From: Oleksandr <olekstysh@gmail.com>
To: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>,
Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>,
Oleksandr Tyshchenko <oleksandr_tyshchenko@epam.com>,
"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V1 3/6] xen/virtio: Add option to restrict memory access under Xen
Date: Sun, 24 Apr 2022 19:53:30 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <6c5042fe-dafc-eb4f-c1fa-03b0faf252de@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <YmQsFb36UEH9BUnN@infradead.org>
On 23.04.22 19:40, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
Hello Christoph
> Please split this into one patch that creates grant-dma-ops, and another
> that sets up the virtio restricted access helpers.
Sounds reasonable, will do:
1. grant-dma-ops.c with config XEN_GRANT_DMA_OPS
2. arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access() with config XEN_VIRTIO
>
>> +
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_RESTRICTED_VIRTIO_MEMORY_ACCESS
>> +int arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access(void)
>> +{
>> + return (xen_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access() ||
>> + cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT));
>> +}
> So instead of hardcoding Xen here, this seems like a candidate for
> another cc_platform_has flag.
I have a limited knowledge of x86 and Xen on x86.
Would the Xen specific bits fit into Confidential Computing Platform
checks? I will let Juergen/Boris comment on this.
>
>> +config XEN_VIRTIO
>> + bool "Xen virtio support"
>> + default n
> n is the default default, so no need to specify it.
ok, will drop
>
>> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
>> +/******************************************************************************
> The all * line is not the usual kernel style, I'd suggest to drop it.
ok, will drop
>
>> +static struct page *xen_grant_dma_alloc_pages(struct device *dev, size_t size,
>> + dma_addr_t *dma_handle,
>> + enum dma_data_direction dir,
>> + gfp_t gfp)
>> +{
>> + WARN_ONCE(1, "xen_grant_dma_alloc_pages size %zu\n", size);
>> + return NULL;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static void xen_grant_dma_free_pages(struct device *dev, size_t size,
>> + struct page *vaddr, dma_addr_t dma_handle,
>> + enum dma_data_direction dir)
>> +{
>> + WARN_ONCE(1, "xen_grant_dma_free_pages size %zu\n", size);
>> +}
> Please just wire this up to the same implementation as .alloc and .free.
I got it, will implement
>
>> + spin_lock(&xen_grant_dma_lock);
>> + list_add(&data->list, &xen_grant_dma_devices);
>> + spin_unlock(&xen_grant_dma_lock);
> Hmm, having to do this device lookup for every DMA operation is going
> to suck. It might make sense to add a private field (e.g. as a union
> with the iommu field) in struct device instead.
I was thinking about it, but decided to not alter common struct device
for adding Xen specific field, but haven't managed to think of a better
idea than just using that brute lookup ...
>
> But if not you probably want to switch to a more efficient data
> structure like the xarray at least.
... I think, this is good point, thank you. I have no idea how faster it
is going to be, but the resulting code looks simple (if of course I
correctly understood the usage of xarray)
diff --git a/drivers/xen/grant-dma-ops.c b/drivers/xen/grant-dma-ops.c
index a512c0a..7ecc0b0 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/grant-dma-ops.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/grant-dma-ops.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include <linux/dma-map-ops.h>
#include <linux/of.h>
#include <linux/pfn.h>
+#include <linux/xarray.h>
#include <xen/xen.h>
#include <xen/grant_table.h>
@@ -19,12 +20,9 @@ struct xen_grant_dma_data {
domid_t dev_domid;
/* Is device behaving sane? */
bool broken;
- struct device *dev;
- struct list_head list;
};
-static LIST_HEAD(xen_grant_dma_devices);
-static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(xen_grant_dma_lock);
+static DEFINE_XARRAY(xen_grant_dma_devices);
#define XEN_GRANT_DMA_ADDR_OFF (1ULL << 63)
@@ -40,21 +38,13 @@ static inline grant_ref_t dma_to_grant(dma_addr_t dma)
static struct xen_grant_dma_data *find_xen_grant_dma_data(struct
device *dev)
{
- struct xen_grant_dma_data *data = NULL;
- bool found = false;
-
- spin_lock(&xen_grant_dma_lock);
-
- list_for_each_entry(data, &xen_grant_dma_devices, list) {
- if (data->dev == dev) {
- found = true;
- break;
- }
- }
+ struct xen_grant_dma_data *data;
- spin_unlock(&xen_grant_dma_lock);
+ xa_lock(&xen_grant_dma_devices);
+ data = xa_load(&xen_grant_dma_devices, (unsigned long)dev);
+ xa_unlock(&xen_grant_dma_devices);
- return found ? data : NULL;
+ return data;
}
/*
@@ -310,11 +300,12 @@ void xen_grant_setup_dma_ops(struct device *dev)
goto err;
data->dev_domid = dev_domid;
- data->dev = dev;
- spin_lock(&xen_grant_dma_lock);
- list_add(&data->list, &xen_grant_dma_devices);
- spin_unlock(&xen_grant_dma_lock);
+ if (xa_err(xa_store(&xen_grant_dma_devices, (unsigned long)dev,
data,
+ GFP_KERNEL))) {
+ dev_err(dev, "Cannot store Xen grant DMA data\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
dev->dma_ops = &xen_grant_dma_ops;
>
>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xen_grant_setup_dma_ops);
> I don't think this has any modular users, or did I miss something?
No, you didn't. Will drop here and in the next patch for
xen_is_grant_dma_device() as well.
--
Regards,
Oleksandr Tyshchenko
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linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-04-24 16:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-04-22 16:50 [PATCH V1 0/6] virtio: Solution to restrict memory access under Xen using xen-grant DMA-mapping layer Oleksandr Tyshchenko
2022-04-22 16:50 ` [PATCH V1 1/6] arm/xen: Introduce xen_setup_dma_ops() Oleksandr Tyshchenko
2022-04-22 22:59 ` Stefano Stabellini
2022-04-23 14:35 ` Oleksandr
2022-04-23 16:32 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-04-22 16:50 ` [PATCH V1 2/6] xen/grants: support allocating consecutive grants Oleksandr Tyshchenko
2022-04-22 16:51 ` [PATCH V1 3/6] xen/virtio: Add option to restrict memory access under Xen Oleksandr Tyshchenko
2022-04-22 23:00 ` Stefano Stabellini
2022-04-23 7:05 ` Oleksandr
2022-04-23 9:10 ` Juergen Gross
2022-04-23 15:25 ` Oleksandr
2022-04-23 16:40 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-04-24 16:53 ` Oleksandr [this message]
2022-04-24 18:08 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2022-04-25 7:53 ` Juergen Gross
2022-04-25 7:47 ` Juergen Gross
2022-04-25 7:58 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-04-25 9:14 ` Juergen Gross
2022-04-25 20:38 ` Oleksandr
2022-04-25 21:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-04-26 5:16 ` Juergen Gross
2022-04-26 8:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-04-26 9:36 ` Juergen Gross
2022-04-26 11:16 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-04-22 16:51 ` [PATCH V1 4/6] dt-bindings: Add xen, dev-domid property description for xen-grant DMA ops Oleksandr Tyshchenko
2022-04-22 23:00 ` Stefano Stabellini
2022-04-23 14:37 ` Oleksandr
2022-05-02 21:59 ` [PATCH V1 4/6] dt-bindings: Add xen,dev-domid " Rob Herring
2022-05-03 17:09 ` Oleksandr
2022-05-04 0:02 ` Rob Herring
2022-05-05 10:12 ` Oleksandr
2022-04-22 16:51 ` [PATCH V1 5/6] xen/grant-dma-ops: Retrieve the ID of backend's domain for DT devices Oleksandr Tyshchenko
2022-04-22 23:00 ` Stefano Stabellini
2022-04-23 15:23 ` Oleksandr
2022-04-22 16:51 ` [PATCH V1 6/6] arm/xen: Assign xen-grant DMA ops for xen-grant DMA devices Oleksandr Tyshchenko
2022-04-22 23:00 ` Stefano Stabellini
2022-04-23 16:42 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-04-24 16:07 ` Oleksandr
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