From: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
To: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Cc: kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu, will@kernel.org,
james.morse@arm.com, alexandru.elisei@arm.com,
suzuki.poulose@arm.com, mark.rutland@arm.com,
christoffer.dall@arm.com, pbonzini@redhat.com,
drjones@redhat.com, oupton@google.com, qperret@google.com,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
kernel-team@android.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 12/12] KVM: arm64: Handle protected guests at 32 bits
Date: Tue, 05 Oct 2021 09:48:03 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87sfxfrh6k.wl-maz@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210922124704.600087-13-tabba@google.com>
On Wed, 22 Sep 2021 13:47:04 +0100,
Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com> wrote:
>
> Protected KVM does not support protected AArch32 guests. However,
> it is possible for the guest to force run AArch32, potentially
> causing problems. Add an extra check so that if the hypervisor
> catches the guest doing that, it can prevent the guest from
> running again by resetting vcpu->arch.target and returning
> ARM_EXCEPTION_IL.
>
> If this were to happen, The VMM can try and fix it by re-
> initializing the vcpu with KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT, however, this is
> likely not possible for protected VMs.
>
> Adapted from commit 22f553842b14 ("KVM: arm64: Handle Asymmetric
> AArch32 systems")
>
> Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
> ---
> arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c
> index 2bf5952f651b..d66226e49013 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c
> @@ -235,6 +235,43 @@ static const exit_handler_fn *kvm_get_exit_handler_array(struct kvm *kvm)
> return hyp_exit_handlers;
> }
>
> +/*
> + * Some guests (e.g., protected VMs) might not be allowed to run in AArch32.
> + * The ARMv8 architecture does not give the hypervisor a mechanism to prevent a
> + * guest from dropping to AArch32 EL0 if implemented by the CPU. If the
> + * hypervisor spots a guest in such a state ensure it is handled, and don't
> + * trust the host to spot or fix it. The check below is based on the one in
> + * kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run().
> + *
> + * Returns false if the guest ran in AArch32 when it shouldn't have, and
> + * thus should exit to the host, or true if a the guest run loop can continue.
> + */
> +static bool handle_aarch32_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
> +{
> + struct kvm *kvm = (struct kvm *) kern_hyp_va(vcpu->kvm);
There is no need for an extra cast. kern_hyp_va() already provides a
cast to the type of the parameter.
> + bool is_aarch32_allowed =
> + FIELD_GET(ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR0_EL0),
> + get_pvm_id_aa64pfr0(vcpu)) >=
> + ID_AA64PFR0_ELx_32BIT_64BIT;
> +
> +
> + if (kvm_vm_is_protected(kvm) &&
> + vcpu_mode_is_32bit(vcpu) &&
> + !is_aarch32_allowed) {
Do we really need to go through this is_aarch32_allowed check?
Protected VMs don't have AArch32, and we don't have the infrastructure
to handle 32bit at all. For non-protected VMs, we already have what we
need at EL1. So the extra check only adds complexity.
> + /*
> + * As we have caught the guest red-handed, decide that it isn't
> + * fit for purpose anymore by making the vcpu invalid. The VMM
> + * can try and fix it by re-initializing the vcpu with
> + * KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT, however, this is likely not possible for
> + * protected VMs.
> + */
> + vcpu->arch.target = -1;
> + *exit_code = ARM_EXCEPTION_IL;
> + return false;
> + }
> +
> + return true;
> +}
> +
> /* Switch to the guest for legacy non-VHE systems */
> int __kvm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> {
> @@ -297,6 +334,9 @@ int __kvm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> /* Jump in the fire! */
> exit_code = __guest_enter(vcpu);
>
> + if (unlikely(!handle_aarch32_guest(vcpu, &exit_code)))
> + break;
> +
> /* And we're baaack! */
> } while (fixup_guest_exit(vcpu, &exit_code));
>
Thanks,
M.
--
Without deviation from the norm, progress is not possible.
_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-10-05 8:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-09-22 12:46 [PATCH v6 00/12] KVM: arm64: Fixed features for protected VMs Fuad Tabba
2021-09-22 12:46 ` [PATCH v6 01/12] KVM: arm64: Move __get_fault_info() and co into their own include file Fuad Tabba
2021-09-30 13:04 ` Will Deacon
2021-09-22 12:46 ` [PATCH v6 02/12] KVM: arm64: Don't include switch.h into nvhe/kvm-main.c Fuad Tabba
2021-09-30 13:07 ` Will Deacon
2021-09-22 12:46 ` [PATCH v6 03/12] KVM: arm64: Move early handlers to per-EC handlers Fuad Tabba
2021-09-30 13:35 ` Will Deacon
2021-09-30 16:02 ` Marc Zyngier
2021-09-30 16:27 ` Marc Zyngier
2021-09-22 12:46 ` [PATCH v6 04/12] KVM: arm64: Add missing FORCE prerequisite in Makefile Fuad Tabba
2021-09-22 14:17 ` Marc Zyngier
2021-09-22 12:46 ` [PATCH v6 05/12] KVM: arm64: Pass struct kvm to per-EC handlers Fuad Tabba
2021-09-22 12:46 ` [PATCH v6 06/12] KVM: arm64: Add missing field descriptor for MDCR_EL2 Fuad Tabba
2021-09-22 12:46 ` [PATCH v6 07/12] KVM: arm64: Simplify masking out MTE in feature id reg Fuad Tabba
2021-09-22 12:47 ` [PATCH v6 08/12] KVM: arm64: Add handlers for protected VM System Registers Fuad Tabba
2021-10-05 8:52 ` Andrew Jones
2021-10-05 16:43 ` Fuad Tabba
2021-10-05 9:53 ` Marc Zyngier
2021-10-05 16:49 ` Fuad Tabba
2021-09-22 12:47 ` [PATCH v6 09/12] KVM: arm64: Initialize trap registers for protected VMs Fuad Tabba
2021-10-05 9:23 ` Marc Zyngier
2021-10-05 9:33 ` Fuad Tabba
2021-10-06 6:56 ` Andrew Jones
2021-09-22 12:47 ` [PATCH v6 10/12] KVM: arm64: Move sanitized copies of CPU features Fuad Tabba
2021-09-22 12:47 ` [PATCH v6 11/12] KVM: arm64: Trap access to pVM restricted features Fuad Tabba
2021-10-04 17:27 ` Marc Zyngier
2021-10-05 7:20 ` Fuad Tabba
2021-09-22 12:47 ` [PATCH v6 12/12] KVM: arm64: Handle protected guests at 32 bits Fuad Tabba
2021-10-05 8:48 ` Marc Zyngier [this message]
2021-10-05 9:05 ` Fuad Tabba
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=87sfxfrh6k.wl-maz@kernel.org \
--to=maz@kernel.org \
--cc=alexandru.elisei@arm.com \
--cc=christoffer.dall@arm.com \
--cc=drjones@redhat.com \
--cc=james.morse@arm.com \
--cc=kernel-team@android.com \
--cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu \
--cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
--cc=mark.rutland@arm.com \
--cc=oupton@google.com \
--cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
--cc=qperret@google.com \
--cc=suzuki.poulose@arm.com \
--cc=tabba@google.com \
--cc=will@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).