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From: lauraa@codeaurora.org (Laura Abbott)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [ARM ATTEND] catching up on exploit mitigations
Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2013 21:51:59 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5209BB6F.2000208@codeaurora.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jKv9Vt+Hu0mFYaxggLLDZ46U3KR9MKegUoHH8StXCkBtQ@mail.gmail.com>

On 7/30/2013 12:05 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> I'd like to propose the topic of catching up to x86 exploit
> mitigations and security features, and potentially identifying
> ARM-unique mitigations/features that could be implemented. Several
> years ago, with Nicolas Pitre doing all the real work, I coordinated
> getting ARM caught up on things like userspace ASLR and
> stack-protector. Recently, based on work by Will Drewry, I ported
> seccomp-bpf to ARM. I'd like to continue this kind of thing, and I
> think it's overdue to examine this area again. A lot of work has
> already been done by grsecurity in this area (see
> http://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=7&t=3292), so it would be
> good to start there.
>
> While it may expose my current ignorance of low level ARM mechanics,
> I'd like to examine and discuss:
>
> - RO and W^X kernel page table protections (similar to x86's
> DEBUG_RODATA and DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX; it's not clear to me how much
> LPAE and PXN is already handling this, if at all)
>

We've had support for RO/NX on our tree for a while. I'm interested in 
attending the summit to share what we've done and to see how much of it 
could be mainlined.

> - something like x86's SMEP and SMAP (to deter kernel exploitation
> from userspace)
>
> - vector table protections (needs to be protected like the x86_64
> vsyscall table, RO, etc)
>
> - kernel ASLR (I'm close to having this upstreamable for x86)
>
> - fuzzing (is anyone running trinity or similar on the ARM tree?)
>
> - any other things ... ?

I'd add getting something similar to CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM for ARM. It 
wouldn't be a direct drop in to x86 but we have some usecases for a 
framework to hook into the arch_get_random_{int,long}. This is mostly 
useful for cases where we need random numbers before the kernel's 
entropy source is completely initialized. The last point is a separate 
discussion all together.

>
> Thanks,
>
> -Kees
>

Thanks,
Laura

-- 
Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. is a member of Code Aurora Forum,
hosted by The Linux Foundation

  parent reply	other threads:[~2013-08-13  4:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-07-30 19:05 [ARM ATTEND] catching up on exploit mitigations Kees Cook
2013-07-30 22:14 ` [Ksummit-2013-discuss] " Dave Jones
2013-07-30 22:28   ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-07-31 13:55     ` Jason Cooper
2013-07-30 23:11   ` Aaro Koskinen
2013-07-30 23:15     ` Dave Jones
2013-07-30 23:33       ` Kees Cook
2013-07-31  0:01         ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-07-30 23:58       ` Aaro Koskinen
2013-07-31  0:04         ` Dave Jones
2013-07-31  9:40           ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2013-07-31 14:24             ` Dave Jones
2013-08-01  2:47               ` Olof Johansson
2013-08-01  2:59                 ` Dave Jones
2013-08-01 16:02                   ` Vince Weaver
2013-08-21 15:26               ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2013-08-21 15:43                 ` Dave Jones
2013-08-21 15:56                   ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2013-08-01  9:13 ` Dan Carpenter
2013-08-01 19:05   ` Dave Jones
2013-08-01 19:16     ` Dan Carpenter
2013-08-01 19:26       ` Julia Lawall
2013-08-03  0:03 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2013-08-06 21:44   ` Kees Cook
2013-08-13  4:51 ` Laura Abbott [this message]
2013-08-26 19:56   ` Mark Brown
2013-08-27  2:09     ` Laura Abbott

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