From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Mounika Botcha <mounika.botcha@amd.com>,
Harsh Jain <h.jain@amd.com>, Olivia Mackall <olivia@selenic.com>,
Michal Simek <michal.simek@amd.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 3/4] crypto: xilinx-trng - Replace crypto_drbg_ctr_df() with HMAC-SHA512
Date: Sun, 31 May 2026 12:17:37 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260531191738.55843-4-ebiggers@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260531191738.55843-1-ebiggers@kernel.org>
This code is just trying to condition 48 bytes of random data. This can
be done easily using HKDF-SHA512-Extract, saving 300 lines of code.
This commit also fixes forward security (in this particular case) by
clearing the entropy from memory after it's used.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
---
crypto/Kconfig | 5 -
crypto/Makefile | 2 -
crypto/df_sp80090a.c | 222 ----------------------------
drivers/crypto/Kconfig | 2 +-
drivers/crypto/xilinx/xilinx-trng.c | 44 ++----
include/crypto/df_sp80090a.h | 53 -------
6 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 312 deletions(-)
delete mode 100644 crypto/df_sp80090a.c
delete mode 100644 include/crypto/df_sp80090a.h
diff --git a/crypto/Kconfig b/crypto/Kconfig
index b5c5a1e04435..c3d7a20d5cb1 100644
--- a/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -1244,15 +1244,10 @@ endif # if CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY
config CRYPTO_KDF800108_CTR
tristate
select CRYPTO_HMAC
select CRYPTO_SHA256
-config CRYPTO_DF80090A
- tristate
- select CRYPTO_AES
- select CRYPTO_CTR
-
endmenu
menu "Userspace interface (deprecated)"
config CRYPTO_USER_API
tristate
diff --git a/crypto/Makefile b/crypto/Makefile
index c73f4d51d036..f98f57c7a49f 100644
--- a/crypto/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/Makefile
@@ -206,8 +206,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SIMD) += crypto_simd.o
#
# Key derivation function
#
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_KDF800108_CTR) += kdf_sp800108.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DF80090A) += df_sp80090a.o
-
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_KRB5) += krb5/
diff --git a/crypto/df_sp80090a.c b/crypto/df_sp80090a.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 90e1973ee40c..000000000000
--- a/crypto/df_sp80090a.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,222 +0,0 @@
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
-
-/*
- * NIST SP800-90A DRBG derivation function
- *
- * Copyright (C) 2014, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
- */
-
-#include <linux/errno.h>
-#include <linux/kernel.h>
-#include <linux/module.h>
-#include <linux/string.h>
-#include <linux/unaligned.h>
-#include <crypto/aes.h>
-#include <crypto/df_sp80090a.h>
-
-static void drbg_kcapi_sym(struct aes_enckey *aeskey, unsigned char *outval,
- const struct drbg_string *in, u8 blocklen_bytes)
-{
- /* there is only component in *in */
- BUG_ON(in->len < blocklen_bytes);
- aes_encrypt(aeskey, outval, in->buf);
-}
-
-/* BCC function for CTR DRBG as defined in 10.4.3 */
-
-static void drbg_ctr_bcc(struct aes_enckey *aeskey,
- unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *key,
- struct list_head *in,
- u8 blocklen_bytes,
- u8 keylen)
-{
- struct drbg_string *curr = NULL;
- struct drbg_string data;
- short cnt = 0;
-
- drbg_string_fill(&data, out, blocklen_bytes);
-
- /* 10.4.3 step 2 / 4 */
- aes_prepareenckey(aeskey, key, keylen);
- list_for_each_entry(curr, in, list) {
- const unsigned char *pos = curr->buf;
- size_t len = curr->len;
- /* 10.4.3 step 4.1 */
- while (len) {
- /* 10.4.3 step 4.2 */
- if (blocklen_bytes == cnt) {
- cnt = 0;
- drbg_kcapi_sym(aeskey, out, &data, blocklen_bytes);
- }
- out[cnt] ^= *pos;
- pos++;
- cnt++;
- len--;
- }
- }
- /* 10.4.3 step 4.2 for last block */
- if (cnt)
- drbg_kcapi_sym(aeskey, out, &data, blocklen_bytes);
-}
-
-/*
- * scratchpad usage: drbg_ctr_update is interlinked with crypto_drbg_ctr_df
- * (and drbg_ctr_bcc, but this function does not need any temporary buffers),
- * the scratchpad is used as follows:
- * drbg_ctr_update:
- * temp
- * start: drbg->scratchpad
- * length: drbg_statelen(drbg) + drbg_blocklen(drbg)
- * note: the cipher writing into this variable works
- * blocklen-wise. Now, when the statelen is not a multiple
- * of blocklen, the generateion loop below "spills over"
- * by at most blocklen. Thus, we need to give sufficient
- * memory.
- * df_data
- * start: drbg->scratchpad +
- * drbg_statelen(drbg) + drbg_blocklen(drbg)
- * length: drbg_statelen(drbg)
- *
- * crypto_drbg_ctr_df:
- * pad
- * start: df_data + drbg_statelen(drbg)
- * length: drbg_blocklen(drbg)
- * iv
- * start: pad + drbg_blocklen(drbg)
- * length: drbg_blocklen(drbg)
- * temp
- * start: iv + drbg_blocklen(drbg)
- * length: drbg_satelen(drbg) + drbg_blocklen(drbg)
- * note: temp is the buffer that the BCC function operates
- * on. BCC operates blockwise. drbg_statelen(drbg)
- * is sufficient when the DRBG state length is a multiple
- * of the block size. For AES192 (and maybe other ciphers)
- * this is not correct and the length for temp is
- * insufficient (yes, that also means for such ciphers,
- * the final output of all BCC rounds are truncated).
- * Therefore, add drbg_blocklen(drbg) to cover all
- * possibilities.
- * refer to crypto_drbg_ctr_df_datalen() to get required length
- */
-
-/* Derivation Function for CTR DRBG as defined in 10.4.2 */
-int crypto_drbg_ctr_df(struct aes_enckey *aeskey,
- unsigned char *df_data, size_t bytes_to_return,
- struct list_head *seedlist,
- u8 blocklen_bytes,
- u8 statelen)
-{
- unsigned char L_N[8];
- /* S3 is input */
- struct drbg_string S1, S2, S4, cipherin;
- LIST_HEAD(bcc_list);
- unsigned char *pad = df_data + statelen;
- unsigned char *iv = pad + blocklen_bytes;
- unsigned char *temp = iv + blocklen_bytes;
- size_t padlen = 0;
- unsigned int templen = 0;
- /* 10.4.2 step 7 */
- unsigned int i = 0;
- /* 10.4.2 step 8 */
- const unsigned char *K = (unsigned char *)
- "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07"
- "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f"
- "\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17"
- "\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f";
- unsigned char *X;
- size_t generated_len = 0;
- size_t inputlen = 0;
- struct drbg_string *seed = NULL;
- u8 keylen;
-
- memset(pad, 0, blocklen_bytes);
- memset(iv, 0, blocklen_bytes);
- keylen = statelen - blocklen_bytes;
- /* 10.4.2 step 1 is implicit as we work byte-wise */
-
- /* 10.4.2 step 2 */
- if ((512 / 8) < bytes_to_return)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- /* 10.4.2 step 2 -- calculate the entire length of all input data */
- list_for_each_entry(seed, seedlist, list)
- inputlen += seed->len;
- put_unaligned_be32(inputlen, &L_N[0]);
-
- /* 10.4.2 step 3 */
- put_unaligned_be32(bytes_to_return, &L_N[4]);
-
- /* 10.4.2 step 5: length is L_N, input_string, one byte, padding */
- padlen = (inputlen + sizeof(L_N) + 1) % (blocklen_bytes);
- /* wrap the padlen appropriately */
- if (padlen)
- padlen = blocklen_bytes - padlen;
- /*
- * pad / padlen contains the 0x80 byte and the following zero bytes.
- * As the calculated padlen value only covers the number of zero
- * bytes, this value has to be incremented by one for the 0x80 byte.
- */
- padlen++;
- pad[0] = 0x80;
-
- /* 10.4.2 step 4 -- first fill the linked list and then order it */
- drbg_string_fill(&S1, iv, blocklen_bytes);
- list_add_tail(&S1.list, &bcc_list);
- drbg_string_fill(&S2, L_N, sizeof(L_N));
- list_add_tail(&S2.list, &bcc_list);
- list_splice_tail(seedlist, &bcc_list);
- drbg_string_fill(&S4, pad, padlen);
- list_add_tail(&S4.list, &bcc_list);
-
- /* 10.4.2 step 9 */
- while (templen < (keylen + (blocklen_bytes))) {
- /*
- * 10.4.2 step 9.1 - the padding is implicit as the buffer
- * holds zeros after allocation -- even the increment of i
- * is irrelevant as the increment remains within length of i
- */
- put_unaligned_be32(i, iv);
- /* 10.4.2 step 9.2 -- BCC and concatenation with temp */
- drbg_ctr_bcc(aeskey, temp + templen, K, &bcc_list,
- blocklen_bytes, keylen);
- /* 10.4.2 step 9.3 */
- i++;
- templen += blocklen_bytes;
- }
-
- /* 10.4.2 step 11 */
- X = temp + (keylen);
- drbg_string_fill(&cipherin, X, blocklen_bytes);
-
- /* 10.4.2 step 12: overwriting of outval is implemented in next step */
-
- /* 10.4.2 step 13 */
- aes_prepareenckey(aeskey, temp, keylen);
- while (generated_len < bytes_to_return) {
- short blocklen = 0;
- /*
- * 10.4.2 step 13.1: the truncation of the key length is
- * implicit as the key is only drbg_blocklen in size based on
- * the implementation of the cipher function callback
- */
- drbg_kcapi_sym(aeskey, X, &cipherin, blocklen_bytes);
- blocklen = (blocklen_bytes <
- (bytes_to_return - generated_len)) ?
- blocklen_bytes :
- (bytes_to_return - generated_len);
- /* 10.4.2 step 13.2 and 14 */
- memcpy(df_data + generated_len, X, blocklen);
- generated_len += blocklen;
- }
-
- memset(iv, 0, blocklen_bytes);
- memset(temp, 0, statelen + blocklen_bytes);
- memset(pad, 0, blocklen_bytes);
- return 0;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_drbg_ctr_df);
-
-MODULE_IMPORT_NS("CRYPTO_INTERNAL");
-MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
-MODULE_AUTHOR("Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>");
-MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Derivation Function conformant to SP800-90A");
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/Kconfig b/drivers/crypto/Kconfig
index 26194c33cb32..ad6427f08d4f 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -707,11 +707,11 @@ config CRYPTO_DEV_TEGRA
AES encryption/decryption and HASH algorithms.
config CRYPTO_DEV_XILINX_TRNG
tristate "Support for Xilinx True Random Generator"
depends on ZYNQMP_FIRMWARE || COMPILE_TEST
- select CRYPTO_DF80090A
+ select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA512
select HW_RANDOM
help
Xilinx Versal SoC driver provides kernel-side support for True Random Number
Generator and Pseudo random Number in CTR_DRBG mode as defined in NIST SP800-90A.
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/xilinx/xilinx-trng.c b/drivers/crypto/xilinx/xilinx-trng.c
index a30b0b3b3685..f615d5adddde 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/xilinx/xilinx-trng.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/xilinx/xilinx-trng.c
@@ -2,10 +2,11 @@
/*
* AMD Versal True Random Number Generator driver
* Copyright (c) 2024 - 2025 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
*/
+#include <crypto/sha2.h>
#include <linux/bitfield.h>
#include <linux/clk.h>
#include <linux/delay.h>
#include <linux/firmware/xlnx-zynqmp.h>
#include <linux/hw_random.h>
@@ -13,13 +14,10 @@
#include <linux/iopoll.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/mod_devicetable.h>
#include <linux/platform_device.h>
-#include <crypto/aes.h>
-#include <crypto/df_sp80090a.h>
-#include <crypto/internal/cipher.h>
/* TRNG Registers Offsets */
#define TRNG_STATUS_OFFSET 0x4U
#define TRNG_CTRL_OFFSET 0x8U
#define TRNG_EXT_SEED_OFFSET 0x40U
@@ -41,11 +39,10 @@
#define TRNG_STATUS_QCNT_MASK GENMASK(11, 9)
#define TRNG_STATUS_QCNT_16_BYTES 0x800
/* Sizes in bytes */
#define TRNG_SEED_LEN_BYTES 48U
-#define TRNG_ENTROPY_SEED_LEN_BYTES 64U
#define TRNG_SEC_STRENGTH_SHIFT 5U
#define TRNG_SEC_STRENGTH_BYTES BIT(TRNG_SEC_STRENGTH_SHIFT)
#define TRNG_BYTES_PER_REG 4U
#define TRNG_RESET_DELAY 10
#define TRNG_NUM_INIT_REGS 12U
@@ -53,12 +50,10 @@
#define TRNG_DATA_READ_DELAY 8000
struct xilinx_rng {
void __iomem *rng_base;
struct device *dev;
- unsigned char *scratchpadbuf;
- struct aes_enckey *aeskey;
struct hwrng trng;
};
static void xtrng_readwrite32(void __iomem *addr, u32 mask, u8 value)
{
@@ -170,33 +165,34 @@ static void xtrng_enable_entropy(struct xilinx_rng *rng)
iowrite32(TRNG_CTRL_EUMODE_MASK | TRNG_CTRL_TRSSEN_MASK, rng->rng_base + TRNG_CTRL_OFFSET);
}
static int xtrng_reseed_internal(struct xilinx_rng *rng)
{
- u8 entropy[TRNG_ENTROPY_SEED_LEN_BYTES];
- struct drbg_string data;
- LIST_HEAD(seedlist);
+ static const u8 default_salt[SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ u8 entropy[SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE] __aligned(4);
u32 val;
int ret;
- drbg_string_fill(&data, entropy, TRNG_SEED_LEN_BYTES);
- list_add_tail(&data.list, &seedlist);
- memset(entropy, 0, sizeof(entropy));
xtrng_enable_entropy(rng);
- /* collect random data to use it as entropy (input for DF) */
+ /* Collect some output from the TRNG. */
+ static_assert(sizeof(entropy) >= TRNG_SEED_LEN_BYTES);
ret = xtrng_collect_random_data(rng, entropy, TRNG_SEED_LEN_BYTES, true);
if (ret != TRNG_SEED_LEN_BYTES)
return -EINVAL;
- ret = crypto_drbg_ctr_df(rng->aeskey, rng->scratchpadbuf,
- TRNG_SEED_LEN_BYTES, &seedlist, AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
- TRNG_SEED_LEN_BYTES);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
+ /* Extract entropy from the TRNG output using HKDF-SHA512-Extract. */
+ hmac_sha512_usingrawkey(default_salt, sizeof(default_salt), entropy,
+ TRNG_SEED_LEN_BYTES, entropy);
+
+ /* Write the extracted entropy to the hardware. */
xtrng_write_multiple_registers(rng->rng_base + TRNG_EXT_SEED_OFFSET,
- (u32 *)rng->scratchpadbuf, TRNG_NUM_INIT_REGS);
+ (u32 *)entropy, TRNG_NUM_INIT_REGS);
+
+ /* Clear the entropy from the stack. */
+ memzero_explicit(entropy, sizeof(entropy));
+
/* select reseed operation */
iowrite32(TRNG_CTRL_PRNGXS_MASK, rng->rng_base + TRNG_CTRL_OFFSET);
/* Start the reseed operation with above configuration and wait for STATUS.Done bit to be
* set. Monitor STATUS.CERTF bit, if set indicates SP800-90B entropy health test has failed.
@@ -276,11 +272,10 @@ static void xtrng_hwrng_unregister(struct hwrng *trng)
}
static int xtrng_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
{
struct xilinx_rng *rng;
- size_t sb_size;
int ret;
rng = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(*rng), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rng)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -290,19 +285,10 @@ static int xtrng_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
if (IS_ERR(rng->rng_base)) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Failed to map resource %pe\n", rng->rng_base);
return PTR_ERR(rng->rng_base);
}
- rng->aeskey = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(*rng->aeskey), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!rng->aeskey)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- sb_size = crypto_drbg_ctr_df_datalen(TRNG_SEED_LEN_BYTES, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
- rng->scratchpadbuf = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sb_size, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!rng->scratchpadbuf)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
xtrng_trng_reset(rng->rng_base);
ret = xtrng_reseed_internal(rng);
if (ret) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "TRNG Seed fail\n");
return ret;
diff --git a/include/crypto/df_sp80090a.h b/include/crypto/df_sp80090a.h
deleted file mode 100644
index e594fb718eb8..000000000000
--- a/include/crypto/df_sp80090a.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
-/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
-
-/*
- * Copyright Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>, 2014
- */
-
-#ifndef _CRYPTO_DF80090A_H
-#define _CRYPTO_DF80090A_H
-
-#include <crypto/internal/cipher.h>
-#include <crypto/aes.h>
-#include <linux/list.h>
-
-/*
- * Concatenation Helper and string operation helper
- *
- * SP800-90A requires the concatenation of different data. To avoid copying
- * buffers around or allocate additional memory, the following data structure
- * is used to point to the original memory with its size. In addition, it
- * is used to build a linked list. The linked list defines the concatenation
- * of individual buffers. The order of memory block referenced in that
- * linked list determines the order of concatenation.
- */
-struct drbg_string {
- const unsigned char *buf;
- size_t len;
- struct list_head list;
-};
-
-static inline void drbg_string_fill(struct drbg_string *string,
- const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
-{
- string->buf = buf;
- string->len = len;
- INIT_LIST_HEAD(&string->list);
-}
-
-static inline int crypto_drbg_ctr_df_datalen(u8 statelen, u8 blocklen)
-{
- return statelen + /* df_data */
- blocklen + /* pad */
- blocklen + /* iv */
- statelen + blocklen; /* temp */
-}
-
-int crypto_drbg_ctr_df(struct aes_enckey *aes,
- unsigned char *df_data,
- size_t bytes_to_return,
- struct list_head *seedlist,
- u8 blocklen_bytes,
- u8 statelen);
-
-#endif /* _CRYPTO_DF80090A_H */
--
2.54.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-05-31 19:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-05-31 19:17 [PATCH 0/4] Xilinx TRNG fix and simplification Eric Biggers
2026-05-31 19:17 ` [PATCH 1/4] crypto: xilinx-trng - Remove crypto_rng interface Eric Biggers
2026-05-31 19:17 ` [PATCH 2/4] crypto: xilinx-trng - Fix return value of xtrng_hwrng_trng_read() Eric Biggers
2026-05-31 19:17 ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2026-05-31 19:17 ` [PATCH 4/4] hwrng: xilinx - Move xilinx-rng into drivers/char/hw_random/ Eric Biggers
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