Re: [PATCH -next v5 7/8] arm64: add uaccess to machine check safe

Tong Tiangen
2022-06-20T02:06:11Z

在 2022/6/18 19:35, Mark Rutland 写道:
> On Sat, Jun 18, 2022 at 05:27:45PM +0800, Tong Tiangen wrote:
>>
>>
>> 在 2022/6/17 17:06, Mark Rutland 写道:
>>> On Sat, May 28, 2022 at 06:50:55AM +0000, Tong Tiangen wrote:
>>>> If user access fail due to hardware memory error, only the relevant
>>>> processes are affected, so killing the user process and isolate the
>>>> error page with hardware memory errors is a more reasonable choice
>>>> than kernel panic.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Tong Tiangen <tongtiangen@huawei.com>
>>>
>>>> ---
>>>> arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user.S | 8 ++++----
>>>> arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S | 8 ++++----
>>>
>>> All of these changes are to the *kernel* accesses performed as part of copy
>>> to/from user, and have nothing to do with userspace, so it does not make sense
>>> to mark these as UACCESS.
>>
>> You have a point. so there is no need to modify copy_from/to_user.S in this
>> patch set.
>
> Cool, thanks. If this patch just has the extable change, that's fine by me.
>
>>> Do we *actually* need to recover from failues on these accesses? Looking at
>>> _copy_from_user(), the kernel will immediately follow this up with a memset()
>>> to the same address which will be fatal anyway, so this is only punting the
>>> failure for a few instructions.
>>
>> If recovery success, The task will be killed and there will be no subsequent
>> memset().
>
> I don't think that's true.
>
> IIUC per the last patch, in the exception handler we'll apply the fixup then
> force a signal. That doesn't kill the task immediately, and we'll return from
> the exception handler back into the original context (with the fixup applied).
>

correct.

> The structure of copy_from_user() is
>
> copy_from_user(to, from, n) {
> _copy_from_user(to, from, n) {
> res = n;
> res = raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
> if (res)
> memset(to + (n - res), 0, res);
> }
> }
>
> So when the fixup is applied and res indicates that the copy terminated early,
> there is an unconditinal memset() before the fatal signal is handled in the
> return to userspace path.

correct in this scenario.

My idea is also valuable in many other scenarios.

>
>>> If we really need to recover from certain accesses to kernel memory we should
>>> add a new EX_TYPE_KACCESS_ERR_ZERO_MC or similar, but we need a strong
>>> rationale as to why that's useful. As things stand I do not beleive it makes
>>> sense for copy to/from user specifically.
>
> [...]
>
>>>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/extable.c b/arch/arm64/mm/extable.c
>>>> index c301dcf6335f..8ca8d9639f9f 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/arm64/mm/extable.c
>>>> +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/extable.c
>>>> @@ -86,10 +86,10 @@ bool fixup_exception_mc(struct pt_regs *regs)
>>>> if (!ex)
>>>> return false;
>>>> - /*
>>>> - * This is not complete, More Machine check safe extable type can
>>>> - * be processed here.
>>>> - */
>>>> + switch (ex->type) {
>>>> + case EX_TYPE_UACCESS_ERR_ZERO:
>>>> + return ex_handler_uaccess_err_zero(ex, regs);
>>>> + }
>>>
>>> This addition specifically makes sense to me, so can you split this into a separate patch?
>>
>> According to my understanding of the above, only the modification of
>> extable.c is retained.
>>
>> So what do you mean which part is made into a separate patch?
>
> As above, if you just retain the extable.c changes, that's fine by me.

Thanks,
Tong.
>
> Thanks,
> Mark.
> .