/parisc/net/bpf_jit_core.c
index a5eb6b51e27a..4d339636a34a 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/net/bpf_jit_core.c
+++ b/arch/parisc/net/bpf_jit_core.c
@@ -44,30 +44,19 @@ bool bpf_jit_needs_zext(void)
 struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 {
 	unsigned int prog_size = 0, extable_size = 0;
-	bool tmp_blinded = false, extra_pass = false;
-	struct bpf_prog *tmp, *orig_prog = prog;
+	bool extra_pass = false;
 	int pass = 0, prev_ninsns = 0, prologue_len, i;
 	struct hppa_jit_data *jit_data;
 	struct hppa_jit_context *ctx;
 
 	if (!prog->jit_requested)
-		return orig_prog;
-
-	tmp = bpf_jit_blind_constants(prog);
-	if (IS_ERR(tmp))
-		return orig_prog;
-	if (tmp != prog) {
-		tmp_blinded = true;
-		prog = tmp;
-	}
+		return prog;
 
 	jit_data = prog->aux->jit_data;
 	if (!jit_data) {
 		jit_data = kzalloc_obj(*jit_data);
-		if (!jit_data) {
-			prog = orig_prog;
-			goto out;
-		}
+		if (!jit_data)
+			return prog;
 		prog->aux->jit_data = jit_data;
 	}
 
@@ -81,10 +70,8 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 
 	ctx->prog = prog;
 	ctx->offset = kzalloc_objs(int, prog->len);
-	if (!ctx->offset) {
-		prog = orig_prog;
+	if (!ctx->offset)
 		goto out_offset;
-	}
 	for (i = 0; i < prog->len; i++) {
 		prev_ninsns += 20;
 		ctx->offset[i] = prev_ninsns;
@@ -93,10 +80,8 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 	for (i = 0; i < NR_JIT_ITERATIONS; i++) {
 		pass++;
 		ctx->ninsns = 0;
-		if (build_body(ctx, extra_pass, ctx->offset)) {
-			prog = orig_prog;
+		if (build_body(ctx, extra_pass, ctx->offset))
 			goto out_offset;
-		}
 		ctx->body_len = ctx->ninsns;
 		bpf_jit_build_prologue(ctx);
 		ctx->prologue_len = ctx->ninsns - ctx->body_len;
@@ -116,10 +101,8 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 						     &jit_data->image,
 						     sizeof(long),
 						     bpf_fill_ill_insns);
-			if (!jit_data->header) {
-				prog = orig_prog;
+			if (!jit_data->header)
 				goto out_offset;
-			}
 
 			ctx->insns = (u32 *)jit_data->image;
 			/*
@@ -134,7 +117,6 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 		pr_err("bpf-jit: image did not converge in <%d passes!\n", i);
 		if (jit_data->header)
 			bpf_jit_binary_free(jit_data->header);
-		prog = orig_prog;
 		goto out_offset;
 	}
 
@@ -148,7 +130,6 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 	bpf_jit_build_prologue(ctx);
 	if (build_body(ctx, extra_pass, NULL)) {
 		bpf_jit_binary_free(jit_data->header);
-		prog = orig_prog;
 		goto out_offset;
 	}
 	bpf_jit_build_epilogue(ctx);
@@ -183,13 +164,10 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 		kfree(jit_data);
 		prog->aux->jit_data = NULL;
 	}
-out:
+
 	if (HPPA_JIT_REBOOT)
 		{ extern int machine_restart(char *); machine_restart(""); }
 
-	if (tmp_blinded)
-		bpf_jit_prog_release_other(prog, prog == orig_prog ?
-					   tmp : orig_prog);
 	return prog;
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
index 52162e4a7f84..7a7c49640a2f 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
@@ -142,9 +142,6 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *fp)
 	int flen;
 	struct bpf_binary_header *fhdr = NULL;
 	struct bpf_binary_header *hdr = NULL;
-	struct bpf_prog *org_fp = fp;
-	struct bpf_prog *tmp_fp;
-	bool bpf_blinded = false;
 	bool extra_pass = false;
 	u8 *fimage = NULL;
 	u32 *fcode_base;
@@ -152,24 +149,13 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *fp)
 	u32 fixup_len;
 
 	if (!fp->jit_requested)
-		return org_fp;
-
-	tmp_fp = bpf_jit_blind_constants(org_fp);
-	if (IS_ERR(tmp_fp))
-		return org_fp;
-
-	if (tmp_fp != org_fp) {
-		bpf_blinded = true;
-		fp = tmp_fp;
-	}
+		return fp;
 
 	jit_data = fp->aux->jit_data;
 	if (!jit_data) {
 		jit_data = kzalloc_obj(*jit_data);
-		if (!jit_data) {
-			fp = org_fp;
-			goto out;
-		}
+		if (!jit_data)
+			return fp;
 		fp->aux->jit_data = jit_data;
 	}
 
@@ -194,10 +180,8 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *fp)
 	}
 
 	addrs = kcalloc(flen + 1, sizeof(*addrs), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (addrs == NULL) {
-		fp = org_fp;
+	if (addrs == NULL)
 		goto out_addrs;
-	}
 
 	memset(&cgctx, 0, sizeof(struct codegen_context));
 	bpf_jit_init_reg_mapping(&cgctx);
@@ -211,11 +195,9 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *fp)
 	cgctx.exception_cb = fp->aux->exception_cb;
 
 	/* Scouting faux-generate pass 0 */
-	if (bpf_jit_build_body(fp, NULL, NULL, &cgctx, addrs, 0, false)) {
+	if (bpf_jit_build_body(fp, NULL, NULL, &cgctx, addrs, 0, false))
 		/* We hit something illegal or unsupported. */
-		fp = org_fp;
 		goto out_addrs;
-	}
 
 	/*
 	 * If we have seen a tail call, we need a second pass.
@@ -226,10 +208,8 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *fp)
 	 */
 	if (cgctx.seen & SEEN_TAILCALL || !is_offset_in_branch_range((long)cgctx.idx * 4)) {
 		cgctx.idx = 0;
-		if (bpf_jit_build_body(fp, NULL, NULL, &cgctx, addrs, 0, false)) {
-			fp = org_fp;
+		if (bpf_jit_build_body(fp, NULL, NULL, &cgctx, addrs, 0, false))
 			goto out_addrs;
-		}
 	}
 
 	bpf_jit_realloc_regs(&cgctx);
@@ -250,10 +230,8 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *fp)
 
 	fhdr = bpf_jit_binary_pack_alloc(alloclen, &fimage, 4, &hdr, &image,
 					      bpf_jit_fill_ill_insns);
-	if (!fhdr) {
-		fp = org_fp;
+	if (!fhdr)
 		goto out_addrs;
-	}
 
 	if (extable_len)
 		fp->aux->extable = (void *)fimage + FUNCTION_DESCR_SIZE + proglen + fixup_len;
@@ -272,7 +250,6 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *fp)
 				       extra_pass)) {
 			bpf_arch_text_copy(&fhdr->size, &hdr->size, sizeof(hdr->size));
 			bpf_jit_binary_pack_free(fhdr, hdr);
-			fp = org_fp;
 			goto out_addrs;
 		}
 		bpf_jit_build_epilogue(code_base, &cgctx);
@@ -301,7 +278,9 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *fp)
 
 	if (!fp->is_func || extra_pass) {
 		if (bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize(fhdr, hdr)) {
-			fp = org_fp;
+			fp->bpf_func = NULL;
+			fp->jited = 0;
+			fp->jited_len = 0;
 			goto out_addrs;
 		}
 		bpf_prog_fill_jited_linfo(fp, addrs);
@@ -318,10 +297,6 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *fp)
 		jit_data->hdr = hdr;
 	}
 
-out:
-	if (bpf_blinded)
-		bpf_jit_prog_release_other(fp, fp == org_fp ? tmp_fp : org_fp);
-
 	return fp;
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_core.c b/arch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_core.c
index b3581e926436..c77e8aba14d3 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_core.c
+++ b/arch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_core.c
@@ -44,29 +44,19 @@ bool bpf_jit_needs_zext(void)
 struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 {
 	unsigned int prog_size = 0, extable_size = 0;
-	bool tmp_blinded = false, extra_pass = false;
-	struct bpf_prog *tmp, *orig_prog = prog;
+	bool extra_pass = false;
 	int pass = 0, prev_ninsns = 0, i;
 	struct rv_jit_data *jit_data;
 	struct rv_jit_context *ctx;
 
 	if (!prog->jit_requested)
-		return orig_prog;
-
-	tmp = bpf_jit_blind_constants(prog);
-	if (IS_ERR(tmp))
-		return orig_prog;
-	if (tmp != prog) {
-		tmp_blinded = true;
-		prog = tmp;
-	}
+		return prog;
 
 	jit_data = prog->aux->jit_data;
 	if (!jit_data) {
 		jit_data = kzalloc_obj(*jit_data);
 		if (!jit_data) {
-			prog = orig_prog;
-			goto out;
+			return prog;
 		}
 		prog->aux->jit_data = jit_data;
 	}
@@ -83,15 +73,11 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 	ctx->user_vm_start = bpf_arena_get_user_vm_start(prog->aux->arena);
 	ctx->prog = prog;
 	ctx->offset = kzalloc_objs(int, prog->len);
-	if (!ctx->offset) {
-		prog = orig_prog;
+	if (!ctx->offset)
 		goto out_offset;
-	}
 
-	if (build_body(ctx, extra_pass, NULL)) {
-		prog = orig_prog;
+	if (build_body(ctx, extra_pass, NULL))
 		goto out_offset;
-	}
 
 	for (i = 0; i < prog->len; i++) {
 		prev_ninsns += 32;
@@ -105,10 +91,8 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 		bpf_jit_build_prologue(ctx, bpf_is_subprog(prog));
 		ctx->prologue_len = ctx->ninsns;
 
-		if (build_body(ctx, extra_pass, ctx->offset)) {
-			prog = orig_prog;
+		if (build_body(ctx, extra_pass, ctx->offset))
 			goto out_offset;
-		}
 
 		ctx->epilogue_offset = ctx->ninsns;
 		bpf_jit_build_epilogue(ctx);
@@ -126,10 +110,8 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 							  &jit_data->ro_image, sizeof(u32),
 							  &jit_data->header, &jit_data->image,
 							  bpf_fill_ill_insns);
-			if (!jit_data->ro_header) {
-				prog = orig_prog;
+			if (!jit_data->ro_header)
 				goto out_offset;
-			}
 
 			/*
 			 * Use the image(RW) for writing the JITed instructions. But also save
@@ -150,7 +132,6 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 
 	if (i == NR_JIT_ITERATIONS) {
 		pr_err("bpf-jit: image did not converge in <%d passes!\n", i);
-		prog = orig_prog;
 		goto out_free_hdr;
 	}
 
@@ -163,10 +144,8 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 	ctx->nexentries = 0;
 
 	bpf_jit_build_prologue(ctx, bpf_is_subprog(prog));
-	if (build_body(ctx, extra_pass, NULL)) {
-		prog = orig_prog;
+	if (build_body(ctx, extra_pass, NULL))
 		goto out_free_hdr;
-	}
 	bpf_jit_build_epilogue(ctx);
 
 	if (bpf_jit_enable > 1)
@@ -180,7 +159,9 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 		if (WARN_ON(bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize(jit_data->ro_header, jit_data->header))) {
 			/* ro_header has been freed */
 			jit_data->ro_header = NULL;
-			prog = orig_prog;
+			prog->bpf_func = NULL;
+			prog->jited = 0;
+			prog->jited_len = 0;
 			goto out_offset;
 		}
 		/*
@@ -198,11 +179,7 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 		kfree(jit_data);
 		prog->aux->jit_data = NULL;
 	}
-out:
 
-	if (tmp_blinded)
-		bpf_jit_prog_release_other(prog, prog == orig_prog ?
-					   tmp : orig_prog);
 	return prog;
 
 out_free_hdr:
diff --git a/arch/s390/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/s390/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
index 1f9a6b728beb..d6de2abfe4a7 100644
--- a/arch/s390/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
+++ b/arch/s390/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
@@ -2305,36 +2305,20 @@ static struct bpf_binary_header *bpf_jit_alloc(struct bpf_jit *jit,
  */
 struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *fp)
 {
-	struct bpf_prog *tmp, *orig_fp = fp;
 	struct bpf_binary_header *header;
 	struct s390_jit_data *jit_data;
-	bool tmp_blinded = false;
 	bool extra_pass = false;
 	struct bpf_jit jit;
 	int pass;
 
 	if (!fp->jit_requested)
-		return orig_fp;
-
-	tmp = bpf_jit_blind_constants(fp);
-	/*
-	 * If blinding was requested and we failed during blinding,
-	 * we must fall back to the interpreter.
-	 */
-	if (IS_ERR(tmp))
-		return orig_fp;
-	if (tmp != fp) {
-		tmp_blinded = true;
-		fp = tmp;
-	}
+		return fp;
 
 	jit_data = fp->aux->jit_data;
 	if (!jit_data) {
 		jit_data = kzalloc_obj(*jit_data);
-		if (!jit_data) {
-			fp = orig_fp;
-			goto out;
-		}
+		if (!jit_data)
+			return fp;
 		fp->aux->jit_data = jit_data;
 	}
 	if (jit_data->ctx.addrs) {
@@ -2347,33 +2331,26 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *fp)
 
 	memset(&jit, 0, sizeof(jit));
 	jit.addrs = kvcalloc(fp->len + 1, sizeof(*jit.addrs), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (jit.addrs == NULL) {
-		fp = orig_fp;
+	if (jit.addrs == NULL)
 		goto free_addrs;
-	}
 	/*
 	 * Three initial passes:
 	 *   - 1/2: Determine clobbered registers
 	 *   - 3:   Calculate program size and addrs array
 	 */
 	for (pass = 1; pass <= 3; pass++) {
-		if (bpf_jit_prog(&jit, fp, extra_pass)) {
-			fp = orig_fp;
+		if (bpf_jit_prog(&jit, fp, extra_pass))
 			goto free_addrs;
-		}
 	}
 	/*
 	 * Final pass: Allocate and generate program
 	 */
 	header = bpf_jit_alloc(&jit, fp);
-	if (!header) {
-		fp = orig_fp;
+	if (!header)
 		goto free_addrs;
-	}
 skip_init_ctx:
 	if (bpf_jit_prog(&jit, fp, extra_pass)) {
 		bpf_jit_binary_free(header);
-		fp = orig_fp;
 		goto free_addrs;
 	}
 	if (bpf_jit_enable > 1) {
@@ -2383,7 +2360,6 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *fp)
 	if (!fp->is_func || extra_pass) {
 		if (bpf_jit_binary_lock_ro(header)) {
 			bpf_jit_binary_free(header);
-			fp = orig_fp;
 			goto free_addrs;
 		}
 	} else {
@@ -2402,10 +2378,7 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *fp)
 		kfree(jit_data);
 		fp->aux->jit_data = NULL;
 	}
-out:
-	if (tmp_blinded)
-		bpf_jit_prog_release_other(fp, fp == orig_fp ?
-					   tmp : orig_fp);
+
 	return fp;
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/sparc/net/bpf_jit_comp_64.c b/arch/sparc/net/bpf_jit_comp_64.c
index b23d1c645ae5..86abd84d4005 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/net/bpf_jit_comp_64.c
+++ b/arch/sparc/net/bpf_jit_comp_64.c
@@ -1479,37 +1479,22 @@ struct sparc64_jit_data {
 
 struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 {
-	struct bpf_prog *tmp, *orig_prog = prog;
 	struct sparc64_jit_data *jit_data;
 	struct bpf_binary_header *header;
 	u32 prev_image_size, image_size;
-	bool tmp_blinded = false;
 	bool extra_pass = false;
 	struct jit_ctx ctx;
 	u8 *image_ptr;
 	int pass, i;
 
 	if (!prog->jit_requested)
-		return orig_prog;
-
-	tmp = bpf_jit_blind_constants(prog);
-	/* If blinding was requested and we failed during blinding,
-	 * we must fall back to the interpreter.
-	 */
-	if (IS_ERR(tmp))
-		return orig_prog;
-	if (tmp != prog) {
-		tmp_blinded = true;
-		prog = tmp;
-	}
+		return prog;
 
 	jit_data = prog->aux->jit_data;
 	if (!jit_data) {
 		jit_data = kzalloc_obj(*jit_data);
-		if (!jit_data) {
-			prog = orig_prog;
-			goto out;
-		}
+		if (!jit_data)
+			return prog;
 		prog->aux->jit_data = jit_data;
 	}
 	if (jit_data->ctx.offset) {
@@ -1527,10 +1512,8 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 	ctx.prog = prog;
 
 	ctx.offset = kmalloc_array(prog->len, sizeof(unsigned int), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (ctx.offset == NULL) {
-		prog = orig_prog;
+	if (ctx.offset == NULL)
 		goto out_off;
-	}
 
 	/* Longest sequence emitted is for bswap32, 12 instructions.  Pre-cook
 	 * the offset array so that we converge faster.
@@ -1543,10 +1526,8 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 		ctx.idx = 0;
 
 		build_prologue(&ctx);
-		if (build_body(&ctx)) {
-			prog = orig_prog;
+		if (build_body(&ctx))
 			goto out_off;
-		}
 		build_epilogue(&ctx);
 
 		if (bpf_jit_enable > 1)
@@ -1569,10 +1550,8 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 	image_size = sizeof(u32) * ctx.idx;
 	header = bpf_jit_binary_alloc(image_size, &image_ptr,
 				      sizeof(u32), jit_fill_hole);
-	if (header == NULL) {
-		prog = orig_prog;
+	if (header == NULL)
 		goto out_off;
-	}
 
 	ctx.image = (u32 *)image_ptr;
 skip_init_ctx:
@@ -1582,7 +1561,6 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 
 	if (build_body(&ctx)) {
 		bpf_jit_binary_free(header);
-		prog = orig_prog;
 		goto out_off;
 	}
 
@@ -1592,7 +1570,6 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 		pr_err("bpf_jit: Failed to converge, prev_size=%u size=%d\n",
 		       prev_image_size, ctx.idx * 4);
 		bpf_jit_binary_free(header);
-		prog = orig_prog;
 		goto out_off;
 	}
 
@@ -1604,7 +1581,6 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 	if (!prog->is_func || extra_pass) {
 		if (bpf_jit_binary_lock_ro(header)) {
 			bpf_jit_binary_free(header);
-			prog = orig_prog;
 			goto out_off;
 		}
 	} else {
@@ -1624,9 +1600,6 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 		kfree(jit_data);
 		prog->aux->jit_data = NULL;
 	}
-out:
-	if (tmp_blinded)
-		bpf_jit_prog_release_other(prog, prog == orig_prog ?
-					   tmp : orig_prog);
+
 	return prog;
 }
diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
index 8f10080e6fe3..bb8e7541d078 100644
--- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
+++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
@@ -3726,13 +3726,11 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 {
 	struct bpf_binary_header *rw_header = NULL;
 	struct bpf_binary_header *header = NULL;
-	struct bpf_prog *tmp, *orig_prog = prog;
 	void __percpu *priv_stack_ptr = NULL;
 	struct x64_jit_data *jit_data;
 	int priv_stack_alloc_sz;
 	int proglen, oldproglen = 0;
 	struct jit_context ctx = {};
-	bool tmp_blinded = false;
 	bool extra_pass = false;
 	bool padding = false;
 	u8 *rw_image = NULL;
@@ -3742,27 +3740,13 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 	int i;
 
 	if (!prog->jit_requested)
-		return orig_prog;
-
-	tmp = bpf_jit_blind_constants(prog);
-	/*
-	 * If blinding was requested and we failed during blinding,
-	 * we must fall back to the interpreter.
-	 */
-	if (IS_ERR(tmp))
-		return orig_prog;
-	if (tmp != prog) {
-		tmp_blinded = true;
-		prog = tmp;
-	}
+		return prog;
 
 	jit_data = prog->aux->jit_data;
 	if (!jit_data) {
 		jit_data = kzalloc_obj(*jit_data);
-		if (!jit_data) {
-			prog = orig_prog;
+		if (!jit_data)
 			goto out;
-		}
 		prog->aux->jit_data = jit_data;
 	}
 	priv_stack_ptr = prog->aux->priv_stack_ptr;
@@ -3774,10 +3758,8 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 		priv_stack_alloc_sz = round_up(prog->aux->stack_depth, 8) +
 				      2 * PRIV_STACK_GUARD_SZ;
 		priv_stack_ptr = __alloc_percpu_gfp(priv_stack_alloc_sz, 8, GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (!priv_stack_ptr) {
-			prog = orig_prog;
+		if (!priv_stack_ptr)
 			goto out_priv_stack;
-		}
 
 		priv_stack_init_guard(priv_stack_ptr, priv_stack_alloc_sz);
 		prog->aux->priv_stack_ptr = priv_stack_ptr;
@@ -3795,10 +3777,8 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 		goto skip_init_addrs;
 	}
 	addrs = kvmalloc_objs(*addrs, prog->len + 1);
-	if (!addrs) {
-		prog = orig_prog;
+	if (!addrs)
 		goto out_addrs;
-	}
 
 	/*
 	 * Before first pass, make a rough estimation of addrs[]
@@ -3829,8 +3809,6 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 						   sizeof(rw_header->size));
 				bpf_jit_binary_pack_free(header, rw_header);
 			}
-			/* Fall back to interpreter mode */
-			prog = orig_prog;
 			if (extra_pass) {
 				prog->bpf_func = NULL;
 				prog->jited = 0;
@@ -3861,10 +3839,8 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 			header = bpf_jit_binary_pack_alloc(roundup(proglen, align) + extable_size,
 							   &image, align, &rw_header, &rw_image,
 							   jit_fill_hole);
-			if (!header) {
-				prog = orig_prog;
+			if (!header)
 				goto out_addrs;
-			}
 			prog->aux->extable = (void *) image + roundup(proglen, align);
 		}
 		oldproglen = proglen;
@@ -3917,8 +3893,6 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 		prog->bpf_func = (void *)image + cfi_get_offset();
 		prog->jited = 1;
 		prog->jited_len = proglen - cfi_get_offset();
-	} else {
-		prog = orig_prog;
 	}
 
 	if (!image || !prog->is_func || extra_pass) {
@@ -3934,10 +3908,8 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 		kfree(jit_data);
 		prog->aux->jit_data = NULL;
 	}
+
 out:
-	if (tmp_blinded)
-		bpf_jit_prog_release_other(prog, prog == orig_prog ?
-					   tmp : orig_prog);
 	return prog;
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c
index dda423025c3d..5f259577614a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c
+++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c
@@ -2521,35 +2521,19 @@ bool bpf_jit_needs_zext(void)
 struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 {
 	struct bpf_binary_header *header = NULL;
-	struct bpf_prog *tmp, *orig_prog = prog;
 	int proglen, oldproglen = 0;
 	struct jit_context ctx = {};
-	bool tmp_blinded = false;
 	u8 *image = NULL;
 	int *addrs;
 	int pass;
 	int i;
 
 	if (!prog->jit_requested)
-		return orig_prog;
-
-	tmp = bpf_jit_blind_constants(prog);
-	/*
-	 * If blinding was requested and we failed during blinding,
-	 * we must fall back to the interpreter.
-	 */
-	if (IS_ERR(tmp))
-		return orig_prog;
-	if (tmp != prog) {
-		tmp_blinded = true;
-		prog = tmp;
-	}
+		return prog;
 
 	addrs = kmalloc_objs(*addrs, prog->len);
-	if (!addrs) {
-		prog = orig_prog;
-		goto out;
-	}
+	if (!addrs)
+		return prog;
 
 	/*
 	 * Before first pass, make a rough estimation of addrs[]
@@ -2574,7 +2558,6 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 			image = NULL;
 			if (header)
 				bpf_jit_binary_free(header);
-			prog = orig_prog;
 			goto out_addrs;
 		}
 		if (image) {
@@ -2588,10 +2571,8 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 		if (proglen == oldproglen) {
 			header = bpf_jit_binary_alloc(proglen, &image,
 						      1, jit_fill_hole);
-			if (!header) {
-				prog = orig_prog;
+			if (!header)
 				goto out_addrs;
-			}
 		}
 		oldproglen = proglen;
 		cond_resched();
@@ -2604,16 +2585,10 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 		prog->bpf_func = (void *)image;
 		prog->jited = 1;
 		prog->jited_len = proglen;
-	} else {
-		prog = orig_prog;
 	}
 
 out_addrs:
 	kfree(addrs);
-out:
-	if (tmp_blinded)
-		bpf_jit_prog_release_other(prog, prog == orig_prog ?
-					   tmp : orig_prog);
 	return prog;
 }
 
diff --git a/include/linux/filter.h b/include/linux/filter.h
index 44d7ae95ddbc..026ad3c6b001 100644
--- a/include/linux/filter.h
+++ b/include/linux/filter.h
@@ -1184,6 +1184,10 @@ static inline bool bpf_dump_raw_ok(const struct cred *cred)
 
 struct bpf_prog *bpf_patch_insn_single(struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 off,
 				       const struct bpf_insn *patch, u32 len);
+
+struct bpf_prog *bpf_patch_insn_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off,
+				     const struct bpf_insn *patch, u32 len);
+
 int bpf_remove_insns(struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 off, u32 cnt);
 
 static inline bool xdp_return_frame_no_direct(void)
@@ -1310,8 +1314,7 @@ int bpf_jit_get_func_addr(const struct bpf_prog *prog,
 
 const char *bpf_jit_get_prog_name(struct bpf_prog *prog);
 
-struct bpf_prog *bpf_jit_blind_constants(struct bpf_prog *fp);
-void bpf_jit_prog_release_other(struct bpf_prog *fp, struct bpf_prog *fp_other);
+int bpf_jit_blind_constants(struct bpf_verifier_env *env);
 
 static inline void bpf_jit_dump(unsigned int flen, unsigned int proglen,
 				u32 pass, void *image)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c
index 229c74f3d6ae..c692213b1fdf 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/core.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c
@@ -1427,82 +1427,19 @@ static int bpf_jit_blind_insn(const struct bpf_insn *from,
 	return to - to_buff;
 }
 
-static struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_clone_create(struct bpf_prog *fp_other,
-					      gfp_t gfp_extra_flags)
-{
-	gfp_t gfp_flags = GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO | gfp_extra_flags;
-	struct bpf_prog *fp;
-
-	fp = __vmalloc(fp_other->pages * PAGE_SIZE, gfp_flags);
-	if (fp != NULL) {
-		/* aux->prog still points to the fp_other one, so
-		 * when promoting the clone to the real program,
-		 * this still needs to be adapted.
-		 */
-		memcpy(fp, fp_other, fp_other->pages * PAGE_SIZE);
-	}
-
-	return fp;
-}
-
-static void bpf_prog_clone_free(struct bpf_prog *fp)
-{
-	/* aux was stolen by the other clone, so we cannot free
-	 * it from this path! It will be freed eventually by the
-	 * other program on release.
-	 *
-	 * At this point, we don't need a deferred release since
-	 * clone is guaranteed to not be locked.
-	 */
-	fp->aux = NULL;
-	fp->stats = NULL;
-	fp->active = NULL;
-	__bpf_prog_free(fp);
-}
-
-void bpf_jit_prog_release_other(struct bpf_prog *fp, struct bpf_prog *fp_other)
-{
-	/* We have to repoint aux->prog to self, as we don't
-	 * know whether fp here is the clone or the original.
-	 */
-	fp->aux->prog = fp;
-	bpf_prog_clone_free(fp_other);
-}
-
-static void adjust_insn_arrays(struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 off, u32 len)
-{
-#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
-	struct bpf_map *map;
-	int i;
-
-	if (len <= 1)
-		return;
-
-	for (i = 0; i < prog->aux->used_map_cnt; i++) {
-		map = prog->aux->used_maps[i];
-		if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_INSN_ARRAY)
-			bpf_insn_array_adjust(map, off, len);
-	}
-#endif
-}
-
-struct bpf_prog *bpf_jit_blind_constants(struct bpf_prog *prog)
+int bpf_jit_blind_constants(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 {
 	struct bpf_insn insn_buff[16], aux[2];
-	struct bpf_prog *clone, *tmp;
+	struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
 	int insn_delta, insn_cnt;
 	struct bpf_insn *insn;
 	int i, rewritten;
 
 	if (!prog->blinding_requested || prog->blinded)
-		return prog;
-
-	clone = bpf_prog_clone_create(prog, GFP_USER);
-	if (!clone)
-		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+		return 0;
 
-	insn_cnt = clone->len;
-	insn = clone->insnsi;
+	insn_cnt = prog->len;
+	insn = prog->insnsi;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
 		if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) {
@@ -1523,35 +1460,25 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_jit_blind_constants(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 		    insn[1].code == 0)
 			memcpy(aux, insn, sizeof(aux));
 
-		rewritten = bpf_jit_blind_insn(insn, aux, insn_buff,
-						clone->aux->verifier_zext);
+		rewritten = bpf_jit_blind_insn(insn, aux, insn_buff, prog->aux->verifier_zext);
 		if (!rewritten)
 			continue;
 
-		tmp = bpf_patch_insn_single(clone, i, insn_buff, rewritten);
-		if (IS_ERR(tmp)) {
-			/* Patching may have repointed aux->prog during
-			 * realloc from the original one, so we need to
-			 * fix it up here on error.
-			 */
-			bpf_jit_prog_release_other(prog, clone);
-			return tmp;
-		}
+		prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i, insn_buff, rewritten);
+		if (!prog)
+			return -ENOMEM;
 
-		clone = tmp;
+		env->prog = prog;
 		insn_delta = rewritten - 1;
 
-		/* Instructions arrays must be updated using absolute xlated offsets */
-		adjust_insn_arrays(clone, prog->aux->subprog_start + i, rewritten);
-
 		/* Walk new program and skip insns we just inserted. */
-		insn = clone->insnsi + i + insn_delta;
+		insn = prog->insnsi + i + insn_delta;
 		insn_cnt += insn_delta;
 		i        += insn_delta;
 	}
 
-	clone->blinded = 1;
-	return clone;
+	prog->blinded = 1;
+	return 0;
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_JIT */
 
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index d92cf2821657..245ec6d74727 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -22039,8 +22039,8 @@ static void adjust_poke_descs(struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 off, u32 len)
 	}
 }
 
-static struct bpf_prog *bpf_patch_insn_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off,
-					    const struct bpf_insn *patch, u32 len)
+struct bpf_prog *bpf_patch_insn_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off,
+				     const struct bpf_insn *patch, u32 len)
 {
 	struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *new_data = NULL;
@@ -22815,7 +22815,6 @@ static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 	struct bpf_insn *insn;
 	void *old_bpf_func;
 	int err, num_exentries;
-	int old_len, subprog_start_adjustment = 0;
 
 	if (env->subprog_cnt <= 1)
 		return 0;
@@ -22887,10 +22886,11 @@ static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 			goto out_free;
 		func[i]->is_func = 1;
 		func[i]->sleepable = prog->sleepable;
+		func[i]->blinded = prog->blinded;
 		func[i]->aux->func_idx = i;
 		/* Below members will be freed only at prog->aux */
 		func[i]->aux->btf = prog->aux->btf;
-		func[i]->aux->subprog_start = subprog_start + subprog_start_adjustment;
+		func[i]->aux->subprog_start = subprog_start;
 		func[i]->aux->func_info = prog->aux->func_info;
 		func[i]->aux->func_info_cnt = prog->aux->func_info_cnt;
 		func[i]->aux->poke_tab = prog->aux->poke_tab;
@@ -22946,15 +22946,7 @@ static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 		func[i]->aux->might_sleep = env->subprog_info[i].might_sleep;
 		if (!i)
 			func[i]->aux->exception_boundary = env->seen_exception;
-
-		/*
-		 * To properly pass the absolute subprog start to jit
-		 * all instruction adjustments should be accumulated
-		 */
-		old_len = func[i]->len;
 		func[i] = bpf_int_jit_compile(func[i]);
-		subprog_start_adjustment += func[i]->len - old_len;
-
 		if (!func[i]->jited) {
 			err = -ENOTSUPP;
 			goto out_free;
@@ -23105,6 +23097,9 @@ static int fixup_call_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 
 	if (env->prog->jit_requested &&
 	    !bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) {
+		err = bpf_jit_blind_constants(env);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
 		err = jit_subprogs(env);
 		if (err == 0)
 			return 0;
-- 
2.47.3

[bpf-next v7 2/5] bpf: Pass bpf_verifier_env to JIT

[Xu Kuohai]

From: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com>

Pass bpf_verifier_env to bpf_int_jit_compile(). The follow-up patch will
use env->insn_aux_data in the JIT stage to detect indirect jump targets.

Since bpf_prog_select_runtime() can be called by cbpf and test code
without verifier, introduce helper function __bpf_prog_select_runtime()
to accept the env parameter.

Remove the call to bpf_prog_select_runtime() in bpf_prog_load(), and
switch to call __bpf_prog_select_runtime() in the verifier, with env
variable passed. The original bpf_prog_select_runtime() is preserved for
cbpf and test code, where env is NULL.

Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com>
---
 arch/arc/net/bpf_jit_core.c      | 17 ++++++++--------
 arch/arm/net/bpf_jit_32.c        |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c    |  2 +-
 arch/loongarch/net/bpf_jit.c     |  2 +-
 arch/mips/net/bpf_jit_comp.c     |  2 +-
 arch/parisc/net/bpf_jit_core.c   |  2 +-
 arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp.c  |  2 +-
 arch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_core.c    |  2 +-
 arch/s390/net/bpf_jit_comp.c     |  2 +-
 arch/sparc/net/bpf_jit_comp_64.c |  2 +-
 arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c      |  2 +-
 arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c    |  2 +-
 include/linux/filter.h           |  4 +++-
 kernel/bpf/core.c                | 34 +++++++++++++++++++-------------
 kernel/bpf/syscall.c             |  4 ----
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c            |  8 ++++++--
 16 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arc/net/bpf_jit_core.c b/arch/arc/net/bpf_jit_core.c
index 12facf5750da..cf708c308adb 100644
--- a/arch/arc/net/bpf_jit_core.c
+++ b/arch/arc/net/bpf_jit_core.c
@@ -153,7 +153,8 @@ static void jit_dump(const struct jit_context *ctx)
 }
 
 /* Initialise the context so there's no garbage. */
-static int jit_ctx_init(struct jit_context *ctx, struct bpf_prog *prog)
+static int jit_ctx_init(struct jit_context *ctx, struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+			struct bpf_prog *prog)
 {
 	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
 
@@ -1317,7 +1318,7 @@ static int jit_patch_relocations(struct jit_context *ctx)
  * to get the necessary data for the real compilation phase,
  * jit_compile().
  */
-static struct bpf_prog *do_normal_pass(struct bpf_prog *prog)
+static struct bpf_prog *do_normal_pass(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_prog *prog)
 {
 	struct jit_context ctx;
 
@@ -1325,7 +1326,7 @@ static struct bpf_prog *do_normal_pass(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 	if (!prog->jit_requested)
 		return prog;
 
-	if (jit_ctx_init(&ctx, prog)) {
+	if (jit_ctx_init(&ctx, env, prog)) {
 		jit_ctx_cleanup(&ctx);
 		return prog;
 	}
@@ -1356,7 +1357,7 @@ static struct bpf_prog *do_normal_pass(struct bpf_prog *prog)
  * again to get the newly translated addresses in order to resolve
  * the "call"s.
  */
-static struct bpf_prog *do_extra_pass(struct bpf_prog *prog)
+static struct bpf_prog *do_extra_pass(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_prog *prog)
 {
 	struct jit_context ctx;
 
@@ -1364,7 +1365,7 @@ static struct bpf_prog *do_extra_pass(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 	if (check_jit_context(prog))
 		return prog;
 
-	if (jit_ctx_init(&ctx, prog)) {
+	if (jit_ctx_init(&ctx, env, prog)) {
 		jit_ctx_cleanup(&ctx);
 		return prog;
 	}
@@ -1393,15 +1394,15 @@ static struct bpf_prog *do_extra_pass(struct bpf_prog *prog)
  * (re)locations involved that their addresses are not known
  * during the first run.
  */
-struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
+struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_prog *prog)
 {
 	vm_dump(prog);
 
 	/* Was this program already translated? */
 	if (!prog->jited)
-		return do_normal_pass(prog);
+		return do_normal_pass(env, prog);
 	else
-		return do_extra_pass(prog);
+		return do_extra_pass(env, prog);
 
 	return prog;
 }
diff --git a/arch/arm/net/bpf_jit_32.c b/arch/arm/net/bpf_jit_32.c
index e6b1bb2de627..1628b6fc70a4 100644
--- a/arch/arm/net/bpf_jit_32.c
+++ b/arch/arm/net/bpf_jit_32.c
@@ -2142,7 +2142,7 @@ bool bpf_jit_needs_zext(void)
 	return true;
 }
 
-struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
+struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_prog *prog)
 {
 	struct bpf_binary_header *header;
 	struct jit_ctx ctx;
diff --git a/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
index 566809be4a02..5c785eab4b5a 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
@@ -2013,7 +2013,7 @@ static void clear_jit_state(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 	prog->jited_len = 0;
 }
 
-struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
+struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_prog *prog)
 {
 	int image_size, prog_size, extable_size, extable_align, extable_offset;
 	struct bpf_binary_header *header;
diff --git a/arch/loongarch/net/bpf_jit.c b/arch/loongarch/net/bpf_jit.c
index 57dd24d53c77..0ac69bac9d3c 100644
--- a/arch/loongarch/net/bpf_jit.c
+++ b/arch/loongarch/net/bpf_jit.c
@@ -1909,7 +1909,7 @@ int arch_bpf_trampoline_size(const struct btf_func_model *m, u32 flags,
 	return ret < 0 ? ret : ret * LOONGARCH_INSN_SIZE;
 }
 
-struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
+struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_prog *prog)
 {
 	bool extra_pass = false;
 	u8 *image_ptr, *ro_image_ptr;
diff --git a/arch/mips/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/mips/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
index d2b6c955f18e..6ee4abe6a1f7 100644
--- a/arch/mips/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
+++ b/arch/mips/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
@@ -909,7 +909,7 @@ bool bpf_jit_needs_zext(void)
 	return true;
 }
 
-struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
+struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_prog *prog)
 {
 	struct bpf_binary_header *header = NULL;
 	struct jit_context ctx;
diff --git a/arch/parisc/net/bpf_jit_core.c b/arch/parisc/net/bpf_jit_core.c
index 4d339636a34a..90d081734d0f 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/net/bpf_jit_core.c
+++ b/arch/parisc/net/bpf_jit_core.c
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ bool bpf_jit_needs_zext(void)
 	return true;
 }
 
-struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
+struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_prog *prog)
 {
 	unsigned int prog_size = 0, extable_size = 0;
 	bool extra_pass = false;
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
index 7a7c49640a2f..a6fd7ef249da 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ bool bpf_jit_needs_zext(void)
 	return true;
 }
 
-struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *fp)
+struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_prog *fp)
 {
 	u32 proglen;
 	u32 alloclen;
diff --git a/arch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_core.c b/arch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_core.c
index c77e8aba14d3..bffaf584226c 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_core.c
+++ b/arch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_core.c
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ bool bpf_jit_needs_zext(void)
 	return true;
 }
 
-struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
+struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_prog *prog)
 {
 	unsigned int prog_size = 0, extable_size = 0;
 	bool extra_pass = false;
diff --git a/arch/s390/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/s390/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
index d6de2abfe4a7..061f16d1e3b1 100644
--- a/arch/s390/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
+++ b/arch/s390/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
@@ -2303,7 +2303,7 @@ static struct bpf_binary_header *bpf_jit_alloc(struct bpf_jit *jit,
 /*
  * Compile eBPF program "fp"
  */
-struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *fp)
+struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_prog *fp)
 {
 	struct bpf_binary_header *header;
 	struct s390_jit_data *jit_data;
diff --git a/arch/sparc/net/bpf_jit_comp_64.c b/arch/sparc/net/bpf_jit_comp_64.c
index 86abd84d4005..eca9365c72e7 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/net/bpf_jit_comp_64.c
+++ b/arch/sparc/net/bpf_jit_comp_64.c
@@ -1477,7 +1477,7 @@ struct sparc64_jit_data {
 	struct jit_ctx ctx;
 };
 
-struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
+struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_prog *prog)
 {
 	struct sparc64_jit_data *jit_data;
 	struct bpf_binary_header *header;
diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
index bb8e7541d078..2c57ee446fc9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
+++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
@@ -3722,7 +3722,7 @@ struct x64_jit_data {
 #define MAX_PASSES 20
 #define PADDING_PASSES (MAX_PASSES - 5)
 
-struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
+struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_prog *prog)
 {
 	struct bpf_binary_header *rw_header = NULL;
 	struct bpf_binary_header *header = NULL;
diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c
index 5f259577614a..852baf2e4db4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c
+++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c
@@ -2518,7 +2518,7 @@ bool bpf_jit_needs_zext(void)
 	return true;
 }
 
-struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
+struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_prog *prog)
 {
 	struct bpf_binary_header *header = NULL;
 	int proglen, oldproglen = 0;
diff --git a/include/linux/filter.h b/include/linux/filter.h
index 026ad3c6b001..d35ebb7415fe 100644
--- a/include/linux/filter.h
+++ b/include/linux/filter.h
@@ -1108,6 +1108,8 @@ static inline int sk_filter_reason(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	return sk_filter_trim_cap(sk, skb, 1, reason);
 }
 
+struct bpf_prog *__bpf_prog_select_runtime(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_prog *fp,
+					   int *err);
 struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_select_runtime(struct bpf_prog *fp, int *err);
 void bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog *fp);
 
@@ -1153,7 +1155,7 @@ u64 __bpf_call_base(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5);
 	((u64 (*)(u64, u64, u64, u64, u64, const struct bpf_insn *)) \
 	 (void *)__bpf_call_base)
 
-struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog);
+struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_prog *prog);
 void bpf_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog);
 bool bpf_jit_needs_zext(void);
 bool bpf_jit_inlines_helper_call(s32 imm);
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c
index c692213b1fdf..88a1834030a0 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/core.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c
@@ -2432,18 +2432,8 @@ static bool bpf_prog_select_interpreter(struct bpf_prog *fp)
 	return select_interpreter;
 }
 
-/**
- *	bpf_prog_select_runtime - select exec runtime for BPF program
- *	@fp: bpf_prog populated with BPF program
- *	@err: pointer to error variable
- *
- * Try to JIT eBPF program, if JIT is not available, use interpreter.
- * The BPF program will be executed via bpf_prog_run() function.
- *
- * Return: the &fp argument along with &err set to 0 for success or
- * a negative errno code on failure
- */
-struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_select_runtime(struct bpf_prog *fp, int *err)
+struct bpf_prog *__bpf_prog_select_runtime(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_prog *fp,
+					   int *err)
 {
 	/* In case of BPF to BPF calls, verifier did all the prep
 	 * work with regards to JITing, etc.
@@ -2471,7 +2461,7 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_select_runtime(struct bpf_prog *fp, int *err)
 		if (*err)
 			return fp;
 
-		fp = bpf_int_jit_compile(fp);
+		fp = bpf_int_jit_compile(env, fp);
 		bpf_prog_jit_attempt_done(fp);
 		if (!fp->jited && jit_needed) {
 			*err = -ENOTSUPP;
@@ -2497,6 +2487,22 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_select_runtime(struct bpf_prog *fp, int *err)
 
 	return fp;
 }
+
+/**
+ *	bpf_prog_select_runtime - select exec runtime for BPF program
+ *	@fp: bpf_prog populated with BPF program
+ *	@err: pointer to error variable
+ *
+ * Try to JIT eBPF program, if JIT is not available, use interpreter.
+ * The BPF program will be executed via bpf_prog_run() function.
+ *
+ * Return: the &fp argument along with &err set to 0 for success or
+ * a negative errno code on failure
+ */
+struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_select_runtime(struct bpf_prog *fp, int *err)
+{
+	return __bpf_prog_select_runtime(NULL, fp, err);
+}
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bpf_prog_select_runtime);
 
 static unsigned int __bpf_prog_ret1(const void *ctx,
@@ -2984,7 +2990,7 @@ const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_tail_call_proto = {
  * It is encouraged to implement bpf_int_jit_compile() instead, so that
  * eBPF and implicitly also cBPF can get JITed!
  */
-struct bpf_prog * __weak bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
+struct bpf_prog * __weak bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_prog *prog)
 {
 	return prog;
 }
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
index 274039e36465..fb07be46c936 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -3090,10 +3090,6 @@ static int bpf_prog_load(union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr, u32 uattr_size)
 	if (err < 0)
 		goto free_used_maps;
 
-	prog = bpf_prog_select_runtime(prog, &err);
-	if (err < 0)
-		goto free_used_maps;
-
 	err = bpf_prog_mark_insn_arrays_ready(prog);
 	if (err < 0)
 		goto free_used_maps;
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 245ec6d74727..f80bb8f0e00e 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -22946,7 +22946,7 @@ static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 		func[i]->aux->might_sleep = env->subprog_info[i].might_sleep;
 		if (!i)
 			func[i]->aux->exception_boundary = env->seen_exception;
-		func[i] = bpf_int_jit_compile(func[i]);
+		func[i] = bpf_int_jit_compile(env, func[i]);
 		if (!func[i]->jited) {
 			err = -ENOTSUPP;
 			goto out_free;
@@ -22990,7 +22990,7 @@ static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 	}
 	for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
 		old_bpf_func = func[i]->bpf_func;
-		tmp = bpf_int_jit_compile(func[i]);
+		tmp = bpf_int_jit_compile(env, func[i]);
 		if (tmp != func[i] || func[i]->bpf_func != old_bpf_func) {
 			verbose(env, "JIT doesn't support bpf-to-bpf calls\n");
 			err = -ENOTSUPP;
@@ -26197,6 +26197,10 @@ int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr, __u3
 		convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(env);
 	}
 
+	env->prog = __bpf_prog_select_runtime(env, env->prog, &ret);
+	if (ret)
+		goto err_release_maps;
+
 	adjust_btf_func(env);
 
 err_release_maps:
-- 
2.47.3

[bpf-next v7 3/5] bpf: Add helper to detect indirect jump targets

[Xu Kuohai]

From: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com>

Introduce helper bpf_insn_is_indirect_target to check whether a BPF
instruction is an indirect jump target.

Since the verifier knows which instructions are indirect jump targets,
add a new flag indirect_target to struct bpf_insn_aux_data to mark
them. The verifier sets this flag when verifing an indirect jump target
instruction, and the helper checks it to determine whether an
instruction is an indirect jump target.

Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com>
---
 include/linux/bpf.h          |  2 ++
 include/linux/bpf_verifier.h |  9 +++++----
 kernel/bpf/core.c            | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c        |  7 +++++++
 4 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h
index 05b34a6355b0..90760e250865 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
@@ -1541,6 +1541,8 @@ bool bpf_has_frame_pointer(unsigned long ip);
 int bpf_jit_charge_modmem(u32 size);
 void bpf_jit_uncharge_modmem(u32 size);
 bool bpf_prog_has_trampoline(const struct bpf_prog *prog);
+bool bpf_insn_is_indirect_target(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const struct bpf_prog *prog,
+				 int insn_idx);
 #else
 static inline int bpf_trampoline_link_prog(struct bpf_tramp_link *link,
 					   struct bpf_trampoline *tr,
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
index 090aa26d1c98..6431b94746cf 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
@@ -578,16 +578,17 @@ struct bpf_insn_aux_data {
 
 	/* below fields are initialized once */
 	unsigned int orig_idx; /* original instruction index */
-	bool jmp_point;
-	bool prune_point;
+	u32 jmp_point:1;
+	u32 prune_point:1;
 	/* ensure we check state equivalence and save state checkpoint and
 	 * this instruction, regardless of any heuristics
 	 */
-	bool force_checkpoint;
+	u32 force_checkpoint:1;
 	/* true if instruction is a call to a helper function that
 	 * accepts callback function as a parameter.
 	 */
-	bool calls_callback;
+	u32 calls_callback:1;
+	u32 indirect_target:1; /* if it is an indirect jump target */
 	/*
 	 * CFG strongly connected component this instruction belongs to,
 	 * zero if it is a singleton SCC.
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c
index 88a1834030a0..51438ab3ba65 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/core.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c
@@ -1475,11 +1475,30 @@ int bpf_jit_blind_constants(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 		insn = prog->insnsi + i + insn_delta;
 		insn_cnt += insn_delta;
 		i        += insn_delta;
+
+		/* bpf_patch_insn_data() calls adjust_insn_aux_data() to adjust insn_aux_data. The
+		 * indirect_target flag for the original instruction is moved to the last of the new
+		 * instructions, but the indirect jump target is actually the first one, so move
+		 * it back.
+		 */
+		if (env->insn_aux_data[i].indirect_target) {
+			env->insn_aux_data[i].indirect_target = 0;
+			env->insn_aux_data[i - insn_delta].indirect_target = 1;
+		}
 	}
 
 	prog->blinded = 1;
 	return 0;
 }
+
+bool bpf_insn_is_indirect_target(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const struct bpf_prog *prog,
+				 int insn_idx)
+{
+	if (!env)
+		return false;
+	insn_idx += prog->aux->subprog_start;
+	return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].indirect_target;
+}
 #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_JIT */
 
 /* Base function for offset calculation. Needs to go into .text section,
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index f80bb8f0e00e..872d031338d1 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -3998,6 +3998,11 @@ static bool is_jmp_point(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
 	return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].jmp_point;
 }
 
+static void mark_indirect_target(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx)
+{
+	env->insn_aux_data[idx].indirect_target = true;
+}
+
 #define LR_FRAMENO_BITS	3
 #define LR_SPI_BITS	6
 #define LR_ENTRY_BITS	(LR_SPI_BITS + LR_FRAMENO_BITS + 1)
@@ -21051,12 +21056,14 @@ static int check_indirect_jump(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *in
 	}
 
 	for (i = 0; i < n - 1; i++) {
+		mark_indirect_target(env, env->gotox_tmp_buf->items[i]);
 		other_branch = push_stack(env, env->gotox_tmp_buf->items[i],
 					  env->insn_idx, env->cur_state->speculative);
 		if (IS_ERR(other_branch))
 			return PTR_ERR(other_branch);
 	}
 	env->insn_idx = env->gotox_tmp_buf->items[n-1];
+	mark_indirect_target(env, env->insn_idx);
 	return 0;
 }
 
-- 
2.47.3

[bpf-next v7 4/5] bpf, x86: Emit ENDBR for indirect jump targets

[Xu Kuohai]

From: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com>

On CPUs that support CET/IBT, the indirect jump selftest triggers
a kernel panic because the indirect jump targets lack ENDBR
instructions.

To fix it, emit an ENDBR instruction to each indirect jump target. Since
the ENDBR instruction shifts the position of original jited instructions,
fix the instruction address calculation wherever the addresses are used.

For reference, below is a sample panic log.

 Missing ENDBR: bpf_prog_2e5f1c71c13ac3e0_big_jump_table+0x97/0xe1
 ------------[ cut here ]------------
 kernel BUG at arch/x86/kernel/cet.c:133!
 Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI

 ...

  ? 0xffffffffc00fb258
  ? bpf_prog_2e5f1c71c13ac3e0_big_jump_table+0x97/0xe1
  bpf_prog_test_run_syscall+0x110/0x2f0
  ? fdget+0xba/0xe0
  __sys_bpf+0xe4b/0x2590
  ? __kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof+0x1c7/0x680
  ? bpf_prog_test_run_syscall+0x215/0x2f0
  __x64_sys_bpf+0x21/0x30
  do_syscall_64+0x85/0x620
  ? bpf_prog_test_run_syscall+0x1e2/0x2f0

Fixes: 493d9e0d6083 ("bpf, x86: add support for indirect jumps")
Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com>
---
 arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 26 +++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
index 2c57ee446fc9..f05ce59bc785 100644
--- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
+++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
@@ -1658,8 +1658,8 @@ static int emit_spectre_bhb_barrier(u8 **pprog, u8 *ip,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int do_jit(struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog, int *addrs, u8 *image, u8 *rw_image,
-		  int oldproglen, struct jit_context *ctx, bool jmp_padding)
+static int do_jit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog, int *addrs, u8 *image,
+		  u8 *rw_image, int oldproglen, struct jit_context *ctx, bool jmp_padding)
 {
 	bool tail_call_reachable = bpf_prog->aux->tail_call_reachable;
 	struct bpf_insn *insn = bpf_prog->insnsi;
@@ -1672,7 +1672,7 @@ static int do_jit(struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog, int *addrs, u8 *image, u8 *rw_image
 	void __percpu *priv_stack_ptr;
 	int i, excnt = 0;
 	int ilen, proglen = 0;
-	u8 *prog = temp;
+	u8 *ip, *prog = temp;
 	u32 stack_depth;
 	int err;
 
@@ -1743,6 +1743,13 @@ static int do_jit(struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog, int *addrs, u8 *image, u8 *rw_image
 				dst_reg = X86_REG_R9;
 		}
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT
+		if (bpf_insn_is_indirect_target(env, bpf_prog, i - 1))
+			EMIT_ENDBR();
+#endif
+
+		ip = image + addrs[i - 1] + (prog - temp);
+
 		switch (insn->code) {
 			/* ALU */
 		case BPF_ALU | BPF_ADD | BPF_X:
@@ -2449,8 +2456,6 @@ st:			if (is_imm8(insn->off))
 
 			/* call */
 		case BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL: {
-			u8 *ip = image + addrs[i - 1];
-
 			func = (u8 *) __bpf_call_base + imm32;
 			if (src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL && tail_call_reachable) {
 				LOAD_TAIL_CALL_CNT_PTR(stack_depth);
@@ -2474,7 +2479,8 @@ st:			if (is_imm8(insn->off))
 			if (imm32)
 				emit_bpf_tail_call_direct(bpf_prog,
 							  &bpf_prog->aux->poke_tab[imm32 - 1],
-							  &prog, image + addrs[i - 1],
+							  &prog,
+							  ip,
 							  callee_regs_used,
 							  stack_depth,
 							  ctx);
@@ -2483,7 +2489,7 @@ st:			if (is_imm8(insn->off))
 							    &prog,
 							    callee_regs_used,
 							    stack_depth,
-							    image + addrs[i - 1],
+							    ip,
 							    ctx);
 			break;
 
@@ -2648,7 +2654,7 @@ st:			if (is_imm8(insn->off))
 			break;
 
 		case BPF_JMP | BPF_JA | BPF_X:
-			emit_indirect_jump(&prog, insn->dst_reg, image + addrs[i - 1]);
+			emit_indirect_jump(&prog, insn->dst_reg, ip);
 			break;
 		case BPF_JMP | BPF_JA:
 		case BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JA:
@@ -2738,8 +2744,6 @@ st:			if (is_imm8(insn->off))
 			ctx->cleanup_addr = proglen;
 			if (bpf_prog_was_classic(bpf_prog) &&
 			    !ns_capable_noaudit(&init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
-				u8 *ip = image + addrs[i - 1];
-
 				if (emit_spectre_bhb_barrier(&prog, ip, bpf_prog))
 					return -EINVAL;
 			}
@@ -3800,7 +3804,7 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_pr
 	for (pass = 0; pass < MAX_PASSES || image; pass++) {
 		if (!padding && pass >= PADDING_PASSES)
 			padding = true;
-		proglen = do_jit(prog, addrs, image, rw_image, oldproglen, &ctx, padding);
+		proglen = do_jit(env, prog, addrs, image, rw_image, oldproglen, &ctx, padding);
 		if (proglen <= 0) {
 out_image:
 			image = NULL;
-- 
2.47.3

[bpf-next v7 5/5] bpf, arm64: Emit BTI for indirect jump target

[Xu Kuohai]

From: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com>

On CPUs that support BTI, the indirect jump selftest triggers a kernel
panic because there is no BTI instructions at the indirect jump targets.

Fix it by emitting a BTI instruction for each indirect jump target.

For reference, below is a sample panic log.

Internal error: Oops - BTI: 0000000036000003 [#1]  SMP
...
Call trace:
 bpf_prog_2e5f1c71c13ac3e0_big_jump_table+0x54/0xf8 (P)
 bpf_prog_run_pin_on_cpu+0x140/0x468
 bpf_prog_test_run_syscall+0x280/0x3b8
 bpf_prog_test_run+0x22c/0x2c0

Fixes: f4a66cf1cb14 ("bpf: arm64: Add support for indirect jumps")
Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com>
---
 arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 17 ++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
index 5c785eab4b5a..036ad607720a 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
@@ -1198,8 +1198,8 @@ static int add_exception_handler(const struct bpf_insn *insn,
  * >0 - successfully JITed a 16-byte eBPF instruction.
  * <0 - failed to JIT.
  */
-static int build_insn(const struct bpf_insn *insn, struct jit_ctx *ctx,
-		      bool extra_pass)
+static int build_insn(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const struct bpf_insn *insn,
+		      struct jit_ctx *ctx, bool extra_pass)
 {
 	const u8 code = insn->code;
 	u8 dst = bpf2a64[insn->dst_reg];
@@ -1224,6 +1224,9 @@ static int build_insn(const struct bpf_insn *insn, struct jit_ctx *ctx,
 	int ret;
 	bool sign_extend;
 
+	if (bpf_insn_is_indirect_target(env, ctx->prog, i))
+		emit_bti(A64_BTI_J, ctx);
+
 	switch (code) {
 	/* dst = src */
 	case BPF_ALU | BPF_MOV | BPF_X:
@@ -1899,7 +1902,7 @@ static int build_insn(const struct bpf_insn *insn, struct jit_ctx *ctx,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int build_body(struct jit_ctx *ctx, bool extra_pass)
+static int build_body(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct jit_ctx *ctx, bool extra_pass)
 {
 	const struct bpf_prog *prog = ctx->prog;
 	int i;
@@ -1918,7 +1921,7 @@ static int build_body(struct jit_ctx *ctx, bool extra_pass)
 		int ret;
 
 		ctx->offset[i] = ctx->idx;
-		ret = build_insn(insn, ctx, extra_pass);
+		ret = build_insn(env, insn, ctx, extra_pass);
 		if (ret > 0) {
 			i++;
 			ctx->offset[i] = ctx->idx;
@@ -2086,7 +2089,7 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_pr
 	if (build_prologue(&ctx, was_classic))
 		goto out_off;
 
-	if (build_body(&ctx, extra_pass))
+	if (build_body(env, &ctx, extra_pass))
 		goto out_off;
 
 	ctx.epilogue_offset = ctx.idx;
@@ -2134,7 +2137,7 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_pr
 	/* Dont write body instructions to memory for now */
 	ctx.write = false;
 
-	if (build_body(&ctx, extra_pass))
+	if (build_body(env, &ctx, extra_pass))
 		goto out_free_hdr;
 
 	ctx.epilogue_offset = ctx.idx;
@@ -2143,7 +2146,7 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_pr
 	ctx.write = true;
 
 	/* Pass 3: Adjust jump offset and write final image */
-	if (build_body(&ctx, extra_pass) ||
+	if (build_body(env, &ctx, extra_pass) ||
 		WARN_ON_ONCE(ctx.idx != ctx.epilogue_offset))
 		goto out_free_hdr;
 
-- 
2.47.3

Re: [bpf-next v7 1/5] bpf: Move constants blinding from JIT to verifier

[kernel test robot]

Hi Xu,

kernel test robot noticed the following build errors:

[auto build test ERROR on bpf-next/master]

url:    https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Xu-Kuohai/bpf-Move-constants-blinding-from-JIT-to-verifier/20260307-181538
base:   https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next.git master
patch link:    https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260307103949.2340104-2-xukuohai%40huaweicloud.com
patch subject: [bpf-next v7 1/5] bpf: Move constants blinding from JIT to verifier
config: x86_64-kexec (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20260307/202603071836.igZbCyrE-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: clang version 20.1.8 (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project 87f0227cb60147a26a1eeb4fb06e3b505e9c7261)
reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20260307/202603071836.igZbCyrE-lkp@intel.com/reproduce)

If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of
the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
| Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202603071836.igZbCyrE-lkp@intel.com/

All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):

>> kernel/bpf/verifier.c:23100:9: error: call to undeclared function 'bpf_jit_blind_constants'; ISO C99 and later do not support implicit function declarations [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
    23100 |                 err = bpf_jit_blind_constants(env);
          |                       ^
   1 error generated.


vim +/bpf_jit_blind_constants +23100 kernel/bpf/verifier.c

 23087	
 23088	static int fixup_call_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 23089	{
 23090	#ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON
 23091		struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
 23092		struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi;
 23093		bool has_kfunc_call = bpf_prog_has_kfunc_call(prog);
 23094		int i, depth;
 23095	#endif
 23096		int err = 0;
 23097	
 23098		if (env->prog->jit_requested &&
 23099		    !bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) {
 23100			err = bpf_jit_blind_constants(env);
 23101			if (err)
 23102				return err;
 23103			err = jit_subprogs(env);
 23104			if (err == 0)
 23105				return 0;
 23106			if (err == -EFAULT)
 23107				return err;
 23108		}
 23109	#ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON
 23110		if (has_kfunc_call) {
 23111			verbose(env, "calling kernel functions are not allowed in non-JITed programs\n");
 23112			return -EINVAL;
 23113		}
 23114		if (env->subprog_cnt > 1 && env->prog->aux->tail_call_reachable) {
 23115			/* When JIT fails the progs with bpf2bpf calls and tail_calls
 23116			 * have to be rejected, since interpreter doesn't support them yet.
 23117			 */
 23118			verbose(env, "tail_calls are not allowed in non-JITed programs with bpf-to-bpf calls\n");
 23119			return -EINVAL;
 23120		}
 23121		for (i = 0; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) {
 23122			if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) {
 23123				/* When JIT fails the progs with callback calls
 23124				 * have to be rejected, since interpreter doesn't support them yet.
 23125				 */
 23126				verbose(env, "callbacks are not allowed in non-JITed programs\n");
 23127				return -EINVAL;
 23128			}
 23129	
 23130			if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn))
 23131				continue;
 23132			depth = get_callee_stack_depth(env, insn, i);
 23133			if (depth < 0)
 23134				return depth;
 23135			bpf_patch_call_args(insn, depth);
 23136		}
 23137		err = 0;
 23138	#endif
 23139		return err;
 23140	}
 23141	

-- 
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki

Re: [bpf-next v7 3/5] bpf: Add helper to detect indirect jump targets

[bot+bpf-ci]

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2328 bytes --]

> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c
> --- a/kernel/bpf/core.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c
> @@ -1475,11 +1475,30 @@ int bpf_jit_blind_constants(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
>  		insn = prog->insnsi + i + insn_delta;
>  		insn_cnt += insn_delta;
>  		i        += insn_delta;
> +
> +		/* bpf_patch_insn_data() calls adjust_insn_aux_data() to adjust insn_aux_data. The
> +		 * indirect_target flag for the original instruction is moved to the last of the new
> +		 * instructions, but the indirect jump target is actually the first one, so move
> +		 * it back.
> +		 */
> +		if (env->insn_aux_data[i].indirect_target) {
> +			env->insn_aux_data[i].indirect_target = 0;
> +			env->insn_aux_data[i - insn_delta].indirect_target = 1;
> +		}

This fixup handles the displacement caused by
bpf_jit_blind_constants() itself, but adjust_insn_aux_data() has
the same displacement behavior in every caller of
bpf_patch_insn_data(). Several patching passes run before
bpf_jit_blind_constants() in bpf_check():

  convert_ctx_accesses()      ->  bpf_patch_insn_data()
  do_misc_fixups()            ->  bpf_patch_insn_data()
  opt_subreg_zext_lo32_rnd_hi32() -> bpf_patch_insn_data()
  fixup_call_args()           ->  bpf_jit_blind_constants()  <-- only fixup here

All of these call adjust_insn_aux_data() which does:

  memmove(data + off + cnt - 1, data + off, ...)
  memset(data + off, 0, ...)

This moves indirect_target from data[off] to data[off + cnt - 1].
Meanwhile, bpf_insn_array_adjust() preserves xlated_off == off:

  if (insn_array->values[i].xlated_off <= off)
      continue;

So after an earlier pass patches an indirect target instruction,
the insn_array still says the target is at off, but
insn_aux_data has indirect_target set at off + cnt - 1.

If an indirect jump target is also, say, a helper call that
do_misc_fixups() replaces with multiple instructions, would
bpf_insn_is_indirect_target() return the wrong result for that
instruction? It seems like the fixup might need to be in
adjust_insn_aux_data() itself rather than only in
bpf_jit_blind_constants().


---
AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug.
See: https://github.com/kernel-patches/vmtest/blob/master/ci/claude/README.md

CI run summary: https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/22803043949

Re: [bpf-next v7 1/5] bpf: Move constants blinding from JIT to verifier

[kernel test robot]

Hi Xu,

kernel test robot noticed the following build errors:

[auto build test ERROR on bpf-next/master]

url:    https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Xu-Kuohai/bpf-Move-constants-blinding-from-JIT-to-verifier/20260307-181538
base:   https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next.git master
patch link:    https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260307103949.2340104-2-xukuohai%40huaweicloud.com
patch subject: [bpf-next v7 1/5] bpf: Move constants blinding from JIT to verifier
config: m68k-defconfig (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20260308/202603080148.tjqluX6P-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: m68k-linux-gcc (GCC) 15.2.0
reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20260308/202603080148.tjqluX6P-lkp@intel.com/reproduce)

If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of
the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
| Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202603080148.tjqluX6P-lkp@intel.com/

All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):

   kernel/bpf/verifier.c: In function 'fixup_call_args':
>> kernel/bpf/verifier.c:23100:23: error: implicit declaration of function 'bpf_jit_blind_constants' [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
   23100 |                 err = bpf_jit_blind_constants(env);
         |                       ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~


vim +/bpf_jit_blind_constants +23100 kernel/bpf/verifier.c

 23087	
 23088	static int fixup_call_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 23089	{
 23090	#ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON
 23091		struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
 23092		struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi;
 23093		bool has_kfunc_call = bpf_prog_has_kfunc_call(prog);
 23094		int i, depth;
 23095	#endif
 23096		int err = 0;
 23097	
 23098		if (env->prog->jit_requested &&
 23099		    !bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) {
 23100			err = bpf_jit_blind_constants(env);
 23101			if (err)
 23102				return err;
 23103			err = jit_subprogs(env);
 23104			if (err == 0)
 23105				return 0;
 23106			if (err == -EFAULT)
 23107				return err;
 23108		}
 23109	#ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON
 23110		if (has_kfunc_call) {
 23111			verbose(env, "calling kernel functions are not allowed in non-JITed programs\n");
 23112			return -EINVAL;
 23113		}
 23114		if (env->subprog_cnt > 1 && env->prog->aux->tail_call_reachable) {
 23115			/* When JIT fails the progs with bpf2bpf calls and tail_calls
 23116			 * have to be rejected, since interpreter doesn't support them yet.
 23117			 */
 23118			verbose(env, "tail_calls are not allowed in non-JITed programs with bpf-to-bpf calls\n");
 23119			return -EINVAL;
 23120		}
 23121		for (i = 0; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) {
 23122			if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) {
 23123				/* When JIT fails the progs with callback calls
 23124				 * have to be rejected, since interpreter doesn't support them yet.
 23125				 */
 23126				verbose(env, "callbacks are not allowed in non-JITed programs\n");
 23127				return -EINVAL;
 23128			}
 23129	
 23130			if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn))
 23131				continue;
 23132			depth = get_callee_stack_depth(env, insn, i);
 23133			if (depth < 0)
 23134				return depth;
 23135			bpf_patch_call_args(insn, depth);
 23136		}
 23137		err = 0;
 23138	#endif
 23139		return err;
 23140	}
 23141	

-- 
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki

Re: [bpf-next v7 1/5] bpf: Move constants blinding from JIT to verifier

[kernel test robot]

Hi Xu,

kernel test robot noticed the following build errors:

[auto build test ERROR on bpf-next/master]

url:    https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Xu-Kuohai/bpf-Move-constants-blinding-from-JIT-to-verifier/20260307-181538
base:   https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next.git master
patch link:    https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260307103949.2340104-2-xukuohai%40huaweicloud.com
patch subject: [bpf-next v7 1/5] bpf: Move constants blinding from JIT to verifier
config: riscv-randconfig-002-20260307 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20260308/202603080126.Lh5uvLLo-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: clang version 23.0.0git (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project c32caeec8158d634bb71ab8911a6031248b9fc47)
reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20260308/202603080126.Lh5uvLLo-lkp@intel.com/reproduce)

If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of
the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
| Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202603080126.Lh5uvLLo-lkp@intel.com/

All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):

>> kernel/bpf/verifier.c:23100:9: error: call to undeclared function 'bpf_jit_blind_constants'; ISO C99 and later do not support implicit function declarations [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
    23100 |                 err = bpf_jit_blind_constants(env);
          |                       ^
   1 error generated.


vim +/bpf_jit_blind_constants +23100 kernel/bpf/verifier.c

 23087	
 23088	static int fixup_call_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 23089	{
 23090	#ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON
 23091		struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
 23092		struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi;
 23093		bool has_kfunc_call = bpf_prog_has_kfunc_call(prog);
 23094		int i, depth;
 23095	#endif
 23096		int err = 0;
 23097	
 23098		if (env->prog->jit_requested &&
 23099		    !bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) {
 23100			err = bpf_jit_blind_constants(env);
 23101			if (err)
 23102				return err;
 23103			err = jit_subprogs(env);
 23104			if (err == 0)
 23105				return 0;
 23106			if (err == -EFAULT)
 23107				return err;
 23108		}
 23109	#ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON
 23110		if (has_kfunc_call) {
 23111			verbose(env, "calling kernel functions are not allowed in non-JITed programs\n");
 23112			return -EINVAL;
 23113		}
 23114		if (env->subprog_cnt > 1 && env->prog->aux->tail_call_reachable) {
 23115			/* When JIT fails the progs with bpf2bpf calls and tail_calls
 23116			 * have to be rejected, since interpreter doesn't support them yet.
 23117			 */
 23118			verbose(env, "tail_calls are not allowed in non-JITed programs with bpf-to-bpf calls\n");
 23119			return -EINVAL;
 23120		}
 23121		for (i = 0; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) {
 23122			if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) {
 23123				/* When JIT fails the progs with callback calls
 23124				 * have to be rejected, since interpreter doesn't support them yet.
 23125				 */
 23126				verbose(env, "callbacks are not allowed in non-JITed programs\n");
 23127				return -EINVAL;
 23128			}
 23129	
 23130			if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn))
 23131				continue;
 23132			depth = get_callee_stack_depth(env, insn, i);
 23133			if (depth < 0)
 23134				return depth;
 23135			bpf_patch_call_args(insn, depth);
 23136		}
 23137		err = 0;
 23138	#endif
 23139		return err;
 23140	}
 23141	

-- 
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki

Re: [bpf-next v7 3/5] bpf: Add helper to detect indirect jump targets

[Xu Kuohai]

On 3/8/2026 1:14 AM, bot+bpf-ci@kernel.org wrote:
>> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c
>> --- a/kernel/bpf/core.c
>> +++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c
>> @@ -1475,11 +1475,30 @@ int bpf_jit_blind_constants(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
>>   		insn = prog->insnsi + i + insn_delta;
>>   		insn_cnt += insn_delta;
>>   		i        += insn_delta;
>> +
>> +		/* bpf_patch_insn_data() calls adjust_insn_aux_data() to adjust insn_aux_data. The
>> +		 * indirect_target flag for the original instruction is moved to the last of the new
>> +		 * instructions, but the indirect jump target is actually the first one, so move
>> +		 * it back.
>> +		 */
>> +		if (env->insn_aux_data[i].indirect_target) {
>> +			env->insn_aux_data[i].indirect_target = 0;
>> +			env->insn_aux_data[i - insn_delta].indirect_target = 1;
>> +		}
> 
> This fixup handles the displacement caused by
> bpf_jit_blind_constants() itself, but adjust_insn_aux_data() has
> the same displacement behavior in every caller of
> bpf_patch_insn_data(). Several patching passes run before
> bpf_jit_blind_constants() in bpf_check():
> 
>    convert_ctx_accesses()      ->  bpf_patch_insn_data()
>    do_misc_fixups()            ->  bpf_patch_insn_data()
>    opt_subreg_zext_lo32_rnd_hi32() -> bpf_patch_insn_data()
>    fixup_call_args()           ->  bpf_jit_blind_constants()  <-- only fixup here
> 
> All of these call adjust_insn_aux_data() which does:
> 
>    memmove(data + off + cnt - 1, data + off, ...)
>    memset(data + off, 0, ...)
> 
> This moves indirect_target from data[off] to data[off + cnt - 1].
> Meanwhile, bpf_insn_array_adjust() preserves xlated_off == off:
> 
>    if (insn_array->values[i].xlated_off <= off)
>        continue;
> 
> So after an earlier pass patches an indirect target instruction,
> the insn_array still says the target is at off, but
> insn_aux_data has indirect_target set at off + cnt - 1.
> 
> If an indirect jump target is also, say, a helper call that
> do_misc_fixups() replaces with multiple instructions, would
> bpf_insn_is_indirect_target() return the wrong result for that
> instruction? It seems like the fixup might need to be in
> adjust_insn_aux_data() itself rather than only in
> bpf_jit_blind_constants().
> 

OK, will move the fixup to adjust_insn_aux_data()

> ---
> AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug.
> See: https://github.com/kernel-patches/vmtest/blob/master/ci/claude/README.md
> 
> CI run summary: https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/22803043949

Re: [bpf-next v7 1/5] bpf: Move constants blinding from JIT to verifier

[Xu Kuohai]

On 3/8/2026 1:08 AM, kernel test robot wrote:
> Hi Xu,
> 
> kernel test robot noticed the following build errors:
> 
> [auto build test ERROR on bpf-next/master]
> 
> url:    https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Xu-Kuohai/bpf-Move-constants-blinding-from-JIT-to-verifier/20260307-181538
> base:   https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next.git master
> patch link:    https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260307103949.2340104-2-xukuohai%40huaweicloud.com
> patch subject: [bpf-next v7 1/5] bpf: Move constants blinding from JIT to verifier
> config: x86_64-kexec (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20260307/202603071836.igZbCyrE-lkp@intel.com/config)
> compiler: clang version 20.1.8 (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project 87f0227cb60147a26a1eeb4fb06e3b505e9c7261)
> reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20260307/202603071836.igZbCyrE-lkp@intel.com/reproduce)
> 
> If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of
> the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
> | Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
> | Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202603071836.igZbCyrE-lkp@intel.com/
> 
> All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):
> 
>>> kernel/bpf/verifier.c:23100:9: error: call to undeclared function 'bpf_jit_blind_constants'; ISO C99 and later do not support implicit function declarations [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
>      23100 |                 err = bpf_jit_blind_constants(env);
>            |                       ^
>     1 error generated.
>

oops, it's not defined when CONFIG_BPF_JIT is not enabled

> 
> vim +/bpf_jit_blind_constants +23100 kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> 
>   23087	
>   23088	static int fixup_call_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
>   23089	{
>   23090	#ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON
>   23091		struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
>   23092		struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi;
>   23093		bool has_kfunc_call = bpf_prog_has_kfunc_call(prog);
>   23094		int i, depth;
>   23095	#endif
>   23096		int err = 0;
>   23097	
>   23098		if (env->prog->jit_requested &&
>   23099		    !bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) {
>   23100			err = bpf_jit_blind_constants(env);
>   23101			if (err)
>   23102				return err;
>   23103			err = jit_subprogs(env);
>   23104			if (err == 0)
>   23105				return 0;
>   23106			if (err == -EFAULT)
>   23107				return err;
>   23108		}
>   23109	#ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON
>   23110		if (has_kfunc_call) {
>   23111			verbose(env, "calling kernel functions are not allowed in non-JITed programs\n");
>   23112			return -EINVAL;
>   23113		}
>   23114		if (env->subprog_cnt > 1 && env->prog->aux->tail_call_reachable) {
>   23115			/* When JIT fails the progs with bpf2bpf calls and tail_calls
>   23116			 * have to be rejected, since interpreter doesn't support them yet.
>   23117			 */
>   23118			verbose(env, "tail_calls are not allowed in non-JITed programs with bpf-to-bpf calls\n");
>   23119			return -EINVAL;
>   23120		}
>   23121		for (i = 0; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) {
>   23122			if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) {
>   23123				/* When JIT fails the progs with callback calls
>   23124				 * have to be rejected, since interpreter doesn't support them yet.
>   23125				 */
>   23126				verbose(env, "callbacks are not allowed in non-JITed programs\n");
>   23127				return -EINVAL;
>   23128			}
>   23129	
>   23130			if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn))
>   23131				continue;
>   23132			depth = get_callee_stack_depth(env, insn, i);
>   23133			if (depth < 0)
>   23134				return depth;
>   23135			bpf_patch_call_args(insn, depth);
>   23136		}
>   23137		err = 0;
>   23138	#endif
>   23139		return err;
>   23140	}
>   23141	
>