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From: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
To: Dan Carpenter <dan@pereq.eu>
Cc: "Oliver Upton" <oupton@kernel.org>,
	"Fuad Tabba" <fuad.tabba@linux.dev>,
	"Joey Gouly" <joey.gouly@arm.com>,
	"Steffen Eiden" <seiden@linux.ibm.com>,
	"Suzuki K Poulose" <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
	"Zenghui Yu" <yuzenghui@huawei.com>,
	"Catalin Marinas" <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	"Will Deacon" <will@kernel.org>,
	"Mark Rutland" <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	"Jintack Lim" <jintack.lim@linaro.org>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	"Karthik Bhargavan" <karthik@pereq.eu>,
	"Clément Blaudeau" <clement@cryspen.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] KVM: arm64: nv: Fix AT emulation for TCR2_EL1
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 16:01:36 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <86ik1w22an.wl-maz@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <eec50693a12e1ba34d60458ae8fe605ac198a79c.1794808373.git.dan@pereq.eu>

On Mon, 16 Nov 2026 06:00:52 +0000,
Dan Carpenter <dan@pereq.eu> wrote:
> 
> Arm provides an AT instruction that translates a virtual address the way
> the MMU would and returns the result.  There is a bug in the way this
> instruction is emulated for nested virtualization because of how TCR2_EL1
> is handled.  The bug is fairly minor.
> 
> The TCR2_EL1 register has bits which turn on permission indirection
> (PIE) and permission overlays (POE).  When these bits are set, the AT
> instruction reads the permissions stored in PIR_EL1 and POR_EL1.  If
> you have the right features and permissions then in the return value from
> the AT instruction we set one bit to either 1 or 0 depending on whether
> the access would be allowed or whether it would fault.
> 
> However, the bug is that just because the host has TCR2 enabled, it
> doesn't mean the VM has it.  KVM doesn't load these registers for a VM
> which doesn't have the features, instead the AT runs with the host's
> HCRX_EL2, which has TCR2En set.  So the AT uses the TCR2_EL1, PIR_EL1 and
> POR_EL1 values another VM left on the CPU, or possibly the VMM's POR_EL0.
> Likewise, for a VM which has TCR2 but not PIE or POE, the L2's TCR2_EL1
> is loaded unmasked.
> 
> The impact of this bug is that we leak a single bit of data to the L1,
> but in real life it's hard to imagine how it is useful to an attacker.
> 
> Fix this by writing zero to TCR2_EL1 when the VM doesn't have TCR2, and
> by clearing the PIE and POE bits when the VM doesn't have those
> features.  Also it should be effective_tcr2(vcpu, TR_EL10) to read the
> TCR2 for the L1 instead of vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, TCR2_EL1).
> 
> Fixes: 477e89cabb14 ("KVM: arm64: nv: Add basic emulation of AT S1E{0,1}{R,W}")
> Fixes: 23e7a34c8397 ("KVM: arm64: Add AT fast-path support for S1PIE")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan@pereq.eu>
> ---
>  arch/arm64/kvm/at.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
>  1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/at.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/at.c
> index 30d8f062b2c2..06765881a4c8 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/at.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/at.c
> @@ -1438,7 +1438,13 @@ static u64 __kvm_at_s1e01_fast(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 op, u64 vaddr)
>  	write_sysreg_el1(vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, TCR_EL1),	SYS_TCR);
>  	write_sysreg_el1(vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, MAIR_EL1),	SYS_MAIR);
>  	if (kvm_has_tcr2(vcpu->kvm)) {
> -		write_sysreg_el1(vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, TCR2_EL1), SYS_TCR2);
> +		u64 tcr2 = effective_tcr2(vcpu, TR_EL10);
> +
> +		if (!kvm_has_s1pie(vcpu->kvm))
> +			tcr2 &= ~TCR2_EL1_PIE;
> +		if (!kvm_has_s1poe(vcpu->kvm))
> +			tcr2 &= ~(TCR2_EL1_POE | TCR2_EL1_E0POE);
> +		write_sysreg_el1(tcr2, SYS_TCR2);

The sanitising should really be moved into the effective_tcr2()
helper, as this is its purpose. Something like the below, which is
obviously untested... Ultimately, TCR2_EL1 should be moved to the
automatic sanitisation scheme to inherit the expected RES0 behaviours.

>  		if (kvm_has_s1pie(vcpu->kvm)) {
>  			write_sysreg_el1(vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, PIR_EL1), SYS_PIR);
>  			write_sysreg_el1(vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, PIRE0_EL1), SYS_PIRE0);
> @@ -1452,6 +1458,9 @@ static u64 __kvm_at_s1e01_fast(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 op, u64 vaddr)
>  	__load_stage2(mmu);
>  
>  skip_mmu_switch:
> +	if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_HAS_TCR2) && !kvm_has_tcr2(vcpu->kvm))
> +		write_sysreg_el1(0, SYS_TCR2);
> +
>  	/* Temporarily switch back to guest context */
>  	write_sysreg_hcr(vcpu->arch.hcr_el2);
>  	isb();
> @@ -1554,6 +1563,9 @@ int __kvm_at_s1e2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 op, u64 vaddr)
>  		if (!vcpu_el2_e2h_is_set(vcpu))
>  			val |= HCR_EL2_NV | HCR_EL2_NV1;
>  
> +		if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_HAS_TCR2) && !kvm_has_tcr2(vcpu->kvm))
> +			write_sysreg_el1(0, SYS_TCR2);
> +
>  		write_sysreg_hcr(val);
>  		isb();
>  

This one needs fixing, as sashiko reported, but the reason why the
proposed fix works at all is pretty fragile:

- the reset value is 0
- we enforce RES0 behaviours on all interesting fields
- TCR2_ELx are trapped and result in an UNDEF

So this deserves a comment, along the lines of what I have written in
the hack below.

Thanks,

	M.

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/at.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/at.c
index 30d8f062b2c29..1ff452277f27e 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/at.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/at.c
@@ -91,11 +91,16 @@ static enum trans_regime compute_translation_regime(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 o
 static u64 effective_tcr2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum trans_regime regime)
 {
 	if (regime == TR_EL10) {
+		u64 val;
+
 		if (vcpu_has_nv(vcpu) &&
 		    !(__vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, HCRX_EL2) & HCRX_EL2_TCR2En))
 			return 0;
 
-		return vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, TCR2_EL1);
+		val = vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, TCR2_EL1);
+		val &= ~(kvm_has_s1poe(vcpu->kvm) ? (TCR2_EL1_POE | TCR2_EL1_E0POE) : 0);
+		val &= ~(kvm_has_s1pie(vcpu->kvm) ? TCR2_EL1_PIE : 0);
+		return val;
 	}
 
 	return vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, TCR2_EL2);
@@ -1544,7 +1549,7 @@ int __kvm_at_s1e2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 op, u64 vaddr)
 	 * switching context behind everybody's back, disable interrupts...
 	 */
 	scoped_guard(write_lock_irqsave, &vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock) {
-		u64 val, hcr;
+		u64 val, hcr, tcr2;
 		bool fail;
 
 		val = hcr = read_sysreg(hcr_el2);
@@ -1554,6 +1559,16 @@ int __kvm_at_s1e2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 op, u64 vaddr)
 		if (!vcpu_el2_e2h_is_set(vcpu))
 			val |= HCR_EL2_NV | HCR_EL2_NV1;
 
+		if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_HAS_TCR2)) {
+			tcr2 = read_sysreg_el1(SYS_TCR2);
+			/*
+			 * This relies on the reset value of TCR2_EL2
+			 * being 0, and not being modified when
+			 * FEAT_TCR2 is not exposed to the guest
+			 */
+			write_sysreg_el1(vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, TCR2_EL2), SYS_TCR2);
+		}
+
 		write_sysreg_hcr(val);
 		isb();
 
@@ -1577,6 +1592,9 @@ int __kvm_at_s1e2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 op, u64 vaddr)
 		if (!fail)
 			par = read_sysreg_par();
 
+		if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_HAS_TCR2))
+			write_sysreg_el1(tcr2, SYS_TCR2);
+
 		write_sysreg_hcr(hcr);
 		isb();
 	}

-- 
Without deviation from the norm, progress is not possible.


      reply	other threads:[~2026-11-16 16:01 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-16  6:00 [PATCH 0/2] KVM: arm64: nv: fix a couple bugs in AT emulation Dan Carpenter
2026-11-16  6:00 ` [PATCH 2/2] KVM: arm64: nv: Update the shadow MMU's VMID for " Dan Carpenter
2026-11-16  6:00 ` [PATCH 1/2] KVM: arm64: nv: Fix AT emulation for TCR2_EL1 Dan Carpenter
2026-11-16 16:01   ` Marc Zyngier [this message]

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