From: "David Hildenbrand (Arm)" <david@kernel.org>
To: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Emanuele Rocca <emanuele.rocca@arm.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/3] arm64: gcs: Do not set PTE_SHARED on GCS mappings if FEAT_LPA2 is enabled
Date: Fri, 20 Feb 2026 16:56:26 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <42e1608b-5a01-4f9c-992f-a1d3a3e54f99@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260220140532.285011-2-catalin.marinas@arm.com>
On 2/20/26 15:05, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> When FEAT_LPA2 is enabled, bits 8-9 of the PTE replace the
> shareability attribute with bits 50-51 of the output address. The
> _PAGE_GCS{,_RO} definitions include the PTE_SHARED bits as 0b11 and they
> match the other user _PAGE_* prot macros.
I assume that comes from _PAGE_DEFAULT -> _PROT_DEFAULT
> However, the difference is
> that all the classic prot values are accessed via protection_map[] and
> have the PTE_SHARED bits removed when LPA2 is enabled.
>
> Ensure that PAGE_GCS{,RO} use the dynamic PTE_MAYBE_SHARED instead of
> the static PTE_SHARED.
I expected here a quick description of the symptom: "Leaving PTE_SHARED
set results in kernel panics." etc. :)
>
> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
> Fixes: 6497b66ba694 ("arm64/mm: Map pages for guarded control stack")
> Reported-by: Emanuele Rocca <emanuele.rocca@arm.com>
> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
> Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
> ---
> arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h | 4 ++--
> arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c | 2 +-
> 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h
> index 161e8660eddd..a65f2c50e9ca 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h
> @@ -164,8 +164,8 @@ static inline bool __pure lpa2_is_enabled(void)
> #define _PAGE_GCS (_PAGE_DEFAULT | PTE_NG | PTE_UXN | PTE_WRITE | PTE_USER)
> #define _PAGE_GCS_RO (_PAGE_DEFAULT | PTE_NG | PTE_UXN | PTE_USER)
>
> -#define PAGE_GCS __pgprot(_PAGE_GCS)
> -#define PAGE_GCS_RO __pgprot(_PAGE_GCS_RO)
> +#define PAGE_GCS __pgprot((_PAGE_GCS & ~PTE_SHARED) | PTE_MAYBE_SHARED)
> +#define PAGE_GCS_RO __pgprot((_PAGE_GCS_RO & ~PTE_SHARED) | PTE_MAYBE_SHARED)
>
> #define PIE_E0 ( \
> PIRx_ELx_PERM_PREP(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_GCS), PIE_GCS) | \
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c b/arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c
> index 08ee177432c2..2e404441063b 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c
> @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ pgprot_t vm_get_page_prot(vm_flags_t vm_flags)
>
> /* Short circuit GCS to avoid bloating the table. */
> if (system_supports_gcs() && (vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK)) {
> - prot = _PAGE_GCS_RO;
> + prot = pgprot_val(PAGE_GCS_RO);
> } else {
> prot = pgprot_val(protection_map[vm_flags &
> (VM_READ|VM_WRITE|VM_EXEC|VM_SHARED)]);
The only confusion I have is why we don't update _PAGE_GCS/_PAGE_GCS_RO,
consequently leaving PTE_SHARED set for the other users of
_PAGE_GCS/_PAGE_GCS_RO in arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h.
Staring at pte_pi_index() (and the definitions of PTE_PI_IDX_0), I
assume it doesn't matter.
Just curious why we don't fixup _PAGE_GCS / _PAGE_GCS_RO instead.
Sorry for the probably stupid questions, still learning all these arch
details :)
--
Cheers,
David
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-02-20 15:56 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-02-20 14:05 [PATCH 0/3] arm64: Assorted GCS fixes Catalin Marinas
2026-02-20 14:05 ` [PATCH 1/3] arm64: gcs: Do not set PTE_SHARED on GCS mappings if FEAT_LPA2 is enabled Catalin Marinas
2026-02-20 15:56 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm) [this message]
2026-02-20 16:45 ` Catalin Marinas
2026-02-20 16:47 ` Catalin Marinas
2026-02-20 14:05 ` [PATCH 2/3] arm64: gcs: Allow PAGE_NONE mappings for NUMA balancing Catalin Marinas
2026-02-20 16:16 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-20 19:52 ` Catalin Marinas
2026-02-20 14:05 ` [PATCH 3/3] arm64: gcs: Do not map the guarded control stack as THP Catalin Marinas
2026-02-20 14:34 ` Mark Brown
2026-02-20 15:13 ` Catalin Marinas
2026-02-20 16:17 ` Mark Brown
2026-02-20 15:33 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-20 15:36 ` Mark Brown
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