From: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
To: bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>,
Jonas Rebmann <jre@pengutronix.de>,
"Alexei Starovoitov" <ast@kernel.org>,
"Daniel Borkmann" <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
"Andrii Nakryiko" <andrii@kernel.org>,
"Martin KaFai Lau" <martin.lau@linux.dev>,
"Eduard Zingerman" <eddyz87@gmail.com>,
"Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi" <memxor@gmail.com>,
"Song Liu" <song@kernel.org>,
Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
kernel@pengutronix.de
Subject: [PATCH bpf-next v2] arm32, bpf: Reject BPF-to-BPF calls and callbacks in the JIT
Date: Fri, 17 Apr 2026 07:33:52 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260417143353.838911-1-puranjay@kernel.org> (raw)
The ARM32 BPF JIT does not support BPF-to-BPF function calls
(BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) or callbacks (BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC), but it does
not reject them either.
When a program with subprograms is loaded (e.g. libxdp's XDP
dispatcher uses __noinline__ subprograms, or any program using
callbacks like bpf_loop or bpf_for_each_map_elem), the verifier
invokes bpf_jit_subprogs() which calls bpf_int_jit_compile()
for each subprogram.
For BPF_PSEUDO_CALL, since ARM32 does not reject it, the JIT
silently emits code using the wrong address computation:
func = __bpf_call_base + imm
where imm is a pc-relative subprogram offset, producing a bogus
function pointer.
For BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC, the ldimm64 handler ignores src_reg and
loads the immediate as a normal 64-bit value without error.
In both cases, build_body() reports success and a JIT image is
allocated. ARM32 lacks the jit_data/extra_pass mechanism needed
for the second JIT pass in bpf_jit_subprogs(). On the second
pass, bpf_int_jit_compile() performs a full fresh compilation,
allocating a new JIT binary and overwriting prog->bpf_func. The
first allocation is never freed. bpf_jit_subprogs() then detects
the function pointer changed and aborts with -ENOTSUPP, but the
original JIT binary has already been leaked. Each program
load/unload cycle leaks one JIT binary allocation, as reported
by kmemleak:
unreferenced object 0xbf0a1000 (size 4096):
backtrace:
bpf_jit_binary_alloc+0x64/0xfc
bpf_int_jit_compile+0x14c/0x348
bpf_jit_subprogs+0x4fc/0xa60
Fix this by rejecting both BPF_PSEUDO_CALL in the BPF_CALL
handler and BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC in the BPF_LD_IMM64 handler, falling
through to the existing 'notyet' path. This causes build_body()
to fail before any JIT binary is allocated, so
bpf_int_jit_compile() returns the original program unjitted.
bpf_jit_subprogs() then sees !prog->jited and cleanly falls
back to the interpreter with no leak.
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Fixes: 1c2a088a6626 ("bpf: x64: add JIT support for multi-function programs")
Reported-by: Jonas Rebmann <jre@pengutronix.de>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/b63e9174-7a3d-4e22-8294-16df07a4af89@pengutronix.de
Tested-by: Jonas Rebmann <jre@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
---
Changelog:
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260417103004.3552500-1-puranjay@kernel.org/
Changes in v2:
- Add Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
- Reject BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC in the BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW handler
- Move code below declarations
---
arch/arm/net/bpf_jit_32.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm/net/bpf_jit_32.c b/arch/arm/net/bpf_jit_32.c
index deeb8f292454..a900aa973885 100644
--- a/arch/arm/net/bpf_jit_32.c
+++ b/arch/arm/net/bpf_jit_32.c
@@ -1852,6 +1852,9 @@ static int build_insn(const struct bpf_insn *insn, struct jit_ctx *ctx)
{
u64 val = (u32)imm | (u64)insn[1].imm << 32;
+ if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC)
+ goto notyet;
+
emit_a32_mov_i64(dst, val, ctx);
return 1;
@@ -2055,6 +2058,9 @@ static int build_insn(const struct bpf_insn *insn, struct jit_ctx *ctx)
const s8 *r5 = bpf2a32[BPF_REG_5];
const u32 func = (u32)__bpf_call_base + (u32)imm;
+ if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL)
+ goto notyet;
+
emit_a32_mov_r64(true, r0, r1, ctx);
emit_a32_mov_r64(true, r1, r2, ctx);
emit_push_r64(r5, ctx);
base-commit: 1f5ffc672165ff851063a5fd044b727ab2517ae3
--
2.52.0
next reply other threads:[~2026-04-17 14:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-04-17 14:33 Puranjay Mohan [this message]
2026-04-17 15:48 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2] arm32, bpf: Reject BPF-to-BPF calls and callbacks in the JIT Emil Tsalapatis
2026-04-17 16:15 ` Puranjay Mohan
2026-04-17 19:10 ` patchwork-bot+netdevbpf
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