linux-arm-kernel.lists.infradead.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: james.morse@arm.com (James Morse)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH v30 04/11] arm64: mm: allow for unmapping memory region from kernel mapping
Date: Wed, 25 Jan 2017 15:49:56 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5888C924.9080100@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170124085004.3892-3-takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>

Hi Akashi,

On 24/01/17 08:49, AKASHI Takahiro wrote:
> The current implementation of create_mapping_late() is only allowed
> to modify permission attributes (read-only or read-write) against
> the existing kernel mapping.
> 
> In this patch, PAGE_KERNEL_INVALID protection attribute is introduced.
> We will now be able to invalidate (or unmap) some part of the existing

Can we stick to calling this 'unmap', otherwise 'invalidate this page range'
becomes ambiguous, cache maintenance or page-table manipulation?!


> kernel mapping by specifying PAGE_KERNEL_INVALID to create_mapping_late().
> 
> This feature will be used in a suceeding kdump patch to protect
> the memory reserved for crash dump kernel once after loaded.

> diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
> index 17243e43184e..9c7adcce8e4e 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
> @@ -190,7 +192,8 @@ static void alloc_init_pmd(pud_t *pud, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
>  			 * Set the contiguous bit for the subsequent group of
>  			 * PMDs if its size and alignment are appropriate.
>  			 */
> -			if (((addr | phys) & ~CONT_PMD_MASK) == 0) {

> +			if ((pgprot_val(prot) | PMD_VALID) &&

& PMD_VALID?


> +			    ((addr | phys) & ~CONT_PMD_MASK) == 0) {
>  				if (end - addr >= CONT_PMD_SIZE)
>  					__prot = __pgprot(pgprot_val(prot) |
>  							  PTE_CONT);
> @@ -203,7 +206,8 @@ static void alloc_init_pmd(pud_t *pud, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
>  			 * After the PMD entry has been populated once, we
>  			 * only allow updates to the permission attributes.
>  			 */
> -			BUG_ON(!pgattr_change_is_safe(pmd_val(old_pmd),
> +			BUG_ON(pmd_valid(old_pmd) && pmd_valid(*pmd) &&
> +			       !pgattr_change_is_safe(pmd_val(old_pmd),
>  						      pmd_val(*pmd)));

Could you add PTE_VALID checks to pgattr_change_is_safe() instead of at every
call? I think (old == 0 || new == 0) is probably doing something similar.


>  		} else {
>  			alloc_init_pte(pmd, addr, next, __phys_to_pfn(phys),
> @@ -791,14 +796,20 @@ int __init arch_ioremap_pmd_supported(void)
>  int pud_set_huge(pud_t *pud, phys_addr_t phys, pgprot_t prot)
>  {
>  	BUG_ON(phys & ~PUD_MASK);
> -	set_pud(pud, __pud(phys | PUD_TYPE_SECT | pgprot_val(mk_sect_prot(prot))));
> +	set_pud(pud, __pud(phys |
> +			   ((pgprot_val(prot) & PUD_VALID) ?
> +					PUD_TYPE_SECT : 0) |
> +			   pgprot_val(mk_sect_prot(prot))));

This looks complicated. Is this equivalent?:

>    prot = mk_sect_prot(prot);
>    if (pgprot_val(prot) & PUD_VALID)
>        prot |= PUD_TYPE_SECT;
>
>    set_pud(pud, __pud(phys | pgprot_val(prot)));


Given you defined PUD_VALID as being PUD_TYPE_SECT, I think you can then reduce
it to:
>    set_pud(pud, __pud(phys | pgprot_val(mk_sect_prot(prot))));

It looks like mk_sect_prot() doesn't touch the valid bit so all this is doing is
clearing the table bit making it a section and keeping the valid bit from the
caller.


Thanks,

James

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-01-25 15:49 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-01-24  8:46 [PATCH v30 00/11] arm64: add kdump support AKASHI Takahiro
2017-01-24  8:49 ` [PATCH v30 01/11] memblock: add memblock_cap_memory_range() AKASHI Takahiro
2017-01-24  8:49 ` [PATCH v30 02/11] arm64: limit memory regions based on DT property, usable-memory-range AKASHI Takahiro
2017-01-24  8:49 ` [PATCH v30 03/11] arm64: kdump: reserve memory for crash dump kernel AKASHI Takahiro
2017-01-24  8:49 ` [PATCH v30 04/11] arm64: mm: allow for unmapping memory region from kernel mapping AKASHI Takahiro
2017-01-24 11:32   ` Pratyush Anand
2017-01-25  6:37     ` AKASHI Takahiro
2017-01-25 15:49   ` James Morse [this message]
2017-01-26  8:08     ` AKASHI Takahiro
2017-01-24  8:49 ` [PATCH v30 05/11] arm64: kdump: protect crash dump kernel memory AKASHI Takahiro
2017-01-25 17:37   ` James Morse
2017-01-26 11:28     ` AKASHI Takahiro
2017-01-27 11:19       ` James Morse
2017-01-27 17:15         ` AKASHI Takahiro
2017-01-27 18:56           ` Mark Rutland
2017-01-30  8:42             ` AKASHI Takahiro
2017-01-30  8:27           ` AKASHI Takahiro
2017-01-27 13:59   ` James Morse
2017-01-27 15:42     ` AKASHI Takahiro
2017-01-27 19:41       ` Mark Rutland
2017-01-24  8:50 ` [PATCH v30 06/11] arm64: kdump: implement machine_crash_shutdown() AKASHI Takahiro
2017-01-24  8:50 ` [PATCH v30 07/11] arm64: kdump: add VMCOREINFO's for user-space tools AKASHI Takahiro
2017-01-24  8:50 ` [PATCH v30 08/11] arm64: kdump: provide /proc/vmcore file AKASHI Takahiro
2017-01-24  8:50 ` [PATCH v30 09/11] arm64: kdump: enable kdump in defconfig AKASHI Takahiro
2017-01-24  8:50 ` [PATCH v30 10/11] Documentation: kdump: describe arm64 port AKASHI Takahiro
2017-01-24  8:53 ` [PATCH v30 11/11] Documentation: dt: chosen properties for arm64 kdump AKASHI Takahiro

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=5888C924.9080100@arm.com \
    --to=james.morse@arm.com \
    --cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).