From: Sebastian Ene <sebastianene@google.com>
To: alexandru.elisei@arm.com, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, android-kvm@google.com
Cc: catalin.marinas@arm.com, dbrazdil@google.com, joey.gouly@arm.com,
kees@kernel.org, mark.rutland@arm.com, maz@kernel.org,
oupton@kernel.org, perlarsen@google.com, qperret@google.com,
rananta@google.com, sebastianene@google.com,
smostafa@google.com, suzuki.poulose@arm.com, tabba@google.com,
tglx@kernel.org, vdonnefort@google.com, bgrzesik@google.com,
will@kernel.org, yuzenghui@huawei.com
Subject: [PATCH 07/14] KVM: arm64: Restrict host access to the ITS tables
Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2026 12:49:26 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260310124933.830025-8-sebastianene@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260310124933.830025-1-sebastianene@google.com>
Setup shadow structures for ITS indirect tables held in
the GITS_BASER<n> registers.
Make the last level of the Device Table and vPE Table
inacessible to the host.
In a direct layout configuration, donate the table to
the hypervisor since the software is not expected to
program them directly.
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Ene <sebastianene@google.com>
---
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/its_emulate.c | 143 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 143 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/its_emulate.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/its_emulate.c
index 4a3ccc90a1a9..865a5d6353ed 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/its_emulate.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/its_emulate.c
@@ -141,6 +141,145 @@ static struct pkvm_protected_reg *get_region(phys_addr_t dev_addr)
return NULL;
}
+static int pkvm_host_unmap_last_level(void *shadow, size_t num_pages, u32 psz)
+{
+ u64 *table = shadow;
+ int ret, i, end = (num_pages << PAGE_SHIFT) / sizeof(table);
+ phys_addr_t table_addr;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < end; i++) {
+ if (!(table[i] & GITS_BASER_VALID))
+ continue;
+
+ table_addr = table[i] & PHYS_MASK;
+ ret = __pkvm_host_donate_hyp(hyp_phys_to_pfn(table_addr), psz >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err_donate;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+err_donate:
+ for (i = i - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+ if (!(table[i] & GITS_BASER_VALID))
+ continue;
+
+ table_addr = table[i] & PHYS_MASK;
+ __pkvm_hyp_donate_host(hyp_phys_to_pfn(table_addr), psz >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int pkvm_share_shadow_table(void *shadow, u64 nr_pages)
+{
+ u64 i, ret, start_pfn = hyp_virt_to_pfn(shadow);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++) {
+ ret = __pkvm_host_share_hyp(start_pfn + i);
+ if (ret)
+ goto unshare;
+ }
+
+ ret = hyp_pin_shared_mem(shadow, shadow + (nr_pages << PAGE_SHIFT));
+ if (ret)
+ goto unshare;
+
+ return ret;
+unshare:
+ for (i = i - 1; i >= 0; i--)
+ __pkvm_host_unshare_hyp(start_pfn + i);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void pkvm_unshare_shadow_table(void *shadow, u64 nr_pages)
+{
+ u64 i, start_pfn = hyp_virt_to_pfn(shadow);
+
+ hyp_unpin_shared_mem(shadow, shadow + (nr_pages << PAGE_SHIFT));
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++)
+ WARN_ON(__pkvm_host_unshare_hyp(start_pfn + i));
+}
+
+static void pkvm_host_map_last_level(void *shadow, size_t num_pages, u32 psz)
+{
+ u64 *table;
+ int i, end = (num_pages << PAGE_SHIFT) / sizeof(table);
+ phys_addr_t table_addr;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < end; i++) {
+ if (!(table[i] & GITS_BASER_VALID))
+ continue;
+
+ table_addr = table[i] & ~GITS_BASER_VALID;
+ WARN_ON(__pkvm_hyp_donate_host(hyp_phys_to_pfn(table_addr), psz >> PAGE_SHIFT));
+ }
+}
+
+static int pkvm_setup_its_shadow_baser(struct its_shadow_tables *shadow)
+{
+ int i, ret;
+ u64 baser_val, num_pages, type;
+ void *base, *host_base;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < GITS_BASER_NR_REGS; i++) {
+ baser_val = shadow->tables[i].val;
+ if (!(baser_val & GITS_BASER_VALID))
+ continue;
+
+ base = kern_hyp_va(shadow->tables[i].base);
+ num_pages = (1 << shadow->tables[i].order);
+
+ ret = __pkvm_host_donate_hyp(hyp_virt_to_pfn(base), num_pages);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err_donate;
+
+ if (baser_val & GITS_BASER_INDIRECT) {
+ host_base = kern_hyp_va(shadow->tables[i].shadow);
+ ret = pkvm_share_shadow_table(host_base, num_pages);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err_with_donation;
+
+ type = GITS_BASER_TYPE(baser_val);
+ if (type == GITS_BASER_TYPE_COLLECTION)
+ continue;
+
+ ret = pkvm_host_unmap_last_level(base, num_pages,
+ shadow->tables[i].psz);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err_with_share;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+err_with_share:
+ pkvm_unshare_shadow_table(host_base, num_pages);
+err_with_donation:
+ __pkvm_hyp_donate_host(hyp_virt_to_pfn(base), num_pages);
+err_donate:
+ for (i = i - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+ baser_val = shadow->tables[i].val;
+ if (!(baser_val & GITS_BASER_VALID))
+ continue;
+
+ base = kern_hyp_va(shadow->tables[i].base);
+ num_pages = (1 << shadow->tables[i].order);
+
+ WARN_ON(__pkvm_hyp_donate_host(hyp_virt_to_pfn(base), num_pages));
+ if (baser_val & GITS_BASER_INDIRECT) {
+ host_base = kern_hyp_va(shadow->tables[i].shadow);
+ pkvm_unshare_shadow_table(host_base, num_pages);
+
+ type = GITS_BASER_TYPE(baser_val);
+ if (type == GITS_BASER_TYPE_COLLECTION)
+ continue;
+
+ pkvm_host_map_last_level(base, num_pages, shadow->tables[i].psz);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
static int pkvm_setup_its_shadow_cmdq(struct its_shadow_tables *shadow)
{
int ret, i, num_pages;
@@ -205,6 +344,10 @@ int pkvm_init_gic_its_emulation(phys_addr_t dev_addr, void *host_priv_state,
if (ret)
goto err_with_shadow;
+ ret = pkvm_setup_its_shadow_baser(shadow);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err_with_shadow;
+
its_reg->priv = priv_state;
hyp_spin_lock_init(&priv_state->its_lock);
--
2.53.0.473.g4a7958ca14-goog
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-03-10 12:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-03-10 12:49 [RFC PATCH 00/14] KVM: ITS hardening for pKVM Sebastian Ene
2026-03-10 12:49 ` [PATCH 01/14] KVM: arm64: Donate MMIO to the hypervisor Sebastian Ene
2026-03-12 17:57 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-03-13 10:40 ` Suzuki K Poulose
2026-03-24 10:39 ` Vincent Donnefort
2026-03-10 12:49 ` [PATCH 02/14] KVM: arm64: Track host-unmapped MMIO regions in a static array Sebastian Ene
2026-03-12 19:05 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-03-24 10:46 ` Vincent Donnefort
2026-03-10 12:49 ` [PATCH 03/14] KVM: arm64: Support host MMIO trap handlers for unmapped devices Sebastian Ene
2026-03-13 9:31 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-03-24 10:59 ` Vincent Donnefort
2026-03-10 12:49 ` [PATCH 04/14] KVM: arm64: Mediate host access to GIC/ITS MMIO via unmapping Sebastian Ene
2026-03-13 9:58 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-03-10 12:49 ` [PATCH 05/14] irqchip/gic-v3-its: Prepare shadow structures for KVM host deprivilege Sebastian Ene
2026-03-13 11:26 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-03-13 13:10 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-03-20 15:11 ` Sebastian Ene
2026-03-24 14:36 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-03-10 12:49 ` [PATCH 06/14] KVM: arm64: Add infrastructure for ITS emulation setup Sebastian Ene
2026-03-16 10:46 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-03-17 9:40 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-03-10 12:49 ` Sebastian Ene [this message]
2026-03-16 16:13 ` [PATCH 07/14] KVM: arm64: Restrict host access to the ITS tables Fuad Tabba
2026-03-10 12:49 ` [PATCH 08/14] KVM: arm64: Trap & emulate the ITS MAPD command Sebastian Ene
2026-03-17 10:20 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-03-10 12:49 ` [PATCH 09/14] KVM: arm64: Trap & emulate the ITS VMAPP command Sebastian Ene
2026-03-10 12:49 ` [PATCH 10/14] KVM: arm64: Trap & emulate the ITS MAPC command Sebastian Ene
2026-03-10 12:49 ` [PATCH 11/14] KVM: arm64: Restrict host updates to GITS_CTLR Sebastian Ene
2026-03-10 12:49 ` [PATCH 12/14] KVM: arm64: Restrict host updates to GITS_CBASER Sebastian Ene
2026-03-10 12:49 ` [PATCH 13/14] KVM: arm64: Restrict host updates to GITS_BASER Sebastian Ene
2026-03-10 12:49 ` [PATCH 14/14] KVM: arm64: Implement HVC interface for ITS emulation setup Sebastian Ene
2026-03-12 17:56 ` [RFC PATCH 00/14] KVM: ITS hardening for pKVM Fuad Tabba
2026-03-20 14:42 ` Sebastian Ene
2026-03-13 15:18 ` Mostafa Saleh
2026-03-15 13:24 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-03-25 16:26 ` Sebastian Ene
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20260310124933.830025-8-sebastianene@google.com \
--to=sebastianene@google.com \
--cc=alexandru.elisei@arm.com \
--cc=android-kvm@google.com \
--cc=bgrzesik@google.com \
--cc=catalin.marinas@arm.com \
--cc=dbrazdil@google.com \
--cc=joey.gouly@arm.com \
--cc=kees@kernel.org \
--cc=kvmarm@lists.linux.dev \
--cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=mark.rutland@arm.com \
--cc=maz@kernel.org \
--cc=oupton@kernel.org \
--cc=perlarsen@google.com \
--cc=qperret@google.com \
--cc=rananta@google.com \
--cc=smostafa@google.com \
--cc=suzuki.poulose@arm.com \
--cc=tabba@google.com \
--cc=tglx@kernel.org \
--cc=vdonnefort@google.com \
--cc=will@kernel.org \
--cc=yuzenghui@huawei.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox