From: lauraa@codeaurora.org (Laura Abbott)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [ARM ATTEND] catching up on exploit mitigations
Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2013 21:51:59 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <5209BB6F.2000208@codeaurora.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jKv9Vt+Hu0mFYaxggLLDZ46U3KR9MKegUoHH8StXCkBtQ@mail.gmail.com>
On 7/30/2013 12:05 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> I'd like to propose the topic of catching up to x86 exploit
> mitigations and security features, and potentially identifying
> ARM-unique mitigations/features that could be implemented. Several
> years ago, with Nicolas Pitre doing all the real work, I coordinated
> getting ARM caught up on things like userspace ASLR and
> stack-protector. Recently, based on work by Will Drewry, I ported
> seccomp-bpf to ARM. I'd like to continue this kind of thing, and I
> think it's overdue to examine this area again. A lot of work has
> already been done by grsecurity in this area (see
> http://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=7&t=3292), so it would be
> good to start there.
>
> While it may expose my current ignorance of low level ARM mechanics,
> I'd like to examine and discuss:
>
> - RO and W^X kernel page table protections (similar to x86's
> DEBUG_RODATA and DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX; it's not clear to me how much
> LPAE and PXN is already handling this, if at all)
>
We've had support for RO/NX on our tree for a while. I'm interested in
attending the summit to share what we've done and to see how much of it
could be mainlined.
> - something like x86's SMEP and SMAP (to deter kernel exploitation
> from userspace)
>
> - vector table protections (needs to be protected like the x86_64
> vsyscall table, RO, etc)
>
> - kernel ASLR (I'm close to having this upstreamable for x86)
>
> - fuzzing (is anyone running trinity or similar on the ARM tree?)
>
> - any other things ... ?
I'd add getting something similar to CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM for ARM. It
wouldn't be a direct drop in to x86 but we have some usecases for a
framework to hook into the arch_get_random_{int,long}. This is mostly
useful for cases where we need random numbers before the kernel's
entropy source is completely initialized. The last point is a separate
discussion all together.
>
> Thanks,
>
> -Kees
>
Thanks,
Laura
--
Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. is a member of Code Aurora Forum,
hosted by The Linux Foundation
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-08-13 4:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-07-30 19:05 [ARM ATTEND] catching up on exploit mitigations Kees Cook
2013-07-30 22:14 ` [Ksummit-2013-discuss] " Dave Jones
2013-07-30 22:28 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-07-31 13:55 ` Jason Cooper
2013-07-30 23:11 ` Aaro Koskinen
2013-07-30 23:15 ` Dave Jones
2013-07-30 23:33 ` Kees Cook
2013-07-31 0:01 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-07-30 23:58 ` Aaro Koskinen
2013-07-31 0:04 ` Dave Jones
2013-07-31 9:40 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2013-07-31 14:24 ` Dave Jones
2013-08-01 2:47 ` Olof Johansson
2013-08-01 2:59 ` Dave Jones
2013-08-01 16:02 ` Vince Weaver
2013-08-21 15:26 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2013-08-21 15:43 ` Dave Jones
2013-08-21 15:56 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2013-08-01 9:13 ` Dan Carpenter
2013-08-01 19:05 ` Dave Jones
2013-08-01 19:16 ` Dan Carpenter
2013-08-01 19:26 ` Julia Lawall
2013-08-03 0:03 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2013-08-06 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2013-08-13 4:51 ` Laura Abbott [this message]
2013-08-26 19:56 ` Mark Brown
2013-08-27 2:09 ` Laura Abbott
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