From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: wangxiongfeng2@huawei.com (Xiongfeng Wang) Date: Wed, 12 Apr 2017 16:35:07 +0800 Subject: [PATCH v3 8/8] arm64: exception: check shared writable page in SEI handler In-Reply-To: <58E7B6BD.3000401@arm.com> References: <1490869877-118713-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com> <1490869877-118713-9-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com> <58E7B6BD.3000401@arm.com> Message-ID: <5b914702-7262-54d5-2f64-0521a04add03@huawei.com> To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org List-Id: linux-arm-kernel.lists.infradead.org Hi James, On 2017/4/7 23:56, James Morse wrote: > Hi Xie XiuQi, > > On 30/03/17 11:31, Xie XiuQi wrote: >> From: Wang Xiongfeng >> >> Since SEI is asynchronous, the error data has been consumed. So we must >> suppose that all the memory data current process can write are >> contaminated. If the process doesn't have shared writable pages, the >> process will be killed, and the system will continue running normally. >> Otherwise, the system must be terminated, because the error has been >> propagated to other processes running on other cores, and recursively >> the error may be propagated to several another processes. > > This is pretty complicated. We can't guarantee that another CPU hasn't modified > the page tables while we do this, (so its racy). We can't guarantee that the > corrupt data hasn't been sent over the network or written to disk in the mean > time (so its not enough). > > The scenario you have is a write of corrupt data to memory where another CPU > reading it doesn't know the value is corrupt. > > The hardware gives us quite a lot of help containing errors. The RAS > specification (DDI 0587A) describes your scenario as error propagation in '2.1.2 > Architectural error propagation', and then classifies it in '2.1.3 > Architecturally infected, containable and uncontainable' as uncontained because > the value is no longer in the general-purpose registers. For uncontained errors > we should panic(). > > We shouldn't need to try to track errors after we get a notification as the > hardware has done this for us. > Thanks for your comments. I think what you said is reasonable. We will remove this patch and use AET fields of ESR_ELx to determine whether we should kill current process or just panic. > > Firmware-first does complicate this if events like this are not delivered using > a synchronous external abort, as Linux may have PSTATE.A masked preventing > SError Interrupts from being taken. It looks like PSTATE.A is masked much more > often than is necessary. I will look into cleaning this up. > > > Thanks, > > James > > . > Thanks, Wang Xiongfeng