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From: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
To: Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>
Cc: kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
	Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>,
	Zenghui Yu <yuzenghui@huawei.com>,
	Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>,
	Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 21/37] KVM: arm64: Implement AT S1PIE support
Date: Thu, 24 Oct 2024 15:21:49 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <86sesl37k2.wl-maz@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241024135925.GB1403933@e124191.cambridge.arm.com>

On Thu, 24 Oct 2024 14:59:25 +0100,
Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com> wrote:
> 
> On Wed, Oct 23, 2024 at 03:53:29PM +0100, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> > It doesn't take much effort to implement S1PIE support in AT.
> > 
> > It is only a matter of using the AArch64.S1IndirectBasePermissions()
> > encodings for the permission, ignoring GCS which has no impact on AT,
> > and enforce FEAT_PAN3 being enabled as this is a requirement of
> > FEAT_S1PIE.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
> > ---
> >  arch/arm64/kvm/at.c | 117 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> >  1 file changed, 116 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/at.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/at.c
> > index f5bd750288ff5..3d93ed1795603 100644
> > --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/at.c
> > +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/at.c
> > @@ -781,6 +781,9 @@ static bool pan3_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum trans_regime regime)
> >  	if (!kvm_has_feat(vcpu->kvm, ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1, PAN, PAN3))
> >  		return false;
> >  
> > +	if (s1pie_enabled(vcpu, regime))
> > +		return true;
> > +
> >  	if (regime == TR_EL10)
> >  		sctlr = vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, SCTLR_EL1);
> >  	else
> > @@ -862,11 +865,123 @@ static void compute_s1_hierarchical_permissions(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> >  	}
> >  }
> >  
> > +#define perm_idx(v, r, i)	((vcpu_read_sys_reg((v), (r)) >> ((i) * 4)) & 0xf)
> > +
> > +#define set_priv_perms(wr, r, w, x)	\
> > +	do {				\
> > +		(wr)->pr = (r);		\
> > +		(wr)->pw = (w);		\
> > +		(wr)->px = (x);		\
> > +	} while (0)
> > +
> > +#define set_unpriv_perms(wr, r, w, x)	\
> > +	do {				\
> > +		(wr)->ur = (r);		\
> > +		(wr)->uw = (w);		\
> > +		(wr)->ux = (x);		\
> > +	} while (0)
> > +
> > +/* Similar to AArch64.S1IndirectBasePermissions(), without GCS  */
> > +#define set_perms(w, wr, ip)						\
> > +	do {								\
> > +		/* R_LLZDZ */						\
> > +		switch ((ip)) {						\
> > +		case 0b0000:						\
> > +			set_ ## w ## _perms((wr), false, false, false);	\
> > +			break;						\
> > +		case 0b0001:						\
> > +			set_ ## w ## _perms((wr), true , false, false);	\
> > +			break;						\
> > +		case 0b0010:						\
> > +			set_ ## w ## _perms((wr), false, false, true );	\
> > +			break;						\
> > +		case 0b0011:						\
> > +			set_ ## w ## _perms((wr), true , false, true );	\
> > +			break;						\
> > +		case 0b0100:						\
> > +			set_ ## w ## _perms((wr), false, false, false);	\
> > +			break;						\
> > +		case 0b0101:						\
> > +			set_ ## w ## _perms((wr), true , true , false);	\
> > +			break;						\
> > +		case 0b0110:						\
> > +			set_ ## w ## _perms((wr), true , true , true );	\
> > +			break;						\
> > +		case 0b0111:						\
> > +			set_ ## w ## _perms((wr), true , true , true );	\
> > +			break;						\
> > +		case 0b1000:						\
> > +			set_ ## w ## _perms((wr), true , false, false);	\
> > +			break;						\
> > +		case 0b1001:						\
> > +			set_ ## w ## _perms((wr), true , false, false);	\
> > +			break;						\
> > +		case 0b1010:						\
> > +			set_ ## w ## _perms((wr), true , false, true );	\
> > +			break;						\
> > +		case 0b1011:						\
> > +			set_ ## w ## _perms((wr), false, false, false);	\
> > +			break;						\
> > +		case 0b1100:						\
> > +			set_ ## w ## _perms((wr), true , true , false);	\
> > +			break;						\
> > +		case 0b1101:						\
> > +			set_ ## w ## _perms((wr), false, false, false);	\
> > +			break;						\
> > +		case 0b1110:						\
> > +			set_ ## w ## _perms((wr), true , true , true );	\
> > +			break;						\
> > +		case 0b1111:						\
> > +			set_ ## w ## _perms((wr), false, false, false);	\
> > +			break;						\
> > +		}							\
> > +	} while (0)
> > +
> > +static void compute_s1_indirect_permissions(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> > +					    struct s1_walk_info *wi,
> > +					    struct s1_walk_result *wr)
> > +{
> > +	u8 up, pp, idx;
> > +
> > +	idx = pte_pi_index(wr->desc);
> > +
> > +	switch (wi->regime) {
> > +	case TR_EL10:
> > +		pp = perm_idx(vcpu, PIR_EL1, idx);
> > +		up = perm_idx(vcpu, PIRE0_EL1, idx);
> > +		break;
> > +	case TR_EL20:
> > +		pp = perm_idx(vcpu, PIR_EL2, idx);
> > +		up = perm_idx(vcpu, PIRE0_EL2, idx);
> > +		break;
> > +	case TR_EL2:
> > +		pp = perm_idx(vcpu, PIR_EL2, idx);
> > +		up = 0;
> > +		break;
> > +	}
> 
> There seems to be inconsistent use of
> 
> default:
> 	BUG();
> 
> when switching on wi->regime.

True. Maybe I should drop them all apart from the one in
setup_s1_walk().

> 
> > +
> > +	set_perms(priv, wr, pp);
> > +
> > +	if (wi->regime != TR_EL2)
> > +		set_perms(unpriv, wr, up);
> > +	else
> > +		set_unpriv_perms(wr, false, false, false);
> 
> When regime == TR_EL2, up == 0, so the if/else should do the same thing? Maybe
> you've done that intentionally to be more explicit.

The reason for doing so was not to give the impression that we were
actively using the unprivileged indirect permissions for TR_EL2.

But maybe that's be just as clear with a comment.

> 
> Either way:
> 
> Reviewed-by: Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>

Thanks!

	M.

-- 
Without deviation from the norm, progress is not possible.


  reply	other threads:[~2024-10-24 14:24 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 55+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-10-23 14:53 [PATCH v5 00/37] KVM: arm64: Add EL2 support to FEAT_S1PIE/S1POE Marc Zyngier
2024-10-23 14:53 ` [PATCH v5 01/37] arm64: Drop SKL0/SKL1 from TCR2_EL2 Marc Zyngier
2024-10-23 14:53 ` [PATCH v5 02/37] arm64: Remove VNCR definition for PIRE0_EL2 Marc Zyngier
2024-10-23 14:53 ` [PATCH v5 03/37] arm64: Add encoding " Marc Zyngier
2024-10-23 16:11   ` Mark Brown
2024-10-23 14:53 ` [PATCH v5 04/37] KVM: arm64: Drop useless struct s2_mmu in __kvm_at_s1e2() Marc Zyngier
2024-10-23 14:53 ` [PATCH v5 05/37] KVM: arm64: nv: Add missing EL2->EL1 mappings in get_el2_to_el1_mapping() Marc Zyngier
2024-10-23 14:53 ` [PATCH v5 06/37] KVM: arm64: nv: Handle CNTHCTL_EL2 specially Marc Zyngier
2024-10-23 14:53 ` [PATCH v5 07/37] KVM: arm64: nv: Save/Restore vEL2 sysregs Marc Zyngier
2024-10-23 14:53 ` [PATCH v5 08/37] KVM: arm64: Correctly access TCR2_EL1, PIR_EL1, PIRE0_EL1 with VHE Marc Zyngier
2024-10-24 10:03   ` Joey Gouly
2024-10-23 14:53 ` [PATCH v5 09/37] KVM: arm64: Extend masking facility to arbitrary registers Marc Zyngier
2024-10-24 10:38   ` Joey Gouly
2024-10-23 14:53 ` [PATCH v5 10/37] arm64: Define ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1.HAFDBS advertising FEAT_HAFT Marc Zyngier
2024-10-23 16:09   ` Mark Brown
2024-10-23 14:53 ` [PATCH v5 11/37] KVM: arm64: Add TCR2_EL2 to the sysreg arrays Marc Zyngier
2024-10-23 14:53 ` [PATCH v5 12/37] KVM: arm64: Sanitise TCR2_EL2 Marc Zyngier
2024-10-24 10:21   ` Joey Gouly
2024-10-23 14:53 ` [PATCH v5 13/37] KVM: arm64: Add save/restore for TCR2_EL2 Marc Zyngier
2024-10-23 14:53 ` [PATCH v5 14/37] KVM: arm64: Add PIR{,E0}_EL2 to the sysreg arrays Marc Zyngier
2024-10-23 14:53 ` [PATCH v5 15/37] KVM: arm64: Add save/restore for PIR{,E0}_EL2 Marc Zyngier
2024-10-23 14:53 ` [PATCH v5 16/37] KVM: arm64: Handle PIR{,E0}_EL2 traps Marc Zyngier
2024-10-23 14:53 ` [PATCH v5 17/37] KVM: arm64: Sanitise ID_AA64MMFR3_EL1 Marc Zyngier
2024-10-24 12:32   ` Mark Brown
2024-10-24 12:45     ` Joey Gouly
2024-10-24 12:55       ` Mark Brown
2024-10-23 14:53 ` [PATCH v5 18/37] KVM: arm64: Add AT fast-path support for S1PIE Marc Zyngier
2024-10-24 14:49   ` Joey Gouly
2024-10-23 14:53 ` [PATCH v5 19/37] KVM: arm64: Split S1 permission evaluation into direct and hierarchical parts Marc Zyngier
2024-10-23 14:53 ` [PATCH v5 20/37] KVM: arm64: Disable hierarchical permissions when S1PIE is enabled Marc Zyngier
2024-10-24 14:02   ` Joey Gouly
2024-10-23 14:53 ` [PATCH v5 21/37] KVM: arm64: Implement AT S1PIE support Marc Zyngier
2024-10-24 13:59   ` Joey Gouly
2024-10-24 14:21     ` Marc Zyngier [this message]
2024-10-23 14:53 ` [PATCH v5 22/37] KVM: arm64: Add a composite EL2 visibility helper Marc Zyngier
2024-10-23 14:53 ` [PATCH v5 23/37] KVM: arm64: Define helper for EL2 registers with custom visibility Marc Zyngier
2024-10-23 14:53 ` [PATCH v5 24/37] KVM: arm64: Hide TCR2_EL1 from userspace when disabled for guests Marc Zyngier
2024-10-23 14:53 ` [PATCH v5 25/37] KVM: arm64: Hide S1PIE registers " Marc Zyngier
2024-10-23 14:53 ` [PATCH v5 26/37] KVM: arm64: Rely on visibility to let PIR*_ELx/TCR2_ELx UNDEF Marc Zyngier
2024-10-23 14:53 ` [PATCH v5 27/37] arm64: Add encoding for POR_EL2 Marc Zyngier
2024-10-23 16:13   ` Mark Brown
2024-10-23 16:28     ` Marc Zyngier
2024-10-23 14:53 ` [PATCH v5 28/37] KVM: arm64: Drop bogus CPTR_EL2.E0POE trap routing Marc Zyngier
2024-10-23 14:53 ` [PATCH v5 29/37] KVM: arm64: Subject S1PIE/S1POE registers to HCR_EL2.{TVM,TRVM} Marc Zyngier
2024-10-23 14:53 ` [PATCH v5 30/37] KVM: arm64: Add kvm_has_s1poe() helper Marc Zyngier
2024-10-23 14:53 ` [PATCH v5 31/37] KVM: arm64: Add basic support for POR_EL2 Marc Zyngier
2024-10-23 14:53 ` [PATCH v5 32/37] KVM: arm64: Add save/restore " Marc Zyngier
2024-10-23 14:53 ` [PATCH v5 33/37] KVM: arm64: Add POE save/restore for AT emulation fast-path Marc Zyngier
2024-10-24 15:26   ` Joey Gouly
2024-10-23 14:53 ` [PATCH v5 34/37] KVM: arm64: Disable hierarchical permissions when POE is enabled Marc Zyngier
2024-10-24 15:36   ` Joey Gouly
2024-10-23 14:53 ` [PATCH v5 35/37] KVM: arm64: Make PAN conditions part of the S1 walk context Marc Zyngier
2024-10-23 14:53 ` [PATCH v5 36/37] KVM: arm64: Handle stage-1 permission overlays Marc Zyngier
2024-10-23 14:53 ` [PATCH v5 37/37] KVM: arm64: Handle WXN attribute Marc Zyngier
2024-10-31  3:04 ` [PATCH v5 00/37] KVM: arm64: Add EL2 support to FEAT_S1PIE/S1POE Oliver Upton

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