From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: Corentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com>
Cc: Tianchu Chen <tianchu.chen@linux.dev>,
herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net,
wens@kernel.org, jernej.skrabec@gmail.com, samuel@sholland.org,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
linux-sunxi@lists.linux.dev, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] crypto: sun4i-ss - clamp PRNG seed length to prevent heap overflow
Date: Fri, 29 May 2026 17:33:41 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260529173341.GA566433@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ahnIbpBLyn5z_siT@Red>
On Fri, May 29, 2026 at 07:10:06PM +0200, Corentin Labbe wrote:
> Le Fri, May 29, 2026 at 09:10:57AM -0700, Eric Biggers a écrit :
> > On Fri, May 29, 2026 at 08:08:01AM +0000, Tianchu Chen wrote:
> > > From: Tianchu Chen <flynnnchen@tencent.com>
> > >
> > > sun4i_ss_prng_seed() copies the user-supplied seed into ss->seed
> > > using the user-provided length with no bounds check. The crypto core
> > > does not enforce slen <= seedsize before calling into the driver, so a
> > > userspace caller via AF_ALG setsockopt(ALG_SET_KEY) can pass up to
> > > sysctl_optmem_max bytes, overflowing the fixed-size buffer and
> > > corrupting adjacent heap memory.
> > >
> > > Clamp the copy length to the buffer size, matching the approach used by
> > > loongson-rng for oversized seeds.
> > >
> > > Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine.
> > >
> > > Fixes: 6298e948215f ("crypto: sunxi-ss - Add Allwinner Security System crypto accelerator")
> > > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> > > Signed-off-by: Tianchu Chen <flynnnchen@tencent.com>
> > > ---
> > > v2: Silently clamp oversized seeds with min_t instead of returning
> > > -EINVAL (Herbert Xu).
> >
> > sun4i-ss-prng.c is useless, is still broken, and should just be deleted.
>
> Hello
>
> useless ? clearly no, it helped a lot on devices where it is.
The only way this code is reachable is via "rng" algorithm type in
AF_ALG, which is almost never used. Everyone just uses the regular
Linux RNG (/dev/random etc) instead, as they should.
In fact, anyone were to accidentally use this it would be a security
vulnerability, seeing as sun4i_ss_prng_generate() doesn't actually fill
in all the bytes that were requested. It also doesn't wait for the FIFO
to be ready when reading data from it.
Is it possible that there's a misunderstanding here and you think this
provides entropy to the regular Linux RNG? It doesn't. hwrng does
that, crypto_rng does not.
The correct fix is to mark CRYPTO_DEV_SUN8I_CE_PRNG as BROKEN or remove
it entirely. Doing otherwise is not responsible.
- Eric
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-05-29 17:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-05-28 14:53 [PATCH] crypto: sun4i-ss: restrict PRNG seed length to prevent heap overflow Tianchu Chen
2026-05-29 6:11 ` Herbert Xu
2026-05-29 7:05 ` Tianchu Chen
2026-05-29 8:08 ` [PATCH v2] crypto: sun4i-ss - clamp " Tianchu Chen
2026-05-29 16:10 ` Eric Biggers
2026-05-29 17:10 ` Corentin Labbe
2026-05-29 17:33 ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2026-05-29 19:41 ` Eric Biggers
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