From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from bombadil.infradead.org (bombadil.infradead.org [198.137.202.133]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C99AEC433EF for ; Fri, 13 May 2022 15:27:38 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=lists.infradead.org; s=bombadil.20210309; h=Sender: Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-Type:List-Subscribe:List-Help:List-Post: List-Archive:List-Unsubscribe:List-Id:In-Reply-To:MIME-Version:References: Message-ID:Subject:Cc:To:From:Date:Reply-To:Content-ID:Content-Description: Resent-Date:Resent-From:Resent-Sender:Resent-To:Resent-Cc:Resent-Message-ID: List-Owner; bh=6y4W4cvt3IFwCLhhvxh5o0mqd/mQxLBbv+RRUG/16YY=; b=N7ltD6vRCZYAn+ MWNLTALjgPnHsIrTVdOCmVCB9/cWDj7muFnMZXlbnPufAVM/V/vCmZvho5AUcPS/mks8EBxwzrTbz s11jO3inykhoH/+o3I5nbWjsFIRTHLB46CCWkgI01lY40Wr/gcFhcaRJbHrTcLsUBA2QLNAf0tC4C aSyC5AszKHnM8XOjc220NyhCwVYoArteh1igTbvqeIruNcyvhbrUnVX7W8WTym+KKOEMENRTcJ8Wh EYSY+ewCsAWTvy52guiyXmKiF0vmJV205qHEA0YadE+1lca40TgVgitW4DA3LngN0bmBvbwJqphXD KK1E8hDVHTVH7UkGt0lw==; Received: from localhost ([::1] helo=bombadil.infradead.org) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.94.2 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1npXBT-00GhPh-SO; Fri, 13 May 2022 15:26:28 +0000 Received: from foss.arm.com ([217.140.110.172]) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.94.2 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1npXBQ-00GhOP-5I for linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org; Fri, 13 May 2022 15:26:26 +0000 Received: from usa-sjc-imap-foss1.foss.arm.com (unknown [10.121.207.14]) by usa-sjc-mx-foss1.foss.arm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0AB9A113E; Fri, 13 May 2022 08:26:22 -0700 (PDT) Received: from lakrids (usa-sjc-imap-foss1.foss.arm.com [10.121.207.14]) by usa-sjc-imap-foss1.foss.arm.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 3D19A3F73D; Fri, 13 May 2022 08:26:19 -0700 (PDT) Date: Fri, 13 May 2022 16:26:16 +0100 From: Mark Rutland To: Tong Tiangen Cc: James Morse , Andrew Morton , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Robin Murphy , Dave Hansen , Catalin Marinas , Will Deacon , Alexander Viro , Michael Ellerman , Benjamin Herrenschmidt , Paul Mackerras , x86@kernel.org, "H . Peter Anvin" , linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, Kefeng Wang , Xie XiuQi , Guohanjun Subject: Re: [PATCH -next v4 3/7] arm64: add support for machine check error safe Message-ID: References: <20220420030418.3189040-1-tongtiangen@huawei.com> <20220420030418.3189040-4-tongtiangen@huawei.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20220420030418.3189040-4-tongtiangen@huawei.com> X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20220513_082624_347420_54B39BBF X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 34.08 ) X-BeenThere: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.34 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org On Wed, Apr 20, 2022 at 03:04:14AM +0000, Tong Tiangen wrote: > During the processing of arm64 kernel hardware memory errors(do_sea()), if > the errors is consumed in the kernel, the current processing is panic. > However, it is not optimal. > > Take uaccess for example, if the uaccess operation fails due to memory > error, only the user process will be affected, kill the user process > and isolate the user page with hardware memory errors is a better choice. Conceptually, I'm fine with the idea of constraining what we do for a true uaccess, but I don't like the implementation of this at all, and I think we first need to clean up the arm64 extable usage to clearly distinguish a uaccess from another access. > This patch only enable machine error check framework, it add exception > fixup before kernel panic in do_sea() and only limit the consumption of > hardware memory errors in kernel mode triggered by user mode processes. > If fixup successful, panic can be avoided. > > Consistent with PPC/x86, it is implemented by CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_COPY_MC. > > Also add copy_mc_to_user() in include/linux/uaccess.h, this helper is > called when CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_COPOY_MC is open. > > Signed-off-by: Tong Tiangen > --- > arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 + > arch/arm64/include/asm/extable.h | 1 + > arch/arm64/mm/extable.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ > arch/arm64/mm/fault.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++- > include/linux/uaccess.h | 9 +++++++++ > 5 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig > index d9325dd95eba..012e38309955 100644 > --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig > +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig > @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ config ARM64 > select ARCH_ENABLE_SPLIT_PMD_PTLOCK if PGTABLE_LEVELS > 2 > select ARCH_ENABLE_THP_MIGRATION if TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE > select ARCH_HAS_CACHE_LINE_SIZE > + select ARCH_HAS_COPY_MC if ACPI_APEI_GHES > select ARCH_HAS_CURRENT_STACK_POINTER > select ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_VIRTUAL > select ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_VM_PGTABLE > diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/extable.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/extable.h > index 72b0e71cc3de..f80ebd0addfd 100644 > --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/extable.h > +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/extable.h > @@ -46,4 +46,5 @@ bool ex_handler_bpf(const struct exception_table_entry *ex, > #endif /* !CONFIG_BPF_JIT */ > > bool fixup_exception(struct pt_regs *regs); > +bool fixup_exception_mc(struct pt_regs *regs); > #endif > diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/extable.c b/arch/arm64/mm/extable.c > index 489455309695..4f0083a550d4 100644 > --- a/arch/arm64/mm/extable.c > +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/extable.c > @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ > > #include > #include > +#include > > static inline unsigned long > get_ex_fixup(const struct exception_table_entry *ex) > @@ -84,3 +85,19 @@ bool fixup_exception(struct pt_regs *regs) > > BUG(); > } > + > +bool fixup_exception_mc(struct pt_regs *regs) > +{ > + const struct exception_table_entry *ex; > + > + ex = search_exception_tables(instruction_pointer(regs)); > + if (!ex) > + return false; > + > + /* > + * This is not complete, More Machine check safe extable type can > + * be processed here. > + */ > + > + return false; > +} This is at best misnamed; It doesn't actually apply the fixup, it just searches for one. > diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c > index 77341b160aca..a9e6fb1999d1 100644 > --- a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c > +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c > @@ -695,6 +695,29 @@ static int do_bad(unsigned long far, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs) > return 1; /* "fault" */ > } > > +static bool arm64_do_kernel_sea(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr, > + struct pt_regs *regs, int sig, int code) > +{ > + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_COPY_MC)) > + return false; > + > + if (user_mode(regs) || !current->mm) > + return false; > + > + if (apei_claim_sea(regs) < 0) > + return false; > + > + if (!fixup_exception_mc(regs)) > + return false; > + > + set_thread_esr(0, esr); > + > + arm64_force_sig_fault(sig, code, addr, > + "Uncorrected hardware memory error in kernel-access\n"); > + > + return true; > +} > + > static int do_sea(unsigned long far, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs) > { > const struct fault_info *inf; > @@ -720,7 +743,9 @@ static int do_sea(unsigned long far, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs) > */ > siaddr = untagged_addr(far); > } > - arm64_notify_die(inf->name, regs, inf->sig, inf->code, siaddr, esr); > + > + if (!arm64_do_kernel_sea(siaddr, esr, regs, inf->sig, inf->code)) > + arm64_notify_die(inf->name, regs, inf->sig, inf->code, siaddr, esr); > > return 0; > } > diff --git a/include/linux/uaccess.h b/include/linux/uaccess.h > index 546179418ffa..884661b29c17 100644 > --- a/include/linux/uaccess.h > +++ b/include/linux/uaccess.h > @@ -174,6 +174,15 @@ copy_mc_to_kernel(void *dst, const void *src, size_t cnt) > } > #endif > > +#ifndef copy_mc_to_user > +static inline unsigned long __must_check > +copy_mc_to_user(void *dst, const void *src, size_t cnt) > +{ > + check_object_size(src, cnt, true); > + return raw_copy_to_user(dst, src, cnt); > +} > +#endif Why do we need a special copy_mc_to_user() ? Why are we not making *every* true uaccess recoverable? That way the regular copy_to_user() would just work. Thanks, Mark. _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel