From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from bombadil.infradead.org (bombadil.infradead.org [198.137.202.133]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D2ADB1061B02 for ; Mon, 30 Mar 2026 14:51:37 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=lists.infradead.org; s=bombadil.20210309; h=Sender:List-Subscribe:List-Help :List-Post:List-Archive:List-Unsubscribe:List-Id:Content-Transfer-Encoding: MIME-Version:References:In-Reply-To:Message-ID:Date:Subject:Cc:To:From: Reply-To:Content-Type:Content-ID:Content-Description:Resent-Date:Resent-From: Resent-Sender:Resent-To:Resent-Cc:Resent-Message-ID:List-Owner; bh=MqTi5mJwUxpVJqBvOKJdlGPVclY+2q0ZyAmSAWPHlxA=; b=KpJGL/+OMlvjaopnmbxItu6485 SbIZocsr2rDiYzbijlaQmRQw1et4jiZ2G8XuKNnr16uTWKoqScQvazWT0a2M5Wlo6e1uDFaiMzNpA kGE8SzgFJtRb5f4gCrXqVqGyLbVHpK7T/za49armuE3JGr0aMxtLCgT8wHSloMzt++mMW94VEV4Es xvcp8QbA9RBrLipsKbJ7Ijok6GKRmuzj1giupTKYtycAwBtrvqNkn/fINK4zlh4HoLxhzuT220haK yTWAjl1t1O90pQFEJo0tXVEGTiVepnna+8ex9IxypMz9oi7wjuHCq/Zt/P1A2H60WU4IgavWvuU+U TVRB3eRQ==; Received: from localhost ([::1] helo=bombadil.infradead.org) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.98.2 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1w7Dxd-0000000BUkz-0UjZ; Mon, 30 Mar 2026 14:51:25 +0000 Received: from sea.source.kernel.org ([2600:3c0a:e001:78e:0:1991:8:25]) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.98.2 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1w7Dwr-0000000BUDf-3dnO for linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org; Mon, 30 Mar 2026 14:50:44 +0000 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (transwarp.subspace.kernel.org [100.75.92.58]) by sea.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 767FD403D6; Mon, 30 Mar 2026 14:50:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 9A511C4CEF7; Mon, 30 Mar 2026 14:50:34 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1774882237; bh=Qd4MhpMUzrMOwnMUgYIjNZ0YuQ9N3zBVyO7g4Wa1/uk=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=gw62cn07Bb6TEWI9buAM81Lo/b0AkeH3STCgpVlrD25B94chVAUqGqC5H+lxvvb1X ZDNzSdCJFYFOjqZHw08d8JLuOg9rcQajWr10IVfd3CVi8PnA76TnG7JtfmRrs4jXWX U4AnbMl3uUWW0TKouYS4ajAC5u5BS7eFk1oGaUMMYwEolaUt4NE2feflimvBc9C0Er 9x4deL5bDuOsdSf2pPbXNe5lo9br+lCT19YdEYe3oOQZhaFWa1/EHCqKJSrPdxQj8H OOq12Mujot5WRw+ohaFCPr1eteN7swf4QooqMAzHqJmQSDcwqdDNYRkbydcDTXY3C/ njo/ie6k844ZQ== From: Will Deacon To: kvmarm@lists.linux.dev Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, Will Deacon , Marc Zyngier , Oliver Upton , Joey Gouly , Suzuki K Poulose , Zenghui Yu , Catalin Marinas , Quentin Perret , Fuad Tabba , Vincent Donnefort , Mostafa Saleh , Alexandru Elisei Subject: [PATCH v5 32/38] KVM: arm64: Add some initial documentation for pKVM Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2026 15:48:33 +0100 Message-ID: <20260330144841.26181-33-will@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.47.3 In-Reply-To: <20260330144841.26181-1-will@kernel.org> References: <20260330144841.26181-1-will@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20260330_075038_091234_895B27AE X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 24.18 ) X-BeenThere: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.34 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org Add some initial documentation for pKVM to help people understand what is supported, the limitations of protected VMs when compared to non-protected VMs and also what is left to do. Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba Tested-by: Fuad Tabba Tested-by: Mostafa Saleh Signed-off-by: Will Deacon --- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 4 +- Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/pkvm.rst | 106 ++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 109 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/pkvm.rst diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 03a550630644..44854a67bc63 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -3247,8 +3247,8 @@ Kernel parameters for the host. To force nVHE on VHE hardware, add "arm64_sw.hvhe=0 id_aa64mmfr1.vh=0" to the command-line. - "nested" is experimental and should be used with - extreme caution. + "nested" and "protected" are experimental and should be + used with extreme caution. kvm-arm.vgic_v3_group0_trap= [KVM,ARM,EARLY] Trap guest accesses to GICv3 group-0 diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/index.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/index.rst index ec09881de4cf..0856b4942e05 100644 --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/index.rst @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ ARM fw-pseudo-registers hyp-abi hypercalls + pkvm pvtime ptp_kvm vcpu-features diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/pkvm.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/pkvm.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..514992a79a83 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/pkvm.rst @@ -0,0 +1,106 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +==================== +Protected KVM (pKVM) +==================== + +**NOTE**: pKVM is currently an experimental, development feature and +subject to breaking changes as new isolation features are implemented. +Please reach out to the developers at kvmarm@lists.linux.dev if you have +any questions. + +Overview +======== + +Booting a host kernel with '``kvm-arm.mode=protected``' enables +"Protected KVM" (pKVM). During boot, pKVM installs a stage-2 identity +map page-table for the host and uses it to isolate the hypervisor +running at EL2 from the rest of the host running at EL1/0. + +pKVM permits creation of protected virtual machines (pVMs) by passing +the ``KVM_VM_TYPE_ARM_PROTECTED`` machine type identifier to the +``KVM_CREATE_VM`` ioctl(). The hypervisor isolates pVMs from the host by +unmapping pages from the stage-2 identity map as they are accessed by a +pVM. Hypercalls are provided for a pVM to share specific regions of its +IPA space back with the host, allowing for communication with the VMM. +A Linux guest must be configured with ``CONFIG_ARM_PKVM_GUEST=y`` in +order to issue these hypercalls. + +See hypercalls.rst for more details. + +Isolation mechanisms +==================== + +pKVM relies on a number of mechanisms to isolate PVMs from the host: + +CPU memory isolation +-------------------- + +Status: Isolation of anonymous memory and metadata pages. + +Metadata pages (e.g. page-table pages and '``struct kvm_vcpu``' pages) +are donated from the host to the hypervisor during pVM creation and +are consequently unmapped from the stage-2 identity map until the pVM is +destroyed. + +Similarly to regular KVM, pages are lazily mapped into the guest in +response to stage-2 page faults handled by the host. However, when +running a pVM, these pages are first pinned and then unmapped from the +stage-2 identity map as part of the donation procedure. This gives rise +to some user-visible differences when compared to non-protected VMs, +largely due to the lack of MMU notifiers: + +* Memslots cannot be moved or deleted once the pVM has started running. +* Read-only memslots and dirty logging are not supported. +* With the exception of swap, file-backed pages cannot be mapped into a + pVM. +* Donated pages are accounted against ``RLIMIT_MLOCK`` and so the VMM + must have a sufficient resource limit or be granted ``CAP_IPC_LOCK``. + The lack of a runtime reclaim mechanism means that memory locked for + a pVM will remain locked until the pVM is destroyed. +* Changes to the VMM address space (e.g. a ``MAP_FIXED`` mmap() over a + mapping associated with a memslot) are not reflected in the guest and + may lead to loss of coherency. +* Accessing pVM memory that has not been shared back will result in the + delivery of a SIGSEGV. +* If a system call accesses pVM memory that has not been shared back + then it will either return ``-EFAULT`` or forcefully reclaim the + memory pages. Reclaimed memory is zeroed by the hypervisor and a + subsequent attempt to access it in the pVM will return ``-EFAULT`` + from the ``VCPU_RUN`` ioctl(). + +CPU state isolation +------------------- + +Status: **Unimplemented.** + +DMA isolation using an IOMMU +---------------------------- + +Status: **Unimplemented.** + +Proxying of Trustzone services +------------------------------ + +Status: FF-A and PSCI calls from the host are proxied by the pKVM +hypervisor. + +The FF-A proxy ensures that the host cannot share pVM or hypervisor +memory with Trustzone as part of a "confused deputy" attack. + +The PSCI proxy ensures that CPUs always have the stage-2 identity map +installed when they are executing in the host. + +Protected VM firmware (pvmfw) +----------------------------- + +Status: **Unimplemented.** + +Resources +========= + +Quentin Perret's KVM Forum 2022 talk entitled "Protected KVM on arm64: A +technical deep dive" remains a good resource for learning more about +pKVM, despite some of the details having changed in the meantime: + +https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9npebeVFbFw -- 2.53.0.1018.g2bb0e51243-goog