From: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
To: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Kevin Brodsky" <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>,
"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
"Catalin Marinas" <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
"David Hildenbrand (Arm)" <david@kernel.org>,
"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>, "Jeff Xu" <jeffxu@chromium.org>,
"Joey Gouly" <joey.gouly@arm.com>, "Kees Cook" <kees@kernel.org>,
"Linu Cherian" <linu.cherian@arm.com>,
"Linus Walleij" <linusw@kernel.org>,
"Marc Zyngier" <maz@kernel.org>,
"Mark Brown" <broonie@kernel.org>,
"Matthew Wilcox" <willy@infradead.org>,
"Maxwell Bland" <mbland@motorola.com>,
"Mike Rapoport (IBM)" <rppt@kernel.org>,
"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>,
"Pierre Langlois" <pierre.langlois@arm.com>,
"Pierre-Clément Tosi" <ptosi@google.com>,
"Quentin Perret" <qperret@google.com>,
"Rick Edgecombe" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
"Ryan Roberts" <ryan.roberts@arm.com>,
"Vlastimil Babka" <vbabka@kernel.org>,
"Will Deacon" <will@kernel.org>,
"Yang Shi" <yang@os.amperecomputing.com>,
"Yeoreum Yun" <yeoreum.yun@arm.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
x86@kernel.org, "Ira Weiny" <iweiny@kernel.org>,
"Lorenzo Stoakes" <ljs@kernel.org>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH RFC v9 22/25] arm64: kpkeys: Guard page table writes
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2026 15:09:04 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260818-kpkeys-v9-22-743ad31b2c8f@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260818-kpkeys-v9-0-743ad31b2c8f@arm.com>
When CONFIG_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES is enabled, page tables (both
user and kernel) are mapped with a privileged pkey in the linear
mapping. As a result, they can only be written in a privileged
kpkeys context.
Introduce a kpkeys guard that sets POR_EL1 appropriately to allow
writing to page tables, and use this guard wherever necessary. The
scope is kept as small as possible, so that POR_EL1 is quickly reset
to its default value. Where atomics are involved, the guard's scope
encompasses the whole loop to avoid switching POR_EL1 unnecessarily.
This patch is a no-op if CONFIG_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES is disabled
(default).
Signed-off-by: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++-
arch/arm64/mm/fault.c | 17 ++++++++++-------
2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
index 27689c62bd25..b4e52d6bb6ba 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -39,6 +39,14 @@
#include <linux/mm_types.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/page_table_check.h>
+#include <linux/kpkeys.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES
+KPKEYS_GUARD_COND(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables, KPKEYS_CTX_PGTABLES,
+ kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_enabled())
+#else
+KPKEYS_GUARD_NOOP(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)
+#endif
static inline void emit_pte_barriers(void)
{
@@ -359,6 +367,7 @@ static inline pte_t pte_clear_uffd_wp(pte_t pte)
static inline void __set_pte_nosync(pte_t *ptep, pte_t pte)
{
+ guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)();
WRITE_ONCE(*ptep, pte);
}
@@ -830,6 +839,7 @@ static inline void set_pmd(pmd_t *pmdp, pmd_t pmd)
}
#endif /* __PAGETABLE_PMD_FOLDED */
+ guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)();
WRITE_ONCE(*pmdp, pmd);
if (pmd_valid(pmd))
@@ -894,6 +904,7 @@ static inline void set_pud(pud_t *pudp, pud_t pud)
return;
}
+ guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)();
WRITE_ONCE(*pudp, pud);
if (pud_valid(pud))
@@ -975,6 +986,7 @@ static inline void set_p4d(p4d_t *p4dp, p4d_t p4d)
return;
}
+ guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)();
WRITE_ONCE(*p4dp, p4d);
queue_pte_barriers();
}
@@ -1103,6 +1115,7 @@ static inline void set_pgd(pgd_t *pgdp, pgd_t pgd)
return;
}
+ guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)();
WRITE_ONCE(*pgdp, pgd);
queue_pte_barriers();
}
@@ -1307,6 +1320,7 @@ static inline bool __ptep_test_and_clear_young(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
{
pte_t old_pte, pte;
+ guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)();
pte = __ptep_get(ptep);
do {
old_pte = pte;
@@ -1354,7 +1368,10 @@ static inline pte_t __ptep_get_and_clear_anysz(struct mm_struct *mm,
pte_t *ptep,
unsigned long pgsize)
{
- pte_t pte = __pte(xchg_relaxed(&pte_val(*ptep), 0));
+ pte_t pte;
+
+ scoped_guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)
+ pte = __pte(xchg_relaxed(&pte_val(*ptep), 0));
switch (pgsize) {
case PAGE_SIZE:
@@ -1427,6 +1444,7 @@ static inline void ___ptep_set_wrprotect(struct mm_struct *mm,
{
pte_t old_pte;
+ guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)();
do {
old_pte = pte;
pte = pte_wrprotect(pte);
@@ -1460,6 +1478,7 @@ static inline void __clear_young_dirty_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
{
pte_t old_pte;
+ guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)();
do {
old_pte = pte;
@@ -1507,6 +1526,7 @@ static inline pmd_t pmdp_establish(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long address, pmd_t *pmdp, pmd_t pmd)
{
page_table_check_pmd_set(vma->vm_mm, address, pmdp, pmd);
+ guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)();
return __pmd(xchg_relaxed(&pmd_val(*pmdp), pmd_val(pmd)));
}
#endif
diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
index 0b52557652be..a853a8d4e61a 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
@@ -229,13 +229,16 @@ int __ptep_set_access_flags_anysz(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
*/
pte_val(entry) ^= PTE_RDONLY;
pteval = pte_val(pte);
- do {
- old_pteval = pteval;
- pteval ^= PTE_RDONLY;
- pteval |= pte_val(entry);
- pteval ^= PTE_RDONLY;
- pteval = cmpxchg_relaxed(&pte_val(*ptep), old_pteval, pteval);
- } while (pteval != old_pteval);
+ scoped_guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables) {
+ do {
+ old_pteval = pteval;
+ pteval ^= PTE_RDONLY;
+ pteval |= pte_val(entry);
+ pteval ^= PTE_RDONLY;
+ pteval = cmpxchg_relaxed(&pte_val(*ptep), old_pteval,
+ pteval);
+ } while (pteval != old_pteval);
+ }
/*
* Invalidate the local stale read-only entry. Remote stale entries
--
2.51.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-18 14:13 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-18 14:08 [PATCH RFC v9 00/25] pkeys-based page table hardening Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-18 14:08 ` [PATCH RFC v9 01/25] mm: Introduce kpkeys Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-18 14:08 ` [PATCH RFC v9 02/25] set_memory: Introduce set_memory_pkey() stub Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-18 14:08 ` [PATCH RFC v9 03/25] arm64: mm: Enable overlays for all EL1 indirect permissions Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-18 14:08 ` [PATCH RFC v9 04/25] arm64: Introduce por_elx_set_pkey_perms() helper Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-18 14:08 ` [PATCH RFC v9 05/25] arm64: Implement asm/kpkeys.h using POE Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-18 14:08 ` [PATCH RFC v9 06/25] arm64: set_memory: Implement set_memory_pkey() Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-18 14:08 ` [PATCH RFC v9 07/25] arm64: Context-switch POR_EL1 Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-18 14:08 ` [PATCH RFC v9 08/25] arm64: Initialize POR_EL1 register on cpu_resume() Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-18 14:08 ` [PATCH RFC v9 09/25] arm64: Enable kpkeys Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-18 14:08 ` [PATCH RFC v9 10/25] memblock: Move INIT_MEMBLOCK_* macros to header Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-18 14:08 ` [PATCH RFC v9 11/25] mm: kpkeys: Introduce kpkeys_hardened_pgtables feature Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-18 14:08 ` [PATCH RFC v9 12/25] mm: kpkeys: Protect regular page tables Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-18 14:08 ` [PATCH RFC v9 13/25] mm: kpkeys: Introduce early page table allocator Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-18 14:08 ` [PATCH RFC v9 14/25] mm: kpkeys: Protect vmemmap page tables Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-18 14:08 ` [PATCH RFC v9 15/25] mm: kpkeys: Introduce hook for protecting static " Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-18 14:08 ` [PATCH RFC v9 16/25] arm64: kpkeys: Implement arch_supports_kpkeys_early() Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-18 14:08 ` [PATCH RFC v9 17/25] arm64: kpkeys: Support KPKEYS_CTX_PGTABLES Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-18 14:09 ` [PATCH RFC v9 18/25] arm64: kpkeys: Ensure the linear map can be modified Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-18 14:09 ` [PATCH RFC v9 19/25] arm64: kpkeys: Protect early page tables Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-18 14:09 ` [PATCH RFC v9 20/25] arm64: mm: Map kernel image alias of init_pg_dir read-only Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-18 14:09 ` [PATCH RFC v9 21/25] arm64: kpkeys: Protect init_pg_dir Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-18 14:09 ` Kevin Brodsky [this message]
2026-08-18 14:09 ` [PATCH RFC v9 23/25] arm64: kpkeys: Batch KPKEYS_CTX_PGTABLES switches Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-18 14:09 ` [PATCH RFC v9 24/25] arm64: kpkeys: Enable kpkeys_hardened_pgtables support Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-18 14:09 ` [PATCH RFC v9 25/25] mm: Add basic tests for kpkeys_hardened_pgtables Kevin Brodsky
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