From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>,
kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>, Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>,
Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>,
"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@suse.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 0/4] unify the keyrings of arm64 and s390 with x86 to verify kexec'ed kernel signature
Date: Wed, 06 Jul 2022 10:33:50 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <45013a3990af13449c2d0deadab419e5d437eae7.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220706114806.GB2403@willie-the-truck>
On Wed, 2022-07-06 at 12:48 +0100, Will Deacon wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 06, 2022 at 07:35:36AM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > On Mon, 2022-07-04 at 09:51 +0800, Coiby Xu wrote:
> > > Currently when loading a kernel image via the kexec_file_load() system
> > > call, x86 can make use of three keyrings i.e. the .builtin_trusted_keys,
> > > .secondary_trusted_keys and .platform keyrings to verify a signature.
> > > However, arm64 and s390 can only use the .builtin_trusted_keys and
> > > .platform keyring respectively. For example, one resulting problem is
> > > kexec'ing a kernel image would be rejected with the error "Lockdown:
> > > kexec: kexec of unsigned images is restricted; see man
> > > kernel_lockdown.7".
> > >
> > > This patch set enables arm64 and s390 to make use of the same keyrings
> > > as x86 to verify the signature kexec'ed kernel image.
>
> [...]
>
> > > For arm64, the tests were done as follows,
> > > 1. build 5.19.0-rc2
> > > 2. generate keys and add them to .secondary_trusted_keys, MOK, UEFI
> > > db;
> > > 3. sign different kernel images with different keys including keys
> > > from .builtin_trusted_key, .secondary_trusted_keys keyring, a UEFI db
> > > key and MOK key
> > > 4. Without lockdown, all kernel images can be kexec'ed; with lockdown
> > > enabled, only the kernel image signed by the key from the
> > > .builtin_trusted_key keyring can be kexec'ed
> >
> > Just confirming, for arm64, this patch set allows verifying the
> > kexec'ed kernel image signature using keys on either the .platform or
> > .secondary_trusted_keys keyrings.
>
> It looks like this series is ready to go, but it's not clear who should
> pick it up. Eric -- would you be the best person? Otherwise, I'm happy to
> take it via the arm64 tree (on its own branch) if that would be helpful.
Unless Eric is interested, I was asked to pick this patch set up.
thanks,
Mimi
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-07-06 14:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-07-04 1:51 [PATCH v9 0/4] unify the keyrings of arm64 and s390 with x86 to verify kexec'ed kernel signature Coiby Xu
2022-07-04 1:51 ` [PATCH v9 1/4] kexec: clean up arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig Coiby Xu
2022-07-04 1:51 ` [PATCH v9 2/4] kexec, KEYS: make the code in bzImage64_verify_sig generic Coiby Xu
2022-07-04 1:52 ` [PATCH v9 3/4] arm64: kexec_file: use more system keyrings to verify kernel image signature Coiby Xu
2022-07-04 1:52 ` [PATCH v9 4/4] kexec, KEYS, s390: Make use of built-in and secondary keyring for signature verification Coiby Xu
2022-07-06 11:35 ` [PATCH v9 0/4] unify the keyrings of arm64 and s390 with x86 to verify kexec'ed kernel signature Mimi Zohar
2022-07-06 11:48 ` Will Deacon
2022-07-06 14:33 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2022-07-07 14:10 ` Coiby Xu
2022-07-07 22:28 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-07-14 13:48 ` Coiby Xu
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