From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
To: Szabolcs Nagy <szabolcs.nagy@arm.com>
Cc: libc-alpha@sourceware.org, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>,
Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>,
Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de>,
Linux ARM <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>,
Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>,
Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>,
Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] arm64: Introduce prctl(PR_PAC_{SET,GET}_ENABLED_KEYS)
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2020 13:37:47 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <X7Ujq6RCzEQKFVId@trantor> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201118133121.GA20578@arm.com>
On Wed, Nov 18, 2020 at 01:31:21PM +0000, Szabolcs Nagy wrote:
> The 11/18/2020 12:33, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> > On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 06:39:13PM +0000, Szabolcs Nagy wrote:
> > > The 11/17/2020 10:17, Peter Collingbourne via Libc-alpha wrote:
> > > > On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 9:48 AM Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de> wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > * Peter Collingbourne:
> > > > >
> > > > > > This prctl allows the user program to control which PAC keys are enabled
> > > > > > in a particular task. The main reason why this is useful is to enable a
> > > > > > userspace ABI that uses PAC to sign and authenticate function pointers
> > > > > > and other pointers exposed outside of the function, while still allowing
> > > > > > binaries conforming to the ABI to interoperate with legacy binaries that
> > > > > > do not sign or authenticate pointers.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > The idea is that a dynamic loader or early startup code would issue
> > > > > > this prctl very early after establishing that a process may load legacy
> > > > > > binaries, but before executing any PAC instructions.
> > > > >
> > > > > I thought that the silicon did not support this?
> >
> > I think the past discussion we had was around enabling PAC for kernel
> > while disabling it for user. The hardware doesn't give us separate bits,
> > so Peter's patch toggles them on kernel entry/return, with some overhead
> > given by the MSR+ISB (to be added).
>
> ah ok. i probably incorrectly thought that toggling that sys
> register bit is too much overhead at kernel entry so assumed
> we cannot have PAC off by default or set per process.
I think Peter can rerun his benchmarks but with the ISB added after MSR.
If they are not too bad, we can take this series.
> (i think with the proposed prctl it's possible to disable PAC
> at early ld.so startup and reenable it before calling into the
> main exe entry code, if we ever need to disable PAC-RET.)
>
> i assume thread creation/fork inherits the setting but exec
> does not (this is another point that may be worth adding to
> the documentation).
Yes, that's my understanding from the patch. It should be documented
explicitly (I haven't read the doc updates, maybe it does this already).
> if we run into issues in userspace with PAC then a prctl that
> can be inherited across exec is a possible workaround (so PAC
> can be disabled for an entire process tree).
Can you do something similar to MTE with an environment variable forcing
PAC off?
--
Catalin
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-11-18 13:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-10-14 5:51 [PATCH v2] arm64: Introduce prctl(PR_PAC_{SET,GET}_ENABLED_KEYS) Peter Collingbourne
2020-11-17 17:29 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-17 18:14 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2020-11-17 18:40 ` Peter Collingbourne
2020-11-17 17:48 ` Florian Weimer
2020-11-17 18:17 ` Peter Collingbourne
2020-11-17 18:39 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2020-11-18 12:33 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-18 13:31 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2020-11-18 13:37 ` Catalin Marinas [this message]
2020-11-18 17:19 ` Dave Martin
2020-11-18 17:31 ` Florian Weimer
2020-11-18 18:18 ` Dave Martin
2020-11-18 12:25 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-19 5:20 ` Peter Collingbourne
2020-11-18 17:55 ` Dave Martin
2020-11-18 19:05 ` Peter Collingbourne
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