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From: Vincent Donnefort <vdonnefort@google.com>
To: maz@kernel.org, oupton@kernel.org, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev,
	 linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: joey.gouly@arm.com, seiden@linux.ibm.com, suzuki.poulose@arm.com,
	 yuzenghui@huawei.com, catalin.marinas@arm.com, will@kernel.org,
	 kernel-team@android.com, fuad.tabba@linux.dev,
	qperret@google.com,  weilin.chang@arm.com,
	Vincent Donnefort <vdonnefort@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 08/22] KVM: arm64: Add a range to hyp_poison_page()
Date: Fri, 11 Sep 2026 14:50:39 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260911135053.146435-9-vdonnefort@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260911135053.146435-1-vdonnefort@google.com>

In preparation for supporting stage-2 huge mappings for protected VMs,
add a nr_pages argument to the memory poisoning mechanism. Use the
existing __apply_guest_page() helper which speeds up the process by
using a PMD_SIZE fixmap when possible.

Also, rename the function to hyp_poison_range() to reflect the new
capability.

Signed-off-by: Vincent Donnefort <vdonnefort@google.com>
---
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c | 18 ++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c
index 58ea0fa62226..642096b2e711 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c
@@ -1276,11 +1276,9 @@ static int __guest_check_transition_size(u64 phys, u64 ipa, u64 nr_pages, u64 *s
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void hyp_poison_page(phys_addr_t phys)
+static void __hyp_poison_page(void *addr, size_t size)
 {
-	void *addr = hyp_fixmap_map(phys);
-
-	memset(addr, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
+	memset(addr, 0, size);
 	/*
 	 * Prefer kvm_flush_dcache_to_poc() over __clean_dcache_guest_page()
 	 * here as the latter may elide the CMO under the assumption that FWB
@@ -1288,8 +1286,12 @@ static void hyp_poison_page(phys_addr_t phys)
 	 * host stage-2 and would otherwise lead to a malicious host potentially
 	 * being able to read the contents of newly reclaimed guest pages.
 	 */
-	kvm_flush_dcache_to_poc(addr, PAGE_SIZE);
-	hyp_fixmap_unmap();
+	kvm_flush_dcache_to_poc(addr, size);
+}
+
+static void hyp_poison_range(phys_addr_t phys, u64 size)
+{
+	__apply_guest_page(__hyp_va(phys), size, __hyp_poison_page);
 }
 
 static int host_stage2_get_guest_info(phys_addr_t phys, struct pkvm_hyp_vm **vm,
@@ -1361,7 +1363,7 @@ int __pkvm_host_force_reclaim_page_guest(phys_addr_t phys)
 	if (ret)
 		goto unlock_guest;
 
-	hyp_poison_page(phys);
+	hyp_poison_range(phys, PAGE_SIZE);
 	WARN_ON(host_stage2_set_owner_locked(phys, PAGE_SIZE, PKVM_ID_HOST));
 unlock_guest:
 	guest_unlock_component(vm);
@@ -1389,7 +1391,7 @@ int __pkvm_host_reclaim_page_guest(u64 gfn, struct pkvm_hyp_vm *vm)
 	switch (guest_get_page_state(pte, ipa)) {
 	case PKVM_PAGE_OWNED:
 		WARN_ON(__host_check_page_state_range(phys, PAGE_SIZE, PKVM_NOPAGE));
-		hyp_poison_page(phys);
+		hyp_poison_range(phys, PAGE_SIZE);
 		break;
 	case PKVM_PAGE_SHARED_OWNED:
 		WARN_ON(__host_check_page_state_range(phys, PAGE_SIZE, PKVM_PAGE_SHARED_BORROWED));
-- 
2.55.0.1007.g17ff1f9808-goog



  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-09-11 13:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-09-11 13:50 [PATCH v2 00/22] Huge mapping support for protected VMs Vincent Donnefort
2026-09-11 13:50 ` [PATCH v2 01/22] KVM: arm64: Prefault host stage-2 entries on block split Vincent Donnefort
2026-09-11 13:50 ` [PATCH v2 02/22] KVM: arm64: Propagate host stage-2 annotated " Vincent Donnefort
2026-09-11 13:50 ` [PATCH v2 03/22] KVM: arm64: Allow block-level stage-2 annotation Vincent Donnefort
2026-09-11 13:50 ` [PATCH v2 04/22] KVM: arm64: Use block-level annotations when setting up the host stage-2 Vincent Donnefort
2026-09-11 13:50 ` [PATCH v2 05/22] KVM: arm64: Make pKVM ownership selftest an HVC Vincent Donnefort
2026-09-11 13:50 ` [PATCH v2 06/22] KVM: arm64: Add a range to __pkvm_host_share/unshare_hyp() Vincent Donnefort
2026-09-11 13:50 ` [PATCH v2 07/22] KVM: arm64: Add a range to __pkvm_host_donate_guest() Vincent Donnefort
2026-09-11 13:50 ` Vincent Donnefort [this message]
2026-09-11 13:50 ` [PATCH v2 09/22] KVM: arm64: Add a range to __pkvm_host_reclaim_guest() Vincent Donnefort
2026-09-11 13:50 ` [PATCH v2 10/22] KVM: arm64: Add a range to __pkvm_guest_share_host() Vincent Donnefort
2026-09-11 13:50 ` [PATCH v2 11/22] KVM: arm64: Add a range to __pkvm_guest_unshare_host() Vincent Donnefort
2026-09-11 13:50 ` [PATCH v2 12/22] KVM: arm64: Handle huge mappings in __pkvm_host_force_reclaim_page_guest() Vincent Donnefort
2026-09-11 13:50 ` [PATCH v2 13/22] KVM: arm64: Handle huge mappings in __pkvm_vcpu_in_poison_fault() Vincent Donnefort
2026-09-11 13:50 ` [PATCH v2 14/22] KVM: arm64: Add a range to pKVM ownership selftest Vincent Donnefort
2026-09-11 13:50 ` [PATCH v2 15/22] KVM: arm64: Warn on pKVM guest stage-2 block collapse Vincent Donnefort
2026-09-11 13:50 ` [PATCH v2 16/22] KVM: arm64: Add pkvm_hyp_req infrastructure Vincent Donnefort
2026-09-11 13:50 ` [PATCH v2 17/22] KVM: arm64: Introduce kvm_pgtable_stage2_table_install() Vincent Donnefort
2026-09-11 13:50 ` [PATCH v2 18/22] KVM: arm64: Add __pkvm_host_split_guest HVC Vincent Donnefort
2026-09-11 13:50 ` [PATCH v2 19/22] KVM: arm64: Extend pKVM page ownership selftests to cover guest block split Vincent Donnefort
2026-09-11 13:50 ` [PATCH v2 20/22] KVM: arm64: Add PKVM_HYP_REQ_SPLIT Vincent Donnefort
2026-09-11 13:50 ` [PATCH v2 21/22] KVM: arm64: Raise PKVM_HYP_REQ_SPLIT on guest to host sharing Vincent Donnefort
2026-09-11 13:50 ` [PATCH v2 22/22] KVM: arm64: Stage-2 huge mappings for protected VMs Vincent Donnefort

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