From: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: kernel-team@android.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
Julien Thierry <julien.thierry.kdev@gmail.com>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/3] KVM: arm64: Enforce PtrAuth being disabled if not advertized
Date: Tue, 09 Jun 2020 08:38:13 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <8c340ebe6be5d9c866c24ad55ed0a841@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200604153900.GE75320@C02TD0UTHF1T.local>
Hi Mark,
On 2020-06-04 16:39, Mark Rutland wrote:
> Hi Marc,
>
> On Thu, Jun 04, 2020 at 02:33:54PM +0100, Marc Zyngier wrote:
>> Even if we don't expose PtrAuth to a guest, the guest can still
>> write to its SCTIRLE_1 register and set the En{I,D}{A,B} bits
>> and execute PtrAuth instructions from the NOP space. This has
>> the effect of trapping to EL2, and we currently inject an UNDEF.
>
> I think it's worth noting that this is an ill-behaved guest, as those
> bits are RES0 when pointer authentication isn't implemented.
>
> The rationale for RES0/RES1 bits is that new HW can rely on old SW
> programming them with the 0/1 as appropriate, and that old SW that does
> not do so may encounter behaviour which from its PoV is UNPREDICTABLE.
> The SW side of the contract is that you must program them as 0/1 unless
> you know they're allocated with a specific meaning.
>
> With that in mind I think the current behaviour is legitimate: from the
> guest's PoV it's the same as there being a distinct extension which it
> is not aware of where the En{I,D}{A,B} bits means "trap some HINTs to
> EL1".
>
> I don't think that we should attempt to work around broken software
> here
> unless we absolutely have to, as it only adds complexity for no real
> gain.
Fair enough. I was worried of the behaviour difference between HW
without
PtrAuth and a guest with HW not advertised. Ideally, they should have
the same behaviour, but the architecture feels a bit brittle here.
Anyway, I'll drop this patch, and hopefully no guest will play this
game (they'll know pretty quickly about the issue anyway).
Thanks,
M.
--
Jazz is not dead. It just smells funny...
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prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-06-09 7:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-06-04 13:33 [PATCH 0/3] kvm: arm64: Pointer Authentication handling fixes Marc Zyngier
2020-06-04 13:33 ` [PATCH 1/3] KVM: arm64: Save the host's PtrAuth keys in non-preemptible context Marc Zyngier
2020-06-04 15:04 ` Mark Rutland
2020-06-04 13:33 ` [PATCH 2/3] KVM: arm64: Handle PtrAuth traps early Marc Zyngier
2020-06-04 15:23 ` Mark Rutland
2020-06-04 13:33 ` [PATCH 3/3] KVM: arm64: Enforce PtrAuth being disabled if not advertized Marc Zyngier
2020-06-04 15:39 ` Mark Rutland
2020-06-09 7:38 ` Marc Zyngier [this message]
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