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[84.74.0.139]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id 5b1f17b1804b1-490bc3b5b06sm375437735e9.3.2026.06.08.10.03.33 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Mon, 08 Jun 2026 10:03:36 -0700 (PDT) From: Lothar Rubusch To: thorsten.blum@linux.dev, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net, nicolas.ferre@microchip.com, alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com, claudiu.beznea@tuxon.dev, tudor.ambarus@linaro.org, krzk+dt@kernel.org Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, l.rubusch@gmail.com Subject: [PATCH v5 1/1] crypto: atmel-ecc - fix multi-device use-after-free and registration races Date: Mon, 8 Jun 2026 17:03:27 +0000 Message-Id: <20260608170327.45788-1-l.rubusch@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.39.5 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.9.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20260608_100341_443177_E4989CED X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 36.54 ) X-BeenThere: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.34 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org During parallel driver initialization or driver teardown sequences in setups with multiple atmel-ecc instances, a race condition exists between atmel_ecc_i2c_client_alloc() and the probe/remove paths. A concurrent transformation request can fetch an i2c_client instance from the global i2c_client_list before the kpp is fully registered, or while it is actively being unbound, resulting in a use-after-free (UAF) risk. 1. The initialization problem in probe(): Adding first an i2c client to the i2c_client_list, and then registering the kpp algorim may result in a race, when this happens for a second (or further) probed device. In this case the algorithm is already registered, so a TFM may arrive, while the latest probing device is added to the list, but not kpp registered. In case this fails and this last device is going to be removed again from the list, this leaves a window where the TFM might obtain a pointer to the - now deleted - i2c client, which opens a UAF risk. Furthermore, there will happen atempts to multiple registering the same driver to the same type of algorithm. Note, a simple reverting of the order: first register kpp, second add the i2c client to the i2c_client_list - is not possible here, since the kpp registration immediately triggers the self tests, which then will allocate and require an i2c client. 2. The critical race condition problem: It exists when an Atmel device instance is rapidly removed and immediately re-probed, before the global resources are fully cleaned up. In this scenario, the asynchronous unregistration sequence in the remove() lags behind the incoming probe() function. Because of the global algorithm structure being not yet completely cleaned up, the newly re-probed device incorrectly intercepts the static, partially-dismantled global context. It then overwrites active pointers and re-acquires the global instance prematurely. In this way, when the deregistration sequence finally completes its execution, under the newly initialized device, it may lose the tracking references, leaking the older driver memory blocks, and introducing an immediate UAF risk. 3. The removal race problem, when a call to remove() starts removing the device, but another thread executing a TFM, a severe Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition exists in the teardown path between the asynchronous remove() sequence and completing TFMs. When the device is unbound, the remove() function evaluates the active tfm_count and decides whether to wait or proceed with resource deallocation. However, if the final active TFM finishes its crypto operation and invokes the client free function immediately after remove() performs its reference check but before it can sleep, the completion signal is fired into a clearing state. The unbind thread then misinterprets the zeroed counter, skips the synchronization barrier entirely, and instantly deallocates the per-device private structures. This leaves the final TFM worker thread executing code inside a completely freed memory area, triggering an immediate UAF kernel panic. Note, simply calling the kpp unregister here won't clean up the situation in the context of having a setup with external hardware on a slow bus. Address this by implementing an independent subsystem reference counter kpp refcnt protected by a dedicated mutex to ensure the static global kpp algorithm structure is registered exactly once by the first probing device instance. In multi-device scenarios, or when extending the resource management support of the i2c_client_list to all atmel-i2c based device drivers, such scenarios can become realistic. The particular algorithm is registered only once. Each i2c client (i.e. each probing device driver) is added as client to the i2c_client_list. This guarantee that only the first probe will register the algorithm. The list is populated for further calls to probe, and subsequent calls to the client alloc function. Concurrently, decouple list mutations from registration by moving the global list eviction to the absolute top of the remove lifecycle. This keeps the quick execution of the list allocation loop intact, ensures that unbinding hardware is instantly blind to the rest of the system, and completely bypasses the recursive deadlock condition previously triggered by synchronous crypto API self-tests. Fixes: 11105693fa05 ("crypto: atmel-ecc - introduce Microchip / Atmel ECC driver") Signed-off-by: Lothar Rubusch --- v4 -> v5: - sashiko warning: revert wait_for_completion_timeout() by wait_for_completion() when former instance still active at probe() - change return type of atmel_ecc_wait_for_tfms() to void v3 -> v4: - sashiko warning: replace wait_for_completion() by wait_for_completion_timeout() in remove; decision is a kind of dilemma - move redundant code of this fix out into a separate function - make also use of the wait_for_completion_timeout() function at probe for convenience v2 -> v3: - sashiko warning: fix missing init_completion() for remove_done - add comment naming all three related main problem situations v1 -> v2: - remove the initial approach with "ready" state bool, replace it by this be a more comprehensive approach drivers/crypto/atmel-ecc.c | 122 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- drivers/crypto/atmel-i2c.h | 3 + 2 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/atmel-ecc.c b/drivers/crypto/atmel-ecc.c index 0ca02995a1de..be956508edcc 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/atmel-ecc.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/atmel-ecc.c @@ -23,6 +23,11 @@ #include #include "atmel-i2c.h" +static DEFINE_MUTEX(atmel_ecc_kpp_lock); +static int atmel_ecc_kpp_refcnt; +DECLARE_COMPLETION(atmel_ecc_unreg_done); +static bool atmel_ecc_unreg_active; + static struct atmel_ecc_driver_data driver_data; /** @@ -241,7 +246,10 @@ static void atmel_ecc_i2c_client_free(struct i2c_client *client) { struct atmel_i2c_client_priv *i2c_priv = i2c_get_clientdata(client); - atomic_dec(&i2c_priv->tfm_count); + spin_lock(&driver_data.i2c_list_lock); + if (atomic_dec_and_test(&i2c_priv->tfm_count) && i2c_priv->unbinding) + complete(&i2c_priv->remove_done); + spin_unlock(&driver_data.i2c_list_lock); } static int atmel_ecdh_init_tfm(struct crypto_kpp *tfm) @@ -276,7 +284,8 @@ static void atmel_ecdh_exit_tfm(struct crypto_kpp *tfm) struct atmel_ecdh_ctx *ctx = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm); kfree(ctx->public_key); - crypto_free_kpp(ctx->fallback); + if (ctx->fallback) + crypto_free_kpp(ctx->fallback); atmel_ecc_i2c_client_free(ctx->client); } @@ -295,6 +304,21 @@ static unsigned int atmel_ecdh_max_size(struct crypto_kpp *tfm) return ATMEL_ECC_PUBKEY_SIZE; } +static void atmel_ecc_wait_for_tfms(struct atmel_i2c_client_priv *i2c_priv) +{ + spin_lock(&driver_data.i2c_list_lock); + list_del(&i2c_priv->i2c_client_list_node); + i2c_priv->unbinding = true; + reinit_completion(&i2c_priv->remove_done); + if (!atomic_read(&i2c_priv->tfm_count)) { + spin_unlock(&driver_data.i2c_list_lock); + return; + } + spin_unlock(&driver_data.i2c_list_lock); + + wait_for_completion(&i2c_priv->remove_done); +} + static struct kpp_alg atmel_ecdh_nist_p256 = { .set_secret = atmel_ecdh_set_secret, .generate_public_key = atmel_ecdh_generate_public_key, @@ -315,6 +339,7 @@ static struct kpp_alg atmel_ecdh_nist_p256 = { static int atmel_ecc_probe(struct i2c_client *client) { struct atmel_i2c_client_priv *i2c_priv; + unsigned long timeout; int ret; ret = atmel_i2c_probe(client); @@ -323,49 +348,90 @@ static int atmel_ecc_probe(struct i2c_client *client) i2c_priv = i2c_get_clientdata(client); + init_completion(&i2c_priv->remove_done); + i2c_priv->unbinding = false; + spin_lock(&driver_data.i2c_list_lock); list_add_tail(&i2c_priv->i2c_client_list_node, &driver_data.i2c_client_list); spin_unlock(&driver_data.i2c_list_lock); - ret = crypto_register_kpp(&atmel_ecdh_nist_p256); - if (ret) { - spin_lock(&driver_data.i2c_list_lock); - list_del(&i2c_priv->i2c_client_list_node); - spin_unlock(&driver_data.i2c_list_lock); - - dev_err(&client->dev, "%s alg registration failed\n", - atmel_ecdh_nist_p256.base.cra_driver_name); - } else { - dev_info(&client->dev, "atmel ecc algorithms registered in /proc/crypto\n"); + mutex_lock(&atmel_ecc_kpp_lock); + /* + * For cases where the same/last such device is still in unregistering, + * and now re-registering (refcnt is 0, but completion still exists). + * Safely capture the pointer, drop the lock and sleep until it + * terminates upon completion or retry limit reached. + */ + while (atmel_ecc_unreg_active) { + mutex_unlock(&atmel_ecc_kpp_lock); + timeout = wait_for_completion_timeout(&atmel_ecc_unreg_done, + msecs_to_jiffies(2000)); + mutex_lock(&atmel_ecc_kpp_lock); + if (timeout == 0) { + mutex_unlock(&atmel_ecc_kpp_lock); + + atmel_ecc_wait_for_tfms(i2c_priv); + dev_err(&client->dev, + "probe timed out, former instance active\n"); + return -ETIMEDOUT; + } + } + if (atmel_ecc_kpp_refcnt == 0) { + ret = crypto_register_kpp(&atmel_ecdh_nist_p256); + if (ret) { + mutex_unlock(&atmel_ecc_kpp_lock); + + atmel_ecc_wait_for_tfms(i2c_priv); + dev_err(&client->dev, "%s alg registration failed\n", + atmel_ecdh_nist_p256.base.cra_driver_name); + return ret; + } } + atmel_ecc_kpp_refcnt++; + mutex_unlock(&atmel_ecc_kpp_lock); + dev_info(&client->dev, "atmel ecc algorithms registered in /proc/crypto\n"); return ret; } static void atmel_ecc_remove(struct i2c_client *client) { struct atmel_i2c_client_priv *i2c_priv = i2c_get_clientdata(client); - - /* Return EBUSY if i2c client already allocated. */ - if (atomic_read(&i2c_priv->tfm_count)) { - /* - * After we return here, the memory backing the device is freed. - * That happens no matter what the return value of this function - * is because in the Linux device model there is no error - * handling for unbinding a driver. - * If there is still some action pending, it probably involves - * accessing the freed memory. - */ - dev_emerg(&client->dev, "Device is busy, expect memory corruption.\n"); - return; - } - - crypto_unregister_kpp(&atmel_ecdh_nist_p256); + bool trigger_unreg = false; + bool wait_needed = false; + unsigned long timeout; spin_lock(&driver_data.i2c_list_lock); list_del(&i2c_priv->i2c_client_list_node); + i2c_priv->unbinding = true; + reinit_completion(&i2c_priv->remove_done); + if (atomic_read(&i2c_priv->tfm_count) > 0) + wait_needed = true; spin_unlock(&driver_data.i2c_list_lock); + if (wait_needed) { + timeout = wait_for_completion_timeout(&i2c_priv->remove_done, + msecs_to_jiffies(5000)); + if (timeout == 0) + dev_emerg(&client->dev, "Teardown timed out! Active TFMs leaked, memory corruption imminent.\n"); + } + + mutex_lock(&atmel_ecc_kpp_lock); + atmel_ecc_kpp_refcnt--; + if (atmel_ecc_kpp_refcnt == 0) { + trigger_unreg = true; + atmel_ecc_unreg_active = true; + reinit_completion(&atmel_ecc_unreg_done); + } + mutex_unlock(&atmel_ecc_kpp_lock); + + if (trigger_unreg) { + crypto_unregister_kpp(&atmel_ecdh_nist_p256); + mutex_lock(&atmel_ecc_kpp_lock); + atmel_ecc_unreg_active = false; + complete_all(&atmel_ecc_unreg_done); + mutex_unlock(&atmel_ecc_kpp_lock); + } } static const struct of_device_id atmel_ecc_dt_ids[] = { diff --git a/drivers/crypto/atmel-i2c.h b/drivers/crypto/atmel-i2c.h index 72f04c15682f..8e6617422191 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/atmel-i2c.h +++ b/drivers/crypto/atmel-i2c.h @@ -129,6 +129,7 @@ struct atmel_ecc_driver_data { * @wake_token_sz : size in bytes of the wake_token * @tfm_count : number of active crypto transformations on i2c client * @hwrng : hold the hardware generated rng + * @unbinding : unbinding handshake * * Reads and writes from/to the i2c client are sequential. The first byte * transmitted to the device is treated as the byte size. Any attempt to send @@ -145,6 +146,8 @@ struct atmel_i2c_client_priv { size_t wake_token_sz; atomic_t tfm_count ____cacheline_aligned; struct hwrng hwrng; + struct completion remove_done; + bool unbinding; }; /** base-commit: 79bbe453e5bfa6e1c6aa2e8329bfc8f152b81c9b -- 2.53.0